



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines


Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>



Per. 971 d. $\frac{79}{45}$



.

.

.

CHURCH REVIEW

*For the United States Catholic,
Pro-Seminar Catholic Press,
New York, N.Y.*

EDITED BY

REV. HENRY ALAZON BATH

JANUARY, 1885

VOLUME XLV. WHOLE NUMBER CLVI

PUBLISHED QUARTERLY

IN THE UNITED STATES

PRINTED BY JAMES J. LEWIS, NEW YORK



Estey

Organ

Estey Organ Co.
Brattleboro, Vt.

The name of the "ESTEY" ORGAN SHALL BE KNOWN AS LONG
AS THE LEAF OF MANN'S BUDS SHALL BE. AMERICAN LITERARY
ILLUSTRATED CATALOGUE NO. 2700.

THE
AMERICAN
CHURCH REVIEW

*Pro Ecclesia Sancta Catholica,
Pro Sancta Catholica Fide,
Pro Sancto Dei Verbo.*


EDITED BY THE
REV. HENRY MASON BAUM

VOLUME XLV
JANUARY AND APRIL, 1885
WHOLE NUMBER CLVII .

PUBLISHED QUARTERLY
IN THE MONTHS OF
JANUARY, APRIL, JULY, AND OCTOBER

NEW YORK
THE CHURCH PRESS ASSOCIATION
1885

**COPYRIGHT, 1885, BY
THE CHURCH PRESS ASSOCIATION.**



**TROW'S
PRINTING AND BOOKBINDING COMPANY,
NEW YORK.**

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
THE AMERICAN BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER AND ITS SEVERAL STANDARD EDITIONS,	1
THE METHOD OF COMPARATIVE RELIGION,	61
THE RELATION OF ENGLISH TO AMERICAN CHURCH LAW,	78
THE PRESENT POSITION OF THE ITALIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH,	97
HERBERT SPENCER'S PLEA FOR RELIGION,	113
THE OUTLOOK OF TOLERATION,	124
THE PRAYER BOOK IN THE CONVENTION OF 1886,	176
THE PRAYER BOOK IN THE CONVENTION OF 1886,	179
MONSIGNOR CAPEL AGAIN,	202
DOCTOR JOHN FULTON TO MONSIGNOR CAPEL,	261
COMMUNION WINE—A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF SCRIPTURE WORDS, AND HISTORIC TESTIMONY,	317
AUTHORITY AND CONSCIENCE,	346
JAMES EMOTT—A MEMOIR,	359
THE RESTORATION OF CATHOLIC UNITY,	372
ANOTHER VIEW OF NATURAL LAW IN THE SPIRITUAL WORLD,	390
THE LIVES OF THE RIGHT REV. ALEXANDER JOLLY, D.D., AND OF THE RIGHT REV. GEORGE GLEIG, LL.D., F.S.S.A.,	415
THE NATIONAL CHURCH AND THE DIOCESE,	423
PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIANITY,	456
HUMAN IMMORTALITY NOT INNATE BUT CONDITIONAL,	477
THE REFORMATION, MONASTICISM, AND VOWS,	498
THE INSPIRATION OF THE BIBLE,	515
THE INSPIRATION OF THE BIBLE,	525
THE INSPIRATION OF THE BIBLE,	531
STORMONTH'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY,	540
BAPTISM FOR THE DEAD—AN EXEGESIS,	549
THE SPIRITS IN PRISON,	556
ERRATA,	594
INDEX,	595

CONTRIBUTORS TO VOLUME XLV.

HILL BURGWIN, ESQ.,	455
THE REV. JOSEPH M. CLARKE, D.D.,	530
THE REV. LEIGHTON COLEMAN, S.T.D.,	422
THE REV. GEORGE WILLIAM DOUGLAS, M.A.,	35 ⁸
THE REV. GEORGE C. FOLEY, M.A.,	123
THE REV. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, D.D.,	524
THE REV. JOHN FULTON, D.D., LL.D.,	316
THE REV. FREDERICK GIBSON, M.A.,	60
THE REV. JOHN HENRY HOPKINS, D.D.,	260
THE REV. EDWARD H. JEWETT, S.T.D.,	345
THE REV. FREDERICK S. JEWELL, Ph.D.,	497
THE REV. JOHN JOHNSON, M.A.,	175
THE REV. W. CHAUNCY LANGDON, D.D.,	389
PROF. FRANCIS A. MARCH, LL.D.,	548
THE REV. GEORGE H. MCKNIGHT, D.D.,	539
EDWARD MCCRADY, ESQ.,	414
THE REV. ROBERT J. NEVIN, D.D.,	112
CHRISTOPHER STUART PATTERSON, M.A., ESQ.,	178
THE REV. HENRY Y. SATTERLEE, D.D.,	371
THE RIGHT REVEREND GEORGE F. SEYMOUR, S.T.D., LL.D.,	514
THE HON. HUGH W. SHEFFEY,	201
CARLOS G. SMITH, M.D., LL.D.,	555
THE REV. EDWARD J. STEARNS, D.D.,	593
THE REV. PROF. J. MACBRIDE STERRETT, M.A., B.D.,	77, 476
THE REV. W. D. WILSON, D.D., LL.D.,	96

JACK LANE

Established
Twenty-seven
Years

No. 59 Carmine St., New York.

✦ SIXTH ✦ AVE. ✦ CARS ✦ PASS ✦ THE ✦ DOOR. ✦



Church Furniture

IN ALL THE DETAILS

Metal Work

RICHLY-ENGRAVED-&-CHASED-
MEMORIAL-TABLETS *.* STER-
LING-SILVER-ALMS-BASINS *.*
COMMUNION-SETS-&c. *.*

Stained Glass

NEW-AND-ORIGINAL-DE-
SIGNS-FOR-CHURCH-WIN-
DOWS-&c.—ARTISTICALLY-
DRAWN-FIGURES *.*

Wood Work

HANDSOMELY-CARVED-PRAYER-
DESKS-AND-CLERGY-STALLS *.*
PULPITS *.* LECTERNS-&c. *.*

Embroideries

ESPECIALLY-ARRANGED-FOR-
INDIVIDUAL-ORDERS *.* NEW
FORMS-OF-STOLES *.* BOOK-
MARKS-&c. *.* IN-ALL-THE-
VARIOUS-CHURCH-COLORS *.*

Dossals

MADE-FROM-IMPORTED-CLU-
NY-TAPESTRY-AND-WOVEN-
GOODS-WITH-SILK-GAL-
LOONS-&c. *.*

ILLUSTRATED ✦ CATALOGUES ✦ BY ✦ MAIL

CONTINUITY OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

THE SCHLEY LECTURES FOR 1883.

By REV. ALEXANDER V. G. ALLEN, D.D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge, Mass. 1 vol., 12mo, \$2.00.

CONTENTS.

- I. The Greek Theology.
- II. The Latin Theology.
- III. Theology in the Middle Ages.
- IV. Theology in the Age of the Reformation.
- V. Conflict of the Traditional Theology with Rationalism.
- VI. Renaissance of Theology in the Nineteenth Century.

A book of noble aim and admirable execution. It contains a careful survey of the history of religious thought since the beginning of the Christian era, and points out the disappearance of certain simple but essential features under the dominance of the Roman Church, and the reappearance of these in the nineteenth century to revolutionize the realm of religious ideas, not by the antagonisms of theology, but by the restoration of the simplicity of the early Christian days. The great value of the work as a study of religious history is even surpassed by its value as suggesting the power and vitality and breadth of the religious thought and faith which are to conquer and transform the world.

American Commonwealths.

Edited by HORACE E. SCUDDER.

Virginia. By JOHN ESTLIN COOKE.
Maryland. By WM. HEND BROWNE.

Oregon. By Rev. WILLIAM BAAROWS.
Kentucky. By Prof. N. S. SHALER.

Each volume, with Map, 16mo, gilt top, \$1.25

"It is clear that this series will occupy an entirely new place in our historical literature. Written by competent and aptly chosen authors, from fresh materials, in convenient form, and with a due regard to proportion and proper emphasis, they promise to supply most satisfactorily a positive want."
— *Boston Journal*.

American Men of Letters.

Edited by CHARLES DUDLEY WARNER.

Washington Irving. By CHARLES DUDLEY WARNER.

Noah Webster. By HORACE E. SCUDDER.

Henry D. Thoreau. By FRANK H. SANBORN.

George Ripley. By G. B. FROTHINGHAM.

Edgar Allan Poe. By G. E. WOODBERRY.

James Fenimore Cooper. By Prof. T. R. LOUNSBURY.

Margaret Fuller Ossoli. By T. W. HIGGINSON.

Ralph Waldo Emerson. By O. W. HOLMES.

John Adams. By JOHN F. MORSE, JR.

Each volume, with Portrait, 16mo, gilt top, \$1.25. Other volumes in preparation for each series.

American Statesmen.

Edited by JOHN T. MORSE, JR.

John Quincy Adams. By JOHN T. MORSE, JR.

Alexander Hamilton. By HENRY CABOT LODGE.

John C. Calhoun. By FRANK H. SANBORN.

Andrew Jackson. By Prof. W. G. SUMNER.

John Naudolph. By HENRY ADAMS.

Thomas Jefferson. By JOHN T. MORSE, JR.

Daniel Webster. By HENRY CABOT LODGE.

Albert Gallatin. By JOHN AUSTIN STEVENS.

James Madison. By SYDNEY HOWARD GAY.

John Adams. By JOHN F. MORSE, JR.

James Monroe. By FRED. D. C. GILMAN.

Each volume, 16mo, gilt top, \$1.25.

Mr. Morse and Mr. Warner, through the agency of their Boston publishers, are doing in their two long and useful series a service to the nation the extent of which, while well rewarded in a commercial sense, is doubtless the greater and more appreciated. Honest and truly important work, which does and shall distinguish the age.

Orders may be sent to the publishers, or to the author, on receipt of price by the publisher.

HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN & CO., Boston: 11 E. 17th St., New York.

SOME INTERESTING AND NOTABLE BOOKS

PUBLISHED BY

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS IN 1884.

BIOGRAPHY.

CORRESPONDENCE AND DIARIES OF JOHN WILSON CROKER. Edited by LOUIS J. JENNINGS. 2 vols., \$5.
OUR CHANCELLOR (Bismarck). By MORITZ BUCH. \$2.00.
CARLYLE IN LONDON. By J. A. FROUDE. 1 vol. \$1.50. 2 vols. \$4.
LUTHER. A Short Biography. By J. A. FROUDE. Paper, 50 cents; cloth, 75 cents.
THE LIFE OF F. D. MACRUE. 2 vols., \$5.
PETER THE GREAT. By EUGENE SCHUYLER. 2 vols., \$10.
FIFTY YEARS OBSERVATIONS. By GEN. E. D. KEYES. \$1.50.
BIOGRAPHICAL ESSAYS. By MAX MÜLLER. \$2.00.
CREATORS OF THE AGE OF STEEL. By W. T. JEANS. \$2.

RELIGION AND SCIENCE.

CREATION. By Prof. ARNOLD GUYOT. \$1.50.
TEACHINGS AND COUNSELS. By President MARK HOPKINS. \$1.50.
INTERNATIONAL COMMENTARY ON ROMANS. \$1.
PHILOSOPHIC SERIES. By Dr. McCLURE. Paper, each 50c. V. Locke's Theory of Knowledge. VI. Agnosticism of Hume and Huxley. VII. A Criticism of the Christian Philosophy.
NATIVE RELIGIONS OF MEXICO AND PERU. By Prof. ALBERT RAVILLE. \$1.50.
HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. By Dr. PHILIP SCHAFF. Vol. III. \$4.
SERMONS TO THE SPIRITUAL MAN. By Prof. W. G. T. SUEDD. \$2.50.
THE REALITY OF FAITH. By Prof. NEWMAN SMYTH. \$1.50.
QUOTATIONS IN THE NEW TESTAMENT. By Prof. C. H. TOY. \$2.50.
THE REALITY OF RELIGION. By Dr. HENRY J. VAN DYKE, Jr. \$1.

FICTION.

STORIES BY AMERICAN AUTHORS. In 5 volumes, containing stories by HENRY JAMES, C. BUNNEN, FRANK R. STOCKTON, MISS WOODSON, MRS. F. M. BERNATT, VIRGINIA W. JOHNSON, and others. Bound in cloth, 50 cents each.
THE CRIME OF HENRY VANE. By J. S. of Dule. \$1.
THE LADY, OR THE TIGER? By FRANK R. STOCKTON. \$1.
NEWPORT. By GEORGE PARSONS LATHROP. Paper, 50 cents; cloth, \$1.25.
THE KING'S MEN. By ROBERT GRANT, JOHN BOYLE O'REILLY, J. S. of Dule, &c.
WHELFRIGHT. \$1.25.
IN PARTNERSHIP. By MATTHEW and BENNER. \$1.
THE FATALITY OF TIPTON. By VIRGINIA W. JOHNSON. \$1.25.

TRAVEL AND ADVENTURE

ROUND THE WORLD. By ANDREW CARNEGIE. \$2.50.
THE SNAKE DANCE OF THE MOQUIS OF ARIZONA. By Capt. J. A. BROWN. \$1.
BERMUDA: AN IDYL OF THE SUMMER ISLANDS. By JULIA C. BROWN. \$1.
THE SILVER CASON. By MASVILLE FENN. \$1.50.

POETRY.

AIRS FROM ARCADY. By H. C. BUNNEN. \$1.25.
BALLADES AND VERSES VAIN. By ANDREW LANG. \$1.50.
THE COMPLETE POEMS OF SIDNEY LANIER. \$1.

MISCELLANEOUS.

MY HOUSE: AN IDEAL. By O. B. BUNCE. Paper, 50 cents.
THE CREOLES OF LOUISIANA. By GEORGE W. CARLE. \$2.
STUFF AND NONSENSE. By A. B. FROST. \$1.50.
COMMON SENSE CALENDAR. By MARTIN HARRMAN. \$1.
THE QUESTION OF SHIPS. By J. D. KELLEY. \$1.25.
UNITED STATES NOTES. By J. J. KNOX. \$2.50.
CONTEMPORARY SOCIALISM. By JOHN RAE. \$2.
ANCIENT EMPIRES OF THE EAST. By A. H. SAYCE. \$2.
THE DRYENNON MSS. Teachings of the Twelve Apostles. \$2.

For further information and special circulars concerning these books, apply to the publishers. They are for sale by all booksellers.

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
743-745 Broadway, New York

ON

THE OLDEST, BEST, AND CHEAPEST

MAGAZINE IN THE WORLD.

THE QUIVER

ONLY \$1.50 PER YEAR.

15 CENTS MONTHLY.

American Edition.

An Illustrated Magazine for Sunday and General Reading.

Endorsed by the clergy, it looks for subscribers in every Christian household throughout the United States. Theological articles, serial stories, shorter fiction, and illustrations, are to be found in every number.

SEND FOR PROSPECTUS—FREE ON APPLICATION.

Sample Copy sent on receipt of Ten Cents.

An Elegant Original Etching, Free,

Size, 19 x 25 inches, etched by Mr. J. A. S. MARKS,
entitled

"CROSSING THE PASTURE,"

Is presented to all subscribers to

The Magazine of Art.

PRICE, \$3.50 PER YEAR.
35 CENTS MONTHLY.

American Art interests will receive unusual attention during 1885, and European Art will not be neglected.

PROSPECTUS FREE ON APPLICATION.

Send 20 cents for Sample Copy of Magazine.

NO TOPIC OF INTEREST

For the home circle is ever lost sight of in

CASSELL'S
FAMILY MAGAZINE.

Price, 15 cts. Monthly.
\$1.50 per Year.

Such practical subjects as Household Management, Domestic Cookery, Gardening, Education, Amateur Art Work of all kinds, the Family Wardrobe, Deportment and Recreation being treated by acknowledged experts. Pure and well-selected Fiction is always plentifully provided, and the Illustrations are profuse and invariably of the best order.

PROSPECTUS FREE ON APPLICATION.

Send 10 cents for Sample Copy.

SEND TEN CENTS for Cassell & Company's New Illustrated Catalogue, pronounced "The handsomest catalogue of the year." Second edition now in press.

CASSELL & COMPANY, Limited,

739 and 741 Broadway New-York.

THE
AMERICAN
CHURCH REVIEW

*Pro Ecclesia Sancta Catholica,
Pro Sancta Catholica Fide,
Pro Sancto Dei Verbo.*

EDITED BY THE
REV. HENRY MASON BAUM

JANUARY, 1885

VOLUME XLV. WHOLE NUMBER CLVI

PUBLISHED QUARTERLY

IN THE MONTHS OF
JANUARY, APRIL, JULY, AND OCTOBER

NEW YORK
AMERICAN CHURCH REVIEW ASSOCIATION

1885

COPYRIGHT, 1885, BY
AMERICAN CHURCH REVIEW ASSOCIATION

TROW'S
PRINTING AND BOOKBINDING COMPANY,
NEW YORK.

CONTENTS.

ARTICLE	PAGE
I. THE AMERICAN BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER AND ITS SEVERAL STANDARD EDITIONS. BY THE REV. FREDERICK GIBSON, M.A.,	I
II. THE METHOD OF COMPARATIVE RELIGION. BY THE REV. PROF. J. MACBRIDE STERRETT, M.A., B.D., .	61
III. THE RELATION OF ENGLISH TO AMERICAN CHURCH LAW. BY THE REV. W. D. WILSON, D.D., LL.D., .	78
IV. THE PRESENT POSITION OF THE ITALIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH. BY THE REV. ROBERT J. NEVIN, D.D.,	97
V. HERBERT SPENCER'S PLEA FOR RELIGION. BY THE REV. GEO. C. FOLEY, M.A.,	113
VI. THE OUTLOOK OF TOLERATION. BY THE REV. JOHN JOHNSON, M.A.,	124
VII. THE PRAYER BOOK IN THE CONVENTION OF 1886. BY CHRISTOPHER STUART PATTERSON, M.A., ESQ., .	176
VIII. THE PRAYER BOOK IN THE CONVENTION OF 1886. BY THE HON. HUGH W. SHEFFEY,	179
IX. MONSIGNOR CAPEL AGAIN. BY THE REV. JOHN HENRY HOPKINS, D.D.,	202
X. DOCTOR JOHN FULTON TO MONSIGNOR CAPEL. BY THE REV. JOHN FULTON, D.D., LL D.,	261

ANNOUNCEMENT.

THE AMERICAN CHURCH REVIEW

Is published quarterly in the months of January, April, July, and October. Each quarterly number contains over three hundred pages, and forms a complete volume in itself.

Terms: \$1.00 a volume, \$3.00 a year, payable in advance.

The REVIEW discusses questions falling within the province of Religion, Ethics, Art, and Literature.

All Articles are signed by their authors, who are responsible for the views therein expressed.

Communications for the REVIEW should be addressed to the Editor, the

REV. HENRY MASON BAUM,

P. O. BOX 1839, NEW YORK.

—THE—

American Church Review

Vol. XLV.—No. 136.

JANUARY, 1885.

THE AMERICAN BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER
AND ITS SEVERAL STANDARD EDITIONS.

INTRODUCTION.

THE American Book of Common Prayer is a revised edition of the English Book of 1662, with many verbal changes, some omissions, and a few additions, but, in all other respects, the American is an exact reproduction of the English Book. It is true, indeed, that in the General Convention of 1789, which “set forth” the American Book, the House of Deputies acted throughout on the *theory* that there was no Book before it for revision, and that it was framing an entirely new Book, though in actual *fact* the English Book was revised by it; but, on the other hand, the House of Bishops, as we know, kept the English Book constantly before it, and deliberately revised that Book. If one has any doubts on this subject, it will only be necessary to examine the two Books, to see that they are the same, save in the comparatively few changes that have been made in the later revision. The Preface to our Book openly and officially

acknowledges that the American Book is a revision of the English. It affirms that "the attention of this Church was in the first place drawn to those alterations in the Liturgy [of the Church of England] which became necessary in the prayers for our Civil Rulers, in consequence of the Revolution," and then it states that "the different alterations and amendments will appear, and, it is to be hoped, the reasons of them also, upon a comparison of this with the Book of Common Prayer of the Church of England."

The General Convention also, in 1841, recommended the Printing Committee for the correction of typographical errors in the Prayer Book to consult, not only "the former standard editions of the Prayer Book, set forth under the authority of this Church," but also "the edition of the English Prayer Book printed at the University Press, Oxford, by Samuel Collingwood & Co., 1840." This Committee would scarcely have been directed to consult the English Book, if the Convention had not considered that as the source of our own Book. And at this day, the Sealed Books of 1662, and particularly the MS. Book, formerly attached to the Act of Uniformity in 1662, are usually reckoned as the Standard by which language common to both Books should be corrected.

THE AMERICAN BOOK.

Many of the changes in certain words and phrases in the American Book were evidently made with a view to the removal of what was obsolete, or in order to attain what was supposed to be a greater correctness of expression. Thus, "which" when referring to persons was changed throughout to "who," even in the Lord's Prayer, but this change had already been made in 1662, in some parts of the English Book, as in the Creeds and in the Collects. The substitution everywhere of "those who" for "they that" and "them that" does not seem to have been at all necessary, since these old expressions are quite as good English, and much more

melodious than the new ones. Indeed our American revisers appear to have been strangely insensible to the marvellous musical rhythm in the English Book. "With pity behold," in the Litany, is not as rhythmical as "Pitifully behold." "Adorable" in the *Te Deum*, though a good word in itself, has not the correct accent of its predecessor "honourable." The change in the rubric from "*meekly kneeling upon your knees*" to "*devoutly kneeling*" is to be regretted, as seeming to allow, without special rebuke, the irreverent practice, alas! too prevalent, of sitting with only one's head bowed down, even though that position could scarcely be, in God's sight, "devoutly kneeling." However, it must be admitted that architects and the Clergy are often responsible in part for this irreverence, by planning or permitting such an arrangement of the pews as that kneeling in them is well-nigh impossible. From a false sentiment of modesty, the definite word "fornication," in the Litany, was changed into the vague expression, "all inordinate and sinful affections," and the strong teaching in the *Te Deum* of "Thou didst not abhor the Virgin's womb," was altered into the weaker statement, "Thou didst humble thyself to be born of a Virgin." This American change in phraseology speaks of the Nativity only, while the expression in the English Book calls attention to the profounder humility of the Incarnation. Indeed the entire verse, as Blunt has recently shown, might be more accurately given as follows: "When thou tookest upon Thee mankind to deliver the world: Thou didst not abhor the Virgin's womb." This American reading in the *Te Deum*, and the garbled *Venite*, had before appeared in a work, published in London, in 1734, entitled "The Book of Common Prayer, revised, corrected, and enlarged, by Way of Specimen," and these changes may have been copied from it. In the curious pamphlet just mentioned, that verse in the *Te Deum* had been altered so as to read, "Thou submittedst to be born of a pure Virgin." No doubt, from this change of language was deriyed the further modification which was adopted in the Proposed Book, "Thou didst humble

thyself to be born of a pure Virgin." From the Proposed Book this phraseology was received into the American Book, with only the single excision of the word "pure" before "Virgin," an omission somewhat remarkable. The alterations prepared by the Royal Commissioners in 1689 had also, unfortunately, a marked influence on the American revision, as may be seen by the laudatory reference to them in the Preface of our Book. To the suggestions in 1689 may be traced, among other things, the omission of the *Magnificat* and the *Nunc Dimittis*, and the placing of the *Jubilate* before the *Benedictus*, changes which have been wisely rectified in the Book Annexed. But, much as we may regret many of these verbal changes and omissions in the American Book, as unnecessary and as imperfections, we must thankfully admit that the great improvement in our Eucharistic office by the addition to it of *The Oblation* and *The Invocation* from the Scotch Book, more than counterbalances these other blemishes. When we remember the low view prevailing here last century respecting the *historical* continuity of the Church and its worship, the prejudice against Bishops in a republican country, as though they must necessarily be of the nobility and form a House of Lords, and for how many hundreds of years, Church people in America had been deprived of the fatherly presence and government of Bishops among them, we may well be thankful that the integrity of the Faith and of liturgical worship has been so well preserved for us in our now venerable and beloved American Prayer Book. In the Proposed Book, which in God's merciful Providence was never adopted by this Church, a sad lowering of Catholic tone had been shown. In that hasty book the Athanasian and Nicene Creeds had been displaced, and an Article of the Apostles' Creed omitted. *Priest* everywhere had been changed to *Minister*. The important word "regenerate" had been dropped in the Baptismal and Confirmation Offices, and the inspired Book of the Psalms mutilated by the omission of quite one-third of the entire book. One short sentence from the Preface of each will prove the

great advance in Churchly tone and breadth of our Adopted Book over the Book Proposed to us only four years before. In the Proposed Book it was affirmed: "It is far from the intention of this Church to depart from the Church of England, any farther than local circumstances require, or to deviate in any thing essential to the true meaning of the Thirty-nine Articles." *Sic!* In our present Book, we declare "that this Church is far from intending to depart from the Church of England in any essential point of doctrine, discipline, or worship; or further than local circumstances require," a statement which is very different from the former one. The American Daughter, as a reformed branch of the Holy Catholic Church in this country, is thus at one in her authorised Prayer Book with her English Mother, in every "essential point of doctrine, discipline, or worship," and while she openly professes the ancient Faith of Christendom, she tacitly accepts with the English Church the truly primitive Rule for Teaching set forth in a Decree of Convocation of 1571, that "Preachers shall, in the first place, be careful never to teach anything from the pulpit, to be religiously held and believed by the people, but what is agreeable to the doctrine of the Old or the New Testament, and collected out of that doctrine by the Catholic Fathers and Ancient Bishops." This Decree should have the greater weight with some among us, as having been ordered by that same Convocation which subscribed the "Articles of Religion" in the form finally adopted by the Church of England, and inherited by us in America.

THE TITLE, "PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL."

Another important alteration in our American Prayer Book, necessitated in part by the war for Independence and by our successful separation from England, was the change of title from "The Church of England" to one that should better mark our independent character. The title that was accepted, "The Protestant Episcopal

Church in the United States of America," is in many respects an unfortunate one, and at present is a decided misnomer. This title was rather received than selected, for it does not appear to have been adopted by any formal vote of the General Convention. It seems to have been *first* suggested in Maryland, at a meeting of three clergymen and twenty-four laymen, in Chestertown, November 9, 1780. From a letter to Bishop Claggett, we learn that, at this Convention in 1780, the Rev. James Jones Wilmer "moved that the Church of England, as heretofore so known in the province, be now called The Protestant Episcopal Church, and it was so adopted." The other two clergymen were Dr. William Smith and Mr. Samuel Keene. The term Protestant Episcopal, as the Rev. Dr. Brand has recently shown, from "A Character of the Province of Maryland," by George Alsop, had long before been in common use in Maryland as an expression to define Church people, certainly as early as 1666. In Chapter II. of Alsop's pamphlet, first printed in London, in 1666, he says: "Here the *Roman Catholick* and the *Protestant Episcopal* (whom the world would persuade have proclaimed open Wars irrevocably against each other) contrarywise concur in an unanimous parallel of friendship and inseparable love intangled into one another," etc. The designation "Protestant Catholick" had also been in use there, in a similar way, for in March, 1642, a petition was presented to the Assembly by David Wickliff, "in the name of the Protestant Catholicks of Maryland." By this expression Churchmen were evidently meant, who were thus contradistinguished from *Roman* Catholics on the one hand, and from Puritans on the other. The title Protestant Episcopal was next acknowledged in a "Declaration of Rights" put forth in Maryland, at a Convention of the Clergy, held at Annapolis, August 13, 1783. In it they say: "We, the Clergy of the Protestant Episcopal Church of Maryland (heretofore denominated the Church of England, as by Law established)," etc. And a year later, the Convention held at Chester, Maryland, October 26, 1784, was formally entitled "A Convention of the Clergy and Lay-

Delegates of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the State of Maryland." In New York, a voluntary gathering of Clergy and Laymen, October 6 and 7, 1784, was called "A Convention of Clergymen and Lay Deputies of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America." And yet, in the first and second articles of the Constitution then adopted, this Church is there called simply "the Episcopal Church," "in the United States," or "in each State." It was in accordance with the recommendations and proposals of this meeting in New York, in 1784, that our first *General* Convention was called in 1785. In Philadelphia, at a meeting of Clergy and Lay Deputies, May 24, 1785, it was "determined and declared that the said Clergy and Congregations shall be called and known by the name of *The Protestant Episcopal Church* in the State of Pennsylvania." Such was the action in sundry of the States respecting the title of the Church here in this country. However, in the first General Convention, held in Philadelphia in September and October, 1785, there was no formal vote or action with respect to the title of this Church, so far as the records show, but that title which had been already adopted in Maryland and Pennsylvania, and received in New York, New Jersey, and Virginia, seems to have been tacitly accepted here, for on the evening of the second day, Wednesday, September 28th, it was "Resolved, That a Committee, to be composed as aforesaid, prepare and report a draft of an Ecclesiastical Constitution for *The Protestant Episcopal Church* in the United States of America." This new title, thus indirectly assumed by the General Church in 1785, was next officially printed on the title-page of the Proposed Book, and finally, in October, 1789, it was published in our Adopted Book, then set forth and established. This title, Protestant Episcopal, the history and reception of which I have thus briefly sketched, is a most unfortunate one, in that it does not distinctly assert our historical heritage as a Reformed Branch of the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church, but seems rather to affiliate this Church with sundry Christian Societies, who do not acknowledge "a certain faith,"

and "a lawful" ministry. Whatever may have been its meaning when first assumed, it is now an uncertain and misleading title, for "Protestant" has come to be in Europe and in this country too often only a synonym for heretical, and "Episcopal" no longer defines an Apostolic Office, since it has been officially adopted by certain Christian Bodies, who openly repudiate the three-fold ministry of Christ's Church—Bishops, Priests, and Deacons. Without doubt, many of our people, from association, and from its continued use, are sincerely attached to this title, but an increasing number among us is beginning to perceive that it is a misnomer, and an injury to our work and growth as an Apostolic Church; and when this knowledge increases and becomes well-nigh universal among our members, the General Convention, it is to be hoped, will unanimously drop this modern negative title, and grant us our true historical name as the "American Catholic Church," in the United States of America.

OMISSION OF THE "KYRIE" AND THE LORD'S PRAYER.

One omission in the American Book must be specially mentioned as an irreparable loss to us, and that is the excision after the Creed in the Daily Offices of the *Kyrie*, or three-fold petitions, "Lord, have mercy upon us. *Christ, have mercy upon us.* Lord, have mercy upon us," and of the Lord's Prayer. Probably this second Lord's Prayer was thought by our revisers to be simply an idle repetition, and it was on that account omitted. But Blunt, Freeman, and others have shown that the Lord's Prayer, as used after the Creed, "has a different intention from that with which it was used at the opening of the Service, and is by no means to be looked upon as an accidental repetition arising from the condensation of several shorter services into one longer. In the former place it was used with reference to the Service of Praise and Prayer in which the Church is engaged. Here it is used with reference to the necessities of the Church for the coming day or night; preceding

the detailed prayers of the versicles which follow, and of the Collects which make up the remainder of the Service." A writer in *The Church Quarterly Review* for July last, wisely says on this subject: "The whole Office may be said to have grown out of, or radiated from, or been crystallised round the Central *Pater Noster*, the erasure of which is, therefore, to a liturgical mind, simply intolerable, whether dictated by a fanciful dread of repetition—if anything will bear repetition surely the Lord's Prayer will—or by any impatient aim at shortening, or by whatever motive. Certainly if one must go, we had far rather it were the opening and introductory use of the Lord's Prayer in the Daily Office, which anciently was said *secreto*, and not its solemn use as the crown and climax of the Office, to which all that goes before leads up, out of which grows, and on which hangs all that follows." Surely we may hopefully demand that this important "gem" shall be restored to our book, with as little delay as possible.

The Black-letter Saints' Days of the English Book are connected with the Church's earliest history, and their erasure in the American Book is to be regretted, as "involving the sacrifice of a very important witness to the historic continuity of the Reformed with the Earlier Church."

The Burial Office of the Church was manifestly composed for use over those who have been made Christians by Holy Baptism, and who look for Christian Resurrection hereafter. Accordingly, a rubric in that Office in the English Book orders that it "is not to be used for any that die unbaptised." In the Proposed Book, this limitation was strangely removed, and that Office could there be used for the unbaptised as well as the baptised! In the American Book, the rubric was again altered, and it directs that "the Office ensuing is not to be used for any unbaptised adults." This change is in some respects a worse one than that in the Proposed Book. The rubric as worded in our Book would almost seem to imply that Baptism is not necessary for infants, but only for adults, an inference which would be directly con-

trary to the teaching of our Baptismal Offices. On this change in the American rubric, an English reviewer has recently remarked: "The American Church thus teaches all but explicitly that it is all one whether souls are or are not members of the Body of Christ, which none can be without Baptism, and that the same words of hope of *the same* resurrection, and the same glorious resurrection lesson, are applicable to baptised and unbaptised alike, if not adults. This is utterly unscriptural. The New Testament phrases to 'be *in Christ*,' to 'be Christ's,' or to 'sleep *in Him*,' have a perfectly definite meaning, and point to a distinct 'resurrection,' different both in time and character from the general resurrection of the uncovenanted saved and lost. We are very far indeed from saying that 'those that are without' are all necessarily lost; but we do think it a very grave thing to blur the New Testament distinction between them and the 'Saints.' . . . Possibly there is need of some special office for the burial of the unbaptised, whether children or others, which should be charitable, kindly, and reverent, dwelling on the general truths of religion, but not, as in the nature of the case it can never be, distinctively Christian in its reference to the deceased." By all means, the old rubric of the English Book should be restored to the American Burial Office.

In the Calendar of Lessons sundry changes were made by Bishop White for the Proposed Book, and these were received into the American Book with scarcely any further alteration. There are no *Second* Proper Lessons in the English Book for Sundays and Holy-days, and the introduction of these into our Book was somewhat of an innovation. Proper Lessons were given for the twenty-seventh Sunday after Trinity. This last addition was probably due to the fact that only the year before, in 1788, there had been twenty-seven Sundays after Trinity, and no Proper Lessons for that Day. The same thing had occurred a few years previously, in 1780, and would soon again occur, in 1799. A Proper Lesson for that day was not added in the Eng-

lish Book till 1871. With respect to *Second* Proper Lessons for the festivals, Blunt says: "The accidental combination of the fixed cycle of Proper Lessons with the variable one of the Second Lessons sometimes throws a wonderful flood of light upon both the Old and New Testament Scripture; and it may be doubted whether any equal advantage would be gained by the substitution of Proper Lessons from the latter for the present system of reading it in order." The Lessons generally were shortened in the American Book, and accordingly the Gospels and Acts are to be read through only twice in a year, instead of three times, as before. The Apocrypha was omitted from the Daily Calendar, but it was still retained on some of the Saints' Days. In our new Calendar of Lessons the Apocrypha has been wisely restored, at least in part, to the Daily Lessons for November.

Our American revisers seem to have thought that in this new Western country we should never be able to chant The Psalter, and so it was printed in the American Book without the musical colon, and the clause from the English Book, "pointed as they are to be sung or said in churches," was dropped from our title-page. The Book Annexed has restored the colon, but, instead of restoring also this clause to its place on the title-page, it has there very strangely omitted any reference whatsoever to the Psalter. This is to be regretted, for the Psalter has ever been considered as the principal feature in the Choir offices, and it is an integral part of the Prayer Book; and in the American Book its title has always closed our Table of Contents.

THE SEVEN STANDARD BOOKS.

The General Convention directs, from time to time, by Canon, which particular edition of the Prayer Book shall be the Standard Book, by which all editions shall be corrected, and to which all are to conform. There have been, thus far, six different "Standard" editions, *so named by Canon*, and these were published respec-

tively in the years of our Lord, 1793, 1822, 1832, 1838, 1845, and the last in 1871. To these six Standard editions, so entitled by Canonical authority, must necessarily be added our *editio princeps*, in 1790, and thus there have been *seven* editions, each one of which was for a time the Standard Book. There are, besides, Standard copies of various offices, usually bound up, and of equal authority, with the Prayer Book, to wit: The Standard of "The Ordination Offices," a royal quarto volume, New York, Hugh Gaine, 1793, containing only thirty-five printed pages; the Standard of "Articles of Religion," a small octavo pamphlet, New York, T. & J. Swords, 1802; and the Standard of "An Office of Institution," an octavo pamphlet, New York, Swords, 1808. The Standard of "The Prayer for Convention," adopted in 1799, would seem to be the copy printed, by order of the Convention, at the end of the original "Journal of the General Convention of 1799," or it may have been printed *after* the "Form of Consecration of a Church or Chapel," adopted also in 1799, a Standard edition of which was probably set forth at that time, though there is no order for such in the Journal of that year. It is desirable, also, for reference, to possess copies of the stereotyped editions of the Prayer Book, which were altered into Standards, where there have been such. As a complete collection of these Standards and Pre-Standards (if I may coin a word for use in a special sense), is a great rarity, and the writer, after many years' search, partly through purchase and partly through gift, has fortunately been able to acquire all of them, he purposes, for the information of those less fortunate, to give a short account of them, with some of their peculiarities, and the more important corrections or changes in them.

THE FIRST STANDARD IN 1790.

Our first American Prayer Book, as set forth by the General Convention in October, 1789, is a small duodecimo volume, published in Philadelphia, in August,

1790, by Hall & Sellers. This firm was the successor of Franklin & Hall, and "The Newest Printing Office" on the board over their door, which remained in that position until 1814, was placed there originally by Benjamin Franklin. The unfortunate Proposed Book had also been published by Hall & Sellers. This *editio princeps* of 1790 is a carefully printed book, on good paper, with two columns to a page, and with a line between the columns, and has very few typographical errors in it. As in English Prayer Books of that time, the pages of it are not numbered, except in the Psalms in Metre, where a separate title-page is given, and the pages are marked by Arabic numbers, in all 221 (iii) pp. The Committee appointed by the Convention of 1789 to superintend the printing of this Book, consisted of Bishop White, Rev. Doctors Smith, Magaw, and Blackwell, and Messrs. Hopkinson and Coxe. They were instructed, "besides a full and complete edition of the said book, printed in folio or octavo, or in both, to have an edition published, to contain only the parts in general use and the Collects of the day, with references to the Epistles and Gospels." But notwithstanding this instruction, *complete* editions of this Book in *folio* or *octavo* were not published, so far as I can learn.

The chief peculiarities in our first Standard are as follows: In reading under A Table of Fasts, "The Season of Lent," instead of "The Forty Days of Lent;" in printing "He descended into Hell," of the Apostles' Creed—in the Morning and the Evening Prayer, in the Catechism, and in The Visitation of the Sick—in brackets and in italics; and in putting in *small capitals* the entire phrase "WHICH WE NOW OFFER UNTO THEE," in the Oblation of the Prayer of Consecration. The printing of this last phrase in capital letters was in a direct following of the later Scotch Books since 1755, and of Bishop Seabury's Communion-Office of 1786. In both of these Books, the entire sacred phrases, "THIS IS MY BODY," "THIS IS MY BLOOD," and the important word "DO" in "Do this," were printed in capitals, and in our Book of 1790, though the capitals *throughout* were omitted, yet each of

these phrases *began* with a capital letter. This *capital* "T" and "D" of our first and second Standards, ought still to be our reading, for they were never changed by authority, but a small "t" and "d" have crept into our later Standards from stereotyped editions, in which these letters were thus changed by a printer's mistake, and which afterwards became Standards, with or without other corrections, the small t being tacitly introduced in the Standard of 1822 from an edition of 1818, and the small "d" in the Standard of 1832 from an edition of 1831. "This is my Body—Blood," had also been printed in capital letters in a folio *English* Prayer Book, London, Norton & Bill, 1627. In like manner, from the Scotch Books we have inherited the more correct position of the reference-letter to the marginal Rubric (e) in the Prayer of Consecration, it being placed *before*, and not after, the word "This." In the Churching of Women, the *Doxology* to the Lord's Prayer, which had been added in the English Book in 1661, was *omitted* in the American (!). On the other hand, at the beginning of the Office of the Holy Communion, the *Doxology* was *added* in our Book. In the Book Annexed, it is wisely proposed again to omit this *Doxology*.

In our first Standard of 1790, sundry changes that had been adopted in the Proposed Book, seem unconsciously to have been reproduced. Thus, before the Prayer of Absolution, wherever it occurred, the word Priest, in accordance with the English Book, was carefully preserved, yet this retention was overlooked in the Offices at Sea, and in The Visitation of Prisoners, in both of which, as taken from the Proposed Book, the word *Minister* was continued in that position, evidently by an oversight, since this was afterwards corrected *by authority*, in the Standards of 1822 and 1838. The *Gloria Patri* was omitted after the Easter Canticle, "Christ our Passover," as in the Proposed Book, and it has never been restored to our Book (!).

It seems strange that our fathers, who could introduce into the American Book, from Bishop Jeremy Taylor, that beautiful prayer with those strong words, "in the

Communion of the Catholic Church," should have accepted from the Proposed Book, in the Prayer for All Conditions of Men, the change to that general expression of the Litany, "thy holy Church universal," for the grand old wording of the English Book, "the good estate of the Catholick Church." Fortunately we have preserved for us in Dr. Smith's correspondence the reasons which at first led to this sad change, and to us who are now outliving those earlier prejudices, and would fain cherish, in every way, our historical continuity and our orthodox Catholic heritage, the special pleading here used appears very weak. Dr. Smith thus writes to Dr. White, October, 1785: "The words 'Good Estate of the Catholic Church,' have been objected to by our Convention here [in Maryland, probably through Dr. Smith's influence], 1st, *because* 'good estate' may be considered in a worldly sense, and if taken in any other is but an awkward or *antiquated* expression—and 2dly, the word 'Catholic' although *intelligible enough* to many, yet it is not approved of by many others, on account of the vulgar Application of it to one particular *Church*." And again in another letter he says that the change to "thy holy Church universal," would rid "us of the exceptionable word to many, viz., 'Catholic,' and also the awkward words 'Good Estate of the Church,' by which some will say we mean good *Glebes* and Salaries or *Estate* merely temporal." If these are the only objections to the ancient phrase, by all means let it be restored at once to our Book. The shallow reasoning here given reminds one of a change advocated by Dr. Smith, and *actually adopted* in the Proposed Book (!). He writes: "At the end of Morning and Evening Prayer, viz., 'Here endeth the Order of Morning [Evening] Prayer'—Dele words 'Order of'—lest it should be implied that something might yet be prayed which is *disorderly*" (!!). The title of "The Psalter," at the *head* of each page of the Psalms, is a marked peculiarity of our American Book, though in accordance with ancient usage, and this page-title, I regret to say, it is proposed in the Book Annexed to abandon for a needless repetition of the

number of the Psalm, in imitation of the *modern* Irish Book. The word "again" was strangely dropped in the Apostles' Creed after the word "rose." In the Visitation of the Sick, the ancient Interrogative Creed of the English Church was omitted, and the ordinary Declarative Creed, in an interrogative form, was put in its stead, but this *was carefully corrected* in the Second Standard. A Table of the Days on which Easter will fall, adjusted for two cycles of the moon, from 1786 to 1823, inclusive, was taken from the Proposed Book, and this had been *abbreviated* by Bishop White, as he states in a letter to Dr. Smith, February 1, 1786, "agreeably to Dr. Franklin's Book," which, he tells us, "has ye said Tables in ye neatest Way of any I have seen." There is a copy of Dr. Franklin's Book in the Congressional Library at Washington, and in Bishop Stevens' library in Philadelphia. It was the joint work of Sir Francis Dashwood, (Baron le Despenser) and Dr. Benjamin Franklin. Its title is "Abridgement of the Book of Common Prayer, . . . London. Printed in the year MDCCLXXIII." In the new cycles, prepared by Bishop White, as he informs us, he had the mortification afterward to find, that in four instances, his computations were inaccurate, and these errors were in the years 1808, 1817, 1818, and 1819. A new Office for the Visitation of Prisoners, derived from the Irish Book, and a Form of Prayer and Thanksgiving, both of these copied from the Proposed Book, and Family Prayers for Morning and Evening, abridged from Bishop Gibson's Form, were introduced into the American Book. Additional Prayers and Thanksgivings were put after the Daily Morning and Evening Prayer, and in the Office of the Visitation of the Sick, and these were taken from the writings of Bishop Taylor, as is mentioned in a letter from Bishop White to Bishop Brownell, a copy of which is in my possession. Tate & Brady's New Version of the Psalms of David, and twenty-seven Hymns were adopted. The Ordinal, and Articles of Religion were not at first admitted into our Book, and the prose part of it ended with the Psalter. In the Office for Holy Matri-

mony, the form, "I *M.* take thee *N.*," was adopted, after the English Books of that date, instead of the original form, "I *N.* take thee *N.*," as given in the Sealed Books. The earliest Prayer Book in which I have noticed this change is a folio edition, Cambridge, Joseph Bentham, 1757, a copy of which is preserved in Christ Church, Cambridge, in this country. In like manner, in Psalm 68.4, of the Psalter, the later form "JAH" was given, where the Sealed Books have "Yea." This change probably began early in the eighteenth century. I have seen the form "Jah" in different Oxford editions, as early as 1701, 1703, and 1715, and the present full form "JAH" in a folio, Oxford, John Baskett, 1718. There was a slight typographical error in the Preface in the word "places" for "place," in the phrase quoted from the English Preface, "those who are in place of authority," and this remained uncorrected till the Book Annexed. A remarkable error, in the insertion of a wrong question and answer at the Receiving of Infants, in the Private Baptism of Children, continued in our Book till ordered to be omitted by the General Convention of 1832.

PECULIARITIES INHERITED FROM OLD ENGLISH EDITIONS.

The different editions of the English Prayer Book, as published by the University Press of Oxford or of Cambridge, and by the Queen's Printers at London, Edinburgh, or Dublin, differ somewhat from one another in spelling and typography, even at the present day, and much more during the last century. Thus the Oxford editions, following therein the Sealed Books, in the Gospel for Septuagesima Sunday, generally have "peny" with one n; in the Epistle for Sexagesima, they have "journeying;" and in that for Quinquagesima, "no charity;" but the Cambridge and London editions, in accordance with the Manuscript Book, usually have "penny," "journeyings," and "not charity." The present Cambridge editions, in Psalm 107.27, in the phrase

“wits end,” have the apostrophe *after* the s, while the Oxford and London editions, and our Bibles have it *before* the s. Now our American Book of 1790, being a revision of the English Book, it would be interesting and important to us, if we could know certainly what particular edition or editions were used in preparing our Book, and of what year or years. There are peculiar readings in the American Book, many of which have continued to the present time, and most of these, particularly in the Psalter, may be found in London editions by Mark Baskett, near the close of the last century, as may be seen by examining the folio edition of the same, in 1766, still preserved in the Sacristy of Christ Church, Philadelphia, and an octavo edition in 1765, in my own possession. If one will examine English Prayer Books of the last century, he will find that they almost all read in the Lord’s Prayer, “*and* the Power,” and in the General Thanksgiving Prayer “they *may* shew,” instead of • “the Power,” and “they shew,” as they now read, in accordance with the Manuscript Book and the Sealed Books. This proves that the “and” and the “may” were not changes intentionally made in our Book, but were inherited as typographical errors. The “may” was omitted in our Book in 1871, but the “and” is still needlessly retained. The Doxology, and with this wording, “The power,” was added to the Lord’s Prayer, for the first time, in the original Scotch Book of 1637, and from that it was introduced into the English Book in 1662.

The marginal note to the Prayer for Christ’s Church Militant, in the present English Prayer Books, rightly reads, after the Sealed Books, “*If there be no alms or oblations, then shall the words* [of accepting our alms and oblations] *be left out unsaid.*” In the American Book, after the Proposed Book, in this note, the phrase “[of accepting]” is printed “[to accept],” and the word “*out*” is omitted before “*unsaid.*” It is possible this was an intentional change, but as that same reading is to be found in a few old English Prayer Books of the last century, particularly in Cambridge editions, as in

1797 and 1813, it is more likely that the American form is a copy of a misprint, and should therefore be corrected. The original language "[of accepting]," dating from 1552, is certainly the more correct phraseology, since it seems to suggest such a division of the phrase as may be requisite, just as though the note said in full, if there are no alms, the words "alms and" are to be left out; and if there be no oblations, the words "and oblations." It is proper to add that in the American Book, in this note, the exact phrase of the text, as given in brackets, is quoted in the note even to the word "and" after "oblations," and this "and" is not found in this note in any old English books which I have examined. However, the "and" might show only an attempt to correct a supposed inaccuracy in the Book copied, and could scarcely prove that the American reading was an intentional change from that of the Standard English Books.

In the English Book, the ancient terms "Mattins" and "Evensong" had always been in use in connection with the Proper Lessons for Sundays and Holy-days, and with the Proper Psalms. These short and expressive old titles were strangely omitted in the American Book, after the Proposed Book, and "Morning" and "Evening" substituted for them. There could scarcely have been any valid objection to their use, for they are both of them ancient terms, and "Evensong" is distinctively an *Anglican* use. It is possible, however, that their omission may have been a typographical error after an old English Book, for Stephens (vol. i., p. ccxx) calls attention to a Cambridge edition of 1816 in which "Morning" and "Evening" had been printed in their stead, and I have myself observed the same in copies of the Cambridge Press in 1813 and 1815; and besides, the American Book has adopted that same short form of the Cambridge Book, "Morning" and "Evening," where "Mattins" and "Evensong" had been, and not the full title "Morning Prayer," "Evening Prayer," as it is given in the Daily Calendar, in both the English and American Books. It is to be hoped that these good

old words, "Mattins" and "Evensong," may be speedily restored to us in our American Book.

A minute examination of the different English editions between 1790 and 1810, as of the Oxford University Press, for instance, will show very many slight verbal and typographical corrections, and these corrections are in keeping, so far as I can learn, with the reading of the Manuscript Book annexed to the Act of Uniformity in 1662. Thus, among other things, Psalm 119 is *now* numbered in all English Books in continuous verses from 1 to 176, in conformity to that Manuscript Book, and not in sections of eight verses each, as it was given in the books of last century, after the Sealed Books, and as we have wrongly inherited. These inspired alphabetical divisions of eight verses are sufficiently marked by their appropriate Latin headings, so that it is to be hoped we may soon have this Psalm numbered in our Book also, in continuous verses, for ready reference to them.

TWO IMPRESSIONS OF THE FIRST EDITION.

There have been at least two impressions of our first edition, and both of these, so far as one can learn, were printed in the year 1790 only. In my own copy of the *editio princeps* of 1790, which I may call a *prima impressio*, the Second Morning Lesson in the Calendar for November 29 reads, "Acts 10 *to* v. 31," following in this the Proposed Book of 1786, instead of "*to* v. 34," as in several other copies of 1790 which have been examined. "To v. 34" is the correct reading in the Second Standard in 1793, and it had been correctly printed also, even in my copy, in the parallel Lesson for May 29, where again the Proposed Book had read "*to* v. 31."

A SECOND EDITION OF THE FIRST STANDARD.

There is a second edition of our First Book, printed in Philadelphia in 1791, by the same publishers, Hall &

Sellers. This is also a duodecimo volume, but a little less in size than the first edition, and in somewhat smaller type, but corresponds almost exactly, page for page, to the former edition.

There are, however, some decided typographical and verbal changes in this second edition in 1791. The Lesson in the Calendar for November 29 is of course corrected. In the beginning of the sixth paragraph of The Preface, the word "aforesaid" is inserted, and the clauses are transposed as follows: "In consequence of the aforesaid resolution, the attention of this Church was, in the first place, drawn to those alterations in the liturgy which became necessary in the prayers for our civil rulers." The edition of 1790 concludes after the Hymns with the words: "*End of the PRAYER BOOK,*" and this had also been the conclusion in the Proposed Book, but the edition of 1791 and the Second Standard of 1793 both close simply with the usual expression, "THE END." No doubt this change was made at the suggestion of Bishop White, for in his Memoirs, and in his Report to the General Convention of 1821, he calls attention to the fact that the Prayer Book proper ends with the Psalter, and not with the Hymns. Certain instructions, also, of the General Convention of 1820 declare: "2. That the Book of Common Prayer be distinguished from the Book of Psalms in Metre, the Articles of Religion, and Sundry Offices set forth by this Church, . . . all which are of equal authority with the Book of Common Prayer, but which, when bound up with it, ought not to appear as parts thereof."

The entire phrase, "WHICH WE NOW OFFER UNTO THEE," was printed in this edition of 1791, as in that of 1790, in small capitals, and continued to be so printed in impressions of this edition, even up to the year 1800, and perhaps to a later date (!). "He descended into Hell," in the Creed, was uniformly printed with *brackets*, but the *italics* in this edition of 1791, in that phrase, varied with different impressions. A copy in the Whittingham Library has "He descended into Hell" in italics in the

Morning *and* the Evening Prayer only, and in ordinary type in the Catechism, and in the Visitation of the Sick. My own copy of this second edition has it in italics in the *Morning* Prayer only. In most of the other copies which have been examined, the italics are in the *Evening* Prayer only. In Dr. Harison's copy, it is not in italics anywhere, though the brackets are continued, as in all the other copies. A separate edition of The Catechism, octavo, Philadelphia, Z. Poulson, Jr., M DCC XCII., has that phrase in brackets, but not in italics. The Second Standard of 1793 omitted the brackets as well as the italics.

The Second Standard follows this second edition of 1791. There are other slight changes from the edition of 1790 in that of 1791, which, since they appear also in the Second Standard of 1793, would lead one to infer that this edition of 1791, rather than the *editio princeps* of 1790, was followed in the Standard of 1793. Thus, in Psalm 73.18, "Oh" of 1790, was changed to "O" in 1791 and 1793, and this change continues through our present Standard of 1871, though in the Book Annexed it is proposed to change the spelling back again to "Oh." In Psalm 38.4, "burden" was altered to "burthen," and this spelling continued till the Standard of 1845. In the Confession at Sea, "burden" was altered, in like manner, to "burthen," and this alteration continued till the Standard of 1838. In Psalm 114.7, the commas before and after "thou earth" were omitted in the edition of 1791, probably by an oversight, and they continued to be wanting till the Standard of 1845. In Psalm 56.3, "sometime" was printed "sometimes," and that change remained till the Standard of 1845. In the Table of Contents, in "The Ministration of Private Baptism of Children, in Houses," a comma was inserted after "Children," in the edition of 1791, and the comma continues to the present time. The only special change made in the edition of 1791, so far as has been observed, which was *not* followed in the Second Standard of 1793, was in the peculiar transposition of the first clauses of the sixth paragraph of the Preface.

FOLIO AND QUARTO "PARTIAL" EDITIONS OF THE FIRST STANDARD.

Besides the two duodecimo *full* editions of 1790 and 1791, by Hall & Sellers, in Philadelphia, there are reprints in folio and quarto (and perhaps in octavo also) of "the *parts* in general use," as ordered by the General Convention of 1789. It is only within the last year that the writer has been able either to hear of, or to see, any of these *partial* editions. They include the Calendar of the Lessons, The Morning and The Evening Prayer, The Litany, The Occasional Prayers and Thanksgivings, The Communion Office, A Form of Prayer and Thanksgiving, The Ten Selections of Psalms, Selections for Holy-Days, and a few of the Hymns. These partial editions were evidently printed with the intention of their being inserted in old English Prayer Books then in use. And we find that they were actually so used in many of the older parishes of our land. In S. John's Parish, Baltimore and Harford Counties, Md., there is a folio copy of an English Prayer Book, Oxford, John Baskett, 1718, in good preservation, in which is inserted and bound up with it, a *folio* edition of "the parts in general use" of our *first* American Prayer Book, and in common with that first Standard, it has "He descended into Hell" in *italics* and brackets, and the phrase "WHICH WE NOW OFFER UNTO THEE" in capital letters throughout. Similar old folio English Prayer Books, with this American folio partial edition bound up with them, or pasted in them, are to be found at Christ Church, Boston; Christ Church, Cambridge; and S. John's Church, Portsmouth, N. H. A unique copy of this *folio* partial edition—corresponding exactly in the portions given, in typography and spelling, to the *duodecimo* Standard editions of 1790 and 1791, in its original blue paper cover, and containing sixty-four printed pages—may be seen in the Rector's library of the late Dr. Edson, at Lowell, Mass. A copy also of the *quarto* partial edition is preserved in the American Antiquarian

Library, at Worcester, Mass., and this copy was given to that library by the famous early printer Isaiah Thomas, who was called by Franklin the Baskerville of America, and he affirmed that it had been printed by the old firm of Thomas & Andrews. These partial editions have no name or date on them. It is doubtful whether an *octavo* partial edition was ever published, as no copy of it is known to be preserved. In one of the folio English Prayer Books, at Christ Church, Boston, a portion of the *full* folio American Book of 1795 is inserted, together with a portion of the *partial* folio, corresponding to the edition of 1790. In both the folio and quarto partial editions, the Lesson for November 29 is correctly printed, "*to v. 34.*"

THE SECOND STANDARD, IN 1793.

The Second Standard Prayer Book is an octavo edition, ordered by the General Convention of 1792, and published in New York, by Hugh Gaine, in 1793. This is a most important Standard, for it is the first that was so named by Canon, to wit, Canon III. of 1801, and it was published with an authentication of it in these words, "By the Direction of the General Convention," placed at the foot of its title-page. In the General Convention of 1792, a joint committee was appointed—consisting of Bishops Seabury and White, Rev. Dr. Magaw, and Dr. Benjamin Moore, afterward Bishop of New York, Rev. Mr. Jarvis, afterward Bishop of Connecticut, and Colonel Ogden, John DeHart, Esq., and Dr. Hindman—who were directed "to compare the printed edition of the Book of Common Prayer with the original acts of the last General Convention," and their report was considered "by paragraphs," and, "with amendments," was passed by both houses. A joint committee, composed of Bishop Provoost, Rev. Drs. Moore and Beach, and Dr. Johnson, was also appointed "to superintend the printing a correct edition of the Common Prayer Book." We may, therefore, conclude that this edition represents the matured

views of our American revisers. It is printed in clear, large type, but has very many typographical errors. In it the brackets and italics in the Apostles' Creed, in "He descended into hell," are both removed. This change was evidently made by special order of the Convention of 1792, but it seems to have been only a compromise, or "some such composition," as Bishop White calls it, and does not fully meet the original intention of the House of Bishops, which designed *the rubric* to be merely "explanatory," as we gather from Bishop White, and not permissive of an omission *or* a substitution, and, therefore, neither brackets nor italics would be required in the text of the Creed. Through the wise action of our Bishops in the last General Convention, a further correction was made in this matter, in the Book Annexed, and *an omission* in the Creed will be no longer permitted, though a substitution in it is, unfortunately, still allowable. May not this rubric be further amended, and be made "explanatory" only? In the Office for the Visitation of the Sick, the ancient interrogative form of the Creed is deliberately restored. This was a most timely and important restoration. That grand phrase, "which we now offer unto thee," in order to quiet captious objectors, is printed in the same type as the rest of the prayer, both in this Second Standard Prayer Book, and in the Quarto Standard of the Ordination Offices, published as a separate volume, and for the first time, in 1793. This change of type, from capitals to *lower-case*, scarcely advisable under any circumstances, is to be much regretted, because the capital letters of that phrase, not only gave emphasis to the spiritual reality of the Memorial Offering, but also served to connect our American Eucharistic Office with its Scotch original. In this Centenary of Bishop Seabury's consecration, we should have been glad to show our Scotch brethren that we still had that important phrase in its capitalised form, as it is with them. However, Bishop White gives us the supposed necessity for the change. He states that the restoration of the Oblation and the Invocation to our Book "has been since objected to by some few among us." To show that a super-

stitious sense must have been intended, they have laid great stress on the printing of the words ‘ which we now offer unto thee ’ in a different character from the rest of the prayers. But this was mere accident. The Bishops being possessed of the form used in the Scotch Episcopal Church, which they had altered in some respects, referred to it to save the trouble of copying. But the reference was not intended to establish any particular manner of printing; and, accordingly, in all editions of the Prayer Book since the first [the editions of 1790 and 1791 being evidently considered as one and the same edition], the aforesaid words have been printed in the same character with the rest of the prayer, without any deviation from the original appointment.” Would not this be an appropriate time in which to restore the capitals, as in the Scotch Book? In the Invocation, in the clause “ with thy Word and Holy Spirit,” the important expression “ thy Word ” is printed with a capital “ W,” which is continued to the present time. In the rubric of the Confirmation Office, before the prayer “ Defend, O Lord,” the word “ hand,” of the First Standard, 1790, 1791, and of the English Book, is changed to “ Hands,” “ *he shall lay his Hands.* ” It is doubtful whether this is a typographical error, or an intentional change. But as it was not corrected in the next Standard, and conforms to the *later* Scotch Books, and to actual Scripture language, it was probably a change made by order of the Convention. In only one edition of our Prayer Book since 1793 have I found the original word “ hand,” and that is in an edition certified to by Bishop Claggett, “ Croom [Md.], March 15, 1815.” The word “ shew ” is modernised, and spelled everywhere “ show.” In the Calendar, “ Civil and Religious Liberty,” opposite July 4, is omitted. The page-title of “ Private Baptism of *Infants*,” after the English Book, is changed to Private Baptism of *Children*, to make it conform to the title of the office, both here and in the Table of Contents. It might have been better to have changed the title of the office to the form of the page-title, since “ children ” are less likely to be baptised *in private* than “ infants.” In the Public Baptism of In-

fants, the Doxology which had been added to the Lord's Prayer, in our First Standard, 1790, 1791, probably by an oversight, is omitted. In the rubric after the Collect for Saint Stephen's Day, the word "unto," of the English Book, and of our First Standard, is changed to "until," and this is still continued in our Book, although probably a typographical error, since "unto" is not changed elsewhere, as in the rubric after The Circumcision. "Ever one God," in the conclusion of the Collects for Advent III., Christmas, Epiphany VI., Septuagesima, Good Friday, and Easter, is punctuated as at present, where in the First Standard it had been printed "ever, one God," following in this particular the Proposed Book and the Oxford edition of 1775, by which Dr. White tells us he had punctuated that book, "as ye said edition appears to have been made on great Deliberation in that Seat of Letters." It is possible that the comma after "ever" may be correct, as modifying the verbs "liveth" and "reigneth," but strictly speaking "ever" is tautological, because it is the equivalent of "world without end," and seems merely to be inserted for euphony. The Latin is simply *unus Deus*. This matter is somewhat discussed in "Notes and Queries," Fifth Series, vol. x., pp. 431, 471, 472. The Litany is very strangely punctuated, "O God, the Father of Heaven;" both in this Second Standard and in the Quarto Standard of the Ordinal, perhaps at Bishop Provoost's suggestion, who was on the committee for printing; and this clause was not changed to its present form, "O God the Father of heaven," till the Standard of 1845. Our First Standard, 1790, 1791, including the folio and quarto partial editions, was probably more correct in reading "O God the Father, of heaven," after that valuable Oxford quarto edition of 1775, copies of which may still be seen at Christ Church and S. Peter's Church, Philadelphia. The First Book of Edward VI.; Whitchurch, June; and The Ordinal, 1549, Grafton (New York reprint), had each of them a similar punctuation. The capitalisation--of the beginning of each *liturgical* clause in the Collects, and in the Confession in the Office of the Holy Communion—which had been care-

fully preserved in our First Standard, is omitted in this Second Standard of 1793, probably through the publisher's want of familiarity with liturgical printing. This was carefully corrected in the Standard of 1845. In Psalm 107.27, after Oxford and London Prayer Books, and our English Bible, an apostrophe is inserted *before* the *s* in the phrase "wit's end." In the last Standard of 1871, as in our first Standards, after *old* English Prayer Books, the apostrophe was entirely omitted. In the Book Annexed, in accordance with Cambridge Prayer Books, the apostrophe is inserted *after* the "*s*." The meaning of the phrase, from the original Hebrew, would seem to be best explained by the form given in our Books from 1793 to 1871, with the apostrophe before the "*s*," "and are at their wit's end," that is, at the end of their wit or wisdom, or, as the margin of our Bible explains it, "all their wisdom is swallowed up." In Psalm 68.27, "Zabulon" is spelled "Zebulon," and this continued till the Standard of 1845. Most of the careless typographical errors of this Second Standard have long since been corrected, chiefly in the Standard of 1822, yet two of them remained till changed in the Book Annexed, to wit, in Psalm 72.17 "amongst" to "among," and in Psalm 102.20, "mourning" to "mournings." Hugh Gaine, the printer of this Second Standard, came to this country in 1750, and died here April 25, 1807, aged eighty-one years.

THE THIRD STANDARD, IN 1822.

The Third Standard is an octavo volume, published in Philadelphia by S. Potter & Co., in 1882, from corrected stereotyped plates of the Common Prayer Book Society of Pennsylvania. This Standard is authorised in advance by the single Canon of the General Convention of 1821. It has the following certificate on its second page :

September 2nd, 1822.

WE certify, that this edition of the Book of Common Prayer and Administration of the Sacraments, &c., is published as the Standard edition of the said Book.

WM. WHITE, FRED'CK BEASLEY,
BIRD WILSON, W. MEREDITH,
Committee of the General Convention.

This edition was very soon after this date published by the Society for the Advancement of Christianity in Pennsylvania, that Society having purchased the plates from the Common Prayer Book Society, in October, 1822. A short report of this Committee was made to the General Convention of 1823, and in it they say that they have certified to this edition, under date of September 2, 1822. This Standard being a correction, by an authorised Committee, of an existing stereotyped edition, mentioned in the Canon of 1821, a comparison of the edition after correction, with an impression before revision, will enable one to see each minute change made by the Committee. The original edition was published in Philadelphia by "S. Potter & Co., for the Common Prayer Book Society of Pennsylvania, W. Fry, Printer, 1818," with a certificate of "Bishop White, Philadelphia, March 3, 1818." But the plates from which it was printed were stereotyped by D. & G. Bruce, New York, and were ordered from them by the Prayer Book Society, in February, 1818. There is also an earlier edition from these same stereotyped plates of D. & G. Bruce, published in New York: Printed and Sold by T. & J. Swords, No. 160 Pearl Street, 1818, with Bishop Hobart's certificate, New York, January 2, 1818. This is the first of the Standard Books which has the pages numbered throughout, and it contains 268 pages to the end of the Psalter, in all 392 pages to the end of the Hymns, with Table, etc.

THE FIRST BOOK STEREOTYPED IN AMERICA.

From Lippincott's "American Encyclopædia of Printing" we learn "that to David Bruce, a Scotchman by

birth, but for many years a resident of New York, belongs the honor of introducing stereotyping into America." In 1812 he visited England, and acquired by purchase a general knowledge of that art, and in 1813 brought it to this country. He was associated with his brother George, under the firm name of "D. & G. Bruce." According to Lippincott, the first work stereotyped in America, a New Testament in bourgeois, was completed by them in 1814. But Munsell, in Thomas's "Printing in America," affirms that the larger "Catechism of the Westminster Assembly," stereotyped and printed by J. Watt & Co., of New York, in June, 1813, claims *upon its title-page* to have been the first work stereotyped in America. There is a duodecimo edition of the Prayer Book, stereotyped by Bruce, New York, with certificate of July 2, 1816, from the Stereotype Press of the Auxiliary New York Bible and Common Prayer Book Society. There is another duodecimo edition, stereotyped by E. & J. White, New York, with certificate of September 9, 1817. This octavo edition, stereotyped by D. & G. Bruce, New York, with certificates of New York, January 2, 1818, and Philadelphia, March 3, 1818, is, therefore, among the earliest of American stereotyped Prayer Books. In England, the first work printed after the stereotype process was issued from Cambridge, in 1807; whilst the earliest production of the Oxford Press bears date 1809.

PECULIARITIES IN THE PRE-STANDARD OF 1822.

Among the many verbal or typographical peculiarities, errors, or changes made in the original edition of 1818, and tacitly inherited by the Standard of 1822, the following may be mentioned. The rubrics, for the first time, were not printed in italics, as they should have been, and this error was continued till corrected in the Standard of 1845. In the phrase "This is my Body—Blood," the capital "T"—of the First Standard, 1790, 1791, including in it the folio and quarto partial editions, and of the Second Standard in 1793, including in it the

Quarto Standard of the Ordinal, in 1793—was changed to a small “t,” *entirely without authority*, for this edition should have followed the Second Standard of 1793, and this error has never since been corrected (!!).

The Roman notation of the Psalms in the Psalter and of the Days of the Month, from the earlier Standards, was changed to the more legible but less dignified Arabic figures. In the Order of Confirmation, in the Collect after the Lord’s Prayer, “everliving” was misprinted “everlasting,” as it was also in the Ordinal, in the Prayer for Christ’s Church, but this last error was inherited from a misprint in the Quarto Standard of the Ordination Offices of 1793. The reading, “And grant that all *they* who,” of the First and Second Standards, and even of the Proposed Book, in the Prayer for Christ’s Church, was changed to “all *those* who,” but this change had already been made in the Quarto Standard of the Ordinal, 1793, and also in Hugh Gainé’s folio complete edition of 1795. The *marginal* note to that prayer was, for the first time, placed at the bottom of the page, and has not since been restored to its proper place (!). The old *marginal* note to “Holy Father,” after *Sursum corda* in the Office of Holy Communion, which had been put in the *body* of the page in our first Standards, was also removed to *the bottom* of the page. The very peculiar spelling, in the Gospel for Advent I., of the word “cloaths,” of our first two Standards, and found also in an Oxford edition of 1715, was corrected to “clothes,” after the Bible version. The correct Latin heading to Psalm 35 in the Psalter, “*Judica, Domine,*” of the earlier Standards, was wrongly changed to “*Judica me, Domine,*” and this error is still continued, even in the Book Annexed (!). In Psalm 100.1 of the Psalter, the word “ye” was inserted, “O be *ye* joyful,” and this was not dropped till several years *after* our last Standard of 1871. In Psalm 104.11, the word “the” was interpolated in the phrase, “All *the* beasts of the field,” and this is still our reading, though it has been rightly corrected in the Book Annexed to “All beasts.” In the *Venite*, both as a Canticle and as a Psalm, at the

6th verse, a comma was inserted after "let us worship," but this was intentionally omitted in the Standard of 1845, and yet it has been again restored in the Book Annexed, though only in the Canticle, after the English Book. In Psalm 83.9, the old form "Madianites" of the English Book and of our first American Standards (as in Acts vii. 29, "Madian" is used) was changed to "Midianites," and it so continues to the present time.

THE CHANGES AUTHORISED IN THE THIRD STANDARD
OF 1822.

The changes made by the Committee in the edition of 1818 for the Standard of 1822 are not many, but some of them are very important. In the Table of Fasts, "The Season of Lent" is corrected to "The Forty Days of Lent," as had been suggested by Bishop White in his report to the General Convention of 1821. The Golden Numbers in the Calendar for March and April are unnecessarily omitted, but were restored again in the edition of 1831, which was afterward made the Standard in 1832. For *the first time* in the history of our American Books the word "Amen" was occasionally printed in Roman type, when the Minister and the People, or the Minister alone, repeated the preceding words, as after the Lord's Prayer, Confessions, Creeds, the last Prayer for Ash-Wednesday, the Formula of Baptism, the Reception and the Signing of the Child, the Confirmation Prayer, "Defend, O Lord," the Declaration pronouncing the persons "man and wife," and the first Blessing in the Visitation of the Sick, "The Almighty Lord." The Confirmation Prayer in our American Books, had no "Amen" at all, even in italics, until this Standard of 1822, when "Amen" was added, and, which should be noted, was printed in Roman type. In the Public Baptism of Infants, after the Prayer introduced by the words "let us . . . give thanks unto him, and say," "Amen" is printed in Roman character. It would be interesting to know certainly to whom we are

indebted for this *most important* change of type, in these special cases.

It was evidently not done through Bishop White's influence, for he tells us long afterward, in his remarks on this subject in the General Convention of 1835, "As for the question of 'Amen,' the author must confess himself not furnished with sufficient information. He does not know any rubric or canon prescribing the difference of type." Most probably, therefore, the change was accomplished under the direction of Mr. William Meredith, one of the Committee on this Standard, since it was on *his* resolution, in the Convention of 1835, that action was then taken on this same subject. In the rubric before the Absolution in the Forms of Prayer to be used at Sea, the word *Minister* is changed to *Priest*. This change was certainly made by the Committee, and evidently at the suggestion of Bishop White, who was one of the Committee. In a long and valuable letter from Bishop White to Bishop Brownell, on the alterations in the Prayer Book, dated "Philadelphia, February 8, 1822," the original of which is now owned by Mr. Rollinson Colburn, of Washington, D. C., the Bishop writes: "Forms for Sea. It must have been from oversight that ye word 'Minister,' designating ye Person who is to pronounce ye Absolution, which had been used here and elsewhere in ye Proposed Book, was not changed to 'Priest.'" This exact statement is also given by Bishop Brownell in his valuable Notes to his Family Prayer Book, together with an additional clause, "as it has been in other parts of the Liturgy," which is wanting in the original letter, and, therefore, was added by Bishop Brownell himself. In Psalm 67.5 of the Psalter, the word "yea" is inserted, to make the Psalm correspond to the Canticle in the Evening Prayer. In Bishop White's Report to the General Convention of 1821, on corrections in Hugh Gaine's Prayer Book, the Second Standard, he mentions that the word "ought" in the Gospel for Advent I. should be changed to "aught." From this it appears that the peculiar spelling of the First Standard in the word "aught" in that Gospel

(which had been changed in the Second Standard of 1793 to "ought"), and also in the Gospel of Trinity VI., was due to Bishop White. In the Standard of 1822 "naught" is given in the discretionary part of the Litany, as well as in Psalm 144.4, and "aught" in both of these Gospels. This spelling is again altered—in the Litany and Psalm, in the Standard of 1845, and in those Gospels, in the Standard of 1871—to "ought" and "nought," that they might conform to the spelling of the Authorised Version of Holy Scripture. Two new Cycles for Easter, from 1824 to 1861 inclusive, prepared by Bishop White, and printed in the General Convention Journal of 1821, are inserted in place of the old Cycles. This was the First Standard edition which, besides the Prayer Book proper, the Psalms in Metre, and the Hymns, contained in it—The Ordination Offices, established in 1792, but at first only published in a separate form, in the Quarto Standard of 1793; The Form of Consecration of a Church or Chapel, established in 1799, and a Prayer of Convention; Articles of Religion, established in 1801; An Office of Institution, established in 1804, and set forth with alterations 1808; and the thirty additional Hymns, set forth also in 1808.

The Ordinal adopted is the same as that in the English Book, "with sundry alterations." From Bishop White we learn that "The Form of Consecration of a Church or Chapel is substantially the same with a Service composed by Bishop Andrewes, in the reign of James the First; and since commonly used by the English bishops in such Consecration; but without the authority of Convocation or of Parliament;" and that the Prayer to be used at the Meetings of Convention is "the same which has been provided by the Church of England." The "Articles of Religion" are the same as those of the Church of England, except that Article XXI. is omitted, "because it is partly of a local and civil nature, and is provided for, as to the remaining part of it, in other Articles." The important word "all" in Article II., "for all actual sins of men" is omitted in our First Standard of the Articles, in 1802, after an error in the

English Prayer Books of that date, and is still wanting in our Book (!). It was rightly inserted in the Book Annexed, and the correction was accepted by the House of Deputies, but unfortunately it was defeated in the House of Bishops, probably through want of decided information on the subject. The "all" undoubtedly belongs to the clause, and should be restored to it. "An Office of Institution" was at first called "An Office of Induction," and the use of it was made obligatory; but afterward, from the objection of sundry Dioceses to that feature in it, its use was made optional only, the word "shall" being changed to "may," in the first rubric thereof. This Office is copied from one which was prepared by the Rev. William Smith, D.D., then of Connecticut, a nephew of the celebrated divine of the same name, and called by him, in one of his letters to Dr. White, "My learned but zealous high Church little Friend and Relation (as he says), Mr. Smith, of Somerset," Md.

THE FOURTH STANDARD, IN 1832.

The Fourth Standard is a royal duodecimo stereotyped edition, published in New York, by the Protestant Episcopal Press, in 1832, being, with a few very slight changes, from an edition by the same in 1831, with Bishop Benjamin T. Onderdonk's certificate, New York, August 1, 1831. This edition was made the Standard by the General Convention of 1832, and authorised by Canon XLVI. of 1832, and Canon VI. of 1835. The original edition was of course supposed to conform to the previous Standard of 1822. Its chief peculiarity was in printing, in capital letters throughout, the sacred words, GOD, the FATHER, the SON, the HOLY GHOST, JESUS, CHRIST, and the LORD, wherever they occur in the Prayer Book. This peculiar feature is continued in the Standard of 1832, but it was not reproduced afterward. "Amen" was printed in Roman type, in addition to the places given in the Standard of

1822, after *Ter-Sanctus*, the giving of the Ring in Holy Matrimony, and the Ordination Prayer for Priests and Deacons. When it was made the Standard, "Amen" is put in Roman character after *Gloria in Excelsis* also. The Golden Numbers were restored to the Calendar in March and April. In the prayer for Christ's Church, in *the Ordinal*, "everlasting" was changed to "everliving." In Psalm 76.2, the word "Jury," of all the earlier Standards of the old English Prayer Books, and of the Sealed Books, was changed to "Jewry," the spelling of the Bible, and of the modern English Prayer Books, after the Manuscript Book of 1662. When it was set forth as the Standard, in the "Comfortable Words" in the Office of Holy Communion, the old spelling "travel" of the Sealed Books is correctly changed to "travail," after the Manuscript Book, and an error in the new Cycle for Easter, introduced in 1821, and continued in the Standard of 1822, is corrected, "March 16" being changed to "April 16," for Easter-day, 1843. Most of these changes, though at first unauthorised, may be considered, in the main, as improvements. However, there were some typographical errors introduced, which one may well regret. In the Prayer of Consecration in the Holy Communion, the important word "Do," in "Do this," was, for the first time in the American Book, printed with a small "d," and this error is unfortunately still continued in our present Book, and in the Book Annexed (!!). In like manner, "New Testament," in the same prayer, was begun with a small "n" and a small "t," and this is continued in the Standard of 1832, and in that of 1838, but it was corrected in the Standard of 1845. It is interesting to know that the original edition of this Standard was prepared in part by the learned Bishop Whittingham, of Maryland, when he was quite a young man, and had only recently been admitted to Priests' Orders. In a copy of this Standard, published in 1838, and now in the Whittingham Library, Baltimore, there is written on the fly-leaf, in Bishop Whittingham's well-known hand: "The plates from which this edition is printed were corrected, as the copy from which they

were set up had been prepared, by J. V. Van Ingen and W. R. Whittingham."

CHANGES ORDERED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTIONS OF 1832 AND 1835.

The House of Bishops in the General Convention of 1832 "declared" that in "the Private Baptism of Children, when a child already baptised is to be received into the congregation of Christ's flock, the Question and Answer there given, "Wilt thou be baptised in this faith? That is my desire," was "a typographical error" in previous editions, inherited from our first Book, and "should be omitted in future editions of the Prayer Book." This correction is, therefore, made, for the first time, in this Standard of 1832. The General Convention, in 1835 also, after due notice to the several Dioceses in 1832, ordered the Prayer at the Meetings of Convention to be removed from the end of the Form for Consecration of a Church or Chapel, and, with an additional rubric to it, to be placed after the Occasional Prayers; and in the third rubric before the Office of the Holy Communion, it ordered the word "north" to be changed to "right," and this is accordingly done in later editions of this Standard, published after the year 1835.

"NORTH SIDE OF THE TABLE" CHANGED TO "RIGHT SIDE."

It may be well to call attention to this deliberate change of "the north side" to "the right side of the Table." It is one of the earliest decided *alterations* ever made in our Prayer Book, *after reference* to the separate Dioceses, according to constitutional requirement. We learn from Bishop White's Memoirs, that the change was made chiefly because many of the churches did not have their chancels toward the east, and so had no "north side." It is probable, too, that "right" was intended to represent the same relative

position as "north" had before done. Indeed, Bishop Benjamin T. Onderdonk, of New York—the proposer of the change—affirms as much. In his Annual Address to his Convention in 1835, he says: "The substitution of the word '*right*' for '*north*,' in the rubric immediately preceding the Communion Service, was also adopted. This, undoubtedly, was the original design of the rubric; it having had reference to the old mode of having the Communion Table uniformly at the east end of the church. In this case the north side—the table facing the people—was always the right side [?], the position designed to be occupied by the principal officiating minister.

"While on this subject, I cannot avoid noticing the impropriety, occurring in too many of our churches, of having the Altar so constructed, or so placed, as that neither side can be occupied, but the minister can officiate only in *front* of it."

But whatever may have been the original intention in this change, it must be evident now from the full history of these terms, as it has been published to this generation, that "north *side*" did not mean "north *end*," and that "the right side" in old English usage was always the *south* side of the front. In corroboration of this statement, I need only refer to Scudamore's *Notitia Eucharistica*; Blunt's *Annotated Prayer Book, revised and enlarged* edition, 1884; and the exhaustive article of Herbert Gedney, Esq., on "The Position of the Priest at the Altar," published in New York, in *The Church and the World*, for April, 1873.

It is at least doubtful what "north side" did then mean in the English Prayer Book, from which we inherited it. The north side of the Table, as there used, is not an ancient liturgical term, but was introduced into England in the Book of 1552, when, through the influence of extreme Continental reformers, the Altars were placed table-wise in the church or chancel—that is, with their ends east and west. The Celebrant, who, in the old Latin Service, had formerly begun the Office at the right or south part of the west side of the Altar, would

naturally go to the north side, with his right hand toward the people, when the Altars were moved table-wise, rather than to the south side; but since the Altars in God's good Providence have now for centuries been almost universally returned to their ancient position Altar-wise, with their *ends* north and south, there is properly no longer any "north side of the Table." In many churches, therefore, in England and in this country, the Celebrant now begins the Communion Office at the right or south side, as was always done in olden times. If we desire to follow ancient liturgical usage, "the right side" in the American Book would certainly require us to begin at the south side of the Altar. In the old Sarum Latin Service in England, from which we derive our Liturgy, *dextrum cornu* or the right side, was always the Epistle or south side; and so it was in the Roman Missal, also, till the Pontifical of 1485 (!). Since that time, when the Crucifix first began to be commonly placed on the Altars, the right side was changed to mean the north or Gospel side, that being henceforth the side *to the right of the figure of our Lord*, as it faces west; whereas, from the earliest times, the right side always meant the side *to the right of the Celebrant* (and people), as he (and they) faced east—that is, the south or Epistle side. It is better for us, as primitive Catholics, to accept the ancient meaning of the right side, as the south side of the Altar, rather than to adopt that *modern* Roman view of it, as the north side, meaning thereby to the right of the Crucifix, as it looks westward toward the people. And the Roman Church herself, though she has recently, for a purpose, reversed the old meaning of the words right and left of the Altar, has nevertheless not changed *the place* for beginning her Office, but begins it, as before, on the Epistle or south side, notwithstanding she now calls it by a new name—the left side, *sinistrum cornu*.

Again: the Hebrew word for right means also south, since the Jews, in defining the cardinal points of the compass, faced the east, and the south would necessarily be on their right hand. "The angel," recorded by S.

Luke as “standing at the *right* side of the Altar of incense,” was therefore standing at its *south* side. The Jewish Temple, unlike our Christian churches, had its entrance from the east, and it is accordingly the more remarkable that the south side of the Altar should be the right side, because to the Jew, at entrance, it would be on his left, as we would say; but with us, the right side, if the south side, according to ancient usage, would be also on our right hand, since we enter from the west, and look toward the east. In like manner, the two brazen pillars at the entrance to the Temple of Solomon, Jachin and Boaz, symbolical, perhaps, of “the pillar of the cloud” and “the pillar of fire,” are expressly called “*the right*” and “the left” pillar, and are respectively on *the south* and the north side, although to *the left* and the right of those entering into the Temple. In confirmation of these statements, I would refer to Dr. Smith’s “Dictionary of the Bible” under the word “EAST,” and to Bishop Patrick’s “Commentary” on 1 Kings vi. 8, and vii. 21. In every point of view, therefore, “the right side of the table” in the American rubric, so remarkably and unanimously changed for us in 1832 and 1835, may best be understood as directing the Priest to *begin* the Liturgy at the Epistle or south side, as he would naturally do, in accordance with both Scripture language and the most ancient liturgical usage. I have asserted that “the north side of the Table,” as used in the English Book, is not an ancient or usual liturgical expression. I must admit, however, that the phrase “the north side,” is found in a rubric in one *Latin* translation of the Syriac Liturgy of S. James, but there it is used, not so much with reference to the Altar, as to the Sanctuary, for the Priest, after his own Communion, and carrying the Sacred Gifts, is directed to go from “the north side” to the south side: “*Sacerdos portat discum in dextra sua, calicem in sinistra, venitque a latere septentrionali ad australe*”—probably with a view to his communicating the faithful from the *south* or Epistle side—that is, from left to right, in accordance with ancient custom. The rubric of the Roman Missal

(x. 6) directs the Priest, in communicating the people, to go to the right of the communicants, "*hoc est ad latus Epistolæ*," and the rubric of the *Rituale* is to the same effect, "*incipiens ab iis qui sunt ad partem Epistolæ*." It is accordingly more ritually correct, as well as more seemly and convenient, for the Priest to begin to communicate the faithful from the south end of the chancel-rail.

Another rubric in that same *Latin* version of the old Syriac Liturgy directs the Priest to incense thrice each, the middle of the Altar, which it calls "the Table of Life," "*the north side of it*," and the south side of it. "*Facta genuflexione, incensat ter partem mediam mensæ vitæ, quæ est typus Patris: tum cornu septentrionale ejusdem mensæ totidem vicibus, quod est typus Filii; ter etiam cornu australe, quod est typus Spiritus Sancti*." The curious symbolical meaning here given to the parts of the Altar may be noted; the middle being a type of the Father; the north or left side, of the Son; and the south or right side, of the Holy Spirit. That the south side is here the same as the right side, and therefore that the north and left are equivalent, is proved by a comparison of a preceding rubric in this Office with one in another copy of the Office, *where the same action is described*. The first rubric directs the Priest to place the Eucharistic spoon on *the south side*, upon the consecrated slab; the second, to put it on *the right side*. "*Cochlear, in latere australi, supra tabulam consecratam deponit. [Sacerdos ponit] cochlear in latere dextro*" [Renaudot's *Liturg. Orient.*, 1847, vol. ii., pp. 2, 13]. Bishop Beveridge, also, has been misquoted and miscited by Wheatly, as showing "that wherever in the ancient Liturgies the Minister is directed to stand *before* the Altar, the north side of it is always meant;" and reference is given to the *Pandects*. Dr. Hoppin tells us the *Annotations* were meant, and Scudamore affirms there is no foundation for Wheatly's statement, and says, "Bishop Beveridge is there merely explaining that in the description of a Greek Church 'the north side' is equivalent to the right part, that is, the part to the

right of the Bishop as he sits at the back of the Altar."

A supposed instance of the use of the north side is also adduced in a careless translation by Dr. Neale of a rubric from the Mozarabic Liturgy; "the Priest goes to the north side of the Altar," but here in the original it is "the right side," "*eat ad cornu altaris dextrum*" [Migne's Patrol. Latin., t. 85]; and as the rubric was composed long before the year 1485, when the modern change of terminology was introduced, it must mean the south or Epistle side. It is scarcely necessary to enter at length into the vexed question, whether in the rubric the word "side" means "end." Historically and liturgically it certainly refers to the *long* side of the Altar, whether fronting west or north, and the wrong *practice* of many Priests for many years cannot alter its technical meaning.

Published statements of persons living soon after this new phrase, "north side," was introduced, assure us that *side* was intended to be distinguished from *end*. "The right side of the Altar," in Western usage, is a well-known liturgical expression, denoting a division of the long side, fronting the people. In the ancient English liturgies the front of the Altar is considered, for ritual purposes, as divided into three sections, the right, or Epistle side, *dextrum cornu*; the midst, *medium altaris*; and the left, or Gospel side, *sinistrum cornu*. Three short rubrics from the Sarum Missal will establish this fact.

"*Sacerdos thurificet medium altaris, et utrumque cornu altaris, primo in dextra, secundo in sinistra parte, et interim in medio.*"

"*Sciendum est quod quicquid a sacerdote dicitur ante Epistolam in dextro cornu altaris expleatur.*"

"*Legatur Evangelium in sinistro cornu altaris.*"

The first rubric proves the threefold division of the Altar's front. The second shows that our American Book, in *beginning* its Communion Office "at the right side of the Table," would be following old English custom, and, therefore, that the right side would be the

south side of the west front of the Altar. The third, in ordering the Gospel to be read "at the *left* side," defines this as the north side, *which is everywhere recognised as the Gospel side*, and accordingly that the right side would be the south side, where the Epistle is read. The Latin word *cornu* is strictly technical, and is equivalent to "latus," and is usually and freely translated "side."

These rubrics are illustrated by the following passages from *Lay Folks' Mass Book*, a medieval "Companion to the Altar," written in the twelfth century, and published by the Early English Text Society, in 1879 [pp. 10, 16, 26].

"The prest bigynnes office of messe,
Or ellis he standes turnande his boke
At the *south* auter noke.

.

Til deken or prest the gospel rede,
Stonde up then and take gode hede ;
For then the prest flyttes his boke
North to that other auter noke."

But at the *Sursum corda* :

The prest will after in that place
Remow him a litel space,
Till he come to the auter *myddis*."

It is quite possible that this old English and Catholic custom of beginning the service at the southwest side of the Altar, may have been derived from early Jewish usage. As confirmatory of such an origin, in the Old Testament Commentary for English Readers, now publishing in England, Dr. Ginsburg, in notes on the Book of Leviticus, tells us that "the Priest went to the *south-west* horn of the Altar," and held the bird to be sacrificed with the neck stretched out, and cut it with the

nail of his thumb, breaking open the great blood-vessels at the neck of the victim.

If this be a correct explanation of the history and meaning of the "right side of the Table" in our American rubric before the Holy Communion, it is to be hoped that our American Priests will not continue to follow a wrong practice, however long it may have been in use, but will fulfil the true and ancient meaning of the order, and in union with the rest of Catholic Christendom *begin* the Eucharistic Office, not at the end of the Altar, but at *the side*, and on the *south* side of the Altar's front, "the right side of the Table," from Scripture phraseology, and from ancient liturgical and English usage.

In this Standard of 1832, the old Tate & Brady Psalms are omitted, and in their stead are printed the new "Psalms in Metre, selected from the Psalms of David," which were set forth December 27, 1832. In it are given also the 212 Hymns, set forth in 1789, 1808, and 1826.

THE FIFTH STANDARD, IN 1838.

The Fifth Standard is a duodecimo edition, in large clear type, one column to a page, published in Philadelphia in 1838, from corrected stereotyped plates, prepared originally in 1837 by the Female Protestant Episcopal Prayer Book Society of Pennsylvania. It is authorised in advance by Canon IX. of the General Convention of 1838, and has the following declaration on its second page:

"In pursuance of a Resolution of the General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America, we, the subscribers, a Committee appointed for the purpose, do hereby set forth this Corrected Standard Prayer Book; being printed from the stereotyped plates of the Female Protestant Episcopal Prayer Book Society of Philadelphia [? Pennsylvania]; and comprising the Common Prayer Book, the Articles,

Offices, Psalms in Metre selected from the Psalms of David, and Hymns.

“ And we hereby DECLARE this Prayer Book, so corrected, to be THE STANDARD.

“ H. U. ONDERDONK,
“ *Bishop of the Diocese of Pennsylvania.*

“ G. W. DOANE,
“ *Bishop of the Diocese of New Jersey.*

“ BENJAMIN DORR,
“ *Rector of Christ Church, Philadelphia.*

“ S. LITTELL, JR.

“ *Philadelphia, Dec. 15, 1838.*”

A long and very interesting statement concerning this Standard, signed by the Committee, was made in December, 1838, and published in *The Protestant Episcopalian, The Banner of the Cross*, and other Church publications of that date. In this statement, the Committee say that they “have met nine times,” and “have considered all the corrections reported, having also the use of a Prayer Book largely corrected by the Rev. H. M. Mason, D.D., and one by the late J. B. Wallace, Esq. Of the various corrections they have adopted, in the prose portion of the Prayer Book, . . . more than 700 of all sorts; of which only 5 or 6 affect materially the sense, and about 36 relate to matters prescribed by the ‘votes, on the subject, of the General Convention.’ In the Metrical department . . . they have adopted 1016 corrections, none of which affect the sense materially; . . . The whole number of corrections is 1720; almost all referring to slight omissions or misprints, to capital, roman, or italic letters, to punctuation or figures, or other defects in the plates.”

A short Report was also made by them to the General Convention of 1841, and the Committee was thanked by that Convention, “for the faithful, laborious, and successful manner in which the task has been performed.” Of the four persons who composed this Committee in 1838, the two Bishops and the Priest have long since entered into their rest, but the one layman, Dr. S. Lit-

tell, is still living in Philadelphia, "a hearty and hale man, with a love for the Church as strong, and a zeal as warm, as the youngest."

THE PRE-STANDARD OF 1838.

The original plates of this edition were stereotyped by L. Johnson, Philadelphia, and printed by William Stavely, No. 12 Pear Street, Philadelphia, for the Female Prayer Book Society, with a certificate from Bishop H. U. Onderdonk, Philadelphia, January 20, 1837. A singular misprint in punctuation is inherited by us from the original plates, and continues in our present Standard. In the rubric before the Lord's Prayer, in Holy Matrimony, a comma is inserted after the word "*Man*," as though "the Man," and not "*the Minister*," were the subject of "*shall say*."

CHANGES IN THE STANDARD OF 1838.

In the corrected Standard edition, "A. & M." after S. Simon and S. Jude in the Calendar for October 28th, which had been retained heretofore from the Proposed Book, is dropped. In Psalm 145.3, in the Psalter, the comma between "marvellous" and "worthy" is omitted, since, as it was stated, "marvellous" is here probably an adverb. In the Apostles' Creed a comma is deliberately inserted after "God," in the first line, wherever that Creed is used, but this was omitted again in the next Standard. In the second rubric of Churching of Women, the word "*Priest*" is changed to "*Minister*," and in the Visitation of Prisoners, in the rubric before the Absolution, the word "*Minister*" is changed to "*Priest*." These last alterations are expressly mentioned in the Statement of the Committee, and the last change is in accordance with a similar alteration in the Office at Sea in the Standard of 1822, made by the recommendation of Bishop White. In the dis-

cretional part of the Litany, the second bracket, which had heretofore preceded "Let us Pray," is in this Standard placed after it; but both brackets were omitted in the next Standard, as they had before been dropped in the Ordinal of the Quarto Standard of 1793.

CHANGES MADE BY ORDER OF THE GENERAL CONVENTION
OF 1835 AND 1838.

In consequence of the action of the General Conventions of 1835 and 1838, an addition was made to the rubric of A Table of Moveable Feasts, in the words: "unless the Table gives some day in the month of March for it; for in that case, the day given by the Table is the right day." In the General Convention of 1838, on motion of Bishop Benjamin T. Onderdonk, of New York, it was "Resolved—As the sense of this Convention, that after the words used by the Bishop at the laying on of Hands in Confirmation the word 'Amen' should be printed in the Italic character, as being properly a response." However, it had been *deliberately* printed in the Roman character in the Standard of 1822. In consequence of this later action, in the Standard of 1838, this "Amen," for the first time by authority, is printed in Italics. It was again printed in Roman character in our next Standard of 1845, without an exception from the General Convention of 1844 that authorised that Standard, and it is so printed in our present Standard. Notwithstanding, in our last General Convention, on the action of the House of Bishops, this "Amen" was ordered to be once more put in Italics in the Book Annexed Amended.

THE "AMEN" IN THE CONFIRMATION PRAYER.

One does not like to differ from venerable Bishops in their judgment about a matter which belongs particularly to their office. If, however, we can put any confidence in the action of their brother Bishops and the

Clergy in our Mother Church of England with reference to their Book of Common Prayer, we shall find that this "Amen" in England has *never* been considered "as being properly a response," but as a necessary part of a Bishop's function, in the bestowal of the Holy Ghost to the laity by the laying on of his hands, and as such has uniformly been printed in Roman character in the English Prayer Book. It may be said, on the other hand, that, in a somewhat similar case, in the Consecration Prayer in the Communion Office, the people have from time immemorial said the Amen; but in this case the people would rightly unite with the Priest in offering up this memorial Sacrifice of our Saviour's precious Passion and Death, for in this holy action *all* are interested, and all should take part. But in Ordination and Holy Baptism, the Bishop or the Priest alone says "Amen," as a part of his official action. And so, in conferring the gift of Confirmation on an individual, the prayer and the laying on of hands is done by the Bishop, and the "Amen" would seem also to be a fitting part of his Apostolic function. And thus, in the Scriptural account of this holy rite, it was the Apostles, not the Congregation, who prayed for the Candidates, and laid their hands on them. If then the "Amen" in this prayer be printed in Italics, the people alone will be instructed to repeat it, and the Bishop, who ought to say it in his official capacity, will not be invited or required so to do, a serious omission which is to be regretted. The "Amen" should therefore remain, it would seem, as in our present Standard and in the English Books, in Roman character.

THE SIXTH STANDARD, IN 1845.

The Sixth Standard is a large octavo edition, stereotyped by H. W. Hewet, New York, and published in New York, in 1845, by the New York Bible and Common Prayer Book Society, and by Messrs. Harper & Brother. It is certified to, on its second page, as the Standard by the Committee of the General Convention of 1841, and this

certificate is signed by Bishops Meade, Ives, and Alfred Lee, and by the Reverend Doctors Anthon, Wainwright, Mead, and Coit. Of these seven signers, the venerable Bishop Lee, now the Presiding Bishop of the American Church, and the learned Doctor and Professor Thomas Winthrop Coit, alone survive. This Standard is authorised by Canon VII. of the General Convention of 1847. It is by far the most carefully prepared edition of all our Standards, and for this result the American Church is chiefly indebted to the indefatigable labors of Dr. Coit, with the loving assistance of Dr. Wainwright, afterward the Provisional Bishop of New York. This valuable Standard was prepared and corrected from sheets of Dr. Wainwright's beautiful illustrated edition of the Prayer Book, bearing Bishop Onderdonk's certificate, New York, December 18, 1843. As Dr. Coit's exhaustive Report to the General Convention of 1844 is reprinted in the Journal of the General Convention of 1868, on the happy suggestion of the Rev. Dr. Hodges, now of Baltimore, I need not enter into the many and minute corrections in this Standard, but will refer those interested in the matter to that exceedingly valuable Report. The original edition of this Standard was stereotyped and printed by H. W. Hewet in 1844, and only 250 copies printed, 200 of which were for the use of the Convention. This edition, with a few slight changes made by the General Convention, was published in 1845 as the Standard.

CHANGES ORDERED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION OF
1844 IN THE PROPOSED STANDARD.

In the Proposed Standard, the Committee, in the Table of Contents, had inserted as additional Headings, "The Litany," and also the titles of the Offices printed after the Psalter, thus giving XXXVI. Heads of reference instead of 29 as before. To this change, the House of Bishops took exception, and after some discussion a joint resolution was passed, which was offered by Bishop Whittingham,—“That the Table of Contents of

the Book of Common Prayer, having been prepared, proposed, and ratified, in the same manner as other parts of the said Book, cannot be altered in any other way than as prescribed by Art. VIII. of the Constitution." Under this action of the Convention, the Table of Contents was restored to its old form, and "The Litany" as a title omitted, though its insertion would have been more properly a typographical correction than an alteration. However, notwithstanding this action in 1844, the Committee of 1868 on the Prayer Book inserted "The Litany" in the Table of Contents, and the General Convention of 1871, in the Standard adopted that year, accepted this "alteration," before proposed and rejected, without its reference to the Diocesan Convention (!). A few other changes were ordered by the General Convention of 1844, in this Standard of 1845, but chiefly such as the substitution of "Selection" for "Psalm" before the number of the Psalms in Metre, and, in the title-page thereof, the putting of "Selections from the Psalms of David in Metre," for "Psalms in Metre." "Sel. 1, Sel. 2," etc., was also ordered to be printed on the outer-top margin of each page in the Selections of Psalms, uniform with "*Day 1, Day 2,*" etc., on the outer top-margin of the Psalter.

IMPORTANT CORRECTIONS IN THE STANDARD OF 1845.

By far the most valuable improvement in this Standard, it will be generally conceded, is the printing of the sacred words LORD and GOD in capital letters throughout, in the Psalter and elsewhere, *wherever they stand for* JEHOVAH, as is done in our Bible version. This is a deliberate change, and a grand advance on the English Book. On this change Dr. Coit remarks:—"Some may think it a needless undertaking; but if God himself has made a marked difference in His own Names,—made this difference a matter of gradual revelation (Exod. vi. 3), and kept up a peculiar application of it for ages (the Messiah is distinguished from JEHOVAH to

the very end of the Old Testament—see Mal. iii. 1, in the Hebrew); and further, if one of the ablest commissions, which ever had a most sacred trust confided to them, thought this difference worthy careful perpetuation, it becomes us not to regard it lightly. . . . For instances, where some distinction is necessary to characterise JEHOVAH and the Messiah, see Psalm cx. 1, 5. Here some Bibles, and English ones too, have the word Lord in the 5th verse thus, LORD. This perverts and misapplies all the latter part of the Psalm, which relates to the Messiah. See also Matt. xxii. 44, under the Eighteenth Sunday after Trinity; and Mal. iii. 1, under the Festival of the Purification.”—This is a much more important change than that made in the Standard of 1832, of putting *all* the divine Names and Titles indiscriminately in capitals.

The rubrics are again printed in italics as before the Standard of 1822, which inherited Bruce’s unauthorised change to Roman letters in 1818. The Titles to the Prayers are given in larger italics, and without the paragraph mark. The Collects are liturgically printed with semicolons, and with proper capital letters. The liturgical clauses in the Confessions, the Creeds, the Lord’s Prayer, and the like, begin with a capital letter. The versicles after the Creed, and the clauses in the Lord’s Prayer, are pointed with periods, instead of semicolons, which were inherited from errors in the English Books of the last century. In the first Collect after the Lord’s Prayer, in the Confirmation Office, “everlasting” is corrected to “everliving,” as in our first two Standards of 1790 and 1793. In the Preface, GOD and JESUS CHRIST are in small capitals, after the Standard of 1832, and in part after the First Standard. The Calendar and Introductory Tables are more clearly printed, and have appropriate leading lines to direct and assist the eye. A Note from the English Book, explaining the Golden Numbers, prefixed to March and April, is added at the side of that page in the Calendar. This Note was proposed in the General Convention of 1838 for insertion in this place, but the proposition does not appear to have

been consummated then, or in the next Convention. A new Cycle for Easter, from 1862 to 1880 inclusive, taken from Collingwood's English Prayer Book, is given, without its having been first proposed to the several Dioceses, as was done in 1821, and afterward in 1868. In the Nicene Creed, the comma between "One God" and "the Father Almighty" is omitted, as at present, and this is probably correct, and is in accordance with the Sealed Books. The comma had been there in *all* our previous Standards, as in Mark Baskett's London edition, 1765; the Oxford quarto, 1775; and the Second Book of Edward VI., in 1552. This comma seems to have been a relic of the form given in the Old Sarum Missal, and the First Book of Edward VI., in 1549, when the Priest began that Creed, saying alone the opening clause, "I believe in one God," and the Choir joined in at the words, "the Father Almighty," and sang the rest.

The number of each page is given at *the bottom* of the leaf, and there are (xx.), 511 pages to the end of the Psalter, in all 580 pages to the end of the Office of Institution. In the Selections from the Psalms in Metre, with Hymns and Table, there are 109 pages. An Index to the entire Book is given on a final fly-leaf. The numbers being printed at the bottom of the page, the Days of the Month, "DAY 1, DAY 2," etc., in the Psalter, are most conveniently put on the *outer-top* margin of each page. In our First and Second Standards these were printed on both the outer and the inner-top margin in Roman numerals, IV. DAY, VI. DAY. In our present Standard the pages were again numbered at *the top* of the leaf, and the number of the Day was obliged to be put less legibly on the inner-top margin. In the Book Annexed, the number of the Day has been returned to the outer-top margin, but, most singularly, the pages of *the Psalter* have not been numbered at all. It is to be hoped that the numbers will be again restored to these pages, and placed *at the bottom* of the page. In the Apostles' Creed, "He descended into hell," is usually considered as a part of the Fifth Article of the

Creed in connection with "The third day he rose again from the dead," and it is thus correctly given in the ancient interrogative Creed in the Office of the Visitation of the Sick. In the present English Prayer Books, perhaps after the Manuscript Book, "He descended into hell" seems to be connected with the Fourth Article, there being only a comma after "buried," and a semicolon after "hell." In the Sealed Books, however, a semicolon was inserted after "buried," and a comma put after "hell," and this punctuation, which would seem to be the correct one, was adopted in the Standard of 1845, after Wainwright's plates of 1844, and is continued in our present Standard. In the Book Annexed, in accordance with the last Report of the Committee on the Standard Prayer Book, this arrangement was the more strongly marked, by having a colon placed after "buried." In our earlier Standards, after English Books of the last century, a semicolon had been put both after "buried" and "hell." The wrong punctuation of the present English Book, in seeming to class "He descended into hell" with the Fourth Article of the Creed, appears to date from "The King's Book," in 1543.

THE CORRECT PRINTING OF THE TITLE-PAGE.

A semicolon is put after "Sacraments," on the title-page, in imitation of the sheets of Wainwright's Book, and this change unfortunately still continues, though our first Standards all have here a comma only. The Latin of the Title, as signed by the Revisers in 1661, and the Latin in the edition of 1560, prove that the words "Administration" and "Other Rites and Ceremonies," are *dependent* clauses, and have "of" or "of the" *understood* before them, and accordingly simply a comma after "Sacraments" would seem to be the correct punctuation. The form of the Latin words is "Administrationis . . . aliorumque," *of* Administration . . . and *of the* other Rites and Ceremonies.

It is most important that the title-page of the Prayer

Book should be printed and punctuated correctly, and as it is given in the Manuscript Book of 1662, and in the Sealed Books, for only thus can the full sense of it be clearly understood. They both give it exactly as follows :

THE BOOK
OF
Common = Prayer
And Administration
OF THE
SACRAMENTS,
AND OTHER
RITES AND CEREMONIES
Of the CHURCH,
According to the Use
Of the
etc., etc.

The Summary of the title is thus—"The Book According to the Use" of the American Church, and the "of" and "of the," being properly printed in separate lines, show that they belong to *all* the dependent clauses below them. Besides having here "The Book of Common Prayer," we have also "The Book *of* Administration of the Sacraments, and *of the* other Rites and Ceremonies of the Church." Our First Standard wrongly inherited a punctuation point after Common Prayer, copied from English editions of the last century, and it should be omitted in the present Standard. In the correct form of the title as given above, there are only two punctuation points, a comma after Sacraments, and a comma after Church, but the hyphen between Common and Prayer need not be imitated, since Common is a regular adjective, and the Latin form of the phrase is also in two distinct words, *Precum Publicarum*.

THE SEVENTH AND LAST STANDARD, IN 1871.

The Seventh and last Standard is a royal octavo edition, stereotyped and printed in England, but published in New York, in 1871, by the New York Bible and Common Prayer Book Society. It is printed in very large black type, and is authenticated on its second page by the Resolution of the General Convention of 1871, "*Adopted in the House of Bishops, Oct. 19: A.D. 1871, and signed by B. B. SMITH, Presiding Bishop, HENRY C. POTTER, Secretary.*" "*Adopted in the House of Deputies, Oct. 24: A.D. 1871, and signed by JAMES CRAIK, President, WILLIAM STEVENS PERRY, Secretary.*"

This edition is printed from new stereotyped plates, which were prepared under the direction of a Joint Committee appointed by the General Convention of 1868. These plates correspond, page for page, to the last Standard. The Rev. W. J. Webbe was appointed Secretary of the Committee, and in their Report to the General Convention in 1871, they express "their great obligations to their Secretary, the Rev. W. T. Webbe, for the industry with which he has discovered the numerous typographical errors; and also for his laborious comparison of the Standard of 1844 with the Sealed Book." They state further that the new plates are "substantially in conformity with the alterations suggested by the Secretary." The Committee signing the Report are Bishops Eastburn, Randall, and Gregg, and Rev. Drs. Haight and Howe. Of these only two survive, Bishop Gregg and Dr. (now Bishop) Howe. May the venerable Dr. Coit, who was of the Committee, but did not sign the Report, long be spared to us in the Church Militant! A full Report was made to the Convention of 1871, under three heads. I. Typographical inaccuracies; II. List of alterations; and III. Corrigenda in the copy laid before the Convention; and this Report is printed in the Journal, to which those interested can refer. Among the "inaccuracies" corrected

are the insertions of the word "the" before "Saints" in The Gospel for The Sunday next before Easter, "and many bodies of the Saints which slept arose;" and the word "also" after "they" in the Lesson at the Burial of the Dead, "As is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy." In the Public Baptism of Infants, and in the Baptism of those of Riper Years, after the prayer—beginning, "Almighty and Everlasting God," and introduced with the words "let us faithfully and devoutly give thanks unto him and say"—the "Amen" in Roman character, though ordered by the General Convention of 1844, is considered an inaccuracy, and italics are substituted therefor. The "Amen" in Roman type was used in the Public Baptism of Infants first in the Standard of 1822, and in the Baptism of those of Riper Years first in the Standard of 1838. In the Book Annexed, the italicised "Amen" of our present Standard was again changed, and printed in Roman characters. In the English Book this "Amen" has always been in italics, which would seem to be the correct form, since "let us give thanks and say" does not mean more than "let us pray," and, therefore, the people ought not to repeat the prayer with the Minister (as they would seem to be required to do by an Amen in Roman characters), but only join in the "Amen" at the close of it, as in the prayers generally. The rubric given here in the First Book of Edward VI. shows that this composition was intended only as an ordinary prayer, "*The Priest shall add also this prayer,*" and there is nothing in the present rubric, or in the liturgical printing of the several clauses, to indicate that it should be said by any one except the Priest. In Psalm 79.1 of the Psalter, "God," before put in lower-case type, is printed in capital letters, GOD, because the phrase "O God," being an opening vocative clause, typography would call for this change; but, on the other hand, since the original word here is Elohim, and not JEHOVAH, theology should rule, and the word remain in small type, as the scholarly Dr. Coit originally printed it.

Among the "Alterations" may be mentioned the fol-

lowing. In the Table of Contents, the Litany is inserted. The Amen is added after the *Gloria Patri* in the Morning and the Evening Prayer (as it was *intended* it should be in the previous Standard), and after the Anthem in the Institution Office. In the General Thanksgiving, the second “may” is stricken out, and the clause now reads “and that we show forth,” as in the present English Prayer Book, and as it was originally written in the folio Book of 1636, which was corrected for the Book of 1662, and as it is in the Sealed Books, and in the Manuscript Book. The omission of this “may” has been considered by some as ungrammatical and inelegant. There are, however, other examples in the Prayer Book of its omission, and this phraseology seems to have been an older usage, which is now more generally corrected. Thus, in the Collect for Grace, we pray, “and grant that this day we fall [not, “*may* fall”] into no sin.” In the Collect for the Sunday next before Easter, *until* 1662, one of the clauses was thus worded: “Mercifully grant, that we both follow [not, as now, “*may* both follow”] the example of his patience.” The word “Whitsun-day,” wherever it occurs, is so printed as to carry out the analogy of Whitsun-week, and not as in the Standard of 1845, “Whit-Sunday,” or as in all the earlier Standards, “Whitsunday.” In the Heading at the end of the Office at Sea, “the” is changed to “their” before “Dead,” “*At the Burial of their Dead at Sea.*” It is thus printed in the English Book, and in our First Standard of 1790 and 1791, and the change to “the” was probably a typographical error in the Second Standard of 1793. The word “their” in its present position is correct, and refers of course to the persons at sea; but as this rubric has been transferred, in the Book Annexed, to the ordinary Burial Service, this word “their” in its new position does not seem to be so appropriate as the word “the” would be, since there are now no particular persons to whom it can relate. An additional cycle for finding Easter for the years 1881 to 1899, inclusive, which was duly proposed in the General Convention of 1868, was adopted in 1871, and

inserted in this Standard, and the cycle for the years 1843 to 1861, inclusive, was omitted. In the Gospel for the First Sunday in Advent the word "strewed," first wrongly introduced into the Standard of 1838, after the edition of 1837, is changed to "strawed," in accordance with our earlier Standards and our authorised Bible. This correction has not been made, however, in very many of the present editions of the Prayer Book professing to follow the last Standard, and the Clergy should carefully insert the change in any such editions that may be in their chancels.

In Psalm 135.6 of the Psalter, the word "and" was inserted before the words "in the sea," in imitation of the present English Prayer Books and the Sealed Books. In our first American Book the "and" was omitted, as in Baskett's London editions, 1765, 1766, and in the Oxford quarto, 1775, and so it continued to be wanting in *all* our Standards till 1871. Dr. Coit informs us in his minute Report in 1844, that "the 'and' is not in the Hebrew, Septuagint, or Vulgate," and hence he did not insert it in the Standard of 1845.

EARLY EDITIONS OF THE AMERICAN PRAYER BOOK.

The short-lived "Proposed Book" was printed in Philadelphia, Hall & Sellers, MDCCLXXXVI., 8vo, and 4,000 copies of it were ordered to be published. A few of these were handsomely bound in red morocco with gilt ornamentation, one of which the writer now happily possesses. It was reprinted in London, England, M,DCC,LXXXIX., 8vo, and from a manuscript note in Bishop Stevens' copy, as mentioned in *The Historical Magazine*, vol. i., p. 221, we learn that there were only *fifty* copies of this English Reprint published, and these were probably for the use of the English Bishops, who were then considering the request of the American Church for the "Succession." The writer has one of this "fifty" also. The English edition was reprinted in Hall's *Reliquiæ Liturgicæ* in 1841, and again in America, for the Reformed Episcopal Church, in 1871.

I give below, from Sabin's *Bibliotheca Americana*, a list of the early editions of our American Prayer up to the year 1800:

Philadelphia: Printed by Hall & Sellers, MDCCXC. 12mo, pp. —, pp. 221 (iii). The Psalms in Metre alone are paged (pp. 221), and have a separate title.

Philadelphia: Hall & Sellers, MDCCXCI. 12mo, pp. —, pp. 221 (iii).

New York: Hugh Gaine, M,DCC,XCIII. 8vo, pp. —, pp. 204 (iii). By *Direction* of the General Convention.

New York: Hugh Gaine, M,DCC,XCIII. 12mo, pp. —, pp. 74 (ii). By *Direction* of the General Convention.

New York: Hugh Gaine, M,DCC,XCIV. 12mo, pp. —, pp. 171. By *Direction* of the General Convention.

Boston: Printed by Manning & Loring, for J. Thomas & E. F. Andrews, MDCCXCIV. 12mo, pp. 244 (iv).

Philadelphia: Printed by Hall & Sellers, MDCCXCIV. 12mo, pp. —, pp. 221 (iii).

New York: Hugh Gaine, M,DCC,XCV. *Folio*.

Philadelphia: W. Young & J. Ormrod, 1795. 12mo, pp. xxxiv, 370. By *Permission* of the General Convention.

New York: Printed for T. Allen, 1797. 12mo, pp. xxxiv, 238.

New York: Printed for T. Allen, 1797. Pp. 168 (ii).

Boston: I. Thomas & E. T. Andrews. October, 1800. Pp. —, pp. 70 (ii).

Philadelphia: Printed by Hall & Sellers, MDCCC. 12mo, pp. xxxvi, 327.

New York: Hugh Gaine, MDCCXCIII. *Quarto*. Ordination offices alone.

See *Hist. Mag.*, I., 158, 219, 281, 308; II., 306.

CONCLUSION.

In this account of our several Prayer Book Standards, and in the enumeration of various verbal changes in them, the writer has striven to be strictly accurate; but

as this history is the first of its kind, and deals with very many particulars, and is derived from many different sources, there are probably a number of inaccuracies in it, and possibly some wrong deductions. It is to be hoped, therefore, that in the interest of historical truth, any corrections that need to be made herein, and particularly any additional facts that ought to have been given, will be freely published in our Church papers, or privately communicated to the writer. The date, size, and publisher of any early editions of the Prayer Book, between the years 1790 and 1793, other than those mentioned above, ought by all means to be named in the public prints, by those who know of their existence.

One good end that may be subserved by this historical review—besides making it generally known when and how certain slight verbal changes were introduced into our Prayer Book—is in demonstrating the fact that our present Standard Prayer Book, save in the correction of a few trifling typographical inaccuracies, is identical, in language and teaching, with our first American Prayer Book, which was published well-nigh a century ago, in the month of August, in the year of our Lord, one thousand seven hundred and ninety.

FREDERICK GIBSON.

THE METHOD OF COMPARATIVE RELIGION.

COMPARATIVE Religion would have seemed superlative blasphemy to Christians of the early part of this century. To-day it is recognised as one of the sciences which is most fruitful in its aids to faith. It is not yet, however, entirely free from elements of irreverence and skepticism. In fact, the most subtle attempt to de-supernaturalise Christianity—to reduce it to a merely natural, though lofty product of the religious spirit of man—comes from this source and sharpens its weapons upon its material. This is one of the chief forms of attack that apologetics must face to-day.

The historical method of investigation, which applied to the New Testament writings oftentimes to destroy their genuineness and authenticity, has resulted in such fruitful triumphant Christian scholarship—this same method is now applied to the study of all religions, oftentimes, too, in the interest of skepticism. We believe that it is already resulting in most fruitful scientific and philosophical indication of Christianity as emphatically *the* revealed Religion. Skepticism here, as so often, leads the way into new fields. Christian scholars, sometimes trembling, follow to claim all the new truth discovered and to lay it at the feet of JESUS. Thus this investigation, this study of the great religions of the world, becomes a department of apologetics. The supernatural character of Christianity is to be vindicated by arguments that come from the historical investigations and comparison of the religions of the world.

A slight sketch of the growth and progress of this work may be of interest, and also show that Christian scholars and missionaries have been most helpful in the

work, it having been closely connected with the kindred science of comparative philology.

We might begin with the Renaissance and the Reformation. The first of these revived knowledge of classical literature and made men thoroughly familiar with the religion of Greece and Rome. The latter gave the spiritual impulse and the intellectual freedom which have been at the root of all modern progress. Another century saw the dawning knowledge of the great religions of the East, obtained through travellers, missionaries, and commercial intercourse. It was this faint knowledge that was sufficient to lead the free-thinkers of France to suggest the setting up of Buddha, Confucius, Zoroaster, and Mahomet as rivals to the founders and apostles of Christianity. Every noble doctrine and moral excellence was attributed to the Oriental religions. Voltaire very naïvely attributed the superiority of the Chinese in morals, philosophy, and general culture to their ignorance of Christianity. Nothing else was needed to put an end to all the miseries and disputes of his day, but the adoption of the Chinese religion throughout Europe.

In the latter part of the eighteenth century (1783), Sir William Jones began the real work of revealing the great literatures of the East. His was the enviable vocation of adding a whole continent of literature to western wealth. A born philologist and lover of truth, like a young knight-errant, his enthusiasm rose to the level of his wonderful linguistic capacity. About the same time (1771) Anguetil du Perron, whose spirit and work were no less enthusiastic and much more romantic, opened to Europe the treasures of Persian literature. These leaders have ever since had devoted followers, profiting by all the modern means of investigation. Then Protestant missionaries, who, however, had been anticipated by Romish missionaries, began the accumulation of an enormous amount of ethnological and philological material; missionary dictionaries, grammars, and translations gave the apparatus for the study of many unknown languages. French, Danish, and German scholars in an

illustrious succession have labored on the same continent of learning.

The discovery of the Rosetta stone in 1799 was the key which Champollion used for unlocking the vast religious literature of Egypt, therewith opening the door to a library of monuments and papyri in myriads of volumes. A very romantic and impressive outcome of the study of Persian literature is that the modern disciples of Zoroaster—the Parsees of India, were first furnished with the meaning of their own sacred books through the labors of European learning. Until 1859 their language of worship was an unknown tongue. On the publication of Spiegel's translation, a wealthy Parsee gentleman, living in England, had it rendered into English and sent to his fellow worshippers for use in Bombay. In fact the whole course of these twin studies—comparative philology and religion—would make volumes of thrilling romance. The result is that we have a large and scientific material for the appreciative and comparative study of the faiths of the world. This, too, is now made accessible through the editing by Max Müller of "The Sacred Books of the East" in twenty-four volumes, twenty-one of which have already been published. But, with all this and abundantly more material, the task of judging justly these foreign religions is a difficult one. The personal equation comes in here as elsewhere to the prejudice of just comparison and truthful appreciation. This is seen in the three methods, or stages of method of this study, which we may style the eighteenth century Christian view, the old skeptical view, and the new scientific and Christian view.

I. The eighteenth century view was that all the religions of the world except Judaism and Christianity were false religions, the result of wickedness, priestcraft, delusion, fanaticism, or quackery. All other religions were disparaged that the Christian apologist might the better exalt and prove the supernatural origin of Christianity. This *a priori* view did not encourage a proper study of them. Indeed, in its special pleading, the evils, rather than the truths were eagerly sought for in them. The rigid line

of distinction between the converted and the unconverted in Christendom was extended into the classification of all religions as "Natural and Revealed," "False and True," or "Paganism and Christianity." Christianity was the wholly true, and heathen religions were the wholly false. They could not be considered as having any Divine significance. They were worse than no religion. They were corrupt, superstitious, and the offspring of fraud and delusion. The utmost allowed to them was the utterly perverted and darkened light of a primeval revelation. This pre-conceived theory held that all false religions were corruptions of the Jewish religion or offshoots of a perfect primeval revelation, which had come down from heaven ready made for perfectly developed man. But all remnants of that having utterly disappeared, there was nothing true in them, and no true faith exercised by their believers.

II. The eighteenth century skeptics cheerfully acquiesced in ascribing the origin of these religions to delusion and fraud, only going further and placing Christianity in the same category. But this view of the origin of Christianity by skeptics and of all religions by Christians has, I believe, once for all been abandoned. The relation of priestcraft to religion is found to be that of statecraft to nations—not that of creating, but that of created. Carlyle utters this fervid protest against the theory of quackery in reference to paganism and every other virile ism: "Quackery and dupery do abound; in religions, above all in the more advanced decaying stages of religions, they have fearfully abounded; but quackery was never the originating influence in such things; it was not the health and life of such things, but their disease, the sure precursor of their being about to die. Let us never forget this. It seems to me a most mournful hypothesis that of quackery giving birth to any faith even in savage men. Quackery gives birth to nothing; gives death to all things. We shall not see into the true heart of anything, if we merely look at the quackeries of it, if we do not reject the quackeries altogether as mere diseases and corruptions." In the same spirit he retorts upon those

who claim that Mahomedanism owed its triumph solely to the sword ; “ But where did it *get its sword?* ” Faith forged its sword and was the inspiration of its first armies.

Scholarly skepticism soon gave up this flimsy, unworthy and irreverent view of Voltaire, and began the course which we may represent as these three stages : 1st, that of looking for the good, true, and beautiful elements in all pagan religions ; 2d, that of tracing the origin and growth of all religion to the lowest forms extant—finding its ultimate source in the sensuous needs, the timidity, and terror which characterise the most barbarous tribes, so as to cast discredit upon it in all its later forms ; 3d, its latest and best phase, which, while finding the source of all religions in its lowest forms, generously, sometimes genuinely, maintains that its real value is not to be determined by its empirical origin or by the accidents of its outward history, but by its own inherent worth—by that to which it developed from very humble beginnings, making sacred anthologies, bestowing an ignorant admiration upon them in place of the sweeping condemnation of Christian writers ; seeking thus to depress Christianity the rather by exalting them to its level, or at least maintaining that Christianity is nothing more than a synthesis of the good and also of some of the evils of all previous religions. Evolution can do as great things for man’s religion as it can for man himself. Mr. Herbert Spencer’s recent article* on “ Religion ; a Retrospect and Prospect,” is the best statement of this phase of the modern skeptical view. He deliberately proposes the Ghost-theory origin of religion and follows through its various stages of evolution even to the far-off future millennium of the agnostic absolute religion. The man’s ghost or double is at first “ equally material with the original.” This is gradually dematerialised or deanthropomorphised into the present conceptions of God, which process is to go on until all conception is destroyed, and the idea sublimated in the unknowable,

* The Nineteenth Century, 1884. .

unnameable something or nothing which the coming agnostic man will nevertheless worship as truly and devoutly as his barbarous gnostic progenitor worshipped fetiches.

III. This brings us to what we may call the modern Christian scientific method. We might call it the Christian view of organic evolution. It is Spencer's evolution minus its materialism and plus a Divine Evolver. It is the Hegelian evolution minus its pantheism and plus the free personality of both God and man. It is that of *organic* evolution, with all that the adjective *organic* signifies, and with all the primary and continuous *involution*, that every evolution implies. We may accept the fact that the method of organic evolution is the method of the nineteenth century. We may be thankful for its merit, and use and baptise it with the Spirit of Him whose is all truth. We start then from the basis of the Christian consciousness, which has been formed by the facts of historical Christianity, applied and inwrought by the HOLY SPIRIT through the Christian centuries. It is the view of the Divine indwelling in the whole historical evolution conducting it to its conclusion. Its viewpoint of the faiths of the world is that of the Divine education of the race—the evident Providence in history. This fruitful idea, broached by Lessing, and anglicised by Bishop Temple, though hooted at by Orthodox, Evangelical, and Tractarian, is now regnant. But it is not wholly modern. It was the cherished view of the fathers of the Alexandrian School. Clement, who Neander says was the founder of the true view of history, opposing those who condemned all paganism as wholly false, declared that all the good in heathen religions "must, therefore, be included with all the rest in God's *plan of education* for the human race;" that Greek philosophy as well as the Jewish religion was a positive preparation for Christianity. Speaking of the progressive steps in the Divine education of humanity, he represents the Logos as the *θεῖος παιδαγωγός*, declaring: "All men belong to Him, some with consciousness of what He is to them, others as yet without it; some as friends, others

as faithful servants, others barely as servants." The doctrine of the whole school was that God had revealed Himself to all nations by his Logos, Christianity being his highest revelation, or a pleroma. Even earlier, Justin Martyr employed this view for setting forth Christianity as the central point, where all the hitherto scattered rays of the God-like in humanity converge—the absolute religion, in which all that has thus far been fragmentary and rent piecemeal, is brought together into a higher unity and for *comparing* all the partial and alloyed revelations of the λογὸς προφορικὸς with the full and unalloyed revelation of the absolute, Divine Logos in CHRIST. Thus early then we find the science of comparative religions, starting from the standpoint of the Christian consciousness. Thus the method of comparison was one of the apologetic tactics of the Greek Fathers of the Church. And the standard of comparison was the Christian consciousness. The comparative religious content of every pagan religion was its fragment of the pleroma of Christianity.

We may well accept this revived Christian method in this study. This method may be called *a priori*—a philosophy rather than a science. But it is both. For no science is without its metaphysical element, its intellectually vivifying principle, even if it be so bathetic as the philosophy of the Unknowable.

Let us, however, turn aside to notice briefly this method on its inductive side. The scientific study of religion consists in observation of facts, comparison of views, induction of principles and verification of these principles from the course of history, and finally the connected synthesis of all these results in a supra-scientific view—in a *Philosophy of Religion*—though this term may be objected to by both skeptic and Christian. Certain phenomena are by general consent classified as religious. These are to be noted, and, when occurring in different bodies of people, to be compared with each other, to see what they are, wherein they agree, and where they differ. It is primarily a department of natural history. All religious facts are to be noted, whether

enshrined in the form of myths, legend, story, dogma, ritual, or life. All its visible or historic phenomena are to be collated. Then comparison inevitably follows—a comparison of the sacred books, the teaching about God, duty, immortality, prayer, sacrifice, and life. It is to study these facts dispassionately, to aim at doing justice to all phases of this manifestation of the human spirit—to study them in the spirit of a judge, rather than that of the special pleader. This precludes the supposition that any form of religion is wholly false. It demands that we take an interest in the study of each one of them—an interest that is sure to come and increase with continued study. It demands a hospitable mind, that esteems everything human of interest. But thus science must pass on from this analytic to its synthetic stage. Deeply impressed by the fact that man is eminently and everywhere a religious being—that the highest and truest history of any nation or age is the history of its religion, the student of this science unavoidably finds himself trying to generalise definitions of religion, God, revelation, that are either implicit or explicit in all religions. From *Religions* he passes by synthesis to *Religion*, and then turns back upon his previous study to read the laws of its development—to read its course either as a progressive Divine revelation and education, or as the necessary dialectic of the idea. Development of some kind is assumed by all. We may call it the nineteenth century postulate in regard to all life and institutions. It is the philosophy that underlies its science, the metaphysic of all its physics. Thus all, Christian or skeptic, are led unavoidably from the mere science of Religion to a Philosophy of Religion, which indeed is implicit, and vitalises its every form as a science.

But the contest with the skeptic is not here, as it is not with the facts collated and classified by the science. Indeed we may go further, and yet not be at the real issue. All comparison both presupposes and produces a standard of comparison. That standard we may say is Christianity, and not be challenged by any one. All grant that Christianity is the highest and best form of

religion—the standard of comparison for measuring all others. CHRIST is formally at least invited to the highest seat in the world's Pantheon.

Before noticing more at length the method and its results we may briefly indicate the crucial point, whence issues, in theory, the life or death of all religion.

It is when we ask, *what is religion*, what its cause, subject-matter, worth, reality, and final end? Skeptics say in fact, though often in most graceful and euphemistic periphrasis, that it is wholly an illusion, beneficent or baleful, a necessary product or a parasitic excrescence of human life. The question, What is religion? must and will be asked. And to be answered it must pass through the laboratory of science and the crucible of philosophic intelligence. Has it an imperishable substance of reality, or are its visible forms only held up by the sand-ropes of illusion, prejudice, and ignorance? Has it concrete reality, or is it, as with Herbert Spencer, only apotheosised ignorance? And thus it merges into the larger question which includes that of the reality of all our knowledge—into the ultimate philosophic question of knowing and being. The answer divides thinkers to-day into the two schools of skepticism and faith, of total agnosticism, and of partial but real gnosticism, without which GOD, the world, science, and philosophy are dead, and the inexplicable puppet man ought to cease to think, speak, and be. Silence unutterable is the only becoming companion of ignorance absolute.

But leaving agnosticism, which has no defence—no root or ground in the universe, we take the other philosophical view of Natural Realism, or of the reality of knowing and being, in a concrete organic nexus of living relations. Being, knowledge, life, all of these imply and may best be viewed under the method of development—the process of vital, organic, progressive relations.

We may be told that we have only finite knowledge and being. But real answer is made when we show that our finite portions are not isolated, but that they are in organic connection with their correlative, infinite and absolute being and knowledge—that man and man's history

have never been isolated from his other infinite side of being, that his connection with Absolute Spirit has been as real and continuous as his connection with the earth—that in God, all men have lived, and moved, and had their quantum of real being. The mechanical isolation of God, the world and man, the complete and essential separation of concrete man from absolute spirit, of his self-consciousness, from the element of God-consciousness, this old barren mechanico-logical view, which is responsible for much intellectual skepticism, can no longer be held. Real logic is found to be a process, and is manifested in all life and not in the forms of the syllogism. Man's being and knowledge are processes in organic relation to God. These relations are implicit in every man's life, but come into the conscious experience gradually. We need not reply to the exclamation—What an assumption! when it is that which alone gives reality to anything; when it is positively given in self-consciousness and its implications.

It is in this implicit organic relation of man with God that we find the root of religion. From this we may educe a definition of religion and trace its conscious evolution or “coming to itself,” in the historical life of the race, with which it is conterminous.

We may briefly define religion as the conscious relation of a man to God. We may amplify this and say that it is the process of man's coming to full realisation of the implicit relations of his own consciousness—the process of man's feeling after God and finding Him, in whom all live and who is not far from, but in organic relation with, every one of his own offspring, though they worship Him ignorantly. It is the surrender of the partial, isolated self to its truer self—the striving after real life in conscious identity of mind and will with the Divine, that the old, false, fragmentary self may no longer live but give place to the realisation of the perfect life—its native dower, its forfeited birthright. It is the truest life of man in communion with God, attempts after which give various expression to that latent consciousness of an infinite Being and Life which is bound up

with man's very nature as a rational and spiritual being.

But all this definition gives only one side, and that the *finite* side of the religious relation. If we are in organic relation with GOD and seek to realise this—if we seek after the living GOD, it is no less true that GOD seeks after us His offspring, seeks to manifest His part of the vital relation, to reveal Himself unto us. He does not sit in the inaccessible heavens and watch us vainly striving to fall upward to His feet. GOD is not foreign to man His creature—His wisdom and love are in vital relation with Him, for of Him, and through Him, and in Him are all things. If man's spiritual nature can only fulfil or realise itself in union with GOD, there must be some vital relation of GOD with man. Of an organic relation, all parts are vital. And this is the truth slighted alike by deist and pantheist, and many professedly Christian writers upon the philosophy of religion. It is sufficient to mention Hegel in place of many of our own day.

Combining the two sides, we may better define religion as the *reciprocal communion of GOD and man*. It is the product of this double attempt to realise this organic relation. But its GOD-ward side is its deepest and strongest—GOD striving to so manifest Himself to us that we may know, love, and live in Him. Revelation is, therefore, a constituent of all religion, and is an historic process as well as man's side of religion—a process that includes the revelation to primeval man, the continuous natural revelation through nature, history, conscience, and life, and all special revelations—all manifestations of the infinite Divine side of man's environment.

This definition of religion is the product of the study of the various religions, and in turn the test to try the measure and worth of each, and its place in the progressive development. That there has been an organic development of religion, the Christian much more than the skeptic is bound to hold. That there has been a providential control of the religious experience of mankind means, too, that there has been an order of progress—"first the blade, then the ear, afterward the full

corn in the ear." The religious experience of the world, followed intelligently through its historic manifestations, gives us the stages of this evolution, of what was from the beginning involved in man's destiny or true nature. At any step in any phase of this experience we may put this measuring test—how much divine light and love, and how much human response to it is to be found here? We may begin at the lowest recorded stage, though we may never begin at the ultimate origin, which neither tradition nor historic research can penetrate, and trace its course to its fulness. But this does not imply, and research does not show, that this process is identical with the successive phenomena of the religious history of particular races, or with the chronological order in which the various religions have succeeded each other. The colligation of facts is only the primary step in the science of religion. Then comes interpretation, or the finding of intelligence, order, progress—the eliciting the hidden presence of rational relations, of an objective reason, of God's activity—in the collated and compared religious facts of the world. Every science starts with the pre-supposition that its subject-matter is intelligible, that there is reason or thought in it, which it seeks to exegete. The student of the religious experience of mankind makes only the same pre-supposition. He traces the steps of this intelligence by viewing his material in the light of the definition of essential religion, and by comparison with it he determines the relation of the various religions to each other.

This gives him the true classification of religions, instead of the prejudiced classification of "natural and spiritual," or the arbitrary and inadequate division into "polytheistic and monotheistic." Passing by all external and arbitrary resemblances, which oftentimes are most wonderful, and all differences, which oftentimes are only dialects of expression, we ask, to what extent each religion fulfils or realises the fundamental idea of religion? The answer determines the moment in the process that each represents. And the working out of the answer is the task of the comparative study of religions involving a de-

tailed examination of the religions of the world. The labors in this work have been abundant. Dr. J. Freeman Clarke in his sympathetic study of "The Ten Great Religions" gives a good bibliography on this science. It is sufficient to refer to his list of authors and works, including those given in the preface of Part II. of this valuable work.

To this definition and method of religion two objections will be raised. The first is that the idea of an organic development of religion reduces it to a merely natural growth and gives no assurance of its objective truth. This arises from the materialism and the pantheism that have largely but wrongly claimed the method as their own. With them there is no place for the free personality of God and of man. It becomes merely a physical or a metaphysical process of necessary development. But to yield the method to these now almost united views, is neither wise nor right. The organic unity of the free personality of God and of man leads to an organic development of this relation in historic processes which are neither merely physical nor metaphysical, but are concrete freedom. We have risen far above the old theological antinomy between God's Sovereignty and man's freedom. The solution, or rather the comprehension of this antinomy is essentially also that of this question of an organic development of religion. It is identical with it.

The second objection to this method will come from its implying an *essential* relation between Christianity and other religions—an incorporation of Christianity into the unity of the idea and the history of religion. This objection is overstated when it is asserted that this view reduces Christianity to the level of other religions, or at least implies that it is the result of their synthesis. But this it need not and does not imply. Christianity is easily differentiated from other religions even under this method, as the absolute religion, in the sense of being the perfect realisation of the idea which underlies and gives significance to all others. All Christians claim that Christianity stands in organic connection with Judaism, both

being parts of a gradually developing system, and draw from this one of the strongest arguments for the Divine origin of Christianity. But can we refuse to extend this connection in some degree to other religions? If the heathen nations were subject to a providential training, if God was in their history in any degree, as all grant, is not this relation essentially granted? Rome's work of the unification of mankind and Greece's work of philosophy have indeed always been allowed to come into this organic connection, but only, as it were, by a side door. As a matter of fact, the Greeks and Romans were found more ready to receive Christianity than were the Jews. It was this that startled the Apostle S. Paul, who soon came to recognise a true seeking and finding through an ignorant worship of God underneath their superstition. It will not do to eviscerate his speech on Mar's Hill by pronouncing it "a masterpiece of ingenuity and eloquence." He believed what he said.

Indeed, the extending of this connection to others, beside Judaism, only strengthens the argument for the Divine origin of Christianity. Not only Judea, but the whole world becomes a theatre for preparation for it, the whole order of human history pointing to CHRIST, who was the true "desire of all nations." Philosophy demands this, and much more does theology; for the doctrine of God, as Light and Love, without whose notice not even a sparrow falls to the ground, necessitates us to take it, and thus to read the history of all religions as the record of His manifestation and of man's very imperfect apprehension and acceptance. God cannot be wholly banished from any human history. Christian apologists to-day point out how Christianity meets "the unconscious longings of heathendom," and trace anticipations of Christian doctrine and guesses at truth in pre-Christian religions. It is even allowed that their vitality came from some lingering elements of a primeval revelation. It is also pointed out that CHRIST came "in the fulness of times." Divine Providence is allowed to have made external preparations for His advent, such as the facilities that the Roman empire and the Greek language afforded

for the diffusion of Christianity. But, as another has said : " It is surely not a less reverential view, to trace a deeper preparation in the movements of men's minds, in the convergence of manifold spiritual tendencies, in the gradual discipline of the human consciousness for the reception of the universal religion," and in the gradual human apprehension of Divine truth in the various religions. It is a shallow and irreverent conception, which regards all pre-Christian seeking after God, and all pre-Christian seeking of God after men, as abortive experiments, the outcome being utter failures and worse than no religion, and their preparation for Christianity merely negative. The method of comparative religion will not admit this conception. Neither will it admit, nor does it involve the concession that there is nothing more in Christianity than a synthesis " of pre-existing elements, or that its originality consists simply in the reproduction, in collective form, of ideas contained in the religious, philosophical, and ethical systems of the ancient world." In reply to such a conception of Christianity, Dr. John Caird* has well said that " it is not more historically improbable than it is inconsistent with the true idea of organic development, which is absolutely antagonistic to any such a notion as that Christian doctrine is a mere compound of Greek, Oriental, and Jewish ingredients. To apply the ideal of development to human history is by no means to find in the old the mechanical or efficient cause of the new. For in organic development, the new, though presupposing the old, involves the introduction of a wholly original element not given in the old. Hence we are not to conceive that Christianity could be elaborated out of pre-Christian religions and philosophies, any more than that life could be elaborated out of inorganic matter. But the connection of Christianity with the past, which we here assert, is a connection which at the same time involves the annulling and transmuting of the past by a new creative spiritual force. To assert it, therefore, is to hold that Christianity neither borrows

* *Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 354, 355.

nor reproduces the imperfect notions of God, be they pantheistic, dualistic, or anthropomorphic, in which the religions of the old world had embodied themselves. In the light of this idea we can perceive these imperfect notions yielding up, under the transforming influence of Christianity, whatever elements of truth lay hid in them, whilst that which was arbitrary and false falls away and dies. Thus, whatever elements of truth, whatever broken and scattered rays of light the old religions contained, Christianity takes up into itself, explaining all, harmonizing all, by a Divine alchemy transmuting all—yet immeasurably transcending all—‘gathering together in one all things in heaven and earth’ in its ‘revelation of the mystery hid from ages’ the revelation of One who is at one and the same time FATHER, SON, and SPIRIT—‘above all, through all, and in all.’”

Indeed, it is not without supposing the human race to have been annihilated and a new race created, out of all connection with the former, as the recipient of Christianity, that we can think of it other than as being essentially, organically related with the whole antecedent course of man’s religious life. This method does not prejudge either how much or how little real movements of the process are found in any of the pre-Christian religions. It does not indeed assert *a priori* that Christianity is the absolute religion, the pleroma, which fulfils all religions as it does Judaism, with something infinitely above them, though implicit in the lowest. But this we may say is a result, granted by all, of a fair comparison—a result too from its fulfilling the definition given of religion. Being the concrete idea of religion, it thus becomes, like it, the standard of comparison. Nor can it, as the absolute religion, be divorced from its historical origin. The facts of the Apostles’ Creed will ever continue to be the basis of its special apology. For comparative religion is all in the air, when it leaves the concrete historical basis, at any moment of the process. But being, in its historical manifestation, the absolute religion, that is, the perfect realisation of the idea which underlies and gives significance to all religions, Christi-

anity becomes the concrete standard of comparison. We thus pass from the assertion that Christianity cannot be fully understood unless viewed as in organic relation to ethnic religions, to the assertion that these can only be understood when viewed in relation to Christianity—that Christianity is the only religion, from which, and in relation to which all other religions may be viewed in an impartial and truthful manner, and their significance as steps in the process of the revelation of the ideal and true relations of God and man be appreciated. Wherever there is any religion there is some revelation. In the absolute religion there is perfect revelation, which subsumes all previous revelations and passes on to special revelation, in the whole historic setting of the Incarnation—the perfect union of God and man.

The implications, inferences, illustrations, and the present results of the application of this method in the study of the “Faiths of the world,” are as innumerable as they are interesting. But notice of these is the work not of an article or series of articles, but the appropriate task of the great science of comparative religion. These indeed are as interesting as the statement of the method may seem dull. But the method is necessary to the attainment of the best and truest results of the science. A false method is cultivated in this science which yields anti-Christian and even atheistic inferences—which issues not in life but death. But this is due to false method, not to the real character of the study itself, which is a realm of human experience demanding study. For the science is an overwhelming demonstration, not only that man was made for religion, but also of the perfect religion for which he was made, and which was made for him—realised and being realised for him as briefly set forth in the Creeds of the Church.

J. MACBRIDE STERRETT.

THE RELATION OF ENGLISH TO AMERICAN CHURCH LAW.

THE relation of English Church Law to American Church Law involves many questions of great importance. And I undertake this essay rather in the hope that I may suggest some considerations of a pretty fundamental character which may help toward a final solution of those questions, than with any expectation or intention of settling any of them by means of anything that I may say.

I. Law, as the word is intended to be understood and used in this essay, is a rule or action that has come to be accepted as having such sanction and authority that all persons ought to regard it as a matter of conscience to follow and be guided by it, and of such importance and authority, moreover, that all persons may be justly compelled to observe and follow it, or be punished for not doing so.

In this sense the law in every well-ordered community, whether civil or ecclesiastical, consists of three parts or elements:

1. Such principles and usages as have arisen out of the necessities, instincts, and common-sense of mankind, relating to their dealings and relations with one another as members of such a community. This, in the earlier stages, constitutes the *unwritten* common law. No community can exist without some such rules and recognised principles of action. No two persons can walk together, unless they are agreed in regard to at least some of the things that are to be done or left undone by them.

This common law—the *lex non scripta*—is the basis

and starting-point of all laws, whether legislative enactments or judicial determinations. And it may be as well to notice the fact that even this common law may be regarded as consisting of two elements (1), that which grows out of the nature of man, and (2) those usages which grow up apparently out of mere circumstances and accidents, and are adopted into use by common consent and the acquiescence of all persons.

2. In every civil or civilised community there arise occasions for the adjudication of disputed questions or disputes between members of that community. This adjudication is the function of a court, and the determination is based, to a large extent, at least, upon the unwritten common law. But after a principle has been once formulated and stated in this way, or by this means, as a principle of law, it becomes a part of the *written* law, and is recognised as such; and after it has been accepted and acquiesced in for a series of years, it comes to be regarded as so sacred and obligatory that no person—not even a judge, acting in his official capacity—is expected or allowed to depart from it.

3. Then, lastly, there arise, in the progress of communities, occasions for legislative enactments. By the increase of population, and the changes that will occur in their condition and occupations, it will sometimes come to pass that a law which has been wise and just hitherto will operate badly in the altered condition of men and things. New cases also may arise for which there has been hitherto no provision of law and no occasion for any. In all such cases the proper remedy is an act of legislation—the making of a new law. In this way, and for this reason, we come to have statute law. And these three elements are found in what is called “the law” of every community.

II. When any system of law has grown up in this way it has a strong hold upon the hearts and consciences of the people—so much so that it seems to be a part of their nature—a part of the instincts which seem to be but the common-sense of mankind.

Hence, in all cases of the conquest of one nation, or

part of a nation, by another, the conquest does not change this common law any further than the change in the sovereignty makes a change necessary. The laws that relate to contracts and the private rights and relations of the individuals one to another, the constitution of their courts and the mode of procedure in them, and even to a large extent the very officers who interpret and administer the law, remain as before.

Or again: if a part of the people of any nation go off and colonise in any place that is not under the recognised sovereignty of any other nation, they take with them their laws. And if it should so happen that they have no officers to administer these laws, they organise a community and appoint officers for that purpose; but the old laws are still in force, except in so far as change of country and of circumstances may make the old laws inapplicable, until they are changed or repealed by competent authority in the new community.

This principle was well illustrated by the colonists who settled this country from England. The laws which they brought with them and regarded as in force here contained elements of the three kinds named. Acts of Parliament were in force here until superseded or repealed by competent legislation, either here or in the old country. But the general principles of the common law were considered permanent. In many of the colonies this principle was declared after the Revolution, when the colonies had become States independent of the sovereignty of the mother country; and in others it was assumed by the courts and acted upon on general principles.

Now, what was true of the Civil or Common Law in the States was true of the ecclesiastical or Canon Law in the Church. And this I assert not only on the ground of the general principle I have stated, but it is confirmed by the express declarations of the Church itself.

In the Preface to our Prayer Book we read, "the attention of this Church was, in the first place, drawn to those alterations in the Liturgy which became necessary in the prayers for our civil rulers in consequence of the

Revolution.” But the Preface adds, “this Church is far from intending to depart from the Church of England in any essential point of Doctrine, Discipline, or Worship, or further than local circumstances require;” that is, as I understand it, they did not intend to depart from the Church of England *at all* in any essential point of doctrine, discipline, or worship, nor in any other, though *un*essential matter, any further than local circumstances might make it necessary to do so.

This emphatic declaration in the Preface to the Prayer Book might be confirmed by many other authorities, if it were thought necessary.

The doctrine thus stated becomes the more explicit for us when we consider that the Preface to the Prayer Book already cited defines very precisely the scope of the legislation referred to. It says: “In every Church what cannot be clearly determined to belong to Doctrine must be referred to Discipline.” Hence, when the Prayer Book says that it is not intended to depart from either Doctrine, Discipline, or Worship, it must include in the scope of the statement all and whatever is embraced in the Canon or Ecclesiastical Law. And under the head of Discipline, as the word is here used, we must have the two parts—morality, or personal conduct, and ritual, or the official conduct of the clergy.

III. Thus far we have followed the analogy between the Church and the State, the Civil and the Canon Law, and it seems to be very complete. But we come now to a point where the analogy, as I think, does not hold, and the relation becomes one of contrast rather. And the mistake—as I cannot but regard it—which has very generally been made has not only led to great diversities of opinion but to many errors in the result.

1. In the first place, it has been assumed that inasmuch as there is an analogy between the organisation of our nation and the subordinate States on the one hand, and the Church, with its General Convention, and the subordinate Dioceses on the other, there is in the Ecclesiastical law an analogy, in regard to its adoption or force, with the Common law, and the same principle

must prevail in the one case as in the other. Now, as the Common law of England did not enter into and form any part of our *national* law, the Church law, it is held, cannot enter into, form any part of, or have any force in our Canon law of the Church at large.

It is quite true that to a certain extent English law had no force in our United States courts as such. But it has defined for us the courts, given us the rules of proceeding, etc., in those courts, and the doctrine referred to was found to be so grave in its consequences that Congress, to remedy the evil, passed a law giving to the United States courts Common law jurisdiction to a very large extent (Revised Statutes, title xiii., ch. 7, sec. 629, and ch. 3, sec. 563).

But the mistake is in the analogy. Our *nation* was a new creation. It was no perpetuation of the English nation. It, of course, therefore, had no law as a body politic, except that which it itself had made. Its Constitution was new. It defined its own laws as "The Constitution," "Acts of Congress," and "Treaties." These three embraced and included all the laws that the United States, *as a nation*, was understood to have, and its courts were created to interpret and administer those laws and no others, except in cases that might arise where either from the citizenship of the parties or the place where the cause of action had arisen, the laws of the States or some one of them might come up for administration.

The Church, however, is not a *new* institution. The State, that is, the nation, was not regarded as a continuance and perpetuation of Great Britain and its laws and principles of civil polity; but the Church was regarded as a continuance and perpetuation of the English Church, its Doctrine, Discipline, and Worship, a branch of the English Church, as the English Church was a branch of the One Catholic Church.

In this case the analogy is between the Church of England and the States, rather than between England and the national government. The people of the States came here with the Common law, they organised with

it as their basis and code of laws, and they retained that code and its principles, all the laws of England, in full force, including Parliamentary statutes, except in so far as they had been repealed or had become inapplicable and impracticable through change of circumstances, or in the form of government.

What, therefore, the English civil law was *to the States*, separately and individually, that the English Church law was to the Church *in the United States*, rather than to the diocesan organisations that were effected in the States. And the Church at large sustains, in this respect, the same relation to the laws of the Church of England as the several States in the Union do to the laws of the realm of England, as those laws were when our forefathers asserted and gained their independence.

2. Another very important difference is in the seat of power or authority in the two bodies, the Church and the State.

With us the theory is that in the State all authority resides in the people. They form and adopt their State Constitutions; they elect their officers, and confer on them, by that election, all the authority they are supposed to have to make, interpret, or enforce the laws. Then, too, the people made the Constitution of this national government; and they give to it and its officers all their authority, all the right they have to be and to do anything. And they have expressly declared that the United States Government was created for a limited purpose, and to act with limited powers; and they have provided that the powers which are not expressly conferred upon the general government or prohibited to the States by the Constitution, are reserved to the States or to the people of the States (Amendment X.).

But in the Church it is quite otherwise. Here all authority comes from the Great Head of the Church. He founded it and gave it the power of perpetuating itself through all time, and extending itself throughout the world. With us, therefore, *power* in the Church *comes down from Above*, and it comes along the line of the

Church, and especially of its Bishops. Hence, wherever there are Bishops, Clergy, and people, there is Church authority. And whether Church authority may be exercised without the consent and co-operation of the people—the laity—and the lower orders of the Clergy or not, I will not stop to inquire, and do not intend to affirm or assume *pro* or *con*. But there is no doubt, I suppose, that the people—the mere laity—are not in and by themselves alone, a Church—not a source of Church law, or capable of creating any such law, or a court, convention, or other body capable of making law, and exercising Church authority without Bishops and Clergy.

3. Again our Dioceses are not the creation of the people. Nor did the people, whether acting as Dioceses or not, create the General Convention and give to it its Constitution. Bishops, Clergy, *and* people came together, and acting as an ecclesiastical authority, they organised a General Convention; the reserve of power is *with them*; they can propose amendments to the Constitution whenever they are in session; these proposed amendments they send down to the Dioceses. But the Dioceses need take no action upon them. Their assent or consent is not necessary to the adoption of the amendments. Nay, it is possible—though I presume it will never occur—that the General Convention may, after such preliminary steps, adopt an amendment after it has been disapproved and voted against in every Diocese in the land.

Here, then, the contrast is complete. And as we say in regard to matters of State and secular law, the powers that are not conferred on the General Government are reserved to the States or *to the people*; so we may say in the Church, and with reference to Ecclesiastical law, that whatever authority and power is not given or conceded to the Dioceses and to the people thereof, is reserved in the hands of the Provincial or National Church, to be exercised by the General Convention and the Bishops thereof.

4. I refer to another very important point of difference between the two codes, and the administration of them,

which I think has been overlooked, and the neglect has led, as I think, many of the writers whom I have consulted into mistakes or confusion.

In all civil codes there are two kinds of laws, the one is sometimes called *private* law, because it relates to the private relations of subjects or citizens to one another, and the other is called *public* or criminal law, because it is assumed to relate to the relations of the subject or citizen to the government or the sovereignty. Out of the one class of the laws arise what are called *civil* actions, and out of the other arise *criminal* suits. In a civil suit the suit is brought and prosecuted by some one who has sustained a wrong, as tort or breach of contract, for the purpose of enforcing the specific performance of the contract or for the recovery of damages. In criminal suits the suit is brought and prosecuted by the State, and the defendant, if the suit goes against him, is *convicted of a crime* and punished accordingly; the party who may have sustained damage by the wrong act gets no redress or recompense as a consequence of this conviction.

Now, in any of our courts the civil actions brought to settle the questions of right as between citizens form the largest part of the cases that come before the court. Not only so, but it is in the determination of these suits that the Common law, the English Common law, and even in some cases the unwritten law, is of use, and is, in fact, indispensable. A suit of this kind may not be dismissed for want of a law applicable to the case. A law, and *the* law, is supposed to exist if not written in the books, yet contained *in gremio magistratus*. And if it cannot be found anywhere in the books, it must be drawn from that recondite source. And when found it is propounded, a case is settled by it; and if it is acquiesced in by the people generally, or if it is adopted by the court of last resort, it becomes thenceforward a part of the written law. It constitutes a part of what is sometimes called judge-made law.

But in the ecclesiastical courts proper there are no cases of this kind. The law may be, and in fact it is, a guide in the performance of one's duty. But if the law

is not observed, there is nothing like a civil suit that can be brought. No one member may sue another at law and recover damages for *non-feasance* or *mal-feasance*—no suit for tort or breach of contract,* but only a *criminal* suit—a complaint for an offence—a violation—by action, or possibly by inaction, of some law for which the offender may be punished.

The accused is put on trial. *He* is himself on trial—it is not the suit or case that is on trial as between parties to a civil suit. And if the suit goes against him, he is punished—reprimanded—admonished—suspended—degraded from the Ministry, or possibly excommunicated from the Church. But there is no recovery of damages. It is not a question of dollars and cents. It is a question of guilt or innocence, of obedience to or violation of law. The question is not whether the one party has endamaged the rights of others, violated a contract, or committed a tort; but it is whether he has obeyed the law or broken it, in violation of his Ordination vows, contrary to his obligations to the Church and its officers, and his duty to the Great Head of the Church.

Now, although we hear and read of “crimes at Common law,” I am inclined to think that such language refers mainly to things and times that are past. Undoubtedly in all nations and countries there was a time when many things that ought not to be done had not been forbidden or prohibited by any statute or written law, which, nevertheless, would and ought to be punished by the magistrate. There are cases of wrong and outrage that could not be reached and remedied by any merely civil process. Hence the act must be treated not as a tort, but as a crime, or go unnoticed altogether. But with the progress of civilisation men became very jealous of their rights, and very anxious to know beforehand what they might do with impunity, and what they might not do without incurring the displeasure of the

* Possibly a suit of this kind might be brought in the *civil* courts to recover damages of a clergyman for non-performance of some duty on his part whereby the plaintiff had sustained pecuniary damage, or damage that could be computed and measured by money.

sovereign and the penalty of the laws. And I presume that this has gone so far in most or all our States that there is nowhere a place or a court in which a man may be proceeded against and deprived of "life, liberty, or property," as a penalty for a crime committed, without there being some statute, some positive enactment, in which the act has been described, prohibited, and a penalty prescribed for the offender when he shall have been duly convicted of the offence.

IV. If I am right in this there is a very important sense in which it may be said that the Common law or the laws of England are not in force or recognised in this country as any part of our criminal code. That law may be cited for the definition of terms, for guidance in proceedings; but no one can be tried, convicted, and punished for merely having violated an English law, which has not been re-enacted and incorporated with our laws in this country by some competent legislative enactment.

If, therefore, any one should look to our ecclesiastical courts for any such recognition of the English Church law as he finds of the English Common law in the practice of our civil courts in civil cases, he would look in vain. The comparison should be made between our ecclesiastical courts and the trial of *criminal* cases in the civil courts of the land. And I think he would find, in fact, a very much larger recognition of the English law in our Church trials, in proportion to the number we have had of them, than he would find of the English Common law in the trials that are conducted in our criminal courts.

With regard, therefore, to offences for which one may be tried in this country, I presume there is no one which could rest on English law alone—no one that has not been described and prohibited as a crime or offence by some one of our own Canons.

But although I think that English Church law is not in force in this country in any such sense that it can be made the ground or basis of any proceedings against any one, I think it is in force so far, and in such a way, that it

may be a rule and guide to action ; and a defence and protection *against* prosecution, in so far as it has not been either expressly repealed or set aside by common and continual disuse.

And, in fact, our Church has expressly declared (Can. 2 of Title II.) what are the "offences for which Ministers may be tried and punished." There are five items, one of which, the fifth is, "Any act which involves a breach of his Ordination vows."

Manifestly, therefore, no man can be tried and punished in this Church for any act regarded as an "offence" which is not included in one of these five groups—any act, therefore, which is merely a violation of any English Church law, however explicit, unless that act is included in one of these classes and forbidden by our law.

But English Church law is, nevertheless, of great value and force in the exercise of discipline and the conducting of Church trials. Its principles, like those of the Common law in criminal trials in all our civil courts, whether State or national, are the common basis upon which we proceed. We resort to it for a definition of our terms, the meaning of words, and for suggestions and helps at every step. It is virtually that common-sense, or the source of it, which every person present in the court and taking part in its proceedings is supposed to have and to exercise. The words in which "the ordination vows" are expressed are largely derived from the English, and we resort to their Church law, if need be, to determine their meaning when we bring a Clergyman to trial for an offence of this kind—"an act that involves a breach of his vows." We must ascertain and determine precisely what those vows mean before we can find any one guilty of an act that either violates or "implies a violation" of any one of them.

V. But with us discipline is not exercised exclusively by way of trial and punishment. Obedience to the Bishop and other chief officers in the Church, and a willing submission to their "godly admonitions" is one of the vows or promises that are made by every one when he enters the Ministry. And there are provisions

for "admonition" on the part of a Bishop without any trial (see Sec. ii., Can. 3, Title II.) See also Sec. ii., Can. 22, Title I., which expressly provides for "admonition" without formal trial, though under the "advice" of the Standing Committee, for certain offences in performing the Service. That this canon means to provide for "admonition" in certain cases without previous "trial" in the proper and technical sense of the word, is made certain by the words in the Proviso to Section ii.: "*Provided* that nothing herein contained shall prevent the presentment, trial, and punishment of any Minister under the provisions of Sec. i., Can. 2, Title II., of the Digest." That is, if the Bishop's Standing Committee or others named in the Can. 1, of Title II., shall see fit to present the offender for trial, he will have a trial; if not, the Bishop, with the advice of the Standing Committee, may adjudge him to have offended, admonish him, and warn him to do so no more.

Now this department of our Church discipline extends over and includes a very large field. Within it the Bishop has doubtless much to guide him besides the English law. He has, or should have, common-sense and good sound theology. He has, or should have, a knowledge of all the canons of our Church, and the decisions of our courts, if there have been any that are pertinent to the case. He should also know the usages that have prevailed and been approved or allowed in our Church. He should also know the opinions in regard to the matter that have been held and expressed by the wisest men in our Church. But after all there will be need of recourse to the English Church law, as a light and a guide, without which all else that he may have will be insufficient and leave him in constant danger of going wrong, and taking a step that will be a cause of regret and must sooner or later be retraced.

In this way and to this extent English Church law is in force in this country, in so far as it has not ceased to have the force of law by either (1) direct repeal, or (2) by common and continued disuse. It is of force, and is law for us as a guide to actions in the performance of duty,

but not as the basis of a criminal procedure or punishment. It is of use in defining terms, and in the guidance of those in authority in the performance of their official duty, but not in use or of force as a defence against the requirements of our canons, or the godly admonitions of those in authority. It is in use and of force for all the purposes of order, and the churchly performance of duties; but not as a means of official tyranny, factious opposition, unreasonable crotchets, senseless whims, and personal eccentricities.

VI. And here we encounter two questions of some difficulty and delicacy. How far has the English Church law which was in force when our ancestors came to this country either (1) been repealed by Church action in this country since that time, or (2) lost its force by general and continued disuse?

1. We may consider the English Church law as it was at that time as consisting of three elements: 1st, express declarations of Holy Scripture; 2d, canons and usages having canonical force which originated in, and had come down from, the Catholic Church before the division of the East and West, including the canons and symbols of the General Councils; and, 3d, that part which, whether as canon, usage, or Episcopal prescription, had originated in England and was peculiar to the English Church.

I suppose it will be conceded that no repeal has been effected of any part of the first and second elements named above. And it may be doubted if we have any right or power to repeal or supersede any of the provisions or principles of either of these branches or parts of the Church law.

But as to the third element, what the Church of England may have originated in its capacity as a Provincial Church, or, rather, as a Provincial branch of the One Church, the case is quite different. In regard to all such matters we claim to be her equal, and to have the right which she as well as we have asserted; "Every particular or national Church hath authority to ordain, change, and abolish ceremonies or rites of the Church

ordained only by man's authority, so that all things be done to edifying" (Art. XXXIV.).

But of this third part of the English Church law there are the three elements spoken of at the beginning of this article as necessarily entering into the code of every community that is at all advanced in civilisation: (1) the *unwritten* common law, the prevalent usages and customs; (2) the written law that rests only on recognition and declaration by competent judicial authority; and (3) the positive law which rests upon enactments by the legislative authority.

With regard to this latter element in any code, I suppose it is a well-settled principle that no such law can be set aside, or deprived of its proper force, except by legislative enactment. It cannot lose its force by disuse, however common or long continued. It cannot be set aside and declared invalid by any court or judicial tribunal, for such an act would be an assumption of legislative authority. (The case of a court's declaring a law invalid on account of a conflict with the Constitution is peculiar to this country, and need not be considered here.) There is indeed always a disinclination to *enforce* any law resting upon a mere statute enactment that has fallen into general disfavor and neglect. And in the Church most manifestly it would be unwise to attempt to enforce such a law. But in theory it is there, and in full force.

With regard to the second element, a law that rests on judicial determinations, the usual remedy and the best remedy is an act of the Legislature changing the law. But yet it is not without precedent and recognised authority for a court of highest authority and last resort to *reconsider* such a principle of law, and, as the phrase is, *overrule* it, declaring it to be no longer in force, and substituting something quite different in its place.

Nothing of this kind has occurred, however, so far as I know, in this country in a matter of Church law, nor do I think it likely that a case of this kind will occur.

But that which constitutes the *unwritten* Common law, and rests merely upon usage and habit, ceases to have

the force of law as soon as it ceases to be a usage, a part of a common habit and understanding of men. I remember a case in the civil courts in which one of the parties claimed the right to what is known as the "three days of grace" in banking, on the ground that, although there was no law, statute or judicial, there was the common usage, amounting to a principle of law, in his favor. And the court sustained that view. But it held that the party must show that the custom was commonly understood and universally practised, and that a practice which had been allowed to go out of use, or to be omitted, had no longer the force of law.

Hence, manifestly, whatever was in use as a mere usage in the English Church when our ancestors came here, can be no longer of force as Church law, if it has not been continued in use until this time; and if it has been so continued it has come to have, by usage in this country, all the force it then had in consequence of usage there.

2. With regard to direct repeal, made avowedly and with the intention of changing the law, there can be no doubt, if only the act was passed by a body having competent authority for such an act. There are, however, some cases of difficulty that occur in the matter, or perhaps rather in the manner of the repeal.

Some of the provisions of a law may be repealed incidentally and by necessary inference, as when in re-enacting a law, a word or phrase is omitted which before formed a part of the law; or again, by the insertion of some new phrase or provision that is inconsistent with the old law. But it is certainly possible that in re-enacting or in codifying a law, words may be changed or left out with no intention of changing the law. *Something* is always implied which is not explicitly stated in the enactment of a law. And a usage which once needed an express statement in the provision of a law, may have become so common and so well understood and appreciated, that on the re-enactment of the law for amendments or emendations, it is no longer necessary to make express mention of this one particular. In such a case the

omission could hardly be regarded, in any fair interpretation and legal application of the law, as a repeal.

Or again, there are cases in which the omission of a phrase may operate not so much as a repeal of the obligation to do what it prescribes, as a prohibition of what it formerly allowed. If the matter be one in accordance with the common-sense of mankind, and such that all right-minded persons are supposed or may be supposed to be inclined to do it, the omission of all mention of it can hardly be called a repeal and as depriving it of its obligatory force. But if the clause be one which merely gave permission to do what would have been otherwise unlawful and not allowed, the omission of the words allowing it must, I should think, be regarded as withdrawing that permission, so that it could no longer be properly considered a part of the law.

It has sometimes been claimed that the omission of words or a formula in the revision has made that which was thus treated not only no longer obligatory, but as unlawful in the sense of being contrary to the law and forbidden by it. But this, I apprehend, must be taken with some limitations. The omission of the Athanasian Creed in the revision of the Prayer Book does not make it *unlawful* for us, as I suppose, to revere it and use it in our private devotions. Suppose there had been a positive enactment requiring of each member of the Church a tithe of his income; the omission of that provision in revising the law, could not operate to make the giving of a tithe *unlawful* for any one who might choose to make that the rule of his offerings to God.

VII. All the proceedings in our ecclesiastical courts are, as I have said, of the *nature* of criminal proceedings. It is true they are not against "life, liberty, or property." But they are in all cases *in personam*, nevertheless; they are for "offences" against the Doctrine, Discipline, or Worship of the Church. Here we have had, fortunately, but very few trials. And by consequence the principles of law have not been extensively discussed or brought into judicial determination. And for this reason both the amount and the value of that

part of the Church law which I have had in view in this essay has not been very adequately determined, and, as I think, is not commonly supposed to be so great or so valuable as it really is. And I, for one, am free to confess that I do not think it desirable that that part of our law should be brought into very frequent discussion in our courts ; or, in other words, I do not think it desirable that courts and " cases " should be of such frequent occurrence as to elaborate these principles of our law into definite form, or to fix much attention upon them *as law*. The essential thing of the Gospel is grace and love, and not the rigors and strictness of law.

Law is always and of necessity a limitation of the liberty and choice of action for some body or some party. True, it is a *protection* also to the rights and liberties of others, and is necessary as a condition of freedom and the enjoyment of our natural rights. Though necessary, it is an evil—a necessary evil, but an evil nevertheless. So far as it is a means of securing the liberty of others it is good—an inestimable good—indispensable to the welfare of the greatest number. But beyond this it is unwise, and becomes an unnecessary restraint, if not an intolerable tyranny.

But in matters of religion it is manifest that more liberty may be allowed than by the civil laws, and in the sphere of civil and political rights. There, there must be a law for everything—everything at least that may be brought into dispute. But in Religion, in matters of Faith and worship, men may be allowed to differ and to go in different ways, each one having his own way, if they will be tolerant of each other, to a far greater extent than is possible in civil and secular matters.

I have no doubt that injustice has often been done to persons under authority by those exercising that authority over them. But any appeal, if an appeal were allowed and provided for in all such cases, would involve not only the cost and trouble of the litigation, but it leaves other evils behind. It can hardly leave the law without some modification, some restriction upon the freedom of action which was allowed so long as that

point of law was undecided. Before, men might act either way as they chose, as in the thousand minor details of worship and duty; after the decision all men must act in the one way which has been declared to be law, in order not to be offenders against the law. If the charge against a clergyman be one of immorality, it is not likely that any reversal of the verdict of the court below by the appellate tribunal could do much, if anything, toward restoring the unfortunate man to that confidence without which there can be no successful prosecution of the work of the ministry. If, however, the charge be one of false doctrine or improper ritual in conducting the services, and the accused is condemned contrary to law, and the law is really on his side, the case is indeed a sad one, when there is no appeal. But then it is to be considered that no appellate tribunal that we can erect will be infallible. Nor is it likely that its decisions will do much to affect or to change the public sentiment or the opinions of thinking men on the subject. And by an error in its decision it might fix an error upon us with all the rigidity of an inflexible law, where now we have liberty of choice and freedom of action in a matter which, from any point of view, cannot be regarded as one of the essentials of the Faith.

It may be a fault in the constitution of the English Courts, that no better results have been reached by the appeals and decisions that have been had in that country during the last twenty or thirty years. But I think that no one who recalls some of the opinions that were entertained and in favor with our Bishops and in our Church, forty or fifty years ago, on many of the questions that are now most in discussion, would care to feel obliged to abide by an "opinion" or decision that would then have been given, if a formal adjudication had been obtained. All doctrines and opinions, all rites and usages, are undergoing reconsideration in the minds of thinking men; and we may trust that the result will be a constant approach toward a more adequate understanding of the truth in matters of doctrine, and a higher standard of duty, as well as a more effective ritual in

matters of worship. And perhaps this is, after all, the best way that we can have for making progress, notwithstanding the many inconveniences and cases of personal hardship that must stand in the way of the most desired result.

W. D. WILSON.

THE PRESENT POSITION OF THE ITALIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH.

TWO years ago, in an article entitled "Some Unfinished Business of the House of Bishops," published in the AMERICAN CHURCH REVIEW, February, 1883, I told how the Reverend Count di Campello, after voluntarily giving up his high position as Canon of the Basilica of S. Peter's at Rome, had presently turned to the Catholic Episcopate in the Anglican Communion, and asked to be received under its protection, until such time as it should please God to constitute fully a National Catholic Church in Italy. At that time this application had not been answered. Our Bishops, it is true, assembled in Council (New York, 1880), had unanimously declared that the great, primitive rule of the Catholic Church—*Episcopatus unus est, cujus a singulis in solidum pars tenetur*—imposes upon the Episcopate of the American Church, and upon the several Bishops of the same, not the right only, but also the duty of protecting in the holding of the Catholic Faith, and in the recovering of the Catholic order, those in the position of the Count di Campello; but the House had adjourned without appointing any one of its members to act as the Executive of its Declaration, and no one of the several Bishops seemed to feel that his individual part in the solidarity of the Catholic Episcopate justified him in exercising this right and duty. Finally, however, it was arranged between the late Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of Long Island, that the latter, being the Bishop in charge of the American congregations in Italy, should extend to the Count di Campello the help and protection asked for, acting as provisional representative, by ap-

pointment of His Grace, of an international Commission of Bishops, appointed by the Lambeth Conference in 1878, to deal with such cases. Fully qualified thereupon by sufficient license from the Bishop thus chosen to represent the Anglican Episcopate, the Count di Campello, who had confined his work thus far to mission schools and preaching, opened a becomingly fitted chapel in the Via Genoa, Rome, with full religious services.

His license recognised him "as a Priest in the Church of God," unaffected by any excommunications of the Bishop of Rome, under which he fell, *ipso facto*, because of his refusal to accept the Papal additions to the Catholic Faith. It authorised him—

To execute his office as a "dispenser of the Word of God and of His Holy Sacraments," working wherever there may be lawful opportunity for a reform of the Church of Italy, upon the model of the primitive Church.

And in carrying out this work he was authorised by the same license,

Until such time as the service book in the Church of Italy can be duly revised, to make use provisionally of the forms of worship set forth by the Church in England and in America, or of so much of them as may be found needful, as well as of such part of the Latin uses as is consistent with the Faith and order of the truly Catholic and Apostolic Church.

For the time being, therefore, the Count di Campello celebrated the Holy Communion after the form used in the American Church, and used in his Vesper Service the Evensong of the Church of England. All services were, of course, in the Italian language. He was assisted in the services and school-work attached to the chapel by two priests—ex-monks—men who had suffered long and much for their convictions of truth, and one of whom has just closed, with the devotion of a saint and the constancy of a martyr, a long life of wonderful faith and patience.*

* Fra Andrea d'Altagene, a Capuchin monk, born in Corsica in 1820. His family name was Panzani. He died at Rome on the 28th of November, from internal disease, brought on by long-continued want of sufficient food. He was impris-

In December, 1884, Monsignore Giambattista Savarese—a Domestic Prelate of the Pope, of high rank and character—professed the Nicene Faith, and, after a formal renunciation of the corrupt additions made thereto by Popes Pius IV. and Pius IX., was received to Catholic Communion in the American Church at Rome. He, too, recognising the Catholic character and authority of the Episcopate in the Anglican Communion, applied to it for help and protection against the usurpations of the Bishop of Rome. His application was received by the present Archbishop of Canterbury, and referred by him to the Bishop of Long Island, from whom he received a recognition and license similar to that previously given to the Count di Campello. Monsignore Savarese, until this was arranged, gave himself chiefly to literary work in the interest of Reform, publishing a valuable work on the encroachments by which, contrary to the Canon Law of the Church, the Papacy had unjustly possessed itself of the Church property, and preparing the material for a revision of the Roman Missal. He attended public worship regularly at the chapel in the Via Genoa, but took no official part in the same until the month of June last, when, by an amicable arrangement with the Count di Campello, he was formally put in charge of the chapel, and recognised by him and his assistants as leader in the Italian Catholic Reform movement.

Monsignor Savarese is a man of fifty-six years of age, of a good Neapolitan family, who stood very high both

oned by Pope Pius IX. in 1860 for writing a work on the evils which had grown upon the Church and their remedy. It was not published. He sent it in manuscript to the Pope. He was tried by the Inquisition and sentenced to perpetual deprivation *a divinis* and twelve years in the galleys; but in 1863 he was released and sent to France at the peremptory request of the Emperor Napoleon II., who claimed him as a French subject. Later he was offered full rehabilitation by the Pope, but he answered that the causes for which he was sentenced were as real as ever—*i.e.*, his conviction of the great evil of the temporal power. He came back to Rome in 1870, and supported himself by hard manual labor, never getting more than \$8 per month, and always putting aside part of this to publish writings that he thought would serve the cause of Reform. He was a learned man in his way, and a strong thinker, but rugged and uncouth in both appearance and speech, and he gained no recognition from the world. Yet so true was he, and patient, and full of faith and love to God; and gentleness to all men through his whole life of hardness and discouragement, that it cannot be but that he is very great in the Kingdom of God.

in order and seniority among the Papal Monsignori. He was made a Prelate by Pius IX. as long ago as 1858. He was well known in the Roman Communion in Italy and Germany as a theologian and canonist, and was one of the commission of picked theologians to whom Pius IX. entrusted the work of preparation for the famous Syllabus against modern errors, which went out as a prelude to the Vatican Council. His character in the Roman Church seems to have been unimpeached, and up to the last his standing was such that the present Pope, Leo XIII., had published at the expense of the Papal treasury his book on "The Church and Democracy," which appeared in 1882. The step of coming to a clear rupture with the Papacy was taken only after very long and anxious consideration. It led to an entire separation between him and the noted Padre Curci, whom he had defended in two successive works, and with whom he had lived for the past year at Rome; but the latter, in his long Jesuit schooling, had learned to bend before the blast from the Vatican, and then to spring back again, and to make seeming submissions, carefully worded so as to involve no real submission (as is the case even with his late one) with a facility that the former could not regard as honest, and which, indeed, has entirely put an end to Curci's influence in Italy.

I think that the great spiritual destitution of his people under the false shepherding of the Bishop of Rome, and the terrible loss of souls following therefrom, was the first and compelling reason that forced Monsignore Savarese to the sacrifice that he made; for he literally gave up everything when he left the Papal Obedience. And next to this, his conviction that the Papacy, which he had learned by his studies to know as the potent cause of schism in the past history of the Church, was to-day the one insuperable obstacle to the Church's unity.

The work, therefore, that he set before himself and his assistants in their chapel at Rome was to gather in a congregation of believers from that large portion of their fellow-citizens who were already separated from the Papal Obedience, and yet not wholly lost to Christianity.

All controversial preaching was prohibited, and working quietly on as well as they knew how—which was not very well—for none of them had had any parochial experience, they began, toward this autumn, to mould together into a homogeneous shape a small body of laity that they had reclaimed from every possible degree of indifferentism and form of rationalism, when suddenly, on the late warlike Feast of S. Michael, the Bishop of Rome, by a public *Notification*, which was posted on all the churches of Rome, and which seems to have been reproduced in all the Papal press of Europe, hurled the Major Excommunication against the Italian Catholic Church, and particularly against the “Congregation of S. Paul, situated in the Via Genoa” in Rome. The bolt was made as hot and heavy as well could be, and may be supposed to have exhausted the Papal resources in the way of cursing. Remission of its penalties is reserved to the Pope himself, and these are extended not only to the Clergy and regular members of S. Paul’s Congregation, but to all who join even casually in worship or hear preaching in its chapel, or induce others to do so, to “those who enter the chapel even from mere curiosity when preaching or worship is in progress,” and there is included in the same censure, “finally, all those who publish any notices of their sermons or meetings, or report the themes of such sermons, because of the assistance that they thus lend to the diffusion or confirmation of this heresy.”

The *Notification* itself is a formidable document of three columns issued by “LUCIDO MARIA PAROCCHI, Cardinal of the Holy Roman Church, . . . Vicar-General of the HOLINESS OF OUR LORD,” and ends with an order to the parish priests to read it to the people on a festival day and explain it—a direction which produced some truly extraordinary preaching from the Roman pulpits on the following Sunday. This document is worth examination, as a manifestation both of the present feeling at the Vatican in regard to the religious condition of Italy, and also of the practical claims made to-day as seriously as ever for the Papacy. It also shows

very plainly the light in which the Roman Curia regards not only the Old Catholic movement, but also the Anglican and the Oriental Churches. It begins by reciting how, at the beginning of his Pontificate, Leo XIII. set himself to exorcise the threatening growth of heresy in Rome, by a warning address to his children. This refers to an Excommunication promulgated in 1878 against any who should enter a Protestant church in Rome, and was drawn out by the fact that large numbers of Italians had begun to come in to hear the Evensong in the American church. But, notwithstanding the undoubted good done by this warning, the Cardinal-Vicar goes on, "the evil has still spread," and "to-day new woes threaten this city. A so-called *Congregation of S. Paul*, in the Via Genoa, arrogating to itself the title of Catholic, and abusing the name of Italian, is trying to entangle the Romans in Schism and Heresy;" and so it is very necessary "to raise the voice high and denounce the new sect." And very high His Eminence thereupon does raise his voice, with an acrimony and an indulgence in vituperation, and, I am sorry to have to add, a want of careful regard to strict truth in some details that is little becoming in the Vicar of one who asks the world to accept him as the Vicar of JESUS CHRIST.

Out of the somewhat confused mass of vituperative and often trivial accusations with which the Cardinal's long and angry Proclamation is filled, one finally makes out three principal charges against the Italian Catholics. First, *Breach of ecclesiastical discipline*; secondly, *Schism*, and thirdly, *Heresy*. Under the first head fall accusations that, while apostates who still retain their priestly character and maintain in substance the worship of the Church, they have dared to abolish the proper language of the Church, which the Cardinal describes as "the bond of union of the faithful from the Amazon to the Tagus, from Terra del Fuego to Iceland, the language of the Councils and of the Fathers," and to conduct their worship in a tongue that the people could understand; and beyond this, to introduce varieties in the ritual (referring probably to the administration of the

Holy Communion in both kinds), "without the consent of the authority that orders the worship of the universe."

They are charged with Schism, because they are preaching without "being sent"—without mission from a Bishop. "The Levite," as Cardinal Parocchi expresses it, "waits upon the commands of the priest, who stands under the Bishop, and the Bishop in his turn glories in being subject to the Roman Pontiff, to whom, in the person of Peter, JESUS CHRIST committed his flock solely, entirely, and without limit or reserve, and," concludes the Cardinal, "what place remains for them in the fold of JESUS CHRIST when they have strayed from the fold of Peter, who received the whole in keeping?"

But the charge of Heresy is sustained by the most numerous and by some rather singular accusations. The first among these runs thus: "It is no secret that they in common with the sect of Old Catholics—the last-born of heretical sects, that arose some fifteen years since to afflict the Church—impugn the Primacy of jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff, and his Infallibility when defining dogma *ex cathedrâ* in matters of Faith and morals. Hence they are manifest heretics." Moreover, His Eminence has found out that they are in open sympathy with "the so-called Gallican Church, miserably begotten by Hyacinthe Loyson;" and he thereupon takes the occasion for a digression against the said Church, because it would exterminate Confession under plea of making it *free and moral*—does not give to the Virgin the dogmatic title of Mother of God—distinguishes, with regard to their origin and authority, between the canonical and deuterocanonical books of the Bible, and holds the schismatic Orientals and the Anglicans to belong to the true Church. And then, coming back to the Italian Catholic Church, the Cardinal-Vicar arraigns it for believing in—I quote his very words—"Religion adapted to the cultivation of the people, and to the needs of modern civilisation, in preference to the true Catholic Religion"—a most naive confession that the Papal Religion, which the Cardinal is pleased to call the "true Catholic Religion," is not adapted to either the cultivation or the needs

of the century. Further, the Cardinal quotes from books which he says the Italian Catholics have freely disseminated among their proselytes, certain passages in one of which prove them to his mind to be heretical in their teachings in regard to Absolution, *i. e.*, "*Almighty God . . . hath given power and commandment to his ministers to declare and pronounce to His people, being penitent, the Absolution and Remission of their Sins*, whilst the Gospel affirms concisely, *Whose sins ye remit; Whose sins ye retain;*" while others, taken from their hymns deny, as he says, the indefectibility of the Church, and the real presence in the Eucharist. I fear that they must plead guilty to having put our Service for Evening Prayer into the hands of their members; but the hymns which the Cardinal quotes against them were *never sung in their Church*. They are found in a Wesleyan Italian Hymn Book, which was used in their choir for a few of its tunes, but was not in the hands of the congregation, and was never distributed to their members.

"Add to the concealment of Catholic truths," the Cardinal triumphantly concludes, "the total absence of Invocation of the Immaculate Virgin, or the Angels, and of the Saints, the frozen breath of Protestantism breathing from beginning to end of these books, and then deny, if you can, the profession of heresy on the part of the so-called Congregation of S. Paul of the Italian Catholic Church."

He then attacks bitterly their name of "*Italian Catholic Church*," as illogical and contradictory, forgetting that all he says on this point could be urged with even greater force against the official title of his own Church, and he affirms that the Popes have written the sublimest pages in Italian history, and been the authors and protectors of every beautiful, noble, and useful institution in it.

It is difficult to realise that a document of this kind could be seriously put forth in this year of Our Lord 1884. I have seen nothing in modern times equal to in insolent assertion of the most extreme Papal claim against every non-Papal form of Christianity, East

and Western alike, and against all rights of conscience. "Let us only be thankful," mocked one of the leading daily papers of Rome "that the Holy Father allows us to walk through the Via Genoa at all;" but others treated the matter more thoughtfully, and saw in it an attempted outrage upon the rights of the citizen and upon the liberty of the press. If any one else but the Pope were the author of such an injurious attack upon a citizen he could be forced by the civil law to retract the false statements made, and to atone for the wrong done; but to-day the Pope stands above the law in Italy, in this respect, far more so indeed than the King himself.

On the 17th October appeared an answer to the Cardinal-Vicar's arrogant *Notification*, signed "for the Italian Catholic Church," by Mons. Giambattista Savarese, Conte Enrico di Campello, and two assistant priests, and addressed "To the Italians." It would have been better had it been shorter, but it was not as long as the Cardinal's attack, and much more to the point; and above all it was entirely free from angry or disrespectful vituperation. The authors claim that an answer has become necessary, not for the sake of any private interest, or to defend their injured reputation, nor for the sake of speculative truth merely, but because the salvation of souls is at stake and the religion of the masses, which the Apostles Peter and Paul first taught the Romans, and thousands of martyrs sealed with their blood.

The Papacy, dominated by the Jesuit sect, has put itself into irreconcilable antagonism with everything which makes for man's highest civilisation and true liberty. The freedom of the press and of conscience, the popular vote, the representative form of government, the very unity of the country itself are condemned as errors and most pestilent heresies, which the Pope cannot forgive, bound as he is not to contradict the Vatican dogma of Infallibility. No link of the chain can be broken, and those who will not lie to God, themselves, and their confessor, by pretending to believe in the absurd dogma of the Divine Prerogative

lent to the elect of the Roman Cardinals, must live without the Sacraments and die without the comforts of religion. But just as impossible as seems any hope of accord between civilisation and the Papacy, seems possible and certain the harmony of both science and liberty with the universal Church founded by CHRIST. The Roman Church, S. Paul teaches, is not the root, but a branch, and not a natural one at that—borne by the one root—the REDEEMER, who might at any moment cut it off. The Pope is not the Catholic Church which existed before the Gospel was ever preached in Rome. The Government of the Church rests in the Universal Episcopate, to which, in the person of Peter, as S. Augustine teaches, Christ committed the feeding of his flock. The Bishops, if successors of the Apostles, cannot receive their mission, as Romanists say, from the Pope. The SAVIOUR said to the Apostles and their successors, “As the FATHER hath sent me, so send I you.” The WE of the Pope is not worth the I of the Incarnate Wisdom. According to S. Paul (Acts xx. 28), the elders were placed by the HOLY GHOST as Bishops to feed the Church of GOD, and therefore S. Cyprian held the Episcopate to be one in which each Bishop held an equal part, and S. Jerome taught that their different sees carry with them no difference of merit or worth—whether at Rome or Gubbio, Constantinople or Rhegium, all have the same Priesthood, all are successors of the Apostles. The Excommunication launched against us wounds thus not single persons, but the Church Universal, from which the Curia has declared itself in schism by this ill-judged act. In this state of things our mission comes from the Bishops who have stood fast in the Faith and discipline of the Catholic Church, like those of the venerable Churches of the East, which have never been subject to the Bishop of Rome, those of the Anglican Churches, and those who in Holland, Germany, and Switzerland have had the courage to maintain the Catholic Faith against Papal usurpations. This truly Catholic Episcopate, recognising us as Catholic Priests, has given us authority to preach the pure Gos-

pel, and to give the Sacraments to such as are deprived of them by the Bishop of Rome, and thus of the spiritual food of their souls, only because they hold fast the pure Faith of our fathers, and refuse to believe in new dogmas. And besides the truly Catholic Episcopate, are with us in spirit learned and pious Bishops in Italy who have not yet bowed to the new dogmas. Everyone knows the serious revolution brought to pass in the divine constitution of the Church by Papal ambition, by which from judges of the Faith, the Bishops have been reduced to advocates in the Papal Court, by the grace of the Pope; from brethren and partners in the one Episcopate to inferiors, valets, and train-bearers of the Bishop of Rome, before whom they bow the knee, kiss the shoe, sit on the lowest step of the throne, and render the service of acolytes. And for their greater abasement the Cardinals, intruded into the Catholic hierarchy a thousand years after Christ, in the saddest times of barbarism and ecclesiastical corruption, command them as masters. Let us hasten by our prayers the moment when our Bishops can manifest freely their opinions, in defence of the old discipline of the Church, and this especially in the matter of the election of Bishops, by Clergy and people, a right exercised in Italy for twelve centuries, which will be certainly recovered when the religious spirit is revived in the masses, and they become conscious they have rights in the Church.

Nor is the accusation made against us of heresy better founded than that of schism. From this S. Vincent of Lerins, a teacher fully acknowledged by the Curia, cleanses us perfectly when he warns us, that when new error threatens the Church, we must hold fast to antiquity, which is beyond the reach of innovators. As the Vatican additions to the Faith are not found in the Gospels, in which is found everything that is necessary to salvation; as in the Nicene Council, the jurisdiction of the Bishops of Rome is defined and limited to a district of a hundred miles around the city; as the Third General Council ordered the restitution of the jurisdiction usurped over

provinces which had been independent from the earliest times ; as the Council of Chalcedon laid down the rule that ecclesiastical sees should be accommodated to political changes ; and as, finally, the Council of Trent itself acknowledged and declared the Apostles' Creed to be the one foundation of the universal Faith of the Church, we can remain Catholics with the whole Church of the past, even while we repudiate all belief in the new dogmas. That only is really and truly Catholic, according to *Lerins*, which has been everywhere, by every one, and always held in the Church. The personal infallibility of the Bishop of Rome is an addition to the primitive Faith of the Councils of Nice and Constantinople ; is contrary to the definitions of the Councils of Constance and Basle, confirmed by Eugenius IV. ; and, in short, according to the seventh canon of Ephesus and the decrees of Chalcedon, which forbid any addition to the Nicene Faith, the Bishop of Rome has incurred the penalty of deposition. But we are not heretical, because we hold no error opposed to Catholic truth, and we have no intention of contradicting the certain definitions of the Church, whose primitive Faith, on the other hand, we are striving to keep pure. The proofs falsely brought forward by the Cardinal-Vicar to convict our Liturgy of heresy fall to the ground before the almost incredible fact that as it is published only to-day, it could not possibly have been read by him.* We

* I do not take up now the subject of the Italian Catholic "*Liturgia*," as I hope to review it in a separate article later on, together with the Offices for Morning and Evening Prayer, now in preparation. It will be enough to say of it here that it is a translation of the Latin Missal, revised only so far as was necessary to bring it into harmony with Catholic teaching and primitive practice. The slight but dangerous additions by which the comparatively modern doctrine of the Invocation of Angels and Saints were introduced into the Mass have been unsparingly cut out. The same has been done with the words obtruded into our Lord's institution of the Holy Eucharist. The administration of the Cup to the laity has been restored. Beyond these changes, under the limitations of their license, they had no right to go at the present. Nor would it have been wise to do so. The present "*Liturgia*" is purely provisional, a stepping-stone, I trust, to a future revision which will be able to take into account not only the essentials of doctrine but the cultivation and the requirements of modern society as well. It is right also to say here, that this Revision of the Missal was not reviewed by the Bishop of Long Island, and can be considered as approved of by him only so far as it has conformed to the authorisation of his license, to use, namely, 'such part of the Latin uses (Roman and Ambrosian) as are consistent with the Faith and order of the truly Catholic and Apostolic Church.'

are not trying to create doubt in the minds of those who are not troubled by the contradictions between their religion and their loyalty to their country. Our work of vital import is to receive those who still believe in Christianity, but cannot endure these contradictions. To such we willingly offer the Sacraments, assuring them that, if they stand fast with antiquity, they can smile at the empty name of heretic, which fits better him who with sacrilegious blasphemy arrogates to himself the mission of CHRIST who alone may say, "I am the Way, the Truth and the Life." Nor need they fear the guilt of schism, because, so long as they are in union with antiquity, they cannot be separated from the Catholic Church. Neither need the appearance of rebellion against the Roman Curia alarm them, because there are circumstances, according even to the Jesuit Bellarmine, which make this not only lawful but a duty, as the open opposition of the Apostle Paul to S. Peter, or of SS. Cyprian, Augustine, Ignatius, and other saints to the Bishops of Rome.

The Vatican would have been lenient toward heresy in us, and, perhaps, have pardoned some little schism, if it had not been for our *Italianism*, which is what the great Pretender abhors above all things. Public opinion has rightly judged that this is our true sin in the eyes of the Roman Curia, as shown by the bitter, stinging, and scornful language on the part of the Cardinal-Vicar's *Notification* which touches on this point. Our prayers for the King, our warm wishes for the independence and the greatness of our country, this is the unpardonable sin of which our congregation has been guilty. Yet we had nothing to do with any party. We but taught our people to render honor to the august head of the nation, both as a religious and a civil duty, and above all to love the country, which, after GOD, has a right to our best love, and in which we were, by the providence of GOD, born citizens before we were made children of the Church. Why from hatred of this our country is the use of the vulgar tongue, granted in some other cases, unlawful in us? Pope John VIII. taught that the diver-

sity of languages served to the greater glorification of the Divine Majesty. Neither was one tongue alone ever the language of the Catholic Church, which in its Councils used Greek before it used Latin.

The answer concludes by reminding the Italians that CHRIST was the head of those who were cast out from the synagogue, and therefore suffered without the gate. Let us go forth, therefore, to Him, without the camp, bearing His reproach.

Such is a pretty close *résumé* of the answer made by the Italian Catholics of Rome to the rulers that have cast them out, and it certainly contrasts most favorably in spirit and in force of argument with the angry, overbearing, and reckless attack upon them of the Cardinal Vicar. The impression made by it, wherever it could find a circulation, has been very favorable, and this whole matter has been a great help to them in many ways. It has brought their hopes and efforts to the knowledge of thousands who had never heard of them; it has aroused a certain sympathy in their favor in quarters that generally have cared for none of these things, and it has clearly defined the position of the leaders before the country and to their ownselves.

They have gained confidence in themselves by standing fire, and are stronger to meet the harder fighting that lies before them. For they know well now that if they hold out after this, in their protest for the Catholic traditions of the Church, every possible effort will be put forth to crush them, and no mercy will be shown; for the Vatican sees in this little cloud that has begun to arise in the horizon of this spiritually famished land a danger which the Pope himself is said to have characterised as greater than any that Protestantism has threatened in Italy. The battle for these men will be hard and long, and must be fought with terrible odds against them. They are few in numbers, poor, undisciplined, untrained, and without political or social influence. The Papacy, on the other hand, can no longer, it is true, since 1870, fight its spiritual battles with the brute force of the temporal power, informing consciences by the

dungeons and fagots of the Inquisition, but its power in this country in material things is still almost incredibly great. It has practically unlimited supplies of well-trained men and of money. It has enormous social influence. It has political influence in high quarters; zealous, if concealed agents serve it even in the Government offices. It has the press, both native and foreign, very largely at its disposal. It has in Rome to-day, as over against these men, pretty much everything on its side except—truth. And it has latterly organised its powers with great care, and it uses all its resources unscrupulously. To all this must be added the fact that the Infidelity of Italy is always ready to lend a hand to the superstition of Italy in strangling any truly Catholic movement, for it hates and fears any Reform that stands firm upon the foundations of primitive Christianity even more than it does Romanism, from which it is born, and which it knows full well is serving its ends.

Their brave fight for truth, under such unequal conditions, should, I think, command our sympathy and interest for these men; but there is a higher reason. It is not only abstract truth that is at stake, it is, as they say, the present salvation of souls. Romanism has made Italy well-nigh an infidel country. Scepticism and Materialism have eaten deep into the vitals of the Roman Church itself; but, besides this, the larger part of the Italian people have strayed entirely away, not only from that Church, but from the Christian Faith itself acknowledged in any dogmatic form. The cause of this may, indeed, be questioned by Romanists, but not the fact, which has formed the burden of oft-repeated Papal denunciations since 1870. The cry of these spiritual estrays may not yet be very bitter, for, poor souls, they do not yet realise their own great want and danger; but the sight of them wandering further and further into the thorny tangles of Rationalism, or the foodless deserts of Materialism, is very sad, very piteous. There is no power in the Roman Church to call them back. The make-shift folds to which they are urgently

called by the many Protestant missions, started of late in Italy, seem to them unattractive, and cold, and foodless; and built, as these largely are, on plans of man's devising, they question whether the shelter therein offered is really safe and can be permanent. These multitudes, scattered far and wide as sheep without a shepherd, this Italian Catholic movement, as declared from its beginning, is seeking. Some of them may hear its call. I see no reasonable hope of saving for them in any other quarter.

R. J. NEVIN.

S. PAUL'S CHURCH, ROME, December 1, 1884.

HERBERT SPENCER'S PLEA FOR RELIGION.

TO most people, Agnosticism seems to be the negation of Religion, and it cannot be denied that there is very good ground for this supposition. And yet in the *First Principles* Mr. Spencer makes a strong and very valuable plea in behalf of Religion, which fails of its most essential force because it stops at the point it does. We believe, however, that this great Agnostic has done an exceedingly useful service, in establishing indirectly a philosophic basis for Religion. It is much for this able scientist to claim in the interest of Religion that it has a sphere and function, that can never be touched by the tests of Science or disproved by its utmost advance. In these days of materialistic tendency, we can hardly estimate the future importance of his strong stand upon the certainty of the existence of a supreme absolute Power.

It is true that he maintains that this Power is unknowable, but he earnestly defends the truth that it *exists*. This is his very positive statement (p. 98): "Though the Absolute cannot in any manner or degree be known, in the strict sense of knowing, yet we find that its positive existence is a necessary datum of consciousness; that so long as consciousness continues, we cannot for an instant rid it of this datum; and that thus the belief which this datum constitutes *has a higher warrant than any other whatever.*" We have italicised the last clause, in order to show how perfectly ingenuous is his plea that "there can never cease to be a place for something of the nature of Religion." "Throughout all future time, as now, the human mind may occupy itself, not only with ascertained phenomena and their relations, but also

with that unascertained something which phenomena and their relations imply." "Knowledge cannot monopolise consciousness;" hence Science can never encroach upon or occupy the sphere of Religion. "It must always continue possible for the mind to dwell upon that which transcends knowledge;" "the subject matter" of Religion "is that which passes the sphere of experience."

Let us now examine somewhat in detail this plea, and see what fatal defect it is which still justifies the popular notion that the Agnostic tendency is to Atheism.

In the chapter on "Ultimate Religious Ideas," he claims that there are only three possible hypotheses respecting the origin of the universe (pp. 30, 33, 35). These are Self-existence, which is the theory of Atheism; Self-creation, which is Pantheism; and Creation by external agency, which is Theism. It will help us in our criticism upon his treatment of these theories, to notice three points as preliminary to it.

First, Mr. Spencer is right in distinguishing between symbolic and real conceptions. We doubtless do continually mistake symbolic conceptions for real ones. "Great magnitudes, great durations, great numbers, are none of them actually conceived, but are all of them conceived more or less symbolically; and so, too, are all those classes of objects of which we predicate some common fact." We must admit that we have not always remembered that our conceptions of God, of eternity, of creation, are not adequate and therefore real, but symbolic, representative of the truth. Yet our symbol of what is beyond our actual powers of imagining, is after all representative of a reality. It is the means by which that reality becomes such to our minds; and, however inadequate, must stand for the great truth it represents. We do not really conceive the earth itself; the solar system is utterly inconceivable: but for all practical purposes our ideas of these are sufficiently near to the reality. The incompetence of our symbolic conceptions regarding the origin of the universe, then, is not a practical, but a philosophical deficiency.

But, secondly, it must be remembered that the incon-

ceivable may be an object of thought and knowledge. Mr. Spencer says (p. 103), "It is impossible to realize in thought the *force* of gravitation." Yet this force has been so much an object of thought, and in its manifestations of actual knowledge that the *law* of gravitation has been formulated. Unpicturable as the exercise of any force is, the fact is ever in our consciousness. The absolute may be an inscrutable Power, but its manifestations are a means by which it may be known. We cannot conceive infinite space or infinite time, any more than infinite Being; but they can all be thought, otherwise we could not have ideas about them. Hamilton's distinction between "images of sense and the unpicturable notions of intelligence" is quite a valid one. Professor Harris, in an article in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, has applied his distinction to the idea of space. The length of the quotation may be pardoned, for the importance of its bearing on our discussion.

He says : 1. Imagination or fancy (sensuous representation) makes *images* of objects ; and, as images must have *limits* in order to have *form*, we could not expect to imagine that which is infinite, if such an object could be found.

2. Thought (using "the unpicturable notions of intelligence") contemplates the *nature* of an object, and attaches predicates accordingly. It is no contradiction if its "unpicturable notions" cannot be *imagined*.

3. *Thought of space*.—Space if finite must be limited from without. But such external limitations would require space to exist in. And hence the supposed limits of space, *posit* space beyond them instead of *negating* space—they prove space to be continuous and not finite. It appears, therefore, that space is of such a nature that it cannot end in, or be limited by, itself alone, and thus is universally continuous or INFINITE.

4. *Representation of space*.—If the result attained by thought is correct, space is infinite; and if this is so, it cannot be *imagined* or *represented*. Hence, as Hamilton says, "Imagination sinks exhausted." If imagination had succeeded in "realising" space, it would have proved space to be picturable, and hence finite; and here would have been a true contradiction. As it is, however, the impotency of imagination is a negative confirmation of the positive assertion made by thought.

This needful distinction will show the confusion of language in such a sentence as this : "We are eternally de-

barred from thinking of the Absolute." We shall never conceive it, it is true; but Mr. Spencer immediately proceeds to think about it as that which lies back of the relative, as the most persistent datum of our consciousness. That it is inconceivable, therefore, does not prevent its being an object of thought.

Thirdly, each of the hypotheses of the origin of the universe may be inconceivable; yet *one of them must be true*. The criterion of truth established in the Psychology (vol. ii. pt. vii. caps. 9, 11) is, that any proposition is true, the negation of which is inconceivable. The universe must have had some origin, and there are only three possible suppositions regarding it. If a fourth is inconceivable, the truth must lie in one of the three. He uses the same method himself. "Matter is either infinitely divisible or it is not; no third possibility can be named." Both are inconceivable, and still one of them is true. We may grant then at the outset the inconceivability of the reality expressed in either theory, and may yet hope by the processes of *thought* to find the truth in one of them.

Returning now to the theories themselves, we may well appreciate his demonstration of the futility of the Atheistic hypothesis of self-existence. The strength of his argument does not consist in the proof that we cannot frame a conception of self-existence; but in the conclusion that Atheism is inadmissible, because even if conceivable, it does not explain what it pretends to. "No one will say that the existence of an object at the present moment is made easier to understand by the discovery that it existed an hour ago, or a day ago, or a year ago; and if its existence now is not made in the least degree more comprehensible by its existence during some previous finite period of time, then no accumulation of such finite periods, even could we extend them to an infinite period, would make it more comprehensible. Thus the Atheistic theory is not only absolutely unthinkable, but, even if it were thinkable, would not be a solution. The assertion that the universe is self-existent, does not really carry us a step beyond the cognition of its present ex-

istence ; and so leaves us with a mere re-statement of the mystery."

The Pantheistic hypothesis of self-creation fares similarly at his hands. "Really to conceive self-creation is to conceive potential existence passing into actual existence by some inherent necessity." But again the insufficiency of Pantheism is not its inconceivability, but its inability to solve the problem of the origin of the universe: "The problem would simply be removed a step back. For whence the potential existence? This would just as much require accounting for as actual existence ; and just the same difficulties would meet us. Respecting the origin of such a latent Power, no other suppositions could be made than those above named—self-existence, self-creation, creation by external agency." We are not made one whit more capable of understanding how this universe came into being, as self-created, even if it were possible to imagine to the mind such a process.

There remains, therefore, the Theistic hypothesis of creation by external agency. As to this, we readily admit it to be quite as inconceivable as either of the others. But it is unnecessary to represent it as "the Carpenter theory." The crude conception which Mr. Spencer so well assails is not identical with the idea of creation itself. There is no need of confining this to creation out of nothing. It is just as applicable to creation *out of himself* ; and this is surely as representable in thought, if not in picture, as his own idea of all Matter and Force being but the manifestation, of the outcome, of the unseen, absolute Power. But then the genesis of the universe by external agency itself must be accounted for by one of the same three hypotheses. How came there to be an external agency? The supposition of its creation by another external agency is useless ; "It commits us to an infinite series of such agencies, and even then leaves us where we were." By self-creation "we are practically involved in the same predicament ; since, as already shown, self-creation implies an infinite series of potential existences." We must accept self-existence then as our only alternative ; since the truth must lie

somewhere in these hypotheses, and it cannot be found elsewhere.

But have we any more warrant for certainty that it is found here? I think we have. It is just here where Mr. Spencer begins to falter. In each of the other cases, he shows that, not only is the theory inconceivable, but even if it could be represented to the imagination, it would not forward our understanding of the problem. Here he asserts that "the mystery would be as great as ever," even if we could picture to ourselves the act of creation, because the external agency would itself require explanation. But we submit that it is a very different thing to have an inconceivable origin of the universe and an inconceivable creator, to explain. The theories of self-existence and self-creation are not only inconceivable, but *unthinkable*. A creator is, it is true, inconceivable, but perfectly thinkable. The distinction pointed out above, I think, establishes this. Mr. Spencer says: "Those who cannot conceive a self-existent universe, and who therefore assume a Creator as the source of the universe, take for granted that they can conceive a self-existent Creator." They do nothing of the kind. They arrive at the certainty of a Creator, not by a process of conception, but by a process of thought. We do not *imagine* Him, we *think* Him, just precisely as Mr. Spencer does not imagine or conceive or picture his Absolute, but thinks it, defines it as a fact of consciousness, points it as the ultimate truth. Just too as Mr. Spencer thinks it as infinite, as eternal, as *Force*; as a reality, moreover, an existence, which is *self-existent*. For the latter is the only refuge from absurdity; and though confessedly incomprehensible, undoubtedly true.

There is a species of unfairness in characterising this idea of a Creator, as one of those symbolic conceptions, which "are altogether vicious and illusive, and in no way distinguishable from pure fictions;" when the identical charge may be made for the same reason against his own radical idea of the Absolute. If creation by God is entertainable only as a "pseudo-idea, as a square fluid and a moral substance," because it cannot be pictu-

rably put together in consciousness ; then the Absolute is an illegitimate symbolic conception for precisely the same reason. Everything advanced by him against the tenability of this theory, may be urged equally well against his fundamental thought. The inability to form a conception of the Absolute does not prevent him from postulating it, when its existence is proven ; and the same inability need not prevent our acceptance of the Theistic origin of the universe, when shut up to that by the exigencies of thought. There is no difficulty to his mind in the idea that the universe comes out of, is a manifestation of, the absolute Force,—unrepresentable though this be. Now, mental being is the highest, deepest, fullest manifestation of force we know. If, therefore, his theory is in any degree adequate, the Theistic hypothesis has equally valid ground, nay, acquires even a stronger validity.

The “soul of truth in things erroneous” in Religion he thus makes to be “the inscrutableness of creation.” The ultimate religious idea is, “that the Power which the universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable.” In his reply to Professor Birks, in the appendix, he contends that this Power “must be, to the emotional consciousness, an object to the sentiment we call religious ;” that “this unknown and unknowable Power is the object-matter of Religion.” He bitterly complains that Professor Birks has misrepresented him as saying, that our ignorance was the sphere of Religion, instead of the power itself. Yet one who reads the chapter on “Ultimate Religious Ideas,” and especially pages 44–46, cannot fail of the impression that it is not the existence of the Power, but its inscrutableness, which is the “deepest, widest, and most certain of all facts.” Far more care seems to be taken to confront us with the Unknowable, in its character of mystery, than to provide a sphere for that religious sentiment which contemplates it as unknowable. On page 106, the sphere and function of religion appear to be identified with nescience. The “vital element in all religions,” that “which all creeds have in common,” is repeatedly indicated as a “mystery ever pressing for

interpretation," but uninterpretable. There is a grim, sardonic humor in this assertion that the only point in which religious thought has been stable, which has become constantly clearer, and which remains after discordant elements are cancelled, unassailable by the most unsparing criticism, is the annihilation of every positive religious idea, and of all reason for religious worship. This is the fatal effect of Mr. Spencer's plea for Religion, that it really deprives Religion of any sphere whatever.

We have seen that he claims that there can never cease to be a place for Religion, that it will forever have its sphere and function among men. But he utterly ignores this sphere when he leaves us simply face to face with the inscrutable. What possible function Religion can have in such a contemplation, he carefully omits to say. It indeed seems a little satirical for him to remark generally that this "gives the religious sentiment the widest possible sphere of action;" when he indicates absolutely nothing of the possibilities of this sphere, and the average man will look upon it as the contraction of the sphere to a mathematical point. It would have been satisfactory if he had shown in some detail what room there could be for Religion, under his system. The unknowable is a mere philosophical abstraction, the statement of a negation; and Religion needs something positive. That which has fed the life of every Religion has been the attempt to solve this inscrutable problem. The knowledge that it is insoluble takes away the whole power of the religious sentiment. Indeed, he confesses as much by effecting the harmony between Science and Religion by their concurrence in the assertion of this one truth. Science and philosophy (p. 108) as distinctly assert the unknowable as Religion. As they can and do accomplish what he says Religion will ceaselessly do, the latter has no separate function, and becomes identical with a certain phase of philosophy. The perpetual effort and failure which he suggests as the profitable discipline of the religious soul (p. 113), comes to an end when one realises that nothing can be known. He has

left nothing definite and intelligible for the *subject-matter* of Religion; though he repeats the vague assurance that "an ultimate Being, known with absolute certainty as existing, but of whose nature we are in ignorance, is the sphere for religious feeling."

If we could interpret such statements by the truths of the Christian revelation, we could readily understand their use; especially as "Being" is an unusual word for him to employ. It is absurd, however, to say that "the choice is between personality and something higher;" for personality is the highest thing we know. It is mere special pleading, and quite unlike his usual method, to ask: "Is it not just possible that there is a mode of being as much transcending intelligence and will as these transcend mechanical motion?" The fact that "we are totally unable to conceive any such higher mode of being," while "not a reason for questioning its existence," is a reason for not asserting its existence, on his own principles. He seems himself to realise the necessity for a positive justification of Religion; for he admits that "there will ever remain a need to give shape to that indefinite sense of an ultimate existence, the necessity of representing it to ourselves in *some* form of thought." What if this is a symbol? Religion has always dealt with symbols; it is essential that the Infinite should become related to our hearts, and this can only be done by means of symbols. They may not be adequate, they may not imply any revelation of the *essential nature* of the Divine; but they will be practically useful, and they will represent verities. They will not be algebraic signs, which may mean anything or nothing; but they will mean to the worshipper his understanding of the Divine in its manifestations. When he comes to think that the tokens of direction in the manifestations of the universal energy will not allow him to predicate wisdom of it, and the apparent beneficence of nature's tendencies are not enough to convey the idea of its goodness; he will give up all thoughts of the religious life; he will lose all trace of the religious spirit. The recognition of an unknowable will then be only a sentiment, an awe, a wonder,

that cannot evoke the feeling of intelligent worship, and that can have no control over the motives and affections. Mr. Spencer says: "By continually seeking to know and being continually thrown back with a deepened conviction of the impossibility of knowing, we may keep alive the consciousness that it is alike our highest wisdom and our highest duty (!) to regard that through which all things exist as the unknowable." But it is unquestionable that his philosophy will teach men to give over such efforts; and when these have ceased there will remain no function for Religion to exercise.

Valuable, therefore, as his service has been in furnishing a scientific reason for Religion in the certain existence of a Higher Power: he has done his best to nullify this by narrowing the part which Religion has to play, until it becomes inappreciable. He is very careful to exhibit his system as Agnosticism. Nescience: "duly requires us neither to affirm nor deny." This seems quite removed from an Atheistic standing-point, in its modesty and self-restraint; but it is to be feared that it cannot be practically distinguished from it. Mr. Austin Holyoake, who speaks for his fellow-disbelievers, says: "Some religious persons charge Atheists with *denying* the existence of a God. But no Atheist of any position who has written or spoken on this subject, so far as I am aware, ever was guilty of such folly; for to deny, would be to imply that you *knew* there was no God—which would be equivalent in presumption to saying there is one. Thomas Cooper, in his 'Purgatory of Suicides,' said:

'I do not say—There is no God;
But this I say—I KNOW NOT.'

This is clearly and tersely put, and is as true of every man alive as of Thomas Cooper. Mr. G. H. Lewes said: "All reflective Atheism is suspensive." That is, the judgment is suspended. Which is simply a reluctant uncertainty as to the consciousness of nature, or as to the existence of a Power over nature. Mr. Bradlaugh says: "The Atheist does not say there is no God, but he says,

I know not what you mean by GOD ; I am without idea of GOD ; the word GOD is to me a sound conveying no clear or distinct affirmation. I do not deny GOD, because I cannot deny that of which I have no conception, and the conception of which, by its affirmer, is so imperfect that he is unable to define it to me !” Comparing these statements with Mr. Spencer’s, we are reluctantly compelled to the conclusion that Agnosticism is essentially Atheism.

GEORGE C. FOLEY.

THE OUTLOOK OF TOLERATION.

WITHOUT being followers of Mr. John Stuart Mill, we may readily agree with him in speaking of Liberty as likely soon to become "the vital question of the future." The momentous interest of all the questions which centre in liberty to-day can hardly be overestimated. Toleration is one of the most difficult and urgent of them. Mr. Mill himself appears to discern this, when he begins to speak of "the liberty of expressing and publishing opinions." And he fairly admits that this species may fall under a principle different from that of the generic head. He even thinks it may be without the bounds of the "appropriate region of human liberty." And he is quite right to be cautious on such a point.

If ever the exigency of the times has called for the thorough consideration of a great question, that exigency exists now, and that question is: How far shall we tolerate?

Are we to take the advice of the Rev. Dr. Dix, and venture "up to the very edge of medieval error, if you will, and down to the very threshold of nineteenth century sectarianism?" Or, are we to let Mr. Mallock's satire of the "New Republic" have its weight, and Dr. Jenkinson, his typical latitudinarian in the Church, persuade us that "Christianity really embraces all religions, even an honest denial of itself?" Are we to listen to the winning words of the late Dr. DeKoven, as when he imagines a "Treatise" to be written by his accusers, and suggests that it be sent forth in binding, neither of Russia, nor of sheep, but of *boards*? "Then will it be purchased by that party which our fathers knew not, which is neither

high nor low, nor broad, but pre-eminently what may be called *hard* Church. And when the work is done, if it be accepted, farewell to the brave old days and the brave old men, out of whose difference often came the higher truth : farewell to high-toned earnestness and straightforward independence, and to the grand heritage of toleration of our Mother Church." Or shall we allow the London *Guardian* to fault us, in company with Canon Farrar, for "that intolerance of intolerance which is the most intolerant thing in the world?"

Such questions as these, it will be seen, turn on ecclesiastical authority as well as on conscience; on Discipline as well as on Order and Truth; on executive firmness as well as on executive clemency. And they demand that with respect to doctrine and discipline some fixed principles of government for the Church should be laid down, so that all may be the better informed, and the obedient may be protected from the disobedient.

It must be confessed that the outlook of toleration is neither bright nor serene; nay, it is rather stormy and ill-omened.

What then is proposed in this essay is, to look for some guidance from the history of opinion, from the exclusive method of Science, truly so called; from the settled principles of social order, law, and government, and, most of all, from the authority of Holy Scripture, so that we may arrive at some practical conclusions on the subject before us, likely to contribute to its clearing up and settlement.

A HISTORY OF OPINION.

In the first and second centuries, the Apostolic Church must have maintained the principles of religious liberty in their right balance. Since that period, however, these principles would appear to have been more obscured than illustrated.

Mr. Hallam makes the rather surprising statement that "Such a genuine toleration as Christianity and Philoso-

phy alike demand had no place in our Statute Book before the reign of George III." (Const. Hist. Eng., c. XV.) What he alludes to must be the political agitation for relief of the Irish Roman Catholics, running through Parliament during all the years 1813, 1817, 1825, 1828, 1829.

Hallam's opinion of the "Act of Toleration" (1689), is that it was "a very scanty measure of religious liberty." Macaulay agreed with him as to the form of the Act, but differs as to the popular acceptance of it. Buckle holds that it marked "the era from which the enjoyment of religious toleration may be dated." And Lecky esteems it the Magna Charta of religious liberty.*

The era of the Protestant Reformation, while naturally associated in many minds with liberty, was not productive of toleration. Calvin, in Geneva, and Knox, in Scotland, were both persecutors on principle. And in England we know too well that a Protestant Bishop burned a friar for refusing to call the King "Head of the Church."† The strange fact is that first from among the Roman Catholics of that period, both in England and in France, the revival of religious toleration may be observed.

The good Sir Thomas More, Lord Chancellor of Henry VIII., expressed in his Utopia (B. II.) the opinion then (1514) most perilous as well as singular: "that no man ought to be punished for his religion;" that no other force than persuasion should be used, "no re-

* It gave no toleration to Unitarians (Macaulay, Church and State). It gave none to offending ministers of the Church of England (Burn's Eccl. Law).

For the information of any reader who may be disposed to follow out this study, we append the following items:

The Statute authorising the Writ *de heretico comburendo*, was in process of development during the years 1381, 1400, 1413, 1414. This writ was not abolished until Charles II. (1678).

In the first year of Edward VI., an Act was passed "repealing 25 Henry V., and all former Acts concerning Doctrines or matters of Religion, so that at this time there was no law at all for punishment of Hereticks" (Thomas Hobbes' Hist. Narration Concerning Heresie). This would seem to be inconsistent with the above, given on authority of Mr. Justice Stephen.

Two flimsy edicts were put forth under Charles II. The first, A Declaration in Ecclesiastical Affairs, in the year of his restoration; the second, in the year 1662, entitled a "Declaration for indulging Non-conformists in matters ecclesiastical."

James II., April 4, 1687, Declaration for Liberty of Conscience.

† The Bishop was Latimer and the victim was Prior Forest.

proaches nor violence with it ; and such as did otherwise were to be condemned to banishment or slavery." True, he was subsequently called upon to prosecute the earliest Lutherans and the latest Lollards, as Fox and Bishop Burnet cannot but report ; but both from the testimony of Erasmus and from More's own letters, the humanity and enlightenment of the man are proved to have been far in advance of his age.

Then there was another great Chancellor, Michael de l'Hôpital by name, who from under the very shadow of his masters, the Guises, procured the passage of edicts (1560-1562), promotive of toleration in the Kingdom of France. The Edict of Nantes was, in 1598, granted to the Protestants by Henry IV. after his perversion to Rome.

To return to England, we may mention with pride the example of Hooker, who conducted controversy so ably, while tempering it with such Christian fairness and moderation as relieved it of all bitterness. After him, Bishop Sanderson, under James I. and Charles I., both held and spoke the truth in firmness and in love, rebuking disobedience in Church and State, and determined, he says, "both to speak as plain and to offend as little as might be." His opinions, particularly in the more difficult cases of conscience, are the most respected among those of our standard authors.

Dr. Chillingworth, more ardent against Church authority than wise to discriminate, wrote about the same time ; and to judge from such modern critics and warm admirers as Buckle and Lecky, he must have been a perfect hero of tolerance. The opinions and acts of the Protector Cromwell are well known. His policy of a free exercise of religious preferences was so complicated by his appointed " triers," as to entirely defeat its ostensible purpose.

Bishop Jeremy Taylor, from his ability and the fact that he lived under Charles I., Cromwell, and then Charles II., has always occupied the most prominent place among the divines of the Church of England on this special subject. He has been quoted, or rather

mentioned by the radicals of toleration with such confidence as to mislead many. Upon comparing his work, "The Liberty of Prophesying," written while he was a political exile in Wales, with his sermon preached at the opening of Parliament in Ireland, after the Restoration and after he had been made Bishop, one observes a considerable difference in tone and statement. But yet the difference, such as it is, never warranted such reproach as his critic, Coleridge, reluctantly bestows upon him. For, all through "The Liberty of Prophesying," there are passages of caution and limitation that quite prepare the reader for the more severe expressions of the sermon.

But it was reserved for Roger Williams, here at the same time in America, to take a prominent place in the history of opinion. "*The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution for Cause of Conscience discussed in a Conference between Truth and Peace*," London, 1644—such was the title of a little work that marked an epoch in its way. The writer did no more than insist on the separation between the Magistrate, or arm of the State, and the orthodox body of believers. These latter were to have and execute their own sanctions without ever having to call upon the officer of the law as the secular arm or as the sword of the Church. Good doctrine and far ahead of England to-day, but not so new, for the Chancellor de l'Hôpital had anticipated it, in this very particular, by nearly a hundred years. Nevertheless, this little work of Roger Williams, purporting to reply to Mr. Cotton's tenets of persecution on behalf of his Puritan body, should be of particular interest to Americans, for Church and State with us have since become constitutionally separate, and we have realised the hopes of this early sufferer for conscience' sake. But what a lame affair, after all, this tolerance was in the mind of Williams! Strange that, after so much controversy, he should have learned so little about it! For we read in Mr. Cotton's answer that Williams, while at Salem, "neither admitted nor permitted any church members but such as rejected all communion with the parish (Church of England)

assemblies, so much as in hearing the Word among them." And Williams has it in his work (ch. xix.) that "if the members of a church of CHRIST shall upon some delusion of Satan kneel at the LORD's Supper, keep Christmas, or any other Popish observation, great tenderness ought to be used in winning his soul from the error of his way; and yet I see not that persons so practising were fit to be received into the churches of CHRIST now, as the Jews, weak in faith—that is, in the liberties of CHRIST—were to be received." (Rom. xiv. 1.)

The first impulse given to the Maryland Act of Toleration* (1649) is ascribed by an American writer, quoted by Mr. Gladstone, to the entreaties of the friends of Roger Williams, seconded by Copeland, a learned Episcopal divine, who shared his views of toleration. This influence of Williams and Copeland appears to have been first exerted upon the British House of Commons in an Act passed in 1645 and in another Act or Ordinance passed in 1647. The Maryland Act, therefore, in Mr. Gladstone's opinion, "seems to have been an echo" of this "home" legislation. In the colony itself, the small legislative body which passed it appears to have been two-thirds Protestant to one-third Roman Catholic, "the recorded members being 16 and 8 respectively." Bishop Lay, in his Discourse at the Centennial of the Diocese (1883) sums up the whole matter by saying:

We hold in all honor the burgesses of Maryland for their simple and strong remonstrance against the enforcement of the religious conscience; but, so far as concerns the Roman Catholic element of that body, we must remember that it was in the time of their persecution, not of their dominance, and that the asylum they sought to secure was most needed by their own fathers and brethren.†

* From its text, these extracts will suffice: "That the enforcement of the conscience has been of dangerous consequence in those countries wherein it had been practised." . . . "No persons professing to believe in JESUS CHRIST should be molested in respect of their religion, or in the free exercise thereof." A fine was imposed on "those reproaching any with opprobrious names of religious distinction."

† "It was a wise measure for which the two Lords Baltimore, father and son,

In the Mother-Church, again, the case of Bishop Hoadley (1705) was that of the first "Broad" Churchman under censure of his brethren. He was as anxious to *minimise* in dogma as any modern Sadducee; but the State intervened in his behalf and he escaped. William Law's celebrated letters to Bishop Hoadley form the only valuable contribution, on Church authority and discipline, in the whole, tedious, Bangorian controversy. The out-speaking and aggressive Dr. South (1633-1716), left sermons that bear directly upon our subject, as also Dr. Barrow did before him: the former treating the Dissenting conscience with a thorough but caustic analysis; the latter arguing for ecclesiastical obedience with great scope and power.

We come now to that next period of the discussion, when persecution had no longer its terror to the Church, but it became her duty earnestly to contend for "the Faith once for all delivered to the saints." This period was well marked by Dr. Waterland. It was in 1735 that he delivered, as Archdeacon, his charge on the subject of "Fundamentals." The term had become known in England, nearly a hundred years before, when Cromwell's divines had made an attempt to draw up "the fundamentals of religion," and had failed. But Dr. Waterland, with a few masterly strokes, vindicates the term and the importance of discussion upon it.* He finds a critic in our day, William Palmer of Oxford; but this author's objections seem like cobwebs blown away by Waterland's strong words. "Have we not full warrant from Holy Writ (the latter asks) for regarding first the *weightier* matters and then the matters *less weighty*, for giving most *earnest heed* to some things in contrast with ordinary heed to others? And, then, proceeding, he makes the following plain case for us, con-

deserve the highest honor. But the measure was really defensive; and its main and very legitimate purpose plainly was to secure the free exercise of the Roman Catholic religion." ("Vaticanism," Ap. H. W. E. Gladstone.)

* Bishop Taylor had said before him: "Whatsoever is against the foundation of the Faith . . . does not pretend to compliance or toleration."

"Liberty of Propheying," Ep. Ded.

necting his term, "Fundamentals," with our own, Toleration, by an indissoluble link :

There were in the days of the Apostles Judaisers of two several kinds ; some thinking themselves obliged, as Jews, to retain their Judaism along with Christianity, others conceiving that the Mosaic law was so necessary that it ought to be received under pain of damnation, by all, whether Jews or Gentiles. Both the opinions were wrong ; but the one was *tolerable* and the other was *intolerable*. Wherefore S. Paul complied in some measure with the Judaisers of the first sort, being willing in some cases "to become all things to all men." (1 Cor. ix. 19-23, Acts xvi. 3, xxi. 21-26.) And he exhorted his new converts of the Gentiles to bear with them and to receive them as brethren. But, as to the Judaisers of the second sort, he would not give place to them by subjection, no, not for an hour, lest "the truth of the Gospel" should fatally suffer by it. (Gal. ii. 5, 21.) He anathematised them as subverters of the Faith of CHRIST, and as a reproach to the Christian name. (Gal. i. 7-9, v. 12.) This simple instance may suffice to point out the distinction between *fundamentals* and *non-fundamentals* ; and to illustrate the use of it in practice.

He distinguishes further between fundamentals "considered in their *abstract* nature as essential parts of the Christian *system*, and fundamentals considered in a *relative* view to the salvation of particular *persons*." And, finally, he exhibits his analysis of the Christian *Covenant* as the basis of the fundamentals of Christianity itself. In this resolving of the rule or *ratio* of a fundamental into the doctrine of the Christian Covenant, Dr. Waterland tells us he only follows the lead of Baron Puffendorf, the Jurist and authority on the law of Nature and Nations. Other rules of fundamentals, from the fullest, *de fide*, to the most attenuated thread of doctrine, he considers and sets aside in favor of his own, humbly conceiving that by it "we may with sufficient *certainty* fix the *terms of communion*" with differing Christians, and, on the other hand, laying it down, that there shall be "no communion with impugn-ers of fundamentals."

Archbishop Whately, it is well known, inclined more to liberty than to authority, but such a man is the more instructive, when he is not extreme. Much of what he says of the spirit of persecution is unnecessary to us, now

a half-century removed from him, and being in the New World, where religion and law have learned their respective places. Yet such sentences as these will serve to mark his position :

To say that religious liberty does not imply irreligious liberty, is to say of a person, that he is at liberty to remain within the walls of the prison, but not at liberty to leave it. . . . There is a heresy of Indifference to revealed religion, which is the most deadly of all heresies. . . . It is not enough to believe what you maintain, you must maintain what you believe. . . . Some persons follow the dictates of their conscience only in the same sense in which a coachman may be said to follow the horses he is driving. . . . The liberality of some men is but indifference clad in the garb of candor.

William Palmer, in his work on the Church (1838) takes up severally the subjects of Indifference in Religion and of Toleration. This author brings down the succession of opinions, through Blackburn (1766) and Dr. Hampden (1836), both "broad" men, to his own day. He informs us of the censure passed upon the latter by the University of Oxford. On the subject of Toleration, Palmer's opinions are those of a zealous advocate of the Establishment, if not of a decided Erastian; so much so, that his editor, the late Bishop Whittingham, is tempted to correct him at every step.

Of Church authorities, the last we need notice in this study of opinion is the present Bishop of Winchester, Dr. Harold Browne. From his valuable work in exposition of the Articles of Religion we can make two brief extracts. The first is the concluding sentence under Article VIII.: "Peace is infinitely to be desired, but it is better to contend for the Faith than to lose it." The last is under Article XXXIII.: "The peculiar nature of the connection between the Church and State in England and the prevalence of what are called Erastian opinions have been the great causes why ecclesiastical censures have lost their power and become a dead letter amongst us." The first is a trumpet of no uncertain sound, calling for defence of the Truth imperilled in these days. The last is a mortifying confession of faulty

constitution and debilitated government in the Church of England.

Except the opinions of those two grand old Chancellors, we have, thus far, been observing only the working of the clerical mind on this subject. That which marks an era in the discussion is the fact that Toleration has entered into the thinking of the laity in the last sixty or seventy years as it never did before. It was a question that could not escape the eye of Coleridge, or fail to come within his comprehensive grasp.

This author's foresight and sagacity are exhibited in his brief treatment of the subject to a wonderful degree, and only serve the more to make us regret that he never carried out a declared intention to write an essay "in which (he says) I hope to state *the grounds and limits of toleration* more accurately than they seem to me to have been hitherto traced." ("The Friend," Gen. Intr. Essay XIII.) Laying down firmly the distinction which he would maintain between law and religion, he proceeds to point out that the present age is likely to see the "usurpation of the function of religion by law," in reaction against the old and long-continued usurpation of the function of law by religion. For himself, he says:

But, notwithstanding this deep conviction of our general fallibility and the most vivid recollection of my own, I dare avow . . . that, as far as opinions . . . are concerned, I neither am tolerant, nor wish to be regarded as such. According to my judgment, it is mere ostentation, or a poor trick that hypocrisy plays with the cards of nonsense, when a man makes protestation of being perfectly tolerant in respect of all principles, opinions, and persuasions, those alone excepted which render the holders intolerant. . . . *That which doth not withstand hath itself no standing place.* To fill a station is to exclude or repel others, and this is not less the definition of moral than of material solidity. We live by continual acts of defence that involve a sort of offensive warfare. But a man's principles, on which he grounds his hope and his faith, are the life of his life. . . . He who asserts that truth is of no importance except in the signification of sincerity, confounds sense with madness and the Word of God with a dream. . . . As much as I love my fellow-men, so much and no more will I be intolerant of their heresies and unbelief. And I will honor and hold forth the right hand of fellowship to every individual who is equally intolerant of that which he conceives such in me. ("The Friend," Gen. Intr., Essay XIII.)

Since Coleridge's day there have been authors who recognised the place of this subject in the philosophy of Civilisation, and under the whole structure of Government. As preliminary to them, these few words of the late Mr. Carlyle will show that he gave it some thought:

Intolerance coiled like a dragon round treasures which were the palladium of mankind was not so bad; nay, rather was indispensable and good. . . . Intolerance, with nothing to protect but empty pots and eggs that are fairly addled, is doubly and trebly intolerable. I do not praise the tolerance talked of in these times; but I do see the wisdom of a Truce of God being appointed, which you may christen tolerance, and everywhere proclaim by drum and trumpet, by public cannon from the high places, and by private fiddle, till once there be achieved for us something to be intolerant about again. There are a few men who have even at present a certain right, call it rather a certain terrible duty to be intolerant, and I hope that there will be even more, and that their intolerance will grow ever nobler, diviner, more victorious. But how few are there in all the earth! ("Spl. Optics," 1852.)

It might be wished that more in such strain had been spoken by that eccentric genius. Soon after that date, appeared the leader of the new school, charging with free lance upon all settled beliefs—Mr. Buckle; and in his company, as colleagues, or critics, the late Mr. Mill, Lecky, J. Fitzjames (now Sir James, or Mr. Justice) Stephen, Max Müller, and others. These men have enlarged the field of discussion, have stimulated thought; and, though often rather bitter than sweet in their reflections, they have made most valuable contributions.

Mr. Buckle would have us believe that men must learn to doubt before they begin to tolerate; that this doubting stage, "far from being yet completed in any country," is upon us now, a stage probationary, preparative to the final one, toleration, pure and simple, if not absolute. At least, this seems to be his meaning when he says that toleration is "the ultimate form of the religious history of the human race." ("Hist. Civ. Eng.," Ch. VII.)

Buckle was followed by Lecky in his use of the historical method. Lecky avoids his leader's blunt offensiveness, but, like him, treats the whole question as a purely religious one, which it is not. He practises upon

the target of "exclusive salvation," as if that were the only field for his flying shafts of criticism.

The appearance of J. Stuart Mill's work on Liberty, late in that author's life, marked the removal of the discussion from historical and religious, to social and philosophic grounds. The study of society, its industry, progress, and government, the philosophy of the individual, his rights rather than his duties, these were seen to be favorite themes with Mr. Mill. Asserting with little or no proof what he calls, at times, the "simple principle," that nothing but self-protection can justify coercion, he seems to have adopted another, not so simple principle—it is said after William Humboldt—viz., that "the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is that it is robbing the human race" of the fruits of "human development in its richest variety." But there are two things which Mill cannot bring himself to tolerate under the broad shield of his liberty: these are public ignorance and fixed principles. Compulsory education is one of his watchwords,* and his scorn of what he calls the "deep slumber of a decided opinion" is unpleasantly suggestive of a watchman's rattle in the dead of night.

In the hands of his critics, Mill fares badly. J. Fitzjames Stephen points out, that the "simple principle" would soon destroy all government. "To force an unwilling person to contribute to the support of the British Museum is as distinct a violation of Mr. Mill's principles as religious persecution." He adds :

Both religion and morality are, and always must be, essentially coercive systems : [they] bear, even when they are at their calmest, the traces of having been established, as we know that in fact they were, by word of command. . . . The real problem of liberty and tolerance is simply this : What is the object of the contention worth ? Is the case one—and no doubt such cases do occur—in which all must be done, dared, and endured that men can do, dare, or endure ? or, is it one in which we can honorably submit to defeat for the present, sub-

* "Is it not almost a self-evident axiom, that the State should require and compel the education, up to a certain standard, of every human being who is born its citizen ?" ("Liberty.")

ject to the chance of trying again? According to the answer given to this question the form of struggle will range between internecine war and friendly argument. . . . Mr. Mill's doctrines about liberty of opinion and discussion appear to me to be a kind of Quakerism. They are like teaching that all revenge whatever, even in its mildest form, is wrong, because revenge carried to an extreme is destructive of society. *"In short, toleration is in its proper sphere so long as its object is to mitigate inevitable struggles. It becomes excessive and irrational, if, and in so far as, it aims at the complete suppression of these struggles and so tends to produce a state of indifference and isolation, which would be the greatest of all evils, if it could be produced."* (*"Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity."*)

Prof. Max Müller, in an address delivered at Birmingham, 1879, comments on the rapid realisation of some of Mill's views of Liberty, and congratulates "the most liberal town in England on having proved itself the most inexorable tyrant in carrying out the principle of compulsory education."

And so, to bring this review of opinion, reaching from the Reformation to the present day, to an end, we may recapitulate by observing three well-marked stages.

First.—There came the hesitating period, beginning with Sir Thomas More and ending with Bishop Taylor; a period of some little advance in the doctrine of toleration, but of much more unsteadiness and inconsistency. Theoretically, there was a widening of thought and a deepening of Christian feeling; practically, there was perfect acquiescence in the retaining of the Civil Magistrate by the Church to enforce the dreadful penalties of her displeasure.

Second.—The earnest period, opening with Roger Williams and closing with Dr. Waterland, was boldly characterised by the incoming of the American element, the absolute severance of Church and State; the former cutting herself off from all employment of the Civil Magistrate, and so far discountenancing what had become only too well known as Persecution. This was the practical reform of the period. Its theoretical advance was the introduction of "Fundamentals" into the discussion, such as Dr. Waterland more especially brought about.

Third.—This may be called the philosophic period. Marked more particularly by the thought of laymen, it exhibits toleration with larger scope than before, while it professes to limit toleration within bonds of reason, rather than of authority. To Coleridge, unquestionably, belongs the initiating of the movement, which we have followed down to our own times.

DEFECTS OF PRESENT POPULAR OPINION.

But the thought of this present period is neither so comprehensive nor so exclusive as it ought to be. In the minds of such men as Buckle, Lecky, and Mill, the anti-theological bias has been either displayed or poorly concealed. And this accounts for the treating of the whole subject of Toleration by them as if it were only a matter of *religious* scruples and *religious* differences. The monster of Intolerance has been, all along the ages, a purely religious monster in their eyes. They will not assume any other reason for its being than religion, or superstition, or as Mr. Lecky expresses it, “exclusive salvation.” Whereas, the want of comprehension is chargeable against this modern school, in that it takes no account either of Science or Law, of logical method, or of civil government in its view of toleration. Confining its regard to the turgid and often bloody stream of persecution for conscience’ sake, that runs through the history of the human race, this school of writers has altogether diverted the public mind from the large region of Truth and Order into the narrow channel of *religious* intolerance. True, the prominence occupied in history by this particular field of intolerance only goes to prove how very close religion lies to the human heart; but there are certain other fields where, without bloodshed or persecution, the issues of tolerance and intolerance are continually joined. Let it be remembered, that if persecution has often attended religious intolerance, it has done so not necessarily. It is not a necessary attendant on any kind of intolerance, religious, scientific, social, or ju-

dicial. Least of all, should persecution be confused with intolerance, as if the two were much the same thing. But this is exactly the way of thinking into which the public of this generation has been led by our modern critics of history and society.

Such a hue and cry has been raised against persecution that intolerance has become "an accursed thing" with it. Just as tolerance on the other hand has been lauded and sublimated into a species of Divine composure or indifference. By such teaching our critics have done violence to some of the first principles of social science and to the plainest distinction between terms.

Therefore, it becomes part of our purpose in this essay to distinguish essentially between tolerance and indifference, and in so doing to establish the legitimacy of a pure *Intolerance*, wherever Truth is to be held, or Right maintained, or Order preserved.

THE RATIONALE OF TOLERANCE AND INTOLERANCE.

From the careless but popular use of the words tolerance and intolerance, into which many have been betrayed by the writers above mentioned, it will be necessary to work back by some steps and definitions into a more exact use of the terms.

It need hardly be said, that while *tolerance* is predicated of a mental or moral state, while, for example, we say "the tolerance of the man's gentle disposition was amazing;" *toleration* is predicated of an outward act, a piece of conduct, thus, "the offence was received with customary toleration." Yet it is not always easy to maintain this distinction, since there is no negative to toleration, as there is to tolerance. Intolerance has to do duty for both the subjective state and the objective act. We have said that intolerance has been too much confused with persecution and associated with religion: it is so. A man may be intolerant without ever persecuting another. A man may be intolerant without being at all religious. He may be only *rational*. To borrow an illustration from a writer: "Three persons witness an

event and immediately afterwards describe it on oath. One of the three describes it in a manner which the other two know to be false, unless their own senses or memory have failed. They naturally conclude that the third man is perjured. This is *rational intolerance*. If they thought a mistake possible, they would tolerate. Conversely, if the two witnesses do not regard the third as untruthful, they admit that they themselves may be mistaken. This is *rational tolerance*."

Again, it may be said that *toleration* is of two kinds, rational and irrational. The former proceeds from a sufferance which suggests disapproval while tolerating, and is therefore rational because limited, conditioned, provisional. The latter proceeds from acquiescence without reservation, which suggests indifference while tolerating, and is, therefore, irrational, because absolute. The former is rational, because it gives consent with qualification, or even under protest. The latter is irrational, because it gives consent without qualification or protest, thereby changing its whole nature and becoming something else, viz., the consent of indifference.

But it is only idiots who are indifferent to right and wrong, good and evil, truth and error, beauty and deformity. Average human beings cannot be indifferent towards these things. They must take sides with or among them; and when they tolerate some, it is of necessity that they register, in the same act, their intolerance of others. For a rational intolerance is nothing more than the reservation which accompanies a rational tolerance. Thus, we may hold, that intolerance can be rational; that it comes from honorable pedigree; that it is the very correlative of rational tolerance itself.

But can *this* intolerance be the "monster" of religious history? You only fail to recognise him, because he is now divested of his war-paint and eagle feathers. History, unfortunately, describes him as continually thirsting for blood, persecuting with fire and sword, desolating homes and countries. History, unfortunately, has a right to do so; but now that some little reflection enters into the question, must it not be conceded that all

his costuming and posturing of the historical monster belong to the *abuse* of intolerance? It has no warrant from the analysis just made, from the place of the general principle of intolerance in human nature. It is contradicted by the assertion of the *use* of intolerance, of the dignity and responsibility of the *trust* of intolerance. That religion first engaged the services of intolerance and persecuted with it may be history, but it should never divert us from these facts of Philosophy, viz. : that this principle of intolerance is implanted in human nature for wise and good purposes ; that it is older and deeper than the principle of tolerance ; and that its connection with Religion should only serve to remind us of the supreme importance of the two things so connected.

TOLERANCE REPUDIATED BY SCIENCE.

The partisans of tolerance would do well to inquire how it happens that their favorite, so much demanded (they say) by Religion, should be so utterly repudiated by Science, as it surely is to-day? It is because the methods of Science are, of all things in the world, the least tolerant ; because they cannot afford to be indifferent to truth and falsehood. *There must be no heresy in Science.* The laws of Nature are inexorable : the canons of criticism, historical or evidential, are arbitrary ; the rules of Logic are rigorous, and intolerant of fallacies. " Where Science begins Liberty ends. . . . Much nonsense about intellectual liberty might have been spared, if people would bear in mind the obvious fact, that Free Thought and Science are mutually inconsistent. The one supposes the absence of the other."

Professor Virchow, in refusing to admit the speculations and hypotheses of some of his contemporaries, has exhibited more courage and conscience than are commonly found in the Church. In his "Address on the Liberty of Science," Munich, 1878, he speaks as follows :

We may not set down our hypothesis as a certainty, our problem as a dogma ; that cannot be permitted. . . . Nothing has been

more injurious to Natural Science, nothing has done more harm to its progress and to its position in the opinion of nations, than premature synthesis.

The principles of Science, as it should be, have been shown with great ability by the late Professor W. Stanley Jevons, to be none other than those of Logic itself. When submitted to logical tests of certainty, some of the most precise and beautiful demonstrations of Mathematical Science are proved not only to be incapable of absolute verification, but even to involve some apparent logical contradiction. At its best, the certainty of Mathematics is only the same as that which attaches to all correct logical *deduction*. And, as to the much vaunted *inductions* of Science, this author lays down the rule that, unless they are based on *complete knowledge of all the agents existing throughout the universe, and also on assurance of continued uniformity*, they will be no more than arguments of greater or less probability. ("Principles of Science," W. Stanley Jevons, Professor, University College, London, 1878, pp. 767, 235, 239.)

The jealousy with which the great body of the medical profession defends itself from the heresies of "quackery" more or less respectable, is well known. Medical Ethics, as they are called, rest upon a rational and high-toned intolerance. To be tolerant of an "advertising" practitioner, or of a patent-medicine, secretly compounded, is to be skeptical of Science and recreant to her principles. The ethical "Code" of the Medical Faculty has no place in it for toleration.

TOLERANCE CHECKED BY SOCIAL INTOLERANCE.

But the field of Science is not the only one passed over by the zealots of toleration. Differences of right and wrong, in principle, or propriety, or even taste, must occur among men, and be disputed also on the field of social life. Society is tolerant of some customs and highly intolerant of others. The phenomena of

unanimity or conventionality are well worthy of study. For example, Fashion is one of the most intolerant things in the world. Dr. Lieber remarks suggestively: "Though the head may wear a crown, Fashion puts her shears to its hair, if she has a mind to do so. Far more powerful than International Law, which only rules between nations, she brings innumerable nations into one fold, and that frequently the fold of acknowledged folly." ("Civil Liberty and Self-Government," C. XXXV.)

The same power is expressed in what may be called the social ban. A writer of eminence assures us, that this is more powerful in England than in Russia or in Germany. "Even where it does not employ the arm of the law, society knows how to use that softer but more crushing pressure, that calm, but Gorgon-like look, which only the bravest and stoutest hearts know how to resist." (Max Müller on "Freedom.") Tennyson calls it the "stony British stare."

THE WITNESS OF GOVERNMENT ON THIS SUBJECT.

It is, however, to a higher social plane that we may now turn, to study the conflict of right or wrong, undisturbed by the variations of human caprice or prejudice. This is the region of Law and Order, in one word, of Government. In this quarter our modern critics have scarcely taken a look for tolerance and intolerance apart from Religion. It is not of laws, ordinances, statutes, restrictive or regulative, in the books, but inoperative in the lives of men: it is rather of law, singular, respectable and respected, written or unwritten, that we would now take some guidance. It is evident that statutes command not the course of all conduct, mingle not with the motives of life, sympathise not with the deeper feelings of the heart.

How small, of all that human hearts endure
That part that laws or kings can cause or cure !

But laws are formed around an *ideal* of law and government that itself is a grand inspiration. And, since there must be some fixed principles of government in general, that will always remain the same, whether in State or Church, or in Church and State combined—since there must be some analysis and proportion discoverable in the composition of government, to instruct and profit us in religious as well as secular affairs, we have a right to ask, What is the witness of government to this subject of toleration?

With no particular reference, then, to Religion, let it be said, that certain demands of Order necessitate government; that certain demands of government necessitate means of administration; that among these means are laws for instruction of all the subjects, and sanctions for protection of the obedient from the disobedient subjects. Laws might as well be without an executive agent, as without the sanctions that make them obligatory. It will not do to have them esteemed to be merely instructive or advisory: they must be obligatory in order to be protective; and to be protective, they must bring force of some kind, physical or moral, to defend the obedient from the disobedient. "It is in idea essential to a reverence for truth (as of order also) to believe in its capacity for self-defence." What is due to truth in the abstract is due both to truth and order in the social sphere.

The obedient subject knows how to find his welfare in the welfare of all, and is willing to have his liberty qualified to secure that end. The disobedient subject, seeking *his* welfare in self-assertion, misses it altogether in falling under the displeasure of the many. And that liberty, which he might have spontaneously allowed to be qualified, is just forcibly qualified for him by the authority of the government. The forcible qualifying of personal liberty is the most disturbing element possible to the human judgment.

No thief who felt the halter draw
E'er spoke in favor of the law.

In other words, government cannot tolerate the offender, for his offence is that he does not tolerate the government. To tolerate the disobedient subject would be to treat all others with something worse than intolerance—with betrayal of their most sacred trusts. Because government is a trust to the officers from the people: it is besides, when accepted, a pledge—the highest possible pledge—of protection.

Bishop Jeremy Taylor well expresses this in saying of weak concession: "It takes away the obliging part of the law, and makes that the thing enacted shall not be enjoined but tolerated only: it destroys unity and uniformity, which to preserve was the very end of such laws of discipline: *it bends the rule to the thing which is to be ruled, so that the law obeys the subject, not the subject the law*: it is to make a law for particulars, not upon general reason and congruity, against the prudence and design of all laws in the world." ("Lib. of Proph.," C. XVII.) And a modern writer draws out of the intolerance of law its highest dignity, viz., its benevolence. "For, in the enforcement of the sanctions of law, there is an escape from the immensely great suffering of all, by inflicting deserved suffering upon the evilly disposed, who, in this case, endure even for themselves, doubtless only a part of what they must suffer, if there were no such enforcement, and hence no government."

GOVERNMENT AND CONSCIENCE.

But the problem is complicated by the introduction of conscience. This we may readily allow, without admitting all the exaggerations of the difficulty. It is asked, Does the province of government extend to the conscience of the individual subject? We answer, Certainly, it extends to the conscience; but how far it should coerce it, is another question. Even Jeremy Taylor assures us that "a law that is made without intention to bind the conscience is no law at all." (*Duct. Dubit.*, B. III., C. 1: 14.) And he asks else-

where, What does the plea of conscience avail? Can not both sides plead conscience? "If one man's conscience can be the measure of another man's action, why shall not the prince's conscience be the subject's measure?"

To the final impregnability of conscience there is no stronger testimony than Dr. South's: "But what man alive, what judge or justice, what Minos or Rhadamanthus, can carry his inspection into the conscience? What evidence, what witness, or rack, can extort a discovery of that which the conscience is resolved to conceal and keep within itself? . . . Conscience is neither scorched with the fire nor pricked with the sword; it feels nothing under a Deity, nothing but the stings and insinuations of an angry, sin-revenging Omnipotence." (Serm. LIII.)

In the question of coercing the conscience, a good deal depends on what kind of a conscience it is. Who would not consent to the coercion of a Thug's conscience? Who would not incline to coerce, if more gently, the Mormon conscience, or the Nihilist, or the Communist conscience? It is at this point we feel the power and penetration of Archbishop Whately's remark: "The plea of conscience would tend to the subversion of the whole fabric of society." It is in such cases, also, that we see the absurdity of the policy of *laissez-faire*, espoused by J. Stuart Mill, after William Humboldt, that "human development in its richest variety" should be perfectly unrestricted; for such a principle would allow the felon to have his doctrine as well as the magistrate.

Then there is a *gainsaying* conscience that seems to be intent on doubting the authority under which it has been placed, rather than the opinion which it has formed for itself at variance with that authority. Such a conscience depends less upon reason than upon constitutional bent and temperament. A certain proportion of people (heady and high-minded) are born with greater fondness and aptitude for rule than others; and it will always be harder for such to obey. But a purely gain-

saying conscience can never command the respect that is felt for a weak or a doubting one.*

There was a *tender* conscience in the days of those great casuists, Bishops Sanderson and Taylor, that was not plainly the blessed fruit of the HOLY GHOST, that rather drew around it so much that was squeamish, as to invite their tender ridicule. The former likens its action to straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel, and says: "It is with it as with other tender things—very subject to receive harm, and soon put out of order." (Pref. Serm.) The latter compares its tenderness to the "soreness of a bile"—tenderness diseased, abused, mis-persuaded, that drives them away from the sight of a surplice affrighted as a bird with a man of clouts, "but their consciences can suffer them to despise government." (Lib. Proph. Ep. Ded.) Again: "If you make a law of order, and in the sanction put a clause of favor for tender consciences, do not you invite every subject to disobedience by impunity, *and teach him how to make his own excuse?*" (*Ib.*)

It is the *doubting* conscience which has always brought up the most cases for determination. The man may feel himself to be in a state of painful suspense and hesitation: he fain would assent, but cannot, so equally poised are the balances. As an honest doubter, he must have thoroughly informed himself—not alone from the stand of an individual detached, but from the larger ground of society, in whose public welfare alone his private welfare will reach its highest attainment. After all this has been done, and the man sees no way out of doubt but to do violence to his conscience—*then*, plainly, he must abide by that conscience, for, in such a case, it is the highest authority for that man. But we all know that such a case may be called exceptional. Either the man will fail thoroughly to inform himself, or, what

* "Nothing easier or more common than for men to pretend conscience when they are not minded to obey." (Bishop Sanderson, Preface to Sermons.)

"Men pretend conscience against obedience expressly against S. Paul's doctrine teaching us to 'obey for conscience' sake; but to disobey for conscience' sake in thing indifferent is never to be found in the books of our Religion." (Bishop Taylor, Lib. P. Ep. Ded.)

is most common, the man of a doubting conscience is a man enlisted "under authority." Here, then, in this the most common case, the conscience is under bonds to Order as well as to Truth. And, while the scales of Truth may be so evenly balanced as to give pause, it is the claim of Order which should prevail, and decide the question, by throwing its weight into the decision.*

But the relations between government and conscience have been sketched by an American writer with so much force, brevity, and moderation, that opportunity will be taken to extract from the work at some length. After laying down some well-settled principles of governmental respect for the conscience of subjects, he proceeds as follows:

Third.—In case of a conflict between the government and the conscience of a subject, *an equivalent in place of the specific obedience may be required*; but the government must not punish the individual as if guilty of a crime. . . .

Fourth.—If still the conscience of the subject forbids him rendering any equivalent, *the government, treating the subject with respect for his regard to right, may take by force the equivalent*, even increased, because of the increased expense in securing it. . . .

Fifth.—In case the subject claims, not as a duty but as a right, in his conscience, that which government forbids as a vice, *the government is under no obligation to regard his claim*. . . . Government is not bound by the judgment of the subject, but the subject is bound by the judgment of government. For the subject to be indifferent toward the government, deadens his conscience, represses his reason, checks his spirit of broad benevolence, and perverts his character into that of narrow selfishness. He must make the duty of obedience an appreciated fact in the conscience, awakening its impulse toward right. . . . In case of a requirement of government in violation of his conscience, *the subject may not denounce the government, and in the spirit of enmity refuse obedience*. . . . He ought to hold in check for a time his own judgment and conscience, while he recasts the matter anew, in reason, to see more clearly wherein the error lies.

* "But you will yet say that, in doubtful cases, the safer part is to be chosen. . . . So should I think too, if thou wert left merely to thine own liberty. But thou dost not consider how thou art caught in thine own net. . . . If authority command thee to kneel, which, whether it be lawful for thee to do or not, thou doubtest, it cannot choose but thou must needs doubt also, whether thou mayest lawfully disobey or not. Now then apply here thine own rule, *in dubiis pars tutior*, and see what will come of it. Judge, since thou canst not but doubt in both cases, whether it be not the safer of the two to obey doubtingly than to disobey doubtingly." (Sanderson, *Serm. Ad Clerum* IV. 30.)

Then, if, finally, his conscience still forbids his yielding to the requirement of government, *the conscience must be obeyed.* . . . Yet this should be done in no violent inimical spirit, but with a calm and quiet submission to what the government may require as an equivalent, or so-called punishment." The right of revolution is, of course, justified by the writer, for therein the individual disappears in a great public movement. ("Archology ; or, The Science of Government," by S. V. Blakeslee, Oakland, Cal.; 1876.)

Before leaving this large division of the general subject, it would be well to glance at the progress of restrictive, or coercive legislation in matters about which men cannot be indifferent.

The right and duty of *Censure*, in connection with a free press, and the responsibility of public men in the repressing and publishing of their opinions is a case in point. It was in recent times (1803) that Sir James Mackintosh made memorable the defence of Jean Peltier for using the press of England for alleged libel on the First Consul of France. But, yet, to estimate him in the present day of fearless political satire and mirth-provoking cartoons, how scrupulous the great lawyer appears to have been, not to insist on too great freedom ! The duty of censure stands forth with all the greater relief and effect, from the fact that he brings it out on the background of liberty, makes it to be a duty reciprocal to a right. Acknowledging the impossibility of defining the limits of libel and innocent discussion, he yet contends earnestly for the removal of everything which may deter men from rendering one of the most important services to their country, from the discharge of one of "the most sacred duties which they owe to mankind." He continues :

To inform the public on the conduct of those who administer public affairs requires courage and conscious security. It is always an invidious and obnoxious office, but it is often the most necessary of all public duties. If it is not done boldly, it cannot be done effectually ; and it is not from writers trembling under the uplifted scourge, that we are to hope for it.

Since that date, early in the century, and particularly since the year 1832, legislation in England has made

strides in toleration. "One of the few remaining restrictions on religious freedom is the principle acted on in several recent cases, that a contract may be broken, if its object is to facilitate the expression of irreligious opinions; *e.g.*, a contract to let a hall for a lecture advocating atheistic principles." ("Encycl. Brit.," ninth ed., Art. "Government.")

But, on the other hand, the instincts of the governed will not allow toleration to run away with protection. For, what with the rapid development of educational, industrial, sanitary, and commercial wants in society; what with the necessity for greater restraint in matters of travel or common-carrying, preparation, or adulteration of food, waste of forests, consumption of game and fish, *there has been a slow but steady advance of the principle of "interference" of the State with private liberty.*

The State refuses to tolerate ignorance, and compels the parent to educate the child. The State refuses to tolerate the hardships of factory life, and by a long series of Factory Acts extends protection over women and children—over their health, safety, work-hours, meal-times, holidays, education, accidents, etc., etc. The regulation of dangerous employments has been assumed by the State: inspectors pry into the secrets of explosives, by order of the Government; into the composition of the dairyman's milk and the publican's gin. After regulating for themselves, during whole centuries past, the practice and courtesy of their callings, the lawyers, physicians, school-teachers, and brokers, are now found to be invoking the aid of Government to lend force and authority to their own voluntary associations. This must be an instinct seeking protection. Whatever it may be, certainly, adult manhood finds it cannot manage its own *private* affairs without some of that intolerant power which the government is capable of lending it.

And, as to moral reforms, the State asserts its conscience with no respect whatever to the subject's conscience, such as it may be. The gamester, the rum-seller, the theatrical manager, all think they have

consciences, but the State refuses to tolerate them. Recently one of the largest gaming resorts in Europe, Homburg, has been closed by the Government; and the days of Monte Carlo, at Monaco, are already numbered. Lotteries are made illegal, liquor-selling is restrained both by license and by Sunday-laws: "the grip of the Lord Chamberlain over the London theatres is tightened." And the curious feature of all this protective legislation, in these liberal days, remains to be mentioned. It is that "while this kind of legislation, under existing social arrangements, fails to affect the well-to-do classes, and presses chiefly on the comparatively poor, *it is becoming more and more identified with the popular party in politics, and gathers strength with every addition to the popular element in government.*" ("Encyc. Britannica," ninth ed., Art. "Government.")

THE SCOPE AND LIMITS OF TOLERATION IN HOLY SCRIPTURES.

It now remains, that the Scriptural argument should be brought forward, in elucidation of our theme. If toleration, as we have seen, is a thing repudiated in the tests of Science and in the canons of Criticism, if it is a thing very carefully handled, checked, and balanced, in Society and Government, what may we look for concerning it in the Oracles of God?

Evidently, there are intrinsic differences in the case, which would, on *a priori* grounds, lead us to expect what we do find. Thus, if truth observed or discovered, lays upon Science the duty of applying her severely exclusive methods; if truth, the truth of opinion or principle, preferred and maintained, lays upon men in social or public life the obligation of a greatly limited toleration; then should truth, revealed, Christian, truth, possess the essential capacity of self-defence. Her method must be supremely, in order to be sufficiently exclusive. The scope and dignity of Christian truth are both beyond and above the discoveries of

men, the social standards of men, the laws and government of men. As it is given of God, this truth concerns the invisible as well as the visible universe, eternity as well as time, the heavenly as well as the earthly home and city: it reveals the mind of God, the depths of Satan, the dark corners of the human heart. It cannot be suspected of compromise or indifference. It must be intolerance itself, the intolerance of all error and all evil.

And what do we find? From the beginning of Holy Writ, where we read of that "flaming sword which turned every way, to keep the way of the tree of life," to the ending of the Revelation, where the warning against adding-to or taking-from the words of the Book, tells us of something final, signed, sealed, and delivered, there is absolute conformity with the highest requisitions of Divine Order, truth, and love, as prescribed in the Scriptures themselves. Of Creation's Order, this is the warrant, "God saw that it was good." Of the Word of Truth revealed from heaven, this is the testimony, "Thus saith the LORD." Of the law of Love, this is the authority of the SON of GOD, "A new commandment I give unto you, that ye love one another: as I have loved you, that ye also love one another."

Now the New Testament develops this latest law of Love only in one way, viz., simultaneously with the law of Divine Truth and that of Divine Order. The disciples were taught to believe as reconciled children in the Fatherhood of GOD, to realise the brotherhood of men in CHRIST, to live in the communion of the HOLY SPIRIT, in the membership and orderly government of the Church. They were not to favor one and neglect another of these things, lest the proportion of the Faith should be distorted. Here, then, we may behold, no pulpy, tasteless mash of tender sentiment, but indeed the very vigor and "confidence of a certain Faith," imparted by uncompromising truth, to be preserved by a firm discipline in the organised Church, and only to be moderated by love for the brethren.

Our purpose in appealing to the Scriptural record is not to go over again, in the train of commonplace, all the latitudes and platitudes of the subject. The self-congratulation of the age upon the progress it assumes it has made in the matter of toleration is almost as comical as it is serious.

The introduction of the Scriptural argument is rather to draw out and establish certain fixed principles in the premises, principles of a true, Christian Intolerance. These, if accepted, will supply a real want. For convenience, let there be several heads of classification and remark, graduating and shaping the doctrine, from the mildest to the severest form of Intolerance. It may be needless to add that our references are wholly to the New Testament.

THE SCALE OF CHRISTIAN INTOLERANCE.

1. *Disapprobation.* The precepts and examples of this primary form are so abundant and their reason so obvious, that mere references will be sufficient for illustration. These may be found in S. Matt. vi. 16; vi. 12; S. Mark viii. 15; S. John iv. 22.

2. *Remonstrance.* This extension of displeasure is warranted and beautifully guarded by our LORD's special instruction: "If thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone: if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more," etc. (S. Matt. xviii. 15, 16.) So, when struck at his trial, JESUS answered, "If I have spoken evil, bear witness of the evil, but if well, why smitest thou me?" (S. John xviii. 23.) So, S. Paul remonstrates against ill-treatment at Philippi, requiring the magistrates to come and fetch him and his companion out of prison. (Acts xvi. 37.)

3. *Admonition.* The rule given in the Gospel for remonstrance seems to be intended for further applications, as when the brother, after remonstrance alone, then in

the presence of two or three witnesses, yet refuses to hear, it is added by the LORD: "And, if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the Church." The passage from one of these stages to the other appears to be for such a purpose as may be called "admonition," for the contingency is suggested of the offender's being willing to hear the Church, in its more formal expression of displeasure. That this ecclesiastical, or official, sense should attach to the admonition is plain from S. Paul's use of the word in two places, viz.: "If any man obey not our word by this epistle, note that man . . . yet count him not as an enemy, but admonish him as a brother." (2 Thess. iii. 14, 15.) And, more particularly, in writing to S. Titus, left in Crete to set in order the things that are wanting, S. Paul says: "A man that is an heretick, after the first and second admonition, reject." (Titus iii. 10.) From this, it appears that there were two formal and official admonitions.

4. *Rebuke or Censure.* The word "rebuke" occurs first in the Gospel, though rather in a private than in a public connection. The words of CHRIST are: "If thy brother trespass against thee, rebuke him, and if he repent, forgive him." (S. Luke xvii. 3.) The Master's own conduct was, on two occasions, in fearless rebuke of the intruders upon the holy precincts of the Temple, to make a scourge of small cords and drive them out, saying: "Take these things hence: make not my FATHER'S house an house of merchandise." And again: "It is written, My house shall be called a house of prayer, but ye have made it a den of thieves." (S. John ii. 13-16; S. Matt. xxi. 12, 13.) In the Acts of the Apostles, we see S. Peter at Samaria, sparing not to rebuke Simon Magus in well-known words of severity. (Acts viii. 20-23.) At Antioch, S. Paul rebukes S. Peter for compromising the truth of the Gospel. (Gal. ii. 11-14.) And the same Apostle directs his subordinate, S. Titus, how to treat "the many unruly and vain talkers" in Crete, by rebuking them "sharply, that they may be sound in the faith." (Titus i. 13.) See also 1 Tim. v. 20, 2 Tim. iv. 2-4.

5. *Denunciation.* The SON of GOD shows that it is not enough that truth be preached; falsehood must be denounced. If he preaches caution in rash judgment of others, he scruples not to denounce as "dogs" and "swine," those who were unworthy. "Give not that which is holy unto the dogs; neither cast ye your pearls before swine, lest they trample them under their feet and turn again and rend you." (S. Matt. vii. 6.) The offending of one of those little ones that believe in Him was to be followed by the hanging of a mill-stone about the offender's neck, and by drowning in the depths of the sea.* (S. Matt. xviii. 6.)

But nowhere in literature, sacred or profane, can language be found to excel, if to equal, that denunciatory passage in S. Matt. xxiii., where our LORD, repeating seven times: "Woe unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites," rises to the climax: "Ye serpents, ye generation of vipers, how can ye escape the damnation of hell?" The first martyr, S. Stephen, in his appeal to the Jews just before they stoned him, rises to the most violent denunciation.† (Acts vii.) While S. Paul's language to Elymas, the Sorcerer, who "withstood them, seeking to turn away the deputy from the faith" (Acts, xiii.), is worthily distinguished for its direct, penetrating, electric power. In the Epistles, there is a memorable burst of keen denunciation from the pen of S. Paul; when writing to the Galatians, he no sooner greets them, than he begins: "I marvel that ye are so soon removed from him that called you into the grace of CHRIST unto another gospel. But though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed! As we said before, *so say I now again*, If any man preach any other gospel unto you, than that ye have re-

* Stier comments so beautifully on this passage, in his *Words of Jesus*, that we give an extract: "O thou tender love, how sharply dost thou speak against the offending of thy beloved little ones; and yet how is thy holy anger against those who are destitute of love, itself nothing but burning love, which would ward off sin and its condemnation." Compare also S. Luke x. 11-16.

† Referring to this violence in connection with the prayer at v. 60, S. Augustine says finely "*Lingua clamat, cor amat.*"

ceived, let him be accursed." (Gal. i. 6-9.) S. John denounces as "liars" those that deny that JESUS is the CHRIST (1 John ii. 22), and elsewhere he teaches: "If there come any unto you and bring not this doctrine (of CHRIST) receive him not into (your) house, neither bid him God-speed." (2 John, 10.)

6. *Separation.* Something more than the spoken displeasure of the faithful found expression among the first Christians. Admonition may have been more or less authoritative, rebuke or censure more or less public, denunciation more or less violent; but when a line of separation came to be drawn, the discipline of the Church had advanced from word to action. That such a line was drawn, S. Paul gives us plainly to understand in at least five places in his Epistles. In his Second Epistle to the Thessalonians (iii. 6, 14), he writes with marked authority: "Now we command you, brethren, in the name of our LORD JESUS CHRIST, that ye withdraw yourselves from every brother that walketh disorderly, and not after the tradition which he received of us." "And, if any man obey not our word by this epistle, note that man, and have no company with him that he may be ashamed." In 1 Cor. v. 11, S. Paul directs: "But now I have written unto you, not to keep company, if any man that is called a brother be a fornicator, or covetous, or an idolater, or a railer, or a drunkard, or an extortioner; with such an one, no, not to eat." At Rom. xvi. 17, we read: "Now I beseech you, brethren, mark them which cause divisions and offences contrary to the doctrine which ye have learned, and avoid them." Finally, in 1 Tim. vi. 3, S. Paul writes: "If any man teach otherwise and consent not to wholesome words, even the words of our LORD JESUS CHRIST, and to the doctrine which is according to godliness, he is proud . . . from such withdraw thyself."

It should be observed and remembered that this discipline of avoidance, separation, or withdrawal, is to be administered for offences both moral and doctrinal.

7. *Judgment of Exclusion.*—We have now reached the last head of this classification. It is a head which

seems to cover the case of the "heretic" rejected "after the first and second admonition" (Titus iii. 10), the case of Hymenæus and Alexander "delivered unto Satan" (1 Tim. i. 20), and the case of the incestuous man at Corinth (1 Cor. v. 5), also delivered unto Satan. It is evident that S. Paul, in all these cases, does but carry out the rule given by CHRIST in S. Matt. xviii. 15-17. Thus the two admonitions given to the "heretic" correspond perfectly with the private monition of S. Matt. xviii. 15, and the reprehension before witnesses of S. Matt. xviii. 16. And it is most likely that rejecting the heretic, and delivering unto Satan those other persons above mentioned, correspond with our LORD's meaning, when He says of the offender who neglects to hear the Church, "Let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican." (S. Matt. xviii. 17.)

But an appeal to the passages 1 Cor. v. 3-5 and 2 Cor. xiii. 1, 2, 10, will prove that S. Paul did look back to his authority from Christ; for, in the former passage, he says: "I verily, as absent in body, but present in spirit, have judged already . . . in the name of our LORD JESUS CHRIST, when ye are gathered together, and my spirit, with the power of our LORD JESUS CHRIST, to deliver such an one to Satan." And, in the latter, he even quotes from the phrase in the Gospel, "In the mouth of two or three witnesses shall every word be established;" gives notice of his coming to hold a regular judicial inquiry into the conduct of offenders—of his intention not to spare *the third time*, but to "use sharpness according to the power which the LORD hath given me to edification and not to destruction." It must, therefore, be concluded that the practice of the Apostolic Church was the true development of the Gospel rule as given in its germinal type and vigor by CHRIST himself.

While it is plain, then, from Holy Scripture, that we have not any warrant for using the civil magistrate to enforce doctrine or ecclesiastical order by persecuting, with fire and sword, or even with fine and imprisonment, it is also plain that we *have* warrant for putting into

force, under the officers of the Church, a clear, strong, positive discipline. And it is a system characterised primarily, not by tolerance, but by intolerance moderated by tolerance. This disciplinary system has been presented with some care in the form of a classification of graduated procedure, more or less official; a sort of scaling of ecclesiastical displeasure, indignation, and wrath. It is offered in the hope that some one else, more expert in law and discipline, may at least use it as the basis of a few well-digested and well-worded canons of Christian intolerance. No canons are more wanted to-day in the Church of Christ than these for the preserving of revealed truth and for the protecting of the obedient many against the disobedient few. But enforcement is more needed than legislation.

THE OUTLOOK IN ENGLAND.

The present working of the discipline of the Church is far from being satisfactory. In England the very legislation of the Church is hampered with that of the State, and the administration of the laws still more through the Church courts. "Dead-letter" has been accumulating for centuries, and the magistrate is becoming more and more of an *incubus*. Men who study the situation there, like J. Fitzjames Stephen and Leslie Stephen, confess the impotency of the laws and cry for relief. The former, writing in 1875 on "The Laws of England as to the Expression of Religious Opinions" (*Contemporary Review*), shows the bearing of the laws on both laity and clergy, and the utter impossibility of enforcing them, if indeed many of them were worthy to be enforced in their harshness and injustice. His advice is Repeal; "on the principle on which it is prudent to unload a blunderbuss too rusty to be fired." Quite recently the same writer, now Mr. Justice Stephen, in an article, in *The Fortnightly Review*, on "Blasphemy and Blasphemous Libel," concludes, on grounds of right and expediency, that it should be enacted that no

one, except beneficed clergymen of the Church of England, should be liable to ecclesiastical censures for "Atheism, blasphemy, heresy, schism, or any other opinion."

The latter writer, Leslie Stephen, sees the impossibility of the "Suppression of Poisonous Opinions" by any other means than a rigorous inquisition, which, of course, he does not favor. But, at the same time, he sees the danger and occasional absurdity attending some consequences of the toleration, now so popular. Speaking very generally, he says :

Certainly, the principle of toleration cannot lay down a distinct external criterion of right and wrong applicable at once to all concrete cases. No test, by the nature of the case, can be given which will decide at once whether a particular rule does or does not transgress the principle of toleration.

And, in more specific cases of *doctrine*, he points out that, while broad differences of truth and error may be acted on with success, delicate and difficult distinctions only create easy evasion of doctrinal tests. With much truth he remarks :

You may crush a downright Tom Paine, but how are you to restrain your wily latitudinarian, who will swallow any formula as if he liked it. (*Nineteenth Century*, April, 1883.)

As to the English Church Courts, the decisions of the last thirty years have been so much at variance among themselves ; and now the very validity of their constitution has been so questioned in the conclusions of Canon Stubbs's exhaustive Report, that nothing can be hoped for from that quarter.

Since the Pan-Anglican Synod of 1867, when one hundred and fifty bishops confirmed the sentence pronounced on Dr. Colenso for heretical opinions, there has been no strong or generally accepted action of intolerance in the English Church.

THE OUTLOOK IN AMERICA.

With us in America, the outlook ought to be less complicated than in England; but is it any clearer? Here the Church has it all to herself, with no State to interfere with her spontaneous action, with no magistrate to make her odious before the people, and with no stretching of undue authority over her laity. But where is the vigorous discipline of the Apostolic Church? Where are the signs of the Church's understanding her duty and discharging it, under these much simplified conditions?

A case occurs in the West, where, evidently, "the public use of unauthorised manuals" has given offence to the Diocese and the Diocesan. In the Journal of the next Convention, he treats the case with six pages of general principles, good advice, and—no names. The "duty of representative conformity" is urged upon the unknown offender. "He can discharge his obligations only as he implicitly obeys the law under which he has voluntarily suffered himself to be placed. *But disobedience grows to the blackness of a deadlier sin, when we reflect that it not only breaks law, but breaks a law which the man has sworn to keep.*"* Strong words! but if they should be unsupported by acts, by even any definiteness of aim or policy, how vain they are!

Another case occurs in the East. The offence, like the former, is too grave for tolerance. Charges are preferred, received, and—"pigeon-holed." From lawlessness to defiance, the passage is not a difficult one. And when at length it seemed right that something should be done to restrain the outlaw, he is very politely requested by his Diocesan to discontinue his public attacks on the Holy Scriptures. Whether anything more than an armed truce can be the result, remains to be seen. In the words of a prominent address at the

* Bishop of Illinois, 1883.

Church Congress in Richmond, we cannot but ask :
 "Do your punishments punish? Do your penalties
 deter?"

TYPES OF TOLERANCE.

Such a state of things in England and America may
 be highly satisfactory to a certain class of minds,

Sweet-hearted (ones) whose light blue eyes
 Are tender over drowning flies,

—a class of "feelers," well described by Dr. Newman in one of his Parochial sermons. "To be kind is their *one* principle of action. And when they find offence taken at the Church's Creed, they begin to think how they may modify or curtail it, under the same sort of feeling as would lead them to be generous in a money transaction, or to accommodate another at the cost of personal inconvenience." Such men appear to be constitutionally afraid of giving offence; as of the mild Melancthon, it has been said, that rather than give offence to Calvin, in the burning of Servetus, he sided with him.

But another large class of people are they, who actually seem to cultivate indifference, like a plant, on beds of sloth and intellectual indolence. Whether they are like "Gallio who cared for none of these things," or Gallio was never like them, they are satirised by Lord Tennyson in one line. Transfixed on the point of his pen as perfectly as if intended to be a type and specimen,

This Gama, swamped in lazy tolerance,

has been pinned for preservation. He stands for the class, neither conservative nor progressive in themselves, but purely compliant, from sheer want of energy, of motive and motive power of their own. These, too lazy to think for themselves, become an easy prey to the advanced thinkers of the age, and flock by hundreds as allies to the standards of such leaders as John Stuart

Mill, who strike for "human development in its richest variety." The coalition becomes formidable.

So, between these influences of too much feeling, too little manhood, and too much thinking, the doctrinal atmosphere is very much thickened. Add for ourselves in America some considerable formative influences due to our democratic Christianity—one man's opinion being popularly esteemed to be as good as another's—and it will be seen how far from clear is the prospect.

But the influence of all others most unfavorable to reform is the settled and very prevalent habit of regarding Religion and doctrine as matter of discovery and not of revelation. Men pride themselves on having thought out their Religion, on having made it true by resolution, on having manufactured, as it were, their doctrines and articles of belief. Out of such habit come naturally the opinions, that "Church" is only a name for a sacred debating-society; that Truth itself is but a subjective conclusiveness. In this way, even good Christian people are led to fall into the snare of degrading the cardinal doctrines of our revealed religion to the level of "religious thought" and "religious opinion." And they allow a kind of free-trade and barter of opinions to enter in and corrupt "the Faith once for all delivered to the saints." Seeing how "religious opinions" demand toleration for one another, they wrongly allow that demand to be made in the sacred department of fundamental, Christian dogma, where such demand should only be met with absolute intolerance. In this department, every step in toleration is a step in skepticism.

But even the show of authority on the part of the Church is deprecated by some of her professed friends. A writer in the AMERICAN CHURCH REVIEW (September, 1883) contributes a thoughtful article on "The Legal Enforcement of Conformity to Doctrine and to Ritual." But in it he assumes, at one place, that the ultimate object of discipline is "*to enforce obedience* by penal procedure:" at another place, he speaks as if the ultimate object were *to enforce conformity* by legal penalties; and again, he assumes that there can be no "trial on a

charge of heresy in doctrine or non-conformity in ritual" without exposing the defendant to "the storm of persecution." But all these assumptions are groundless.

The enforcing of obedience, or conformity, is not the ultimate object of Church discipline. The real end is rightly given by Mr. Mill—a Saul among the prophets,—it is *the protection of the obedient from the disobedient*. For, while he demands that the individual should not be held "accountable to society for his actions in so far as they concern the interests of no person but himself," he yet admits "that for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable, and may be subjected either to social or legal punishment, if society is of opinion that the one or the other is *requisite for its protection*." * Now, if this protection can be secured by other means than the enforcing of the obedience or conformity of the offender, the ultimate object of exercising authority will have been gained.

So, likewise, to recur to Mill's doctrine, if it should be that, by his advice—to speak of no higher authority—we "avoid" the society of the offender, and proceed "to caution others against him, if we think his example or conversation likely to have a pernicious effect on those with whom he associates"—("Liberty," C. IV.)—if these instructions, observed, bring about "protection" (and why may they not, since we have for their wisdom the curious agreement of radical and scriptural authority? then, plainly, the end of government will have been attained, *without enforcement of either obedience or conformity*. And the question suggests itself, if these instructions are worth the carrying out by any individual, why may they not be carried out by any Bishop of the Church? *Fas est ab hoste doceri*.

With regard to the last assumption of the writer, let

* The more respectable testimony of Sir James Mackintosh is to the same effect: "It can hardly be doubted that the highest obligation of a citizen is that of contributing to preserve the community; and that every other political duty, even that of obedience to the magistrates, is derived from and must be subordinate to it." ("Revolution of 1688.")

it be replied, that persecution for religion's sake is, with us, neither very "stormy" nor very frequent. But even if it were so, it is now only "the persecution of the syllogism," as De Maistre oddly remarks, and estimates to be worse than the persecution of racks, stakes, and crosses. If persecution should, at least, be something onerous, without being stormy or cruel, what then? It is "protection," which is the real end of the persecution, such as it is. Racks, stakes, crosses, fines and imprisonments are things of the past, and, with us, gone for ever, but the necessity for protection remains. It is the claim, which the obedient masses make on the government, which has pledged to them protection against the disobedient few, the lawless individuals of society. It is this which justifies the enforcement of our penal canons, and not the procuring of persecution, however miscalled it may be. "Better that the unruly should clamor, than that the regular should groan and all should be undone." And Bishop Taylor says:

If it be false doctrine in any capacity, and doth mischief in any sense, these men must be silenced. ("Whose mouths must be stopped," Titus i. 11.) They must be convinced by sound doctrine and put to silence by spiritual evidence, and restrained by authority ecclesiastic (*i.e.*), by spiritual censures, according as it seems necessary to him, who is most concerned in the regimen of the Church. For all this, we have precept and precedent apostolic and much reason. . . . *And the little inconvenience that happens to the person injuriously judged, is abundantly made up in the excellency of the discipline, the goodness of the example, the care of the public, and all those great influences into the manners of men, which derive from such an act so publicly consigned.*" (Lib. of Proph., Section xv.)

ANARCHISTS IN THE CHURCH.

Although the pointing out of "protection" as the ultimate object of government is no new thing, it is astonishing how the fashion of opinion has inclined the public to excuse protest, and fondle the criminal, while forgetting the law-abiding masses of society. The menacing of these latter by anarchists and dynamiters

is, in its nature, only a lawlessness; and yet how promptly the better part of society rallies to its own defence! The mild cleric and the consenting layman thinking it "of no consequence," menace the law-abiding masses of the Church with new inventions of "sweetness and light," or with medieval relics of devotional exercise, and—poor fellows! they are first to be covered with the broad mantle of the Church's charity; they are to be shielded from that impossible "storm of persecution," before a step shall be taken to protect the truth and order they assail, or the law-abiding masses they offend. Whether it be in the State or in the Church, it is all one, this disturbance of "the foundations" in the name of freedom and development, when these have been provided for, and can be attained through *law*. It is *ἀνομία* in both cases, and that is the single step preliminary to *ἀναρχία*. One may imagine how the Rev. Swanly Smoothdown, or his layman, Mr. Toots, would be astonished at a secret visit of fraternal greeting from the "head-centre" of the dynamite clubs. Yet they are all plainly making common cause together.

The cleric takes the law into his hands and proceeds to act out in posture, or to pour into itching ears the latest perversion of the Faith. The layman, who helps to support the cleric, takes another law into *his* hands and breaks it by practice of fox-hunting on the Day of Rest. The Nihilist, in turn, takes only *his choice* of the laws to be broken. They sow the wind: he reaps the whirlwind. They choose for their purpose to break one law, here and there.* He must have all laws abolished and nothing left. But, in the light of Holy Writ there is the principle: "Whosoever shall keep the whole law and yet offend in one (point) he is guilty of all." (James ii. 10.)

* "So far are they from looking on such men as fit for human society, or to be citizens of a well-ordered commonwealth; since a man of such principles must needs, as oft as he dares do it, despise *all* their laws and customs; for there is no doubt to be made, that a man who is afraid of nothing but the law, and apprehends nothing after death, will not stand to break through *all the laws* of his country, either by fraud or force, that so he may satisfy his appetites." (More's "Utopia," B. II.)

DISORDER FALSIFYING TRUTH.

The cleric with the gainsaying conscience cannot escape with the plea of the layman, for the cleric has registered vows of subscription in doctrine, and of obedience and allegiance to his superiors in the Ministry of the Church. Of him it is, of all men *most* expected, that he will follow up his own precepts of sincerity and fair-dealing by the good example of conformity. Of him it is, of all men *least* expected, that he will "use the opportunity of his ministry under the subscription to the 'doctrine and worship of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States,' to *transform* either or both of these according to his individual conceit or purpose, instead of *conforming* to them as he has declared he will." (AMERICAN CHURCH REVIEW, June, 1883.)

For, while there may be reasonable difficulty in following out some of the faint lines and mystical distinctions of Truth, there need be none at all in being subordinate and carrying out the obligations of Order. And of the two, will any one say that Order is the second? Was there ever, among guesses at the truth, a better one than this: Order is heaven's *first* law? "Without Order there is no living in public society, because the want thereof is the mother of confusion. Whereupon division of necessity followeth, and out of division destruction. . . . The whole world consisting of parts so many, so different is by this only thing upheld: he who framed them hath set them in order." (Hooker, "Eccles. Pol.," B. viii. 2.)

So, to the cleric of the gainsaying conscience, and to the layman who stands ready to excuse him with a languid tolerance, we would say, Remember the vital connections between Truth and Order. To be scrupulous about the Truth, and to be indifferent as to the Order of the Church, is inconsistency itself.* The Apostles' doc-

* "Every fringe in an elaborate cope worn without authority is only a distinct and separate act of private judgment; the more elaborate, the less Catholic; the

trine and fellowship went always together. If S. Paul would have us to "speak the truth in love" (Eph. iv. 15), S. John also would have us to "love in the truth." (3 John i.) And taking up the strain, one of the strongest writers of the day has well said: "The love of law is twin-sister to the law of love." We only wish that we could utter, with the same grace and power, another epigram that will be found exactly to the point. It is this: *Truth can be falsified by disorder as well as by disproof.*

RIOT OF THE FREE-RELIGIONISTS.

But, while the Church is hesitating what to do with false doctrine and disobedience, the march of "religious thought" is right onward. The fever of excitement is catching; the procession gathers in going; the emulation to hear or to invent some new thing rises to the degree of fanaticism; the action of the revellers in religious liberty becomes worthy of those at a carnival. It does not help the difficulty to remark, reflectively, "This is an age of intellectual reconstruction, of intense mental activity," etc., etc. Commonplace at such times deserves to be pelted. Hear some of the cries that rise above the *mélée*: "It is beginning to be permitted men to preach their own views of truth, unclipped by creeds. . . . The one paramount doctrine of the New Testament is the independence of the individual." The article which contains these sentences is entitled, "Progress of Thought in the Church," and the author is a "clerical celebrity" of Brooklyn. "Fixity of opinion is hardly respectable among scholars," so President Eliot, of Harvard University. "Doctrines of the great Apostle of the Gentiles *translated into modern equivalents*," so (the Rev.) James Freeman Clarke, of Boston. "We believe the Word of God recorded in the Bible; we also believe the Word of God recorded in the Book of Mor-

nearer the *imitation*, the farther from the *submission* of faith." (*Archbishop Manning, "England and Christendom."*)

mon, and in all other good books." (Confession of Faith of the Latter Day Saints.) What is all this but the passion, the frenzy of uncertainty?

CONTEMPORARY INTOLERANCE.

Meanwhile, it would be well, if, glancing around, we discovered how all occasions do inform against us. So necessary a thing is intolerance that even its sworn enemies have to be inconsistent and employ it. Here follow some examples, furnished by the very apostles of liberty and individualism.

John Stuart Mill tells us in his "Autobiography," that his father would never *allow* him to have any convictions about Religion different from his own. And we have seen elsewhere, how, in the name of Liberty, he himself is the champion of compulsory education and co-operation.

Professor Robertson Smith, as co-editor of the "Encyclopædia Britannica," has been taken to task by a reviewer in the London *Guardian*, as follows:

A very able article on "Land," describing its various tenures in different times and countries, written by Mr. Boyd Kinnear, appears without his initials in consequence, as we learn from a correspondence in the *Times*, of an excision made by Professor Smith. It seems that Mr. Kinnear's view of the Jewish Land Code differs from that of Professor Smith's, and that, in consequence, this important division of the subject was struck out. . . . Mr. Kinnear naturally objected to assume the responsibility of an essay thus maimed in an important feature; and the article remains accordingly anonymous, a monument of the intolerance sometimes exhibited towards others by writers who claim for themselves the widest possible license of divergence from established views.

Professor Max Müller is our authority for stating that, but a few years ago, when Professor Virchow presumed to criticise the Darwinian hypothesis, he was "howled down" by the German scientists, under the lead of Haeckel, as by Ephesian wolves.

The American Medical Association is constitution-

ally intolerant of persons as well as of conscientious opinions. Its code of ethics requires the protection of the obedient from the disobedient. It hesitates not to censure and expel for false doctrine. The expulsion of eight members of the Massachusetts Medical Society occurred at its annual meeting held in Boston, June 4, 1873; "and of about six hundred members present, only one voted against expulsion." This expulsion was solely for admitting homœopathic practitioners into consultation.

A few years ago the Grand Lodge of Free Masons of New York State resolved, "That we refuse to recognise as Free Masons any person initiated, passed, or raised in a body where the existence of the Supreme Being is denied or ignored."

Mr. Lecky reminds us of the most significant fact of all, one that is opposed to the greater part of his own reasoning and conclusions. It is, that the French have twice shown that the principle (intolerance) is no necessary outgrowth of the religious mind or dogma, as such. Both in 1790 and in 1870 we see "an intense love of religious liberty and a strong bias towards intolerance continually manifested." ("Rationalism in Europe," vol. ii., p. 73.)

THE REPROACHES FALLEN UPON THE CHURCH.

But it appears as though neither the riot of the free-religionists, nor the inconsistencies of the radical tolerationists, can avail to rouse the Church to a sense of the very grave issue before her. The effect upon the world around is unmistakeable. The hopes of many are becoming weakened in her actual power to defend the Faith she bears witness to and feels a pride in proclaiming to the world. The reproach of being a dumb and dubious oracle is laid at her doors. There is a modern Pilate, who asks no longer, "What is Truth?" but "What is Certainty?" He goes farther back into the problem of life than the ancient Pilate went. And if the Church has nothing but negative replies to make, if she

only disclaims Infallibility on the one hand, and Individualism on the other, she will deserve to be reproached.* Her enemies will taunt her with boasting of "the confidence of a certain Faith," and exhibiting little Faith and no confidence at all. But surely there is good standing-ground of *reasonable*, if not infallible *certainly* for us to occupy, and from it we can withstand the "false doctrine" of the day, as well as supplicate the LORD to deliver us from it. Let us do away with the popular fallacy of a hopeless, because eternal antagonism between religious liberty and religious authority. Let us scorn the imputation that we have in our authority only such protection for liberty "as vultures give to lambs, covering and devouring them." Let us show that our authority, far from suppressing liberty, cultivates it, lifts it up, and trains it for a higher life.

It is to be feared, however, that one thing, more than all others, is the cause of malady in our ecclesiastical body. That one thing is lawlessness. It seems to have infected both State and Church like some pestilence in the air. Since it began to be admitted that we were governing too much—look, for example, at the contrast between the English Canons of 1603 and ours of 1883—since the Civil Magistrate has been dismissed from the Church, the man of the gainsaying conscience has entered in and taken his place; and now there can be no exercise of authority or discipline without his consent.

The specialty of rule hath been neglected.

.

And 'tis this fever that keeps Troy on foot.

.

The fever whereof all our power is sick.

One of the more recent explorers of savage land has given it as his opinion, that any traveller may journey unharmed from one end of the continent of Africa to the other, if only a band of music be made to precede him.

* Mr. Lecky asks with considerable penetration: "Is the notion of a teaching, authoritative, and inspired Church which does not profess to be infallible, a tenable one?" (Nineteenth Century, 1879.)

The same happy thought must have occurred to the minds of our religious *illuminati*; only they reverse the case, and looking upon America as the "dark continent," they confidently expect to march through the land, wherever they can beat their big "tom-toms" of Tolerance, catch the ear of the multitude, and silence the opposition of the faithful to their strange devices of new "religious thoughts" and medieval devotion. May we not hope, however, that, adding to their Faith virtue, the faithful will prove manful also, and refuse to be terrified by any such beating of "tom-toms"?

A DEMAND FOR OPEN REBUKE.

How much might be done if, piercing through the scarecrows of persecution, the pretended storms, the painted fagots, the impossible severities of our Inquisition, the Bishops were to determine to make more general use of open rebuke!

It is one of those Apostolic practices which have been classified in this essay: it is commanded, and commended also by special reasons attached.* The rebuke is to be both sharp and open—1st, "*that they may be sound in the faith,*" and 2d, "*that others also may fear.*" Suppose a case where, after all gentler means of remonstrance have been vainly tried, the Bishop, as SS. Timothy and Titus may have done, convokes clergy and laity for the special purpose of rebuking sharply and openly, by name, the offender, as well as his false doctrine or practice.

The Bishop, in so doing, would occupy a position doubly entrenched, on the one side by Apostolic authority (enough with most Churchmen), and, on the other, by the Article XXXIV., speaking as follows: "Whoever, through his private judgment, willingly and purposely, doth openly break the Traditions and Ceremonies of the Church, which be not repugnant to the Word of

* 1 Tim. v. 20; 2 Tim. iv. 2; Titus i. 13, ii. 15.

God, and be ordained and approved by common authority, *ought to be rebuked openly (that others may fear to do the like)*, as he that offendeth against the common Order of the Church, and hurteth the authority of the Magistrate, and woundeth the consciences of the weak brethren."

But the marvel is, that scarcely a trace of this practice of *open* rebuke is to be found in the Canons of the Protestant Episcopal Church. Under Title II., *Of Discipline*, citation, offences, presentment, and deference to Diocesan Canons, all prepare the way for trial, and the case for the law's delay. One is at a loss to recognise the Apostolic Church in such an array of circumlocutory proceedings. The nearest approach to the simplicity, directness, and vigor, of the earliest days is to be found under Sec. ii., Can. 22, Title I., *Of the Use of the Book of Common Prayer*.

If any Bishop have reason to believe, or if complaint, etc., . . . that within his jurisdiction ceremonies or practices not ordained or authorised . . . have been introduced by any Minister, . . . it shall be the duty of such Bishop to summon the Standing Committee as his Council of Advice, and with them to investigate the matter. . . . [If the fact be established] It shall be the duty of the Bishop, by instrument of writing, under his hand, to admonish the Minister so offending to discontinue such practices or ceremonies: and if the Minister shall disregard such admonition, it shall be the duty of the Standing Committee to cause him to be tried for a breach of his Ordination vow.

It appears further, that by *proviso* this Canon is only alternative to that already referred to under Title II.

"Admonition," certainly, comes in after the Apostolic rule, but "open rebuke" is ignored; and the offender is passed on to the notoriously irritating and ineffectual remedy of the ecclesiastical trial. Thus, in attempting too much, the Church fails to effect anything. In reaching after a wrong end, the *enforcement of conformity or obedience*, she incurs reproach. The trial has, of course, its use and necessity in strongly marked distinctions of issue; but the disuse of the practice of *censure* or open rebuke, so pledged in Holy Writ to conduce to the

soundness of the Faith, and the deterring of restless men from disturbance, is a fault of our legislation greatly to be regretted.*

We plead for the revival of this practice. Let it find a place in the canons of Discipline, where it can be applied to offenders against Holy Scripture, as well as to those against the Book of Common Prayer. Let it be resorted to after "admonition," and before "trial." The fruits of it are wanted in the Church, whether they be seen to *enforce* anything or not. Its effect will be no rigor of interdict, suspension, deprivation, or degradation: it will certainly not subject the offender to any "storm of persecution;" but we have the Divine Word for it—Faith will be thereby made sound, literally, healthy; and fear of offending be promoted by its deterring influence.

A DEMAND FOR FUNDAMENTALS.

The distinction made by Waterland between errors "tolerable" and errors "intolerable" should never be forgotten. It is a distinction based directly upon Holy Scripture; upon S. Paul's being "all things to all men," in some matters, and his refusing to "give place to them by subjection, no not for an hour," in other matters. What the Church wants to-day is to know some certain rule for determining between fundamentals and non-fundamentals, so as to be intolerant on the one score, and tolerant on the other. As to complete *catalogues* of fundamentals, Waterland and others think the attempting of these quite unnecessary, so long as a good *rule*

* It is just here, *in the want of censure*, that the remarks of one of our Bishops, in his last Address to his Diocesan Convention, become so very suggestive. Speaking of the legislation of 1874, the Canon 22 of Title I., from which extracts have been made above, he says: "The question therefore remains where it was before. There is in this canon no censure of any specific act of ritual authorised by the English Ecclesiastical Law; but, on the contrary, an emphatic refusal to pass censure upon any specific point, the meaning of the present canon turning entirely upon the phrase, 'adoration of the elements,' which, to the mind of a theologian, touches no doctrine or practice of any body of Christians, except, possibly, the 'Benediction of the Host' in the Roman Church, and the ignorant idolatry of some South American peoples."—*Bishop of Tennessee, Journal*, 1884.

of *fundamentals* is established. That which Waterland gives, viz. : “ Whatever verities are found to be plainly and directly *essential* to the doctrine of the *Gospel covenant*,* they are *fundamental verities*; and whatever errors are plainly and directly *subversive* of it, they are *fundamental errors* ” — may or may not be insisted on as the only possible one. Certainly, much can be said for it; and the usage of nearly all the Christian centuries has stamped that idea of “ *covenant*,” or testament, as essential. But of the possibility, and of the prime importance of some rule of fundamentals, there can be no doubt. Again, as to Creeds, Waterland points out that “ the Apostles’ Creed rather supposes than contains the article of the Divine authority and inspiration of Scripture, and therefore is no complete catalogue or summary of fundamentals.” And he adds : “ Creeds never were intended as perfect catalogues of fundamentals, but were compiled with other views and for other purposes.” But the defect of the Apostles’ Creed, at least, is that by it we should have to fraternise with Romanists, Universalists, and Unitarians, for they all accept it. In Waterland’s day the whole discussion had for its end the comprehension of the more or less orthodox Protestant bodies, with a view to communion. In our day the problem is simpler : it is entirely within ourselves : it is one of discipline as well as doctrine : it is not now for purpose of comprehension that we should solve it, it is for purpose of rebuke and judgment of exclusion. Will not our Bishops look into this matter? If a rule or declaration of Fundamentals is wanted at this time, and we firmly believe it is, then the sooner our Bishops give it to us the better. The

* The Christian Covenant may be considered as containing or including the several articles here following :

1. A Founder and principal Covenantant.
2. A subject capable of being covenanted with.
3. A charter of foundation.
4. A Mediator.
5. Conditions to be performed.
6. Aids or means to enable performance.
7. Sanctions also to bind the covenant and to secure obedience.—*Waterland, Discourse on Fundamentals.*

Church that cannot rightly divide the Word of Truth into doctrines or practices, tolerable and intolerable, is not worthy of the name.

CONCLUSION.

Looking back now over the way we have come, seeing the excesses, the shortcomings and inconsistencies of modern opinion on the subject of Toleration, the stout protests against it offered by the scientific method, by social intolerance, by the maxims of good government, and chiefly by the authority of Holy Scripture, what should hinder us from penetrating through the fogs and bewilderment of the present outlook?

It cannot be so much to any new legislation as to new administration that we are to look for change and improvement. Can we do otherwise than look, for relief, directly to our Bishops, the men consecrated with invocation of

The fire so bright, the love so sweet,
The Uncion Spiritual?

It cannot be God's will that the love of Him should ever degenerate into a languid tolerance of His enemies and their devices. "In all real love there is wrapped up hatred against that evil which counteracts goodness." And "the fire of love" never appears more beautiful in itself, or more hallowed in its purposes, than when it is all aflame in the administration of those who are "set for the defence of the Gospel." May the brightness of their fire never be quenched in the sweetness of their love!

Finally, we are brought by "the exigency of the times" to choose between only two courses. Either we must submit to the radicals of Tolerance and consent to have their motto, *Laissez-faire*, stamped on all our holy things, or we must make head against them in the Church and in the State by protective union, by

publishing and administering the canons of a true Christian Intolerance.

There is a deep meaning and much friendly warning in the words of the following extract; they sound like words of prophecy: "A right higher than the will of the many, a truth above opinion must be recognised, if there is to be a true liberty or true toleration. That seeming toleration which is essentially infidel may not be trusted. It bears the same relation to Infidelity, that the demand for blind faith does to Superstition; and it may yet be that in its full development the one shall bear fruit as bitter as the other has ever borne. The Faith which responds to God's teaching and calls no man master, may be as severely tried by a tyrant democracy enforcing conformity to public opinion, as it has been by despotic power doing the bidding of a Church claiming to be infallible." (J. McLeod Campbell, D.D., "Thoughts on Revelation.")

With these words it is well to conclude. The author wrote them more than a generation ago, and is himself gone to his rest. But the outlook of Toleration has already in part fulfilled his prophecy; and it will require all our Faith and manhood to prepare for, and to meet, the coming of what remains.

JOHN JOHNSON.

THE PRAYER BOOK IN THE CONVENTION OF 1886.

I HAVE carefully read and considered the argument made by Mr. Nash in support of the proposition, that, under the Constitution of the Church, the General Convention of 1886 may lawfully adopt, with modifications which shall not amount to substantial changes, those proposed amendments to the Book of Common Prayer which the General Convention of 1883 formulated as several and independent propositions, and directed to be made known to the Dioceses, with a view to their final adoption by the next General Convention.

I regret that I cannot concur with Mr. Nash's conclusions on this subject, and I should be disposed to regard my dissent from so learned a canonist as affording, at the least, a strong presumption of mistaken judgment upon my part, were it not that Mr. Nash has frankly admitted that the view for which I contend "is the one which is generally held" by lawyers who have been members of the General Convention. If, therefore, I err, I do not stand alone.

I fully concede the strength of the *argumentum ab inconvenienti*. It is desirable that "the examination of liturgical work in a merely critical spirit" should not be needlessly protracted, for there is always some danger that the cleansing stream of reform may swell into the destroying torrent of revolution. I also admit that many of the proposed amendments to the Book of Common Prayer are susceptible of modifications which the Convention of 1886 may, perhaps, adopt, and which the judgment of the Church may, possibly, approve. Yet the *argumentum ab inconvenienti*, useful as it is in deter-

mining the choice as between two admissible constructions, is of no avail as against that construction in which the letter and the spirit of the law join.

I also concede that there ought to be neither a lax nor a rigorous construction of a constitutional restriction, but that any such provision should be so reasonably construed as to effectuate its purpose and intent.

The canon of construction being thus stated, the case seems to me to be free from difficulty.

Article VIII. of the Constitution, as adopted in 1789, gave to each subsequent General Convention full power to establish a Book of Common Prayer; but in 1811 the article was amended by the addition of the following clause :

No alteration or addition shall be made in the Book of Common Prayer, or other Offices of the Church, or the Articles of Religion, unless the same shall be proposed in one General Convention, and by a resolve thereof made known to the Convention of every Diocese, and adopted at the subsequent General Convention.

The necessary grammatical ellipses having been supplied, the constitutional provision will read as follows :

No alteration or addition shall be made in the Book of Common Prayer, etc., unless the same (alteration or addition) shall be proposed in one General Convention, and (unless the same alteration or addition be) by a resolve thereof made known to the Convention of every Diocese, and (unless the same alteration or addition be) adopted at the subsequent General Convention.

Thus stated, the letter of the Constitution is clearly adverse to Mr. Nash's view. Nor upon examination will it appear that its spirit is more favorable. The objects of the restriction are two : *first*, by requiring consideration and action in two successive General Conventions to guard against hasty and improvident changes in the Book of Common Prayer; and *second*, by prescribing notice to the several Dioceses of the terms of any proposed alteration or addition, to secure the selection of such delegates to the next General Convention as may, by voice and vote, best give expression to the matured

judgment of the Church with regard to the proposed alteration or addition.

In the construction of the restriction neither of these objects can be disregarded, and the full accomplishment of either object forbids the adoption by the Convention of 1886 of any alteration or addition, so modified that it cannot be truly said to be "the same" alteration or addition, which was proposed in the Convention of 1883, and, by its resolve, made known to the Convention of every Diocese. Even if it be conceded that the adoption, with an apparently non-material modification, by the Convention of 1886, of any one of the several and independent propositions formulated by the Convention of 1883, is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional restriction considered with reference to its second object, it yet must be admitted that such legislative action in 1886 will fail of attaining the first and most important object, for but one General Convention will have acted upon the specific "alteration or addition." But who is to determine conclusively and for all time that a modification is really, even if it be apparently, immaterial? Heresies and schisms have been heretofore, and may again be, based upon words, letters, and even marks of punctuation; and a modification, which is to-day regarded as non-substantial, may, a decade or a century hence, become the shuttlecock of controversy. Mr. Nash argues that the General Convention of 1886 can be trusted. The answer is, that, by the adoption of the amendment to the Eighth Article of its Constitution, the Church has explicitly refused to trust any one General Convention, and the fact that this discussion as to the meaning and effect of the constitutional restriction has been provoked by the existence of more or less of dissatisfaction with some of the details of the work of the Convention of 1883 in revising the Book of Common Prayer, abundantly vindicates, were vindication needed, the wisdom of that restriction which denies to any one General Convention the power of definitively altering that Book.

CHRISTOPHER STUART PATTERSON.

THE PRAYER BOOK IN THE CONVENTION OF 1886.

[N the last November number of the AMERICAN CHURCH REVIEW there appeared an article, with the above title, written by Stephen P. Nash, Esq., of New York. Mr. Nash is a lawyer of eminence in his profession, and is an earnest Churchman. It is with regret, therefore, that we feel constrained to express, we trust in courteous words—we know with most kindly intent—our dissent from the views announced and the grounds assumed by the distinguished author. The article was written soon after the General Convention adjourned, and was, without doubt, inspired by a sincere desire to bring the work of altering and adding to the Book of Common Prayer to the point of rounded completeness in 1886; and while it breathes the spirit of its sanguine and enthusiastic author, and is characterised by mental vigor, ingenious suggestions, and persuasive eloquence, it advocates doctrines deemed by us disorganising in their tendency, and announces views, not only confessedly unsanctioned by precedent, but, we respectfully submit, unsustained by any recognised rules of construction, or by any constitutional sanctions.

In order that the positions of the article may be fairly stated, we make the following quotations from it. On page 414 the learned author says:

Our view, then, is that the *second* Convention (that of 1886), composed of deputies, selected after such a notice (that prescribed by the Constitution for making known to the Dioceses the proposed alterations and additions to the Book of Common Prayer), with a view to action in reference to the constitutional changes proposed, has the power, in addition to its power of ordinary legislation of a Constitu-

tional Convention; that it may consult and deliberate, not only whether it will adopt or reject the proposed alterations, but whether it will modify and then adopt; the limitation on its powers of modification being only that the proposition first submitted shall not be substantially changed.

At first we thought we would *italicise* portions of these sentences; but, on consideration, we found them, as a whole, so novel, not to say startling, that they needed no change of type to call attention to their emphatic force. Again, on page 415, he says:

The *various* additions and alterations which by the action of the late Convention have gone through the first process of being proposed, and are now to be made known to the Dioceses, will present, when they come to be *maturely* considered, *many* cases for the application, if it is sound, of the view we are advocating.

Again, on page 417, it is said:

It will be urged that this is a lax mode of dealing with constitutional restrictions. But there should be no question as between lax and strict modes of construction, etc.

Again the author says:

We do not shut our eyes, however, to the fact that the stricter interpretation is the one which is generally held. This is *probably* due to the fact that the lay membership of the General Convention has always included many lawyers, some of them gentlemen of large experience in legislation, and that these have been *probably* influenced by the *supposed* analogy between the Constitution of the Church and that of the Federal and State Governments. That there is no such analogy in respect to the point now under consideration, we think a little examination will show, etc.

It is conceded that no precedent can be found to sustain these views.

No *dictum* of any Canon law writer is cited to give color of plausibility to such confidently asserted opinions. Judge Hoffman is indeed cited; but with no effect, so far as the question here involved is concerned. In vain would the writings of that wise and conservative jurist be searched for a word to give countenance to such views as those advocated in the article referred to.

The only twig upon which the theory insisted on could be fastened was to be found in the following very correct and harmless words of Dr. Hall, chairman of the Committee on Constitutional Amendments, which were contained in a report made by him in 1874 upon a proposal to sanction by canon the use of "shortened services," and which proposal the committee rejected. Dr. Hall, in that report, said :

By the present wise provision of the Constitution *no alteration can* be made in the Prayer Book, unless the desired changes, *in all essential details*, have been *proposed* in one General Convention to each Diocesan Convention and *adopted* at the next General Convention ; thus securing three full years for *their* examination and approval ; and thus is obtained that deliberate sanction which the Constitution intended to secure in such an imperfect matter.

We have quoted all that Dr. Hall said on this point. The learned author takes some comfort from the words "*in all essential details ;*" yet he does not, as he admits, feel "at liberty to hang too large conclusions upon" them. And well may he not, for the "essential details" referred to by Dr. Hall are plainly such as must be "*proposed*" as well as "*made known*," and *then* "*adopted*." The "essential details," whatever that phrase may mean, must be in the *proposal* as well as in the *adopted* change. Dr. Hall, referring to *them*, says, "thus securing three full years for THEIR examination and approval."

On page 190 of the Journal of 1883, it appears that Mr. Nash offered a proposition for the amendment of Article IX. of the Constitution, in these words :

That Article IX. of the Constitution be amended to read as follows :

"ARTICLE IX. This Constitution shall be unalterable except as follows :—Amendments shall be first proposed in one General Convention, and, if *then approved*, shall be made known to the several Diocesan Conventions ; and the ensuing General Convention shall then have power to amend or modify the alterations proposed and *to act finally upon the same*."

This resolution was referred to the Committee on Constitutional Amendments, of which Dr. Hall was the

Chairman. The Committee reported against the proposition: concluding their report with these emphatic words:—"The *only* safety is in adhering *strictly* to the rule, that *two* successive Conventions shall agree on the *exact* alteration contemplated, as it was made known in the interim, to the several Dioceses." See Journal, pp. 233, 234. The House (see page 279), in accordance with their request, discharged the Committee from the further consideration of the subject. This proposal, therefore, to alter the Constitution so as to give the subsequent Convention the power to amend, failed. But the same view without constitutional sanction now presents itself under the pleasing and seductive guise or claim of authority arising out of a supposed reserved or inherent conventional power to amend; *provided the substance* be not touched: the amending conventional body, however, to determine for itself what the substance may be.

Now, it would seem that there can be no difference between an alteration to be made in the *Constitution*, and one to be made in *the Book of Common Prayer*; that is, no difference as to whether "*the exact alteration contemplated* be not required to be made known to the several Dioceses in advance as much in the one case as in the other." Article IX. provides that "all alterations shall be first proposed in one General Convention, and made known to the several Diocesan Conventions, before they shall be finally agreed to, or ratified in the ensuing General Convention." Article VIII. provides that "*No* alteration or addition shall be made in the Book of Common Prayer unless the same (alteration or addition) shall be proposed in one General Convention, and by a resolve thereof made known to the Convention of every Diocese, and adopted at the subsequent General Convention." This last clause, as before stated, was not in the Constitution until 1811. Up to that time The Constitution protected the Prayer Book "*when established* by this (the first) or a future General Convention;" thereby, by implication, as has been contended, giving to *any* General Convention the power "*to establish a Book of Common Prayer.*" Whether this construction

was right or wrong, is immaterial to the proper solution of the question now under consideration. Supposing it to have been right, and that an ordinary Convention (notwithstanding Article IX., which protected Article VIII., as well as all other articles of the Constitution), possessed of old time the conventional or sovereign power, by canon or resolution, to *establish a Book of Common Prayer*; and thereby to change, reconstruct, alter, or add to the Book theretofore established, at its impulsive will and pleasure; suppose this were so, the Church, in solemn form, and by constitutional action, declared in 1811, that in future it should *not* be so, and that alterations in the Book of Common Prayer should thereafter, in this particular, stand on the same footing as alterations in the Constitution.

And it would seem that if anything be settled in the law of this Church, it is, as the Committee on Constitutional Amendments, in 1883, declared the rule to be, "*that two successive Conventions shall agree on the exact alteration contemplated, as it was made known in the interim to the several Dioceses.*" As that able and learned Committee declared, so we think; that "the only safety (of the Church) is in adhering strictly to *the* rule," as stated above.

The extracts given suffice, we think, for a proper understanding of the object desired to be accomplished, on the one hand, and of the doubts which manifestly perplexed the author's mind, as to the constitutional propriety of taking the short road toward that object, on the other; and, also, for a just appreciation of the alarming nonchalance with which "constitutional restrictions" may be dealt with, and put aside for the occasion, in order to save a little time, or to accomplish a seeming good; such good as always becomes bitter evil when sought to be attained by unlawful or even doubtful means.

The first question which presents itself, as well to laymen who are *lawyers*, and who are accustomed to be influenced, we submit, not by *supposed analogies*, but by fixed and universally recognised rules of construction

and interpretation, as to calm-minded and considerate Churchmen, lay and clerical, who regard the security and strength of the Church as not *solely* resulting from the conservative spirit of its members, as being sufficient in itself for safety in every emergency, but as resting upon the solid ground of profound reverence for the bulwarks of the faith itself to be found in Holy Scripture, in the Book of Common Prayer, and in the Constitution, the first question, we say, is, whether we *have* a Constitution which in conscience, if for no other cause, we are bound to respect and obey, however trying and inconvenient obedience may be?

In secular matters the cry, at times, goes forth: "*Salus populi suprema lex:*" All law must yield to the safety of the people! But with us no such voice need be heeded: with grateful hearts we recognise the fact that the Church is safe. As it has been in the past it may be in the future, *safe* with the Prayer Book as it is! No lash of necessity is laid upon us to drive us on blindly over the obstructing ramparts of the Constitution itself, in order to save the Church or its sacred treasures. No: we can stand secure in what we *have*—rejoicing in the liturgical treasures which are already ours.

And we must calmly consider (1) whether the Constitution adopted by ourselves, is of binding force upon the consciences of the members of the General Convention? and (2) whether, if obligatory, and to be respected, it sanctions the "views" advocated in the article referred to? First, then, is our Constitution of binding force and obligatory upon the members of the General Convention? It is true that these members take no oaths to maintain it; to observe and keep its provisions! No common oath is theirs; but (if possible) a higher obligation binds them: it is the bond of Christian honor—of reverent submission to the will of the Church, as expressed in its organic law; a spirit of frank and cheerful obedience to that will, so expressed, without turning to the right or the left, in order to evade its plain meaning, under the impulse of any

present urgency. In nothing has the Church shown itself more entitled to the confidence which it has now among all men, than in its steady adherence and submission to the laws made for its own government! Never has its General Convention yielded for an instant to the outcry of urgent reform to let down one bar of the constitutional restraints. If a new Lectionary was desired, it must be had only as the Constitution would allow, even though to accomplish the object an amendment of that Constitution was found to be necessary. If “shortened services” were yearned for, as they have been, the learned men who constituted the Committee on Constitutional Amendments stood firm as rocks, and denied the request so urgently made to provide for such services *by canon*. In the same able report referred to, the eminent canonist, Dr. Hall, so justly eulogised by Mr. Nash, says :

It is true that the canon introduced into the Convention, allowing a shortened form of prayer, has been substantially enacted, and is now in force in England ; but it should not be forgotten that in England no Constitution limits or restrains the Legislative power, either in ecclesiastical or temporal affairs ; and, in both, the authority of Parliament is supreme and omnipotent—their action, therefore, does not seem to be a safe guide or precedent to us. Our written Constitution is *our* organic law, our *Magna Charta*,—and must control and limit all our legislation.

The usage of the Church, then—the good examples of those who have gone before us—and the sacred character of the instrument itself, as expounded by the Church, compel us to say : that we *have* a Constitution which members of the General Convention are bound to obey—bound by an obligation even greater than that which binds the English peer, as he lays his hand on his heart, and declares his judgment, “upon honor”—yes ; we *have* a Constitution which we may not trifle with or disregard without wronging conscience, however urgent the apparent necessity or tempting the persuasions may be, or however inconvenient it may be to wait awhile longer, in order to accomplish what we desire. Professor Bledsoe, a man of very great learn-

ing and of profound insight into the mysteries of things, while once speaking of the slow progress of the Christian Faith over the world, uttered, as the summary of the reasons, this great thought: "God is not more grand in His works, *than sublime in His patience!*" And His Church does well when it imitates Him, even in His Sublime Patience; knowing well that "all things shall work together for good to them who are His." And the more is this to be done—is this patience to be exercised—where speed or hurry may endanger Constitution or wound conscience; may impair reverence for constitutional law; or may have "the appearance of evil," whereby the conscience of even the weaker ones, of those who have not learned to brush away the "cobwebs" of "constitutional restrictions," may be wounded.

Our position is impregnable; ours is the *status quo*; we are safe as we are. Our Zion, as it is, is the glory of the whole earth: to it the unhappy and the dissatisfied other Christian bodies are flocking, as birds to the windows of a strong Fortress—a tower of Refuge! Its safety, its security, and its stability depend upon the conviction of Churchmen inside, and of admiring seekers after a Home, outside, that its foundations are solid, and do not rest upon the fickle sand; that its monuments of Law as well as of Faith are strong and immovable!

Let us beware, then, how we trifle with so sacred a thing as a Constitution—our Church "*Magna Charta*," as Dr. Hall calls it—how we bring it into contempt by ingenious expansions or contractions of its plain provisions: how we countenance the idea that it is to have *one* meaning for one Convention, and another for a subsequent Convention: how, without a word in it to justify such an idea, the first General Convention, which puts in shape and proposes an alteration or addition to the Book of Common Prayer, is to be regarded as a *legislative* body *under* the Constitution, while the subsequent Convention, which is to *adopt* or reject the proposed addition or alteration, blooms forth into the body and shape of a *Constitutional Convention, outside*

of the Constitution ! that is, with absolute powers, such as, either by previous grants or by universal acquiescence, the Convention of 1789 is said to have exercised. We cannot concede, without defeating the objects of the Constitution itself, that any subsequent Convention is clothed with the power, as now claimed, of altering alterations and of adding to additions which are "proposed" for *adoption by itself* ; and to this, at *its* own pleasure, provided, as it is said, that according to *its* judgment the *substance* be not changed. Let us beware how we allow such novelties in doctrine and Constitutional law to perplex or disturb our judgments.

And we should be the more on our guard when we see to what corner the logic of the argument retreats. On page 420 of the REVIEW, containing the article, we find these words : "*Who* is to *judge* whether the variation from the language of the alteration, as made known by the action of the Primary Convention, *is essential or not*, if the proposition, just as submitted, is once departed from ? The change of a word—yes, even of a letter—*may* involve the change of the Faith itself." To this most grave and pertinent question the short reply is given in these words : "*The only answer is, that the General Convention must be TRUSTED !*" "*Must be trusted !*"—that is, that it *should* under the circumstances—whether the Constitution allows it or not—be trusted with unrestricted power ; as if it was the Church, or its sovereign representative ; as if it was, indeed, a Constitutional Convention, and was under no obligation to do what the Church Constitution plainly points out and requires—that is, to adopt the proposed alteration, or to reject it. "*The General Convention must be trusted,*" it is argued, or inconvenience and delay will follow. We respectfully deny that any such alternative *can* be presented to us. The framers of our Constitution did not choose to trust the General Convention acting last on a *proposed* alteration of the Prayer Book, with the power to amend it ; and, therefore, the attempt to do so would be an usurpation of power, and *ultra vires*.

In Virginia, and in many of the States, the State Constitution may be amended thus: One Legislature formulates, in apt and clear words, an amendment which *it* proposes for adoption; a second Legislature, fresh from the people, after full and thorough conference with the constituent body—after time has been allowed—“for the purposes of consultation, of gathering views and information, and of instructions to delegates” (which Judge Hoffman says is the purpose of making known to the Dioceses a proposed alteration), comes to consider and consult about the proposed amendment. Now, it might happen, after time for consideration has been given, that one or more changes—in *form*, even—would be very desirable. And the reasoning of the article now under consideration, the expediency of the change being obvious; and the *power* not being expressly *denied* in the State, any more than it is in the Church Constitution, would be cogently persuasive to authorise the *second* Legislature to make the amendment required; and the more so, it might be argued, as the *people* were to vote finally upon the amendment, if amended; and *surely the second Legislature and the sovereign people should be trusted!* And yet the learned author of the article would smile at the suggestion that any such trust or confidence device, between the second Legislature and the sovereign people themselves, would result in a valid constitutional amendment! The humblest court would hold it to be a mere nullity. No; the second Legislature may think as it may; may (with most satisfactory reasons) desire to amend as it may; yet it must, at length, come to the square question of adoption or rejection of the amendment as proposed by the first Legislature, and the *people* must do the same. There can, in the nature of things, be no amendment anywhere.

And where, we ask, is there room or authority for amendment in the case now under consideration?

Article VIII. of the Constitution is as follows:

No alteration or addition shall be made in the Book of Common Prayer, or other Offices of the Church, or the Articles of Religion, un-

less the *same* shall be proposed in one General Convention, and by a resolve thereof *made known* to the Convention of every Diocese, *and adopted* at the subsequent General Convention.

The language used is negative at the start—restrictive of power—and rejects the idea of any subsequent discretion. It does not, in general terms, declare how amendments may be made; but it denies the power to make *any*, except in a way clearly and restrictively indicated. It is true that this express inhibition was not engrafted in the Article until 1811. As to this, Dr. Hall says:

It is well known that the article now under consideration was not found in the original Constitution of 1789, but was adopted by the Convention of 1808, at which those great men and legislators, Bishop White and Dr. John Henry Hobart, were leading lights. This article guards with jealous care the integrity of the Prayer Book. It does not, indeed, provide that any alterations must be preceded by an amendment of the Constitution; but the protection against its alteration is even more guarded than if such were the case. For, if an amendment of the *Constitution only* was necessary to authorise us to change the Prayer Book by mere *canon*, such *canon* might be *passed* without three years' consideration of *its* terms. The proposition to *amend the Constitution* must, indeed, be before the Church for three years, but desired *changes in the Prayer Book* would not necessarily be. But, by the present *wise* provision of the Constitution, *no* alteration *can* be made in *the Prayer Book, unless* the desired changes in all essential details have been proposed in one General Convention, made known to each Diocesan Convention, and adopted at the next General Convention.

And viewing these clauses of Dr. Hall's report altogether, the meaning of the words, "in all essential details," becomes obvious; they mean that the *changes desired* must not be *proposed* in general terms; but must be stated in details essential to their clear comprehension by the Church. They hardly mean that the first Convention may propose the substance, and the second add the details.

It is not for us to consider whether the inhibition of any alteration or addition, except upon the conditions prescribed, be wise or not. Suffice it to say, that it is imbedded in the Constitution itself, and it must remain there until it is eliminated by Constitutional

amendment; and it must be obeyed so long as it does remain. And the only question for loyal Churchmen is, What does the Constitution mean? And when that is ascertained, its prescription must be followed and reverently complied with. If we will follow the words of Article VIII., its clearly expressed and plain provisions, for a moment, and construe them according to the canon of common sense, which is the true rule of interpretation, we will find that said Article means that ANY alteration or addition whatsoever is prohibited, *unless* the same, that is, as plain people would understand it, the same thing, which is to be made an alteration or addition, be considered, and put in due form of words, in one General Convention, and by it agreed to, as THE change which it proposes shall be made in the Prayer Book, the change or alteration so proposed by the primary Convention to be embodied in its resolution, and directed by it to be made known to the several Dioceses, *in order that it* (the alteration or change so proposed) may be *adopted* in the next General Convention. This is what the Article means—nothing more—nothing less. As an example of this, see the form of Resolution on page 13 of the Joint Committee's Report, which is in these words: "*Resolved, that the following changes be made* in the Order for Daily Evening Prayer, and that the *proposed* alterations be made known to the several Dioceses, *in order that they may be severally adopted* in the next General Convention," etc. The case there is this: that upon the adoption of such a resolution, so far as the primary Convention is concerned, each of the changes or alterations is, in fact, "*made*;" each of them becomes, as far as that Convention is concerned, "*un fait accompli*"—a completed and perfected change or alteration; and it is thereupon sent forth in all essential details, to be scrutinised and considered by the Church for three years, "*in order that it may be adopted* in the next General Convention," and when so adopted, the inchoate change made by the first Convention, by reason of its adoption in the subsequent Convention, becomes complete and absolute. It is inconceivable, nay, viewing

Article VIII. altogether, and guided by the light of reason and sound principles of construction, it would seem to be impossible to imagine, much less to believe, that the change finally *adopted* can be other than that primarily made and "*proposed*." Two co-equal bodies are required to concur in making the change; they are *not* branches of the same body, but two independent and equal bodies, the first being clothed with the power to make the change and propose it to the second, which is to meet three years afterward, in order that *it* may consider and adopt the proposed change *or reject it!*

Amendments between such bodies are simply impossible. Amendments made by the adopting body, if tolerated, would alter the text of the organic change, already inchoately made by the primary Convention; and that, too, *without its consent!* In a word, the change or alteration first made and proposed would *not* be the change or alteration finally made, and would be adopted *without being proposed at all!*

The true test is this: Will *the* thing, if done, either as to words or matter, be an alteration or addition? If either, then *that* thing must logically and necessarily be the *same* thing agreed to in the primary Convention, as *the* change made by it, and by it made known to the Dioceses, in order that it may be adopted or rejected in the next General Convention. It will not do to say that the changes are merely verbal, or are immaterial; whether they are so or not, it is not for a *single* Convention to determine. Two must concur in judgment and determination as to the whole and each part of the change. And this is what Dr. Hall calls the "wise provision of our Constitution"—the conservative principle which requires that each change—that each alteration in, or addition to, the Book of Common Prayer, in all essential details, shall be stamped with the sanction of the great representative body of the Church *twice* given to the *same thing*, with the seal of its approval *twice* affixed.

It would seem from the reasoning of the article referred to, that *nothing was settled* by the action of the

Convention of 1883; that suggestions *only* were made by it for the consideration of the Convention of 1886; that it merely sent forth, in the rough, the substance of changes to be made by the last-named body, and when properly shaped and amended, to be adopted by it: whether amended in substance or in form *only, it alone* is to decide for itself *and* for the Church:—this assumption of authority, *ex necessitate rei*, resting upon the claim always set up by a body usurping power, that *it*, as the Supreme Parliament of the Church, *must be trusted!*

It is said that “the various additions and alterations which, by the action of the late Convention have gone through the *first* process of being *proposed*, and are now to be made known to the Dioceses, will present, when they come to be *maturely* considered, *many cases* for the application, if it is sound, of the view we are advocating.” (See page 415 of the REVIEW, of November, 1883.) Yes, “*many cases*” will (if this view be accepted and acted on) be presented for reconsideration, amendment, and change! It will, in any event, require a long session of the Convention of 1886, apart from the time consumed in discussions, for the necessary taking and recording of the multitudinous votes required by the Report of the Committee. It will be remembered that *each* item of addition or alteration, according to its letter or number, must be voted on separately; that the resolutions require the changes, made by the Convention of 1883, to be made known, as proposed, to the Dioceses, “in order that they may be *generally adopted* at the next General Convention,” and so the vote on each will, or may be, a recorded vote. The session of the “Long Parliament” of England will sink into insignificant brevity when compared with that of the General Convention of 1886 if, in addition to its necessary labors, it shall throw wide open the door “for the application of the view” now advocated, for the reconsideration of the “*many cases*” suggested.

One of these, and it may be considered as “a test case,” is that of “the Feast of the Transfiguration.”

As to this, the restoration of the Feast to the Calendar is considered by the learned author to be the *substance of the proposed addition*; the day appointed for it is deemed by him to be immaterial, it being "one of the *minor* features of the proposition as to which the Convention of 1886 would have power of *final action*;" that is, "would have power" to amend the proposed addition by striking out "*August 6th*," and inserting "*January 18th*," the day recommended by the Joint Committee in their Report; "would have power" to reverse the deliberate judgment of the Convention of 1883, not hastily, but after mature consideration, at the close of one of the most able, learned, and exhaustive discussions ever listened to in any General Convention; "would have power" to amend the proposed addition as above stated, and then as amended to *adopt* it, as an addition which would be neither in form nor in substance *the* "addition *proposed*" by the Convention of 1883, and "made known to the Dioceses." We most respectfully ask, was there "no *substance*" in the cogent arguments, by which, with all its partiality for, and marked leaning toward the Committee's Report, under the direction of Dr. Huntington, its skilled defender and unsurpassed advocate, induced the Convention to disagree with the Committee;—to reject the "18th of January," and to adopt the "6th of August" as *the* day for the Feast most consonant with Catholic usage? Those who advocated the addition as it now stands, and as it has been "proposed" for adoption by the Convention of 1886, verily *believed* that it *was* a matter of *substance* and of conscience too, not only to have the Feast, *but to have it on the right day*; and so *they*, composing a majority of the Convention of 1883, adopted the change in the form "proposed," and we submit that all the Convention of 1886 can do is to adopt *or* to reject it. That body *may* think the "18th of January" is the right day; to *them*, in such case, it *would* be a matter of substance, of constraining conscience to make the change; if so, they must reject this addition *as* "proposed," and make a change to suit themselves, and propose *that* for adop-

tion. The Convention of 1886 may, however, upon the same grounds of conscientious conviction agree with that of 1883, and *may* reject an addition to the Prayer Book, which as was thought by the Convention of 1883, would put the American Church in a false position, in a position out of harmony with the Church Catholic. And yet it is gravely insisted that such a change as this would only affect "one of the *minor* features of the proposition," and that the addition providing for a Feast of the Transfiguration, to be observed on the "18th of January," would be the same in substance as such a Feast to be observed on the "6th of August;" and that, *therefore*, "the Convention of 1886 would have power of "final action" upon it. All we can say is, that we earnestly trust no such "view" will ever be considered "sound" in the American Church!

Ex pede Herculem. If this be a specimen of the "cases" to which "the view," advocated by the distinguished author, *may* be applied by the General Convention of 1886, when *it* comes *maturely* to consider the "*various cases*" of baseless or hurried proposals of the Convention of 1883, we may well tremble before the Herculean power for mischief of the "view" of which this is a sample! What proposition of addition or alteration is there which may not have its "*minor features*," and which the Convention of 1886 may not change by amendments, if this "view" be accepted as "sound?" We see no limit to the power, when the discretion for *any* purpose is conceded. If we say that the Convention of 1886 may *amend* and then *adopt*, then the discretion is absolute, and the restriction of amendments to such as do not affect the *substance* is simply nugatory, inasmuch as the body which is to exercise the power is to judge of the discretion, that is, of the power granted, and of the restriction imposed. The restriction on the power is not found either in the Constitution or the Canon law; and if recognised at all, must be conceded to be absolute. Upon familiar principles of law, if it were a matter of civil jurisprudence, the discretion claimed would be beyond the restraining or controlling

power of injunction, prohibition, or mandamus! And it is for the General Convention of 1886 to determine whether it *has* the power to amend *every* proposed alteration in and addition to the Book of Common Prayer, at its own unrestricted discretion, and *then* to adopt it? It would fill our hearts with bitter sorrow if our old, historic, and conservative Church should so declare. We feel abiding confidence that such action is simply impossible in the General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America!

We have already commented upon the language used in Article VIII., and have shown that it is *negative* in its character. “*No* alteration or addition shall be made, etc.” In this connection we desire further to say that the rule of construction is always strict in interpreting *negative* legislation: and this is so, whether the negative words are used in a constitution or a statute. “The general rules of interpretation are the same whether applied to statutes or constitutions.” See Sedgwick on “Constitution of Statutes,” etc., p. 19. It is also the law that “negative statutes” do away with and repeal all former laws contrary to them: and that absolute and exclusive rights are best secured by negations of power.

Magna Charta itself stands upon a negative: “*Nullus Capiatur aut imprisonetur.*” And it is further held, that a “negative statute controls and takes away any common law right or remedy previously existing.” A negative statute differs widely in this respect from one that is affirmative and is never construed to be cumulative; but it *excludes* all antecedent remedies, modes of procedure, rights, and privileges, whether arising out of statute or by implication, within the purview of its exhibition. See Sedgwick, “Constitution of Statutes, etc.,” p. 31. So that, when a constitution or statute prohibits the doing of a certain thing, except in a certain way; that thing can be done in no other way! and all questions of implied or reserved powers, or of expediency, or inconvenience, are squarely met. The Sovereign has spoken: and controversy is, or should be ended.

This reasoning, if applicable to a *Church Constitution* at all, would seem to put an end to arguments derived from the action of the Church in 1789 in adopting the Constitution. That action had been preceded by many conferences and conventions and was finally adopted by the representatives of the respective Dioceses, who announced, before signing the Constitution, that they were authorised so to do by their several Dioceses. As early as June the 24th, 1786, the General Convention adopted the following recommendation: "That the several State Conventions do authorise and empower the deputies to the next General Convention, after we shall have obtained a Bishop or Bishops in our Church, to confirm or ratify a general Constitution respecting both the doctrine and discipline of the Protestant Episcopal Church." The deputies of six Dioceses who declared that they were authorised to confirm and ratify the Constitution did so in August, 1789;—But, to meet the views of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, and to secure the union of the Eastern Churches, the question of finality was held in suspense until October 2, 1789, when the deputies of the nine Dioceses, claiming to be empowered by their respective Conventions to act finally, adopted the Constitution. And yet, after all the precautions taken, Judge Hoffman, in his work "On the Law of the Church," pp. 103, 104, says: "From the foregoing statement of facts, it may fairly be deduced that the deputies to the General Convention of 1789, regarded themselves and were treated by their associates, as vested with full power to form a Constitution for the Church; that this authority was afterwards generally recognised: and it then results that the Constitution derived its power and became the controlling law from the assent of the deputies in the Convention of 1789. The ratifications which took place in any of the States were not essential to its validity, however useful as recognitions and confirmations of the authorities of the delegates. Yet the conclusion need not be pressed further than this, that the Constitution was binding on

the Original States, unless there was an act of disavowal and rejection. By the Original States, I mean New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina. It was rightfully in their power to judge whether their instructions had been adhered to, and to ratify or reject accordingly. It was in their power to have refused their consent at all. But when they did not assert a deviation from the authority of their delegates, nor simply refuse an assent, their silence and acquiescence bound them, and bound them because of the powers they had bestowed on their Agents." Now, it can hardly be contended that the General Convention of 1886, could act under instructions or by virtue of delegated powers from the Diocesan Councils and Conventions: or, that after the adoption of the proposed amendments the Dioceses could have any voice in ratifying or repudiating such amendments, or in determining, as was the reserved power of the Diocesan Conventions in 1789, whether their instructions had been obeyed, or whether the amendments to the amendments were matters of form or substance. The cases are entirely dissimilar. The action of 1789 sprung out of the necessities of the times; and the Constitution then adopted, although agreed to by the deputies, who claimed to be authorised to act finally, found its final sanction in formal ratifications by some of the Dioceses and in the assent, given to it by the others, resulting from their Diocesan action, in conformity with it.

An analogous case may be found in the history of Virginia. The Constitution of that State was framed in 1776 by representatives of the people; and when assented to by those representatives, without popular vote, it was accepted and acquiesced in, *nemine contradicente*, as the organic law of the State; and so continued for sixty-four years, until 1830. And yet no one ever dreamed in the fiercest excitements of party feeling which sprung up in the State in respect to the amendment of that Constitution, that the General Assembly, as inheritor of Conventional powers exercised in 1776,

could alter a word or a letter even of that organic law.

In the AMERICAN CHURCH REVIEW of October, 1884, among other articles which reflect bright honor upon the reputation of American Churchmen for learning and ability, are two bearing upon the subject we have been considering. One by the Hon. James Emott, entitled the "General Convention of 1883;" and the other by the Rev. Frederick Gibson, M.A., entitled "The Book Annexed Amended." In the first, the author stating Mr. Nash's proposition, says: "I agree with this general view. Little can be added to the arguments and illustrations by which it is supported." He then proceeds briefly to discuss the question; and rests his argument upon a supposed difference in the methods of amending State and Church Constitutions. He concedes that, if a State Constitution is to be amended by the action of the Legislature at two successive sessions of its body, the Legislature, at its second session, cannot amend what it, the Legislature, proposed at its first session for adoption; that it must either adopt or reject "the amendment proposed *ipsissimis verbis*. . . . There *can* be no amendment of such a proposition." We ask respectfully, as a question of power, where is the difference? If it were merely a question of delegated power, where is the authority to do what is proposed? But if it be, as it is, a question of the absolute restriction of power to amend only by the concurrence of two separate and distinct bodies of the representatives of the Church in General Convention in 1883 and 1886 in *the same* amendment, where can the second or subsequent General Convention find justification or authority, to say, the object being enrichment or flexibility, we are of opinion that the Convention of 1883 made a blunder; said what *we think* it should not have said: and, therefore, in the interest of enrichment or flexibility, or Catholic usage as *we* view the matter, we will amend by substituting a new response in the Beatitudes, which neither the Joint Committee nor those who, in the Convention of 1883, proposed the Amendment, ever heard or thought of: to

say that the question is on introducing the Beatitudes, just as in the case of the Feast of the Transfiguration the question is upon restoring the Feast of the Calendar, and, notwithstanding the masterly argument of Dr. Egar in the latter case, and the concurrent action of the Joint Committee, of the Bishops, and of the House of Deputies, we will substitute a new response in the one case, and defeat the deliberate will of the Convention of 1883, upon a matter of *substance*, that is, the Catholic usage and conformity as to the day on which the Feast *should* be kept. And we will amend it: *call* it the *same* proposition, and pronounce it a finality. The learned author says: "There can be no substitute of something different from what is proposed: *but, as in the progress of a measure through a deliberative body, the measure may be amended, provided it still continues the same.*"

The italics are ours; they show whither we are to drift, if "the view presented" be entertained at all. It would seem that the subsequent Convention is to take the measure in hand, in its rude imperfectness, recast it, amend it, as far as the rules of the deliberative body will allow, "provided it (the measure) continues the same." And who shall decide? Shall the President rule an amendment out of order on the ground suggested? Or, is it to be left to those who, upon the spur of the occasion, desire to bring in something new, to determine whether in general *the measure continues the same?* The lurking error in the reasoning is found in the idea that *the General Convention is the Church*; that the proposition to amend is one made, as it were, by the Church to itself; that, at first, it merely throws out a suggestion of what *it* proposes to do, three years afterwards; and that, in the meantime, it will think the matter over, put it into shape, amend, and re-dress it, according to the fashion of the hour, when it is to be finally dealt with. The learned author undertaking to show a difference in the modes of amending State Constitutions and our Church Constitution, says: "But here the first action of the General Convention is in effect, a *notice* of what *they*

propose to do," and it is to be inferred, that, having given the notice, *they*, or, rather the next General Convention, to be composed, in large part, of *new* men with *other* views, may do as they please, *provided* the general measure mentioned in the notice be not, in *their* judgment, changed in substance. In a civil court such views would not be entertained for a moment. How it will be in the great representative body of this stable and conservative Church in 1886, *Nous verrons!*

The article of Mr. Gibson, which is full of learned suggestions of change and amendments, closes as follows: "But, whatever changes may hereafter be made in our Book, it is earnestly hoped that 'The Book Annexed Amended' will not be allowed to pass, *just as it is now proposed*, but that it will receive during these three years the fullest criticism from our foremost scholars and theologians, and *be further enriched* by them; and then, after all corrections and improvements have been duly made in 1886, be *finally* adopted, if deemed necessary, in 1889, exactly one hundred years after its first revision and ratification."

In conclusion we may be permitted to say that, foreseeing the evils and embarrassments which would result from party or precipitate *final* action at the time, the writer of this, by resolution offered, and by argument submitted, in the General Convention of 1883, urged that body to forbear final action until 1886, and to greet the second century of the Church's life in 1889 with a Revised Book of Common Prayer, as perfect as it could be made: so that, for one hundred years, at least, the hand of reform should not again be laid upon it. His views, however, were not concurred in by the House; and, thereupon, yielding to the opinions of the eager majority, he did what he could to perfect the proposition. And it makes him somewhat sad now to hear the haste and precipitancy of action in 1883 made the pretext for establishing a precedent which, if "the views presented" be adopted will, he fears, lead to a breach in the strong walls of our Zion. He may be too conservative—be filled with too much anxiety about the Church and the

Book of Common Prayer, and may carry the maxim, *Obsta principiis*, to an extreme.

It may be so ; but being reared from lisping infancy and nurtured in her sacred bosom, he believes the Church he loves to be *the* Power ordained of God for the conservation of religion and the stability of public virtue on this Continent. As Burke thought of the English Church so he thinks of ours: " Her fortification, her walls, and her bastions, are constructed of other materials than of Stubble and Straw. They are built of the strong and stable matter of the Gospel of Liberty. She has securities not shaken in any single battlement, in any single pinnacle: " and as the eloquent orator elsewhere says: " Yes, I would have her great and powerful. I wish to see her foundations laid low and deep, that she may crush the Giant powers of rebellious darkness. I would have her head raised up to that Heaven to which she would conduct us. I would have her open wide her hospitable gates, by a noble and liberal comprehension, *but I would have no breaches in her walls.* I would have her cherish all those who are within, and pity all those who are without. I would have her a common blessing to the world : an *example*, if she is not permitted to be an instructor, to all who have not the happiness to belong to her. I would have her give a lesson of peace to mankind, that a vexed and wandering generation may be taught to seek repose in the Maternal bosom of her Christian charity and not in the harlot lap of indifference or infidelity."

As Burke loved the English Church, so we love the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America, and we would have no breaches in her walls !

HUGH W. SHEFFEY.

MONSIGNOR CAPEL AGAIN.

Monsignor Capel's Rejoinder to the Reply of Rev. J. H. Hopkins, D.D. New York and Cincinnati: Fr. Pustet & Co.

IN closing the review of Monsignor Capel's "*Catholic*," in the October issue, it was said: "We shall await every fresh appearance of his amiable countenance upon the field of controversy as the opening up of a fresh fountain of amusement." And, ever since, the Monsignor has been fulfilling the prediction with an abundant variety, transcending even the most sanguine anticipations. The long history of Anglican controversy with advocates of the Roman Church shows nothing that will compare with it.

His first demonstration appeared promptly on the 22d of October, and the sole basis of attack is thus stated by him:

You are pleased to make me the mouthpiece of a gross heresy—namely, that I assert "Mission or jurisdiction is direct from God."

The amusing thing about this is, that there is *no such phrase* in our entire article. The seven words are given by him in quotation marks, as if they were cited accurately. Yet they are a *manufactured* quotation. We never used them, and never *could* have used them, because they muddle precisely the two things which we had been careful to keep distinct.

In the same *Open Letter* he refers to a passage quoted by us from him; and he adds concerning it: "Wherein I repeat in three different ways that 'Mission is not direct from God.'" And yet the amusing fact is that, in the passage referred to, he does not say that thing even

once! He does not in that passage use the word "mission" *at all*. If he had, there would have been no danger of misapprehending his meaning.

But his power of misquotation is not by any means exhausted. In his *Rejoinder* (p. 22) he asserts :

Dr. Hopkins says : "The being sent, the Mission, and Jurisdiction come through valid ordination."

This is another *manufactured* quotation. No such words were written by us. It is meant, as before, to *muddle* the very two things which we had most carefully kept distinct.

Again, in his *Rejoinder* (p. 19), the Monsignor gives another adroit quotation from himself :

We say, "the being sent, or mission, with its necessary consequent Commission or Jurisdiction, can only be done through the Church's appointment."

It would be hard to say where this quotation comes from. It certainly is not to be found in this form, anywhere in "*Catholic*." The insertion of the word "*mission*" as identified with *jurisdiction*, shows the object to be to supply *what had been left out* in the original pamphlet.

One more specimen of the art of misquotation—not that it is of any great importance, but Monsignor, with a happy grace, strikes into it as if it were a matter of course. In his *Rejoinder* (p. 17), he says :

The Doctor has not yet learnt the theology embodied in the Monsignor's words : "There are in *all* sects those who are in simple, honest faith ; they act with good conscience, and accordingly they receive of God grace and joy and peace."

But these were not "the Monsignor's words." He said nothing at all about the "sects," or "*all* sects." The words as he originally used them refer simply and only to "the greater number" of those commonly called Ritualists. He says :

There is no city of any size in the States where such religious belief and practices have not a fair, sometimes even a large following. And if the descriptions of the press be accurate, the conformity with Roman Catholic liturgy and doctrines is complete.

These words certainly cannot refer to "*all* sects;" and yet *immediately* follows this paragraph (italics are ours):

Of *those* who do *believe* and *so practice*, the *greater number* are verily convinced their church is not Protestant but Catholic. They are in simple, honest faith; they act with good conscience, and accordingly they receive of God grace, and joy, and peace.

What is to be done with a Monsignor who seems to be unable to quote correctly either from his opponent or from *himself*?

But now let us turn to the point about which he has made such clamorous complaints in the newspapers, and renews them in his *Rejoinder*.

Monsignor correctly declares Spiritual power to be *twofold* (and *two* does not mean *three* or *four*). He says:

It will be remarked that, in appointing these pastors, there was (1) "imposition of hands"; and (2) "the being sent."

Again he says: "These *two* powers are distinguished as the power of *Order*, the power of *Jurisdiction*." And he quotes S. Thomas Aquinas as saying: "Spiritual power is *twofold*: one sacramental, the other jurisdictional." Now there is no difference between us thus far—none whatever. The only point is as to the *use* of the word *mission*. Our writers not uncommonly use the word *Mission* to signify the Sacramental gift. When we speak of "Mission and Jurisdiction," we mean the same as "Order and Jurisdiction." It is perfectly clear that *this* is the sense in which it was used in our October article. In the *only* place in which Monsignor used the word "mission" in "*Catholic*," he couples it with "jurisdiction"—"mission *and* jurisdiction"—as if they were *two* separate and distinct things. He does not say mission *or* jurisdiction, which would have im-

plied that they were identified. Now if they are *two* separate and distinct things (and there are only the *two* powers spoken of), "jurisdiction" is clearly "jurisdiction," and the *other word*, "mission," *must* refer to the *other thing*. When Monsignor said "mission and jurisdiction," therefore, putting "Mission" first, it was taken for granted, as clearly evident, that by "mission" he meant "Order." He has nobody but himself to thank for the error, which was solely due to his own use of the word without clearer explanation. His manufactured quotations are for the purpose of making it appear that *we* charged him with teaching that "*jurisdiction*" is given "direct by God"—a thing we are utterly innocent of, never having even dreamed of such a thing. And the *uselessness* of the whole squabble is palpable. It is only about the use of a *word*, when there is no contest about the *thing*. We both agree that Order is a direct gift from God. We both agree that jurisdiction comes from God *indirectly* by human appointment. And whether the *word* "Mission" is used to signify the former or the latter, makes no difference in the *thing*. All that was needed was, for Monsignor to say that we had misunderstood his use of the word "Mission"—that he meant it as *identified* with jurisdiction, not as a distinct thing from it. Any requisite correction would cheerfully have been made at once: *and we make it now*. We are polite enough to take his word for it, that he meant it so: though it was impossible to prove it by his first pamphlet. The main point at issue is not touched by so much as a hair, either one way or the other.

But this easy solution would not have furnished the amusement which the Monsignor was bound to supply. A new thing under the sun was to be seen, absurd enough to make every body's face break into a smile. The question whether the word "Mission" was to be identified with "Order" or with "Jurisdiction" was declared to involve "gross heresy," and a threat was made to drag it before the civil courts on a suit at law for damages! Only think of a Roman Prelate—Domestic Prelate—threatening to bring a case of "heresy"

before a *civil* court, and with an *American jury* at that ! And, as if this were not enough, he threatens likewise to sue the publishers of the AMERICAN CHURCH REVIEW, and even a bookseller who kept the REVIEW for sale on his counters ! In his " Rejoinder " he mentions again the " claim made by him, which claim he re-asserts, to hold both printer and author *responsible for damages* accruing." This is a new phase of amiability !

But even this is not the whole. The threat was made that he would sue, if the sale of our Article was not suspended, and the required correction made. Not seeing that any such correction was called for, his two conditions were refused, and his challenge to a law-suit accepted. Whereupon—instead of proceeding to his law-suit—our amusing Monsignor, *without withdrawing his threat*, proposes to go on with the discussion, as if no threat had been made ! When the distinct issue is put to him in reply, that he must *execute* his threat, or *withdraw it*, or no further notice would be taken of anything he might address to his opponent, his brief reply made no allusion to the legal matter whatsoever !

Even this is not the climax. Within three days after this quiet slipping out from the challenging position, after his challenge had been *accepted*, the Monsignor finds himself among his own people, at a banquet after services in the Church of Our Lady of Grace in Hoboken, where his health was proposed by Father Corrigan, who said : " He is so gifted in the especial mission he has undertaken, that he can penetrate into social circles where ordinary secular and regular priests would not be recognised." And Monsignor, in his reply, speaking highly of the press, said also some handsome things about his own prowess :

Of course, it occasionally happened that I received some blows from that quarter. But then I can strike hard, straight out from the shoulder (laughter). In fact I am a knocker-out (continued laughter and applause). But don't misunderstand me. I said knocker-out, but I am not a slugger in the John L. Sullivan sense. (The guests at this point were completely convulsed with laughter, the glasses jingled on the tables, and the room fairly rang with the applause.) *

* Evening Telegram of November 18, 1884.

The climax of the amusement is to see how gloriously militant the Monsignor could be, in a safe place, within three days after a clean back-down from his own challenge, when all the conditions appended to it by himself had been complied with. He is quite right in saying that he is not the same sort of a "slugger" as John L. Sullivan!

Another source of amusement may be noticed. The old fable of the Bull and the Ox comes into mind spontaneously when we think of it. When the Monsignor thought himself misrepresented—though every word quoted from him was *correctly quoted*—he flies to a dozen newspapers at once, with an Open Letter, demanding "immediate action," and that "the necessary reparation" shall at once be made. But when it is shown him that *he* has made a *bogus quotation*—ascribing to his opponent words which he *never wrote*, but which are manufactured expressly to maintain a charge for which there is *no* ground whatever—when this is *his* position, what does *he* do? He says, indeed, "In America as in the Old World, I have ever found men of honor ready to repair any violation of truth, even made under misunderstanding." But that is meant for his opponent to act on. Does he act on it himself? Not he! When detected in *manufacturing* a quotation to put into his opponent's mouth, and openly charged with it, he says—*nothing*. He does not deny it—it is too plain to be denied. He does not confess it and "repair" it—*that* would be the act of a "man of honor." He just—drops it in silence, and goes on as if nothing had been said!

But even this is not all. Monsignor Capel quotes to us, from the decree of the Vatican Council of 1870, the following words, which we give a little more fully and correctly than he does:

But so far is this power of the Supreme Pontiff from being any prejudice to the *ordinary* and *immediate power of Episcopal jurisdiction*, by which Bishops who have been *set by the Holy Ghost to succeed and hold the place of the Apostles*, feed and govern, each his own flock, as true Pastors, that this their episcopal authority is really asserted, strength-

ened, and protected by the supreme and universal Pastor ; in accordance with the words of S. Gregory the Great : My honor is the honor of the whole Church. My honor is the firm strength of my brethren. I am truly honored when the honor due to each and all is not withheld.

Now Monsignor calls it "gross heresy" to say that the Bishops have *immediate* jurisdiction ; yet here the Vatican Council itself speaks of the "*immediate power of Episcopal jurisdiction*." Monsignor calls it "gross heresy" to say that "jurisdiction" is given "direct by God ;" yet the Vatican Council says that it is *by* this "ordinary and *immediate* power of Episcopal *jurisdiction*" that "the Bishops" "have been set *by the* HOLY GHOST"—and the HOLY GHOST is certainly God—"to *succeed and hold the place of the Apostles*," and yet he would fain have us believe that the "Apostolate" is one thing—confined to the Pope, and that the "Episcopate" is another thing—subordinate to the Apostolate. Now does the *Vatican Council* teach "*gross heresy*?"

Or is it only that Monsignor has not yet corrected his earlier habit of writing, to conform to this latest Vatican standard? In regard to this, "The Faith of Catholics" gives us some shining examples. To this work Monsignor refers us more than once. It is in three bulky volumes, lately reprinted, with a Preface by Monsignor himself. He tells us that it was originally compiled by the Rev. Fathers Berington and Kirk, in the early part of this century, and was after some years learnedly revised and enlarged by the Rev. Father Waterworth. It was a sort of standard controversial work, about the same time that Keenan's "Controversial Catechism" declared the "personal infallibility of the Pope" to be "a Protestant invention" and "no article of the Catholic Faith." Now "The Faith of Catholics," in its new edition, prints at the end of the third volume a translation of the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church of CHRIST, issued by the Vatican Council of 1870, and containing the famous decree of the Infallibility of the Pope ; which is what one would expect. But in the body of the work (vol. ii., p. 105) what do we find?

PROPOSITION XIV.

It is no article of Catholic Faith to believe that the Pope is in himself infallible, separated from the Church, even in expounding the faith ; by consequence, papal definitions or decrees, in whatever form pronounced, taken exclusively of a general council or acceptance of the Church, oblige none, under pain of heresy, to interior assent.

Why, this is Keenan's Catechism over again ! It is the *direct contradictory* of the Vatican decision ! It is now—to Vatican ears, *heresy*—"gross heresy !" In the case of Keenan's Catechism, they had wit enough to call in all the copies they could find, and issue a new edition *corrected up to date*. Monsignor seems to have been less careful ! It is one of the blessings of belonging to a communion which is *semper eadem*, that not more than *two* new articles have been added to the Creed during the reign of any one Pope. But in reissuing works concerning the *Roman Faith*, it is very important that they be carefully *corrected up to date*. What was a "Protestant invention" in 1869 is the "Catholic Faith" in 1870, and *ought* to have been so set down in "The Faith of Catholics" in 1884.

But there is more amusement of the same sort on the same page and the page following :

PROPOSITION XV.

Nor do Catholics, as Catholics, believe that the Pope has any direct or indirect authority over the temporal concerns of States, or the jurisdiction of princes. Hence, should the Pope pretend to absolve, or to dispense his Majesty's subjects from their allegiance, on account of heresy or schism, such dispensation they would view as frivolous and null.

And in regard to this *Proposition*, and the one quoted before, the book itself goes on to say :

On the two points contained in these two last propositions, that is, the *personal* infallibility, and the *temporal power* of the Roman Bishop, it is *not necessary to adduce authorities* (!). That the former is *not* an *essential term of communion* is *certain* ; whatever may be the *private*

opinions of individuals as to whether that infallibility does, or does not, form a part of the *deposit of Faith*; while as to any temporal power being of divine right vested in the Apostolic See, *both Scripture and History* testify against such doctrine being either a *term of communion* or a *revealed truth*. On points *avowedly undefined* by the voice of the Church, the *opinions of men* are not restrained. This proves our liberty, but it touches not the substance of faith, if on such questions *discordant notions have been entertained*.

Only think of such a thing as including the personal infallibility of the Pope among the "points *avowedly undefined* by the voice of the Church," and that it is "*certain*" that it is "*not* an essential term of communion!" And this reprinted *fourteen years* after the Vatican decree has changed all that! Oh, Monsignor, how *could* you do it? And *you* a "Domestic Prelate of His Holiness Leo XIII., happily reigning," and "Member of the Congregation of the Segnatura" besides! What *will* they say to you if they ever get news of this in Rome?

Other "Propositions" might be quoted and commented on, similarly free from slavish adherence to the Bulls of Popes and other declarations which the decree of 1870 *fastens* upon all who accept it. But we should define all these "Propositions" as simply "Protestantism made easy." For, if Fathers Berington and Kirk and Waterworth, and Monsignor Capel, simply private doctors, can, of their own private judgment, throw overboard at one fell swoop so many Bulls of so many Popes, what is to prevent *other* Protestants from going a little further, and ignoring all the rest? If "both Scripture and History" are enough for them, why are they not enough for *us*?

We might find some additional amusement by considering the several charges of "garbling" which Monsignor so loudly brings against us. Outside of the two corrections spontaneously made before they were noticed by Monsignor (thus proving our personal integrity and desire for accuracy), his charges amount to nothing. The addition to the passage of S. Augustine makes not a particle of difference in the sense of the words we quoted. As to "keeping back" quotations from S. Gregory and

others, about "the Royal Supremacy," the charge is utterly idle. We never undertook to give *all* possible quotations from the one, or in regard to the other. We gave only what was pertinent to the point in hand. The charge of "garbling and suppressing passages of the Dogmatic Constitution of the Vatican," is the queerest of all. We quoted the definition of the Pope's Infallibility, —his decisions on faith and morals being "*irreformable of themselves, and not from the consent of the Church,*" and we declared that it "*says not one word* about the Apostles in their corporate capacity." And Monsignor replies, emphasising with small capitals:

The decree of the Vatican runs: "THE SACRED COUNCIL APPROVING, we teach and define," etc. These underlined words you omit.

Well, well! Here is "garbling" to be sure! As if anything *could* be a part of the Vatican decree which "The Sacred Council" had *not* approved! Hereafter, we suppose, any extract from any Act of Parliament, or Congress, will be set down as "garbled" unless it begin with first citing *the enacting clause*!

But now that we have had more amusement out of Monsignor than the most sanguine could have anticipated, let us settle down to solid business. And here we must beg the reader not to be discouraged by the number of quotations. They are *of the essence* of an appeal to antiquity. And they are all *to the point*. We shall enliven the array of extracts now and then, as far as we can, but we trust that the reader will be brave enough to brace himself up for a *thorough* reading of the *whole*.

The entire issue turns upon the question of Jurisdiction by the confession of Monsignor Capel himself, who says ("Rejoinder," p. 65):

'The issue is far nobler than personal triumph or notoriety; it is none other than to know if a Corporation calling itself a Church *is* or *is not* possessed of Divine Mission and Jurisdiction, and, as a consequence, *is* or *is not* a part of the Catholic Church. If this Corporation can prove itself to be possessed of such Divine Mission and Jurisdiction, then is it alone the Catholic Church in the United States; and any

other Corporation claiming the name Catholic is a fraud, or, in the language of S. Cyprian, "an adulteress."

And in connection with this, take the following, from "Catholic" (p. 81, fourth edition), speaking of our American Church :

She holds no communication with Rome ; she has no jurisdiction from the See of Peter ; consequently she forms no part of the Organic Body of CHRIST, nor indeed of any other organism, for, like her Mother, and apart from that Mother, she forms a separate and independent Corporation possessed of human authority, and bereft of every shred of the divine jurisdiction which appertains to the Catholic Church.

Now, this test of communion with Rome is a test very easy to be applied historically. Let us see, then, whether every portion of the Church which lost communion with Rome was forthwith considered to be cut off from the unity of the Church, and "bereft of every shred of divine jurisdiction."

Monsignor is never weary of quoting S. Cyprian as a witness for the unity of the Church. But is *this* what S. Cyprian understood by it? Not at all! On the question of the validity of heretical Baptism—in which Pope Stephen was right and S. Cyprian and the African Bishops were wrong—Stephen had written his strong condemnation of the African decision, and threatened to excommunicate them all unless they yielded. But did S. Cyprian at once submit? *Not he!* He at once held a Council of seventy-one Bishops, and decided that heretics should be rebaptised—just the very thing which the Pope had forbidden. And in writing his account of the action of that Council to the Pope he says :

We know that some are unwilling to give up an opinion they have once imbibed, nor easily change their mind ; but, without interruption to the bonds of peace and concord with their colleagues, retain certain peculiarities which have once grown into usage among themselves. [*Is this* the way in which modern Ultramontanes speak of a decision of the Pope concerning one of the Sacraments?] In which matter we too do violence and give the law to no one, inasmuch as *every Bishop* has the *free choice of his own will* in the administration of the Church, as *he will give an account of his acts to the LORD.*

Stephen refused to see the Bishops who brought him this answer, and even forbade the faithful in Rome to offer them any hospitality. The promised excommunication was launched. And if you would like to see what S. Cyprian thought about it, and about the infallibility of the Pope, read what he says to his Brother-Bishop Pompeius :

Because you desired to be informed what answer our Brother Stephen sent me to our letters, I send you a copy of his rescript, after reading which you will more and more mark *his error*, who attempts to *assert the cause of heretics* against Christians and *against the Church of God*. For amongst other either *proud*, or *impertinent*, or *inconsistent* remarks, which he has written *rashly* and *improvidently*, etc. . . . But what *blindness of mind* is it, what *perverseness*, to refuse to recognise *the unity of the faith* coming from God the Father and the tradition of JESUS CHRIST our LORD and GOD ! . . . Why has the *harsh obstinacy* of our Brother Stephen burst forth to such a degree ? . . . Does he give honor to GOD, who, the *friend of heretics* and the *enemy of Christians*, deems the priests of GOD, maintaining the truth of CHRIST and *the unity of the Church*, worthy of *excommunication* ?

Now, only think of the fairness of quoting such a man as proving the modern ultramontane Papacy, when, without the slightest hesitation or compunction, he declares that the Pope is capable of "error;" that he "asserts the cause of heretics against the Church of GOD;" that he is "proud," "impertinent," and writes "rashly and improvidently;" that he has such "blindness of mind," and such "perverseness," that he "refuses to recognise the *unity of the faith*;" that he is guilty of "harsh obstinacy;" that he is the "friend of heretics" and "the enemy of Christians," while those whom *he excommunicates* are "maintaining the truth of CHRIST and the *unity of the Church*." Not much ultramontaniam *there* ! But it suits Anglicans *exactly*.

And how did the African Church behave under this sentence of excommunication ? Did they consider themselves at once cast out of the Unity of the Church, and "bereft of every shred of Divine jurisdiction ?" Anything but that ! They received it with about as much of respect as our General Convention would receive a

similar document. S. Cyprian convened another Council out of three Provinces, eighty-five Bishops attending, among whom were fifteen Confessors, besides Priests and Deacons and a great number of the laity. And in opening this Council S. Cyprian said :

It remains for us each to deliver our sentiments on this matter, judging no one, *nor removing any one*, if he be of a different opinion, from the *right of Communion*. For *no one of us* sets himself up to be a *Bishop of Bishops*, or by *fear of his tyranny* compels his colleagues to the *necessity of obedience*, since *every Bishop*, according to his *recognised liberty and power*, possesses a *free choice*, and *can no more be judged by another than he himself can judge another*. But let us all await the judgment of our Lord Jesus Christ, who *singly and alone* has the power both of *setting us up* in the government of His Church, and of *judging our proceedings*.

The eighty-five Bishops thereupon delivered their judgments *seriatim*, and unanimously stuck to their own previous decision, just as our General Convention would do under similar circumstances. The "excommunication" troubled *them* no more than it troubles *us*.

We cannot leave S. Cyprian without enjoying another little bit of amusement, and seeing how the boasted "sayings of the Fathers" are sometimes gotten up by Roman advocates. On p. 46 of the "Rejoinder," Monsignor gives us the following, which we reproduce with his own italics and small capitals :

S. Cyprian writing to the Pope S. Cornelius says : "For this has been the very source whence heresies and schisms have taken their rise, that obedience is not paid to the Priest of GOD, nor do they reflect that there is for the time *one High Priest* in the Church, and *one Judge for the time in CHRIST'S stead* ; WHOM, IF THE WHOLE BROTHERHOOD WOULD OBEY ACCORDING TO THE DIVINE INJUNCTIONS, no one would stir in anything against the College of Prelates" (Ep. lix. 6).

The italics, and especially the small capitals, show the high value and authority which the Monsignor attaches to these words. He has taken it at second-hand, as so many others have done before him, and doubtless in good faith. But he is kind enough to commend to our study the *works* of the Rev. T. W. Allies, wh

while yet a clergyman of the Church of England made a "most elaborate and lengthened research of the Fathers on this very question." And we transcribe a *note* of Mr. Allies ("The Church of England Cleared, etc.," p. 39) on this very passage of S. Cyprian :

Of a passage in this letter [to Cornelius] De Maistre says ("Du Pape" liv. i., ch. 6) : "Resuming the order of the most marked testimonies which present themselves to me on the general question, I find, first, S. Cyprian declare, in the middle of the third century, that heresies and schisms only existed in the Church, because all eyes were not turned toward the Priest of GOD, toward the Pontiff who judges in the Church *in the place of* JESUS CHRIST." A pretty strong testimony, indeed, and one which would go far to convince me of the fact. Pity it is, that when one refers to the original, one finds that S. Cyprian is *actually speaking of HIMSELF*, and of the consequences of anywhere setting up in a See a schismatical Bishop against the true one ! After this, who will trust De Maistre's facts without testing them ? The truth is, he had taken the quotation at second-hand, and never looked to see to whom it was applied. It suited the Pope so admirably that it *must* have been meant for him. But I recommend no one to change their faith upon the authority of quotations which they do not test.

This is amusing enough ! But if those words *meant* the modern Papal idea, when they were *thought* to be spoken of the Pope, why not let them mean the same thing—for surely the same words *ought* to mean the same thing—when spoken of S. Cyprian ? Then we should have a clear testimony that the *Bishop of Carthage* was the "One High Priest," the "one Judge in CHRIST's stead," whom "the whole brotherhood" must "obey according to the Divine injunctions." And what could this be, but to make the *Bishop of Carthage* Pope, instead of the Bishop of Rome ! But will any Roman controversialist give the words *this* meaning, as soon as he sees that they are spoken of S. Cyprian ? Of course not ! Words spoken of the Bishop of Rome are *interpreted in a different way* from the same words when spoken of any one else. If of the Bishop of Rome, they are magnified to the uttermost. If of anyone else, they are made to mean as little as possible. And without this *doubly* distorting process, no case for Rome can be made out from antiquity at all.

But to resume our sketch of the Cyprianic controversy. The African Church was excommunicated by Rome, and paid no attention to it. How did the rest of the Church regard it? Did *they* consider that the Africans had ceased to be a part of the Catholic Church? Did *they* take for granted that these excommunicated Africans were now bereft of every shred of the Divine jurisdiction? Not in the slightest! S. Cyprian is evidently countenanced by S. Dionysius of Alexandria, S. Firmilian of Cæsarea in Cappadocia, and S. Basil the Great—the last-named acting as independently in the matter as if the Pope had made no decision at all. The position taken by S. Cyprian as to the question of Jurisdiction, is justified later by S. Augustine also. But let us read some words written by S. Firmilian to S. Cyprian, and see how he not only speaks as freely about the Pope as S. Cyprian, but he turns the proof-text of Romanists against themselves :

What is *the error*, and how great *the blindness* of him (*i.e.*, the Pope) who says, remission of sins can be given in the meetings of heretics, nor remains in the foundation of the one Church which was once fixed by CHRIST upon the Rock, may be hence understood, because to Peter alone CHRIST said, Whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven ; and, again, in the Gospel, when on the Apostles alone CHRIST breathed and said, Receive the Holy Ghost : whose sins ye remit they are remitted, and whose ye retain, they are retained. *Therefore the power of remitting sins was given to the Apostles and the Churches, which they, being sent by CHRIST, set up, and to the Bishops who have succeeded them by ordination in their stead.* . . . And here I am justly indignant at this so *open* and *manifest folly* of Stephen, because, glorying as he does in the rank of his Episcopate, and maintaining that he holds the succession of Peter, upon whom the foundations of the Church were laid, he introduces many other rocks, and sets up new buildings of many Churches, while he affirms, *on his own authority*, that baptism is in them. . . . Nor does he perceive that the truth of the Christian Rock is clouded over by him, and in a manner abolished, who thus *betrays* and *deserts unity*.

But even this is not all. He has not the slightest hesitation in charging the Pope with “ error ” “ and blindness,” with “ open and manifest folly ” in deciding such a matter “ on his own authority,” and even tells him that

he, the Pope, "*betrays and deserts Unity!*" Moreover, he thus apostrophises Pope Stephen himself, in words of fearful strength :

But thou art *worse than all heretics* ; for whilst many, acknowledging their error, come to thee, thence to receive the true light of the Church, thou assistest the errors of those so coming. . . . Nor understandest that their souls will be demanded at thy hand, when the day of judgment is come, who to the thirsting hast denied the Church's draught, and hast been the cause of death to those who would live. And, moreover, thou art indignant ! See with what *ignorance* thou ventur'est to censure those who strive for the truth against falsehood. For who had most right to be angry at another ; he who *supports the enemies of God*, or he who argues for the *truth of the Church* against him who *supports God's enemies* ? except that it is evident that the ignorant are also passionate and wrathful, whilst through lack of wisdom and discourse, they readily betake themselves to passion, so that it is of none other than *thee* that Holy Scripture says : "The passionate man prepares quarrels, and the wrathful man heaps up sins ;" for *what quarrels and dissensions hast thou caused through the whole world !* But how great a sin hast thou heaped upon thyself, *when thou didst cut thyself off* from so many flocks ; for *thou hast destroyed thyself*. Do not be deceived. Since *he* is the *true schismatic* who has *made himself an apostate from the Communion of the Church's oneness* ; for *while thou dost fancy that all can be excommunicated by thee, thou hast excommunicated thyself alone from all*.

Here a *Saint*—for Firmilian is reckoned a Saint as well as Cyprian, Dionysius, and Basil—tells a Pope that he is "worse than all heretics," that he is "ignorant," that he "supports God's enemies," that he has "caused quarrels and dissensions through the Churches of the whole world," that he is a "true schismatic." And as to his excommunication, instead of its severing the Africans from the unity of the Church, S. Firmilian tells Stephen that by it he has "*destroyed himself*"—has "*made himself an apostate from the communion of the Church's oneness*." He tells him that his power of excommunicating all others is only a "*fancy*," while, by excommunicating the Africans he has "*excommunicated himself alone from all*." How does *that* square with modern ultramontane notions ? If any Metropolitan *now* should address such language to the Pope, what chance would he have to be *canonized* ? Such lan-

guage is about as much like ultramontaniam as noon is like midnight !

From all these extracts it is perfectly clear that the modern Roman notion that he who is not in communion with Rome, is thereby, *ipso facto*, cut off from the unity of the Catholic Church, and "bereft of every shred of the Divine jurisdiction," never so much as entered the heads of any one of these Saints. There were no such doctrines known in *their* day. They paid no more respect to the Pope's excommunications than Anglicans do now. It is by no means certain that any reconciliation between Africa and Rome took place before the martyrdom of S. Cyprian. If so, it was probably on the basis of each continuing its own custom until a General Council should decide (as it *was* afterward decided, and *then* Africa yielded). It is not at all clear that S. Cyprian was not still excommunicated when he died, a glorious martyr. But instead of being cut off from the Unity of the Church, he is a Father and a Saint, and his name appears still in the Roman Liturgy itself, *before* the name of Stephen, who excommunicated him, he also being a *Saint*. A beautiful symbol of the happy unity of holiness in which—hereafter—the sharpest ecclesiastical controversies of the day may be reconciled !

We cannot drop this controversy about rebaptising heretics, however, without remarking how curiously "the whirligig of time brings about its revenges." Stephen maintained that baptism with water, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, was *valid*, and was *not* to be *repeated* when a heretic thus baptised was received into the Church. S. Cyprian claimed that valid Baptism was given in the Church alone, and that all baptisms given *outside* of the Church were to go for nothing. Great Councils of the Church afterward ratified Stephen's opinion, and it has been the law of the Church ever since. But in our day—though alleging a different reason—the *Roman* Clergy are generally *adopting that very practice of re-baptising, for which Pope Stephen excommunicated S. Cyprian!* This is another very pretty proof of what they mean by *semper eadem!*

But let us take another famous case, that of S. Meletius of Antioch. He was not in communion with Rome, the Pope giving his countenance and communion to the rival Bishop in Antioch, Paulinus. But was Meletius thought to be cut off from the Catholic Church, and "bereft of every shred of the Divine Jurisdiction?" The entire East would have laughed the idea to scorn! At the Second General Council, which met at Constantinople, and where there were assembled one hundred and fifty Bishops, with many Saints and Confessors among them, Meletius was actually *chosen to preside*! When, during the session, he died, we read that "the whole East mourned over his death; his body was carried in triumphal procession, with torches lighted and psalms sung, from Constantinople to Antioch, being borne within the walls of cities, by special law of the Emperor, contrary to the custom of the Romans." After his death, in spite of the earnest entreaties of S. Gregory Nazianzen, Paulinus, who *was* in communion with Rome, was *not* recognised, but Flavian was elected and consecrated, in strict accordance with the Canons. The Eastern Bishops write the following account of their proceedings to the Pope himself and other Westerns:

And those [the Bishops] both of the Province and of the Diocese of the East, being canonically assembled, the whole accordant Church as with one voice honoring the man, have elected the most reverend and religious Bishop Flavian to the *most ancient and truly Apostolical* Church of Antioch in Syria, where first the venerable name of Christian became known; which legitimate election the whole Synod hath received. But of the Church in Jerusalem, *the mother of all Churches*, we declare that the most reverend and religious Cyril is Bishop, both as long since canonically elected by those of his Province, and as having struggled much against the Arians in different places. Whom, as being lawfully and canonically established *by us*, we invite your Piety also to congratulate, through spiritual love, and the fear of the LORD, which represses all human affection, and accounts the edification of the Churches more precious than sympathy with, or favor of, individuals.

Not the slightest shadow of a shade is there, in all **this**, of the notion that, to be in the Catholic Church at **all**, one must be in communion with the Pope of Rome;

or that *all* Bishops receive their jurisdiction *only* from the Pope.

Take another case, that of S. Theophilus, Patriarch of Alexandria. He belonged to the opposite party in the Church from S. Chrysostom, and was naturally strongly prejudiced against him, took part in his condemnation, and was not willing to change his opinion concerning him. For their treatment of S. Chrysostom Alexandria and Antioch and Constantinople were all excommunicated by the Pope of Rome. Did these three Patriarchates thereupon cease, *ipso facto*, to be parts of the Catholic Church, and “lose every shred of their Divine jurisdiction?” Not in the slightest! After a while Constantinople and Antioch gave up the point of contest. But S. Theophilus was unyielding, kept up his opinion and his conduct unchanged, and *died excommunicated by the Pope of Rome*. Well, what of it? Everything went on at Alexandria as if nothing had happened—just as it did at Canterbury; and Theophilus is not only spoken of in the highest terms by contemporaries and those who came after, but he is quoted as says Tillemont, “in the Fifth (General) Council” with the title of “Saint” and “of *blessed* memory;” the Council of Myra in Lycia calls him a “Prince of the Orthodox and genuine Faith;” and even a *Pope of Rome*, S. Leo, speaks of those “most excellent prelates, Athanasius, *Theophilus*, and last of all Cyril;” while *another Pope*, Gelasius, approves the writings of “the blessed *Theophilus*.” S. Cyril, the nephew of S. Theophilus who succeeded him as Bishop of Alexandria, remained *five years* out of the communion of Rome, rather than seem to reflect upon the course pursued by his honored uncle. But in those days nobody dreamed that such an excommunication put *anybody* out of the unity of the Catholic Church. And it has just as little power *now*.

How, then, *were* people cast out of the Church in those days? It was not by the action of any *individual* Bishop, except within his own proper Diocese; but by the power of the Episcopate *acting collectively*, in *Synods* and *Councils*, lawfully assembled.

Before going any further, however, let us first look a little into the *reason* of things. What is actually the basis of the argument of Rome is, the supposed necessity of some one head, to take away the occasion of schism. The one Emperor in the vast Roman Empire is the pervading idea which really rests at the bottom of this *assumption*. We call it a pure assumption, for there is *nothing* in Holy Scripture to justify it. Our LORD positively *forbade* that any one of the Apostles should have authority over the rest,—a fact which is, as a general thing, *totally ignored* by Roman controversialists, and by Monsignor Capel among the rest. The “Kingdom” was given to the Apostles *collectively*. The “sending” was addressed to them all *collectively*. The abiding presence of Himself was promised to them all *collectively*, even until the end of the world, thus including their official successors the Bishops. The gift of the HOLY GHOST was to abide with them *collectively* “forever,” to give them strength and unity, and to guide them into all truth. This is the Divine plan for securing unity. The *worldly* plan would be—as in the Roman Empire—to have a *visible* Head for a visible Body to secure unity. The Divine plan gives a Spiritual unity, in one Brotherhood, for a Spiritual Kingdom. Our Roman friends ask us to believe that when our LORD *forbade* that any one of the Apostles should be exalted over the rest, he really *meant* that the Pope should be “adored” from the moment of his election! They ask us to believe, that when our LORD gave the Kingdom to the Apostles *collectively*, He really *meant* to give it to S. Peter alone, “in its plenitude,” and to all the rest *only* as being subject to him. They ask us to believe that when He promised to be with them, He *meant* that He would surely be present with S. Peter, and with the others *only* so long as they acknowledged their subjection to him. They ask us to believe that though, on the day of Pentecost, the HOLY GHOST descended upon *all* of them, yet none of the rest could be *sure* of the direction of the HOLY GHOST in anything concerning faith or morals, unless His words came through the lips

of S. Peter. They ask us to believe that when Our LORD prayed "that they all may be one in us," He *meant* to say, "that they all may be one *in Peter*." In the treatise of Bouix,*—which may be called one of the present standard works, bearing on its forefront the special commendation of the author in a letter addressed to him by Pius IX. himself—we find the distinction between the two laid down with the utmost clearness, and with a full and logical sense of all the consequences ;

If Canon law does not spring from the *sole* authority of the Roman Pontiff, and does not derive *from thence* the power of binding all the faithful of CHRIST, but rather flows from the *collective authority* of the chief pastors, that is, from the Bishops generally, together with the Chief Pontiff, it follows: *First*, that laws and constitutions issued by the Vicar of CHRIST alone, do not constitute Canon law properly so called, but only acquire the force of Canon law when at the same time they are confirmed by the other chief pastors of the Church ; *secondly*, that the Roman Pontiff, to whom it was said in the person of Peter, *Feed my lambs, Feed my Sheep*, cannot feed and rule the lambs, that is, the faithful of the Universal Church, and touch them with his Decrees, except in so far as *the whole body of the Bishops* at the same time decrees the *same things* ; also, that he cannot feed the sheep, that is, the Bishops, unless *they themselves* may be willing to *bind themselves* by the decrees issued by the Chief Pontiff *concerning themselves* ; it follows, *thirdly*, that pontifical constitutions issued for the Universal Church may be *regarded by the Bishops* as *not binding*, and therefore as *being null*, so long as *they* have not established them by *their own authority*, no matter how much *the Pope* may *urge* them, and may *fulminate his censures* against *those who rebel* ; it follows, *fourthly*, and most manifestly, that *plenary power* of feeding, ruling and governing the Universal Church, to wit, the faithful and their pastors, *was not given by Christ to the Roman Pontiff* in the person of Peter, no matter how expressly the Œcumenical Council of Florence may have defined it. Hence, under the aforesaid definition, there lies hid the *total poison* of Gallicanism, Febronianism, Jansenism, *Anglicanism*, and, in one word, Schism.

Bouix is entirely correct in this—that last word, "*Schism*," being from *his* point of view. It is the real issue between Anglicanism and Romanism. *We* say that the Church is built "upon the *Apostles* [plural] and Prophets, JESUS CHRIST Himself being the head corner-

* Tractatus de Principiis Juris Canonici, auctore D. Bouix Theologiæ et Juris Utriusque Doctor. Editis Tertia. Paris, 1882.

stone." *They* say, that the Church is built upon the Pope of Rome for the time being.

Let us compare the two. First, we have the Apostles *as a body*. There is *no* evidence that any one of them was subject to any other of them. The first Canon of the most ancient body of Canons in the Christian Church—called the *Apostolical* Canons—requires that a Bishop shall be consecrated by two or three Bishops, thus recognising the *collective* idea from the start, and the larger of these numbers, *three*, has been the express requirement of all subsequent canonical legislation on the subject. It has always been maintained in the Anglican Church, and in every branch of it to this day, though not so strictly in the Roman branch, nor has *any* Anglican consecration *ever* taken place with less than *three* Bishops uniting in the act. This gives a threefold guarantee of *validity* to every Bishop consecrated. It is an open and public guarantee. As each of the three consecrators must himself have been consecrated by three others, the second step has a *ninefold* guarantee, and so on by geometrical progression. This is somewhat reduced by the same Bishop acting in two or more consecrations. It is, on the other hand, *increased* by the fact that very often four or more Bishops join in a consecration, thus greatly *multiplying* the threads of connection with the past. Take for instance the case of the present Bishop of Albany.* He was consecrated by *five* Bishops, and, tracing up the lines of their consecrators, it will be found that every priest ordained by Bishop Doane combines in himself the transmission of the spiritual gift through no less than *sixty-nine* Bishops of the American Episcopate, including the whole of the four (*one* Scottish and *three* English) consecrations with which our American succession begins; and *besides* these includes *four* Bishops of the English and Colonial Churches—Spencer, Medley, Fulford, and Staley—besides the *three* Scottish and *six* English with whom our succession began, or *eighty-two* Bishops in all. And this

* The Bishop of Albany ordained the writer to the Priesthood.

is in less than one century. The same rule, having prevailed in every part of the Catholic Church from the beginning, must everywhere have produced the same result. It is as sure and as simple as the multiplication table. It leaves no room for doubt.

Take our American Church, for instance. Is it conceivable that a man should be received by all the clergy and laity of a Diocese as a Bishop who had *never been consecrated*? and that, too, when the sole ground on which he *could* be received was that he *had* been consecrated! Is it *conceivable* that a man would be received into the House of Bishops, and sit and vote there unquestioned, while as yet he had *never been consecrated* and that, too, when the sole right to a seat rested on the fact that he *had* been consecrated, and those among whom he sat *must* have certainly known whether *they* had consecrated him or not! And as these consecrations are things of *public local notoriety*, the stealing of any unconsecrated man, and his universal recognition both by the clergy and laity of a Diocese, as well as in the House of Bishops, is a *moral impossibility*. The same is true of every Province and Provincial Synod in Christendom.

The *fact* of consecration, therefore, is as certain as any human event can be. And in every such consecration there is the *personal contact* of the *consecrators* and the *consecrated*, and each consecrator imparts to the consecrated that which *he himself already possesses*—a participation in that One Episcopate of the Catholic Church, of which each validly consecrated Bishop has an undivided share. No one can say of such an act that the consecrators undertook to *give* what they *had not got themselves*. And the requirement of three or more consecrators in each consecration produces, not a single chain composed of single links, the failure of any *one* of which would break the line; but it gives a multitudinous web of validity, so wide-spreading and comprehensive that the loss of one thread here and there—even if it could be *proved* (as it can *not*)—would have no effect at all on the general result.

But see what a marvellous contrast to all this is found when we consider the Roman theory. Remember that it is a maxim which lies at the basis of the whole Roman doctrine of jurisdiction, that "No one can give *what he has not got*." Yet this very maxim, when closely examined, cuts up their own theory by the roots. For Monsignor tells us (in "Catholic," p. 23, first edition) that "the Apostles had *universal* jurisdiction directly from CHRIST." Yet our Roman friends will have it that none of these Apostles left any jurisdiction to his successors—the lines of Bishops whom they consecrated; but that S. Peter left the *entirety* of this *universal* jurisdiction to the Bishop of Rome. Well, as all the Apostles had this universal jurisdiction directly from CHRIST, I suppose our Roman prelate will be good enough to leave them all in full possession of it at least as long as they lived. But S. Peter did not outlive all the rest! At the time when he was martyred, certainly *one*, and probably more than one, of the other Apostles were still alive. S. Peter, then, *could* not have taken away S. John's "universal jurisdiction," which S. John had "directly from CHRIST." S. John lived about *thirty years* after S. Peter was crucified with his head downward. S. Peter, therefore, *never* enjoyed "universal jurisdiction" in such a sense as to *exclude* from the same power all the other Apostles. As he did not possess such an exclusive power, he could not transmit it; for "no one can give what he has not got." Linus, Anacle-tus, Clement, and the other early Roman Bishops who were contemporary with S. John, never could have pos-sessed any such exclusive power, any more than S. Peter before them. They *could* not—on Monsignor's own showing—have gotten it at all until the last of the origi-nal Apostles was dead. And who was to give it to them *then*?

The same maxim—that no one can give what he has not got—works the destruction of the Roman theory in yet another way. It is supposable that S. Peter, if he had it, might, before his death, have given it to Linus. But how was the *successor* of Linus to get it? If each

Bishop of Rome himself consecrated his own successor, it would be conceivable that the power were transmitted. But that has never been done at Rome. It is contrary to the canonical system of the entire Catholic Church from the beginning. No Bishop of Rome either elects or consecrates his successor. No Bishop of Rome has ever had *any* Episcopate which was not given to him by those who were *not* Bishops of *Rome*, and whose Episcopate was therefore precisely the same as that of all the rest. In the earlier ages, he was always elected by the clergy and the Christian laity of the city of Rome, and he was consecrated by the Bishops of the Province, the Bishop of Ostia generally acting as Chief Bishop or Consecrator. In the year 1059 the right of election was transferred, by the Pope himself, to the body of Cardinals. Now, supposing this supreme jurisdiction is to be transmitted from S. Peter, *how* is it to be *done*? It must come through some one who *has* it, for "no one can give what he *has not got*." It *could* not be transmitted through the other Bishops of the Province, because *they never had it*. Our LORD never said to the *Bishop of Ostia*, "Feed my lambs, Feed my sheep." Nor did He say to the *Bishop of Ostia*, "Upon this Rock will I build my Church." It *could* not be transmitted through the clergy and laity of Rome by their *election* of the new Bishop, for it is not claimed that S. Peter left this power originally to the clergy and laity of Rome; and certainly our LORD never said to the clergy and laity of Rome, *Feed my lambs, Feed my sheep*. So *they* "could not give what they *had not got*." And how are the Popes *now* to get it through the *Cardinals*? As they did not come in possession of the power till the year 1059, it is impossible that they could have gotten it from S. Peter much less from our LORD Himself. The change was a thousand years too late for that. As their power of election comes only from the Pope himself, it amounts to *nothing*; for, as the Pope had no power of choosing his own successor, he could not give such power to any one else, for "no one can give what *he has not got*." Thus there is a *total solution of continu-*

ity on *every* vacancy in the See of Rome. Instead of a chain of links interlaced with one another, it is a mere series of links no two of which can possibly be brought within touching distance !

This would be strong enough had the Roman succession of Popes run on without interruption in its usual channel through all the ages from Linus. But when we look into history we find that no one of the great Sees of Christendom has had such great and long-continued interruptions and gross scandals connected with its succession as the See of Rome. To allude to only a few of these—for one clear break in a chain of single links is as destructive as a thousand—what shall we say of the shameful Pornocracy at Rome ? For about sixty years together, every Pope—Baronius acknowledging it—was intruded into the Roman See, without a valid or canonical election of any one of them ; and the celebrated prostitutes—the two Theodoras and Marozia—were the power which thus thrust into the “ See of Peter ” their own paramours, sons or grandsons. Baronius says that their names are kept in the list only for chronological purposes ; but what, then, becomes of the sole foundation of spiritual jurisdiction in the whole Catholic Church ? Who will bridge over that gap of *sixty years* ? Who, at the end of it, was able to *give* to the next Pope what the giver himself *had never received* ?

Similar cases may be found in the Papal Schisms, when there were two or three claiming to be Popes at the same time, each anathematising the others with all his adherents, and declaring all his acts to be null and void.* Then, again, *Simony* has power to vitiate an election. At the Roman Synod held by Gregory VII. in 1078, it was enacted (Canon V.) that “ All simoniacal elections *are void*, even *without any formal judicial sentence*, and though the elected person may be wholly ignorant of the facts.” Now, the infamous Alexander

* By the way, Monsignor asserts that “ the act of resigning to the Crown, as the Archbishop does, is the *visible admission* that the source whence whatever authority the *Archbishop* has, comes from the Sovereign of England,” on the principle that all “ resignations ” are “ made to a superior.” Then when Popes resigned to a General Council they thereby admitted the *superiority* of a General Council.

VI., a Borgia—generally regarded as the climax of badness in Popes—not only, through his friend Cardinal Ascanio Sforza, *purchased* the votes by which he was elected, but also *sold* the Cardinalate openly during his pontificate, thus vitiating all subsequent elections. By strict Canon Law—*Roman* Canon Law—therefore, there has not been a valid Pope or Cardinal for nearly four hundred years! Nay, still worse! For it is the natural instinct of those who buy and sell votes for the Papacy to keep the thing secret. It is only in a peculiarly shameless case that it *can* be known. It *may* be happening—for all the Christian world may know—at *every* Papal election. And thus *nobody* can be *sure* of the validity of *any* Papal election! Yet we are asked to accept *this* as the *sole* fountain of spiritual jurisdiction from the beginning!

If, then, there is any force in the axiom that “no one can give to another a power which he himself does not possess”—and this principle is the essence of all *transmitted* power—the Roman theory is not only unhistorical as a matter of fact, but it is *impossible* as a matter of *principle*.

On the other hand, as we have seen, the true principle is embodied in the Apostolic Succession of the Episcopate *as a body*, each Bishop possessing *entire* the power which he transmits through the laying on of his hands, while the requirement of at least *three* consecrators so multiplies the assurances of a valid transmission, that all possible irregularities known in history are as drops in a bucket, leaving the direct transmission of spiritual authority by the entire Order, *unquestionable*.

Moreover, the question as to whether the Church is founded upon the *Pope* or upon the *Bishops of the Church* as a body, admits of so plain an answer from antiquity that it shines forth clearly even from the quotations given from the Fathers by Monsignor Capel himself. S. Cyprian, as quoted by him, says: . . . “there is one Church from CHRIST throughout the whole world, divided into many members, and *one Episcopate diffused throughout an harmonious multitude of many Bishops*,” etc. S-

Pacian, as quoted by him, after mentioning our LORD's promise to S. Peter, adds: "He spake *to one*, that from one he might lay the foundation; afterward delivering the *very same* command *in common to all*." Dr. Pusey's note on Tertullian, which Monsignor quotes, thus defines S. Cyprian's teaching about S. Peter's being the Rock: . . . "the authority he speaks of as derived through him *to all Bishops*, so that *the Church is placed on the Bishops*." And finally, the "last sentence," says Monsignor, "expresses fairly accurately the Roman Catholic teaching;" and that last sentence is as follows:

The words were pronounced to S. Peter by virtue of the true Faith in CHRIST which he had just confessed; he was a rock by reason of his union with the Rock; that Faith in CHRIST as the Son of GOD was his stability, and that of the Church afterward, and of those who at any time were pillars of the Church.

If *this* be the "fairly accurate Roman Catholic teaching," then *every* one who has "the true faith in CHRIST," *every* one who is in "union with the Rock," *every* one who "at any time" is a "pillar of the Church" is as much of a Rock as S. Peter himself. *Every* such one, therefore, has the plenitude of power, and is the sole fountain of Spiritual jurisdiction to the whole Catholic Church throughout the world! But we hardly think that this definition will pass as "fairly accurate" at the Vatican!

Again, the Monsignor quotes S. Cyprian as saying, after the usual reference to "Thou art Peter:"

Thence the ordinations of Bishops and the ordering of the Church runs [*sic*] down along the course of time and line of succession, so that the Church *is settled upon her Bishops*, and *every act* of the Church is *regulated by these same prelates*.

The Roman theory would have required him to draw the inference the other way, namely, that the Church was settled upon the *Pope of Rome*, and that every act of the Church is regulated by that same *Pope of Rome*.

Again, alluding to S. Cyprian, he speaks of "the au-

thority *derived* through Peter *to all Bishops*." Well, we contend that if the power has been derived through Peter *to all Bishops*, it is as clear as daylight that *all Bishops have it!* If S. Peter had given it *only* to the Bishops of Rome, it would be the other thing!

Again, Monsignor himself says: "Not by delegated or vicarious power, but by the HOLY GHOST, do Bishops rule in the Church of God as the successors, not of individual Apostles, but of the Apostolic College," which is truly Catholic and Anglican doctrine, but he spoils it by putting the Roman addition, that "this Episcopal jurisdiction is plainly subordinate to the Apostolate"—that is, the Papacy. Cardinal Hergenrother, also, tries to maintain the ancient doctrine of the One Episcopate, but only with the modern Roman "rider:"

The Episcopal power of jurisdiction is therefore not derived immediately from CHRIST, in so far as it exists in individuals; it has been *established by* CHRIST, but is not conferred immediately by Him upon individual Bishops; it is imparted to them by the Head of the Church, or Bishops whom He has authorized. *Thus the Unity of the Episcopate, so much insisted on by the Fathers*, is fully upheld (!); the Holy See is head, root, spring, and origin of the spiritual authority.

Nay, so ingrained into the thought and speech of all antiquity is this *Collective Unity of the Episcopate* as the reservoir of Spiritual power on earth, that the Vatican decree of 1870 itself cannot ignore it. It gives at the last the Roman twist, of course, but there lies imbedded in it—like a lifeless fossil in the Old Red Sandstone—the *verbal* statement of the old idea about the Bishops:

So far is this power of the Supreme Pontiff from being any prejudice to the *ordinary and immediate power of Episcopal Jurisdiction* by which Bishops who have been *sent by the HOLY GHOST to succeed* and *hold the place of the Apostles*, feed and govern *each his own flock as true pastors*, that this their Episcopal authority is strengthened by the Supreme and Universal Pastor.

Now the flavor of true antiquity is so strong in the *italicised* words of this passage, that it justifies us in making the point we have already made against Mon-

signor's definition of jurisdiction. But as to whether all this is "strengthened" by the modern Roman absolute monarchy, according to which each Bishop is at the mercy of the Pope, that is quite another matter ! Let the answer on *that* point be given by the entire Episcopate of France, whose sees the Pope summarily suppressed only to please Napoleon, requiring them all to resign those sees whether or no, and *depriving*, without synod or trial of any kind, all who refused to resign ! If that be "*strengthening*," what is *destroying* ?

The clearest demonstration of the constitution of the Primitive Church, however, is not to be found by gathering together, from the writings of individuals, all the complimentary phrases or epithets bestowed upon the most powerful See in Christendom, and ignoring everything else. That a primacy of honor was willingly accorded by all to the Bishop of Rome, is freely acknowledged. That the primacy of influence was his also, is equally clear. No Anglican writer of any standing denies it. That the patriarchate over which he presided was so large and important, that, generally, without its acceptance no action was accounted Œcumenical, is a matter of course : but the same rule made the acquiescence of the East equally indispensable, and *that* did not make *the East* supreme over the whole Church. The favorite plan with Roman controversialists is, to quote all the passages that refer to the Primacy, and then *take for granted* that they prove *the Supremacy*, which is a *totally* different thing. This is what the famous Bossuet says on the subject, who lived and died in communion with Rome ; and we give it as imbedded in a quotation from that same Mr. Allies, whose researches "while yet a clergyman of the Church of England, on this very question," Monsignor Capel so cordially commends to our study. Allies says :

Roman Catholic writers, in defending the Papal Monarchy from the remains of antiquity now allowed to be genuine, instead of being able, clearly and historically, without subterfuge and ingenious expedients, to prove their doctrine, are reduced to the predicament which one of their own Communion thus expresses:—' If the question be concerning the

Pope's Supremacy, he diligently collects from Councils and the holy Fathers the strongest proofs for the Pope's *Primacy*, which *Primacy was not in discussion*. If the Papal infallibility be controverted, he writes out those passages in which the Councils and holy Fathers have expressed high and reverential feelings about the First See, though they *were not acquainted* with its infallibility.' 'Those who use such a mode of arguing do not find it difficult to get the patronage of the holy Fathers for their errors. Yet how *easy it is to see* that they *nefariously abuse their abilities*, and violate faith with the public, and religion itself. Yet thus did Bellarmine, and whatever other adversaries the Gallican doctrine found.

Mr. Allies continues :

Others, again, remind one, I am constrained to say, of that celebrated feat in which a single rider vaults alternately from one horse to another at full speed. He rides both, but keeps fast to neither, showing his skill by the dexterity with which he changes his position. Just so they manage the Papal and the Patriarchal power of the Roman Bishop.

And, after enlarging on this, he says :

It is hard, certainly, to be convinced by those who take up such a line as this. Fully aware as I am that it is a question of salvation, I am not at all persuaded by their mode of proceeding : nay, I have to struggle against a continual feeling of *bad faith in those who pursue it*, which I am most loath to impute to any. But, *if inexorable history would allow them to be honest*, surely they injure their own cause : *ours* has been injured by concealing the original and legitimate power of the Roman Bishop as occupant of the first, and that S. Peter's, See.

The admirable work from which this extract is taken, Mr. Allies utterly failed to answer, when—upset by the Gorham decision—he went over to the Church of Rome himself. Notwithstanding his personal inconsistency, his *history* continues to be *history*, and the correctness and honesty of his quotations has never been impugned. And while on the subject of unfairness in the working up of historical evidence, it may be well to give a quotation or two from the Rev. Edmund S. Ffoulkes, from a work written by him while he was yet in full communion with Rome. He is speaking of the positions maintained

* Church of England Cleared from the Charge of Schism. Pp. 341, 2.

by the Greeks in their great controversy with the Latins, and he says :

'Too often, it must be confessed, they were sought to be answered or evaded by *assertions* which were *not fact*, and *authorities* that were *not genuine*. Thus we are brought to a phase in the controversy, which no Western, it is to be hoped, in modern times will ever look back to without unfeigned regret and shame. The two great questions on which the controversy between the East and West turned, were, the Procession of the HOLY GHOST and *the Papacy*. On *both*, the West has been *convicted*, by modern criticism, of having sought to establish the positions on which it insisted by means of *such volumes of forged or spurious evidence* as would *damn any cause forever irrecoverably, Christian or pagan*, could it also be proved to have been used, *knowingly*, that it *was* what it has since turned out to be. It would be difficult, in short, to name any *secular* controversy where *so much utterly worthless testimony* had been adduced in favor of the points sought to be proved, etc.

To Bossuet, Allies, and Ffoulkes we leave the pretended array of patristic authorities, of which Monsignor makes so much ; but before quitting this branch of our subject, we would allude to some things which Roman controversialists are pretty sure to skip, with great unanimity.

S. Paul says: . . . "beside that which cometh upon *me* daily, the *care of all the Churches*." If S. Peter had said that, we should never have heard the last of it, as a conclusive proof that "*all spiritual jurisdiction*" had been given to the Pope of Rome from the beginning. But as it was only S. Paul who said it, it goes for—nothing! It rather *seems* to prove, however, that "*all spiritual jurisdiction*" was not given to S. Peter, and therefore *could* not have been transmitted by him to the Bishops of Rome. Other points might easily be named, which would have made the *show* of scriptural proof incomparably stronger, had they only built the Papacy on S. Paul rather than on S. Peter. But let us take a few cases from history.

Our readers will not have forgotten the words (already quoted) which Monsignor copies from S. Cyprian, with *italics* and small capitals, thinking that they refer to the Pope, and must therefore prove the Supremacy. But

when he finds that those strong words refer only to S. Cyprian, will he, or any Roman controversialist, give the same exalted interpretation to them *then*? By no means!

Take another case. S. Basil the Great writes to the Bishop of a great See :

That the Church of Antioch be well ordered, manifestly depends upon *your piety* : to manage some, to quiet others, and to restore strength to the Church by agreement. For you yourself know better than any one can tell you, that, like the most skilful physicians, you must begin the cure with the most vital parts. And what can be more vital than Antioch to the Churches of the *whole world*? If this could be restored by concord, nothing prevents but that, as a strong and healthy *head*, it should procure soundness to the *whole body*.

Now if *Rome* had thus been spoken of as the "head" to "the whole body," and as "vital" to "the Churches of the whole world," we should have seen it constantly quoted as a proof of *Roman* Supremacy. But as it is only *Antioch*, nothing is made of it. And the Bishop to whom S. Basil is writing is *not* the Bishop of Rome, but the Bishop of *Alexandria*.

Again, S. Basil, writing to another Bishop, says : "In — form me constantly of your affairs, and *undertake the care of the universal Brotherhood* with the same tenderness and the same zeal, which that most blessed man showed to all that love God in truth." These words are not written to the Bishop of *Rome*. If they were, it would have been a famous text to prove the sole jurisdiction of the See of Peter over "the universal brotherhood." But as they are only said to the Bishop of *Alexandria*, they go for nothing. And "that most blessed man" who had "the care of the universal brotherhood" previously, was S. Athanasius, Bishop of *Alexandria*.

Again, S. Gregory Nazianzen, speaking of a great Bishop, says : "Having gone through the whole *series* of sacred offices, . . . he is entrusted with the presidency over the people, which is the same as saying with *the rule of the whole world*. And I cannot say

whether he received the priesthood as the reward of his virtue, or to be *the source and life of the Church.*" If these words—having "the rule of the whole world," and being "*the source and life of the Church*"—do not assert Supremacy and the one vital fountain of all jurisdiction, what *do* they mean? As they only refer to S. Athanasius, who was never Bishop of Rome, but only of Alexandria, *of course* they only mean a rhetorical compliment, and have nothing to do with Canon law!

Again, a great and sainted father writes: "This dignity, in which I now am, makes *all* my adopted children." If a Bishop of Rome had said this, what would it not prove? But it is said only by the Bishop of Cæsarea! Of this same S. Basil, Tillemont writes:

S. Basil's actions show him to us, I say, not as a particular Bishop, **OR** a mere Metropolitan, or as Exarch or Patriarch of several **Provinces**, but as a Saint who enjoyed the Episcopate in *full possession*, without wronging the authority of his brethren, who did not limit his **charity** to his jurisdiction, but, regarding himself as *successor of the Apostles*, as *Bishop of all the Churches*, extended his cares everywhere **where** the name of JESUS CHRIST extended, and considered *all* Christians as *his own people*, since he carried them all in his heart.

What more would Monsignor Capel wish to have said **of** the Pope? And yet these words are written by a **Roman Catholic** historian concerning a Bishop of *Cæsarea*—one who was not even a Patriarch! S. Chrysostom, too, writes of a certain Bishop, that he not only took good care of his own Diocese, "but sent abroad *in all directions* men to instruct, exhort, converse, defend the approach against the enemy (the Arians). . . . For well had he been instructed by the grace **of** the Spirit, that it is the duty of one set over a Church not only to provide for that which has been entrusted to him by the Spirit, but for *the whole Church throughout the world*. And this he learnt from the sacred prayers. 'For if,' said he, 'we should offer prayers for the Catholic Church from one end of the earth to the other, much more must we shew our vigilance for the whole of it, and care alike for *all* Churches, and be solicitous for

all.' " And this was said, not of a Bishop of Rome, but only a Bishop of Antioch—S. Eustathius.

S. Basil once more writes to a great Bishop :

Most other men have enough to do to look after what is under their own charge, whereas this is not sufficient for you, who have as great solicitude for *all the Churches*, as for that, the burden of which in particular has been laid upon you by our common LORD. This may be said, since you are incessant in conversing, admonishing, writing letters, sending persons *in all directions* with the best suggestions. . . . And wishing to contribute something to this matter myself, I thought it would be a most suitable beginning to recur to your perfection, *as to the supreme Head*, and to take you for counsellor and leader.

And yet this "*Supreme Head*" is only the Bishop of Alexandria, and *not* the Bishop of Rome ! Any number of similar places might be quoted. *All* the ancient Bishops felt themselves responsible for doing what was in their power to protect the integrity of the Faith *every where*, and to remove any scandals which threatened or disturbed the peace of the Church. And of course this responsibility was felt the most strongly by those whose prominent and powerful Sees gave them the greatest influence. *Outside* of these disturbing causes, the regular administration of Church work and discipline went on with the *universal* admission that all Bishops are equal. A Bishop of Rome himself has expressed this with admirable clearness. S. Gregory the Great says, speaking of his own See :

I know not what Bishop is not subject to it, *if any fault be found in Bishops*. But *when no fault requires it all are equal* according to estimation of humility.

And these words were written when the Bishop of Rome had made great strides upward in claiming the due power for his See.

And now let us turn to the fundamental and overwhelming proof that the *collective* idea, not the *monarchical*, is the true rule of the ancient Catholic Church. This is to be found in her *written Canons*. These were the universally acknowledged *laws* of Church govern-

ment. They cannot be upset by quoting phrases from letters, or books, or *any other documents whatever*, written by *individuals*, no matter how high their position or how great their fame. When the Constitution of the United States plainly states *the law*, it is idle to quote from letters or papers or speeches of Jefferson or Madison or Webster or Clay, to show that the Constitution does not mean what it says; or that the most important principle of all, underlying all the rest, has been *entirely left out!* So universally was the obligation of the Canons acknowledged, that for ages the Popes themselves constantly urged it, as the ground of their interference, that they were bound to see that *the Canons* were obeyed. S. Leo, of Rome, uses the following noble language to the Emperor:

The privileges of the Churches, instituted by the Canons of the Holy Fathers, and fixed by the decrees of the venerable Nicene Synod, *cannot be plucked up by any wickedness, or changed by any innovation*. In the faithful execution of which work, by the help of CHRIST, *I am bound to show persevering service*; since the dispensation has been entrusted to me, and it tends to my guilt if the *rules of the Fathers' sanctions*, which were made in the Nicene Council for *the government of the whole Church*, by the teaching of GOD'S SPIRIT, be *violated*—which God forbid—by *my connivance*.

And to the Empress he writes in a similar strain:

Since *no one* is allowed to attempt anything against the Statutes of the Fathers' Canons, which many years ago were based on spiritual decrees in the *City of Nicæa*; so that if any one desires to decree anything against them, he will rather *lessen himself* than injure *them*. And if these are kept uninjured, as it behoves, by *all Pontiffs*, there will be *tranquil peace and firm concord through all the Churches*. There will be *no dissensions* concerning the degree of honors; *no contests* about ordinations; *no doubts* about privileges; *no conflicts* about the *usurpation of another's right*; but under the equal law of charity both men's minds and duties will be kept in the due order.

And, again, to Anatolius he writes:

Those holy and venerable Fathers, who in the Nicene city established laws of *ecclesiastical Canons, which are to last till the end of the world*, when the sacrilegious Arius with his impiety was condemned,

live both with us and in the whole world by their constitutions ; and if *anything anywhere* is resumed upon, contrary to what *they* appointed, it is *without delay annulled*.

Golden words ! Compare this with the statement of Bouix as to the sole source of Canonical Law, and it will be seen at once that S. Leo, on *that* point, is a thorough Anglican ! If the Popes of Rome would only fairly and fully go back to S. Leo's ground, as stated above, all the great breaches of Christian brotherhood would be healed within one generation !

But even when the Popes first began to go beyond this, they did it, not by claiming that their own decrees had in themselves the force of Canons—it was some centuries before they came to *that* ! Their first step was much more modest, though by no means ingenuous. They claimed that certain Canons were of Œcumenical authority, which really were not so ; and, still later, they claimed that *Canons* gave them the authority they wished to exercise, when the *fact* was, that no such Canons had ever been passed. It was, however, a substantial confession that *the Canons* were the only imaginable foundations for *any* such exercise of power.

If we look over the *modern* body of Roman Canon Law, we shall *not* find that there is a *total omission* of all allusion to the universal power of the Pope. In the ancient Canons, however, we find just such a *total omission*. Yet Roman controversialists ask us to believe that *both* mean the same thing !

But first let us examine what is meant by jurisdiction. Monsignor Capel says :

Ordination does not make a man *Assistant* Bishop, or Bishop *New York*, or *Archbishop* : it only makes him Bishop. The power to have charge of souls in a Diocese, or to have authority over suffragan Bishops of a Province, comes not from ordination but by appointment.

This is perfectly correct. And this “appointment,” as S. Thomas Aquinas expresses it, is *ex simpliciter injunctione hominis*, of purely human authority. Now

when a vacancy occurred in ancient times, the clergy and laity of the vacant See commonly went into an election of a proper person to fill it. The metes and bounds of that Diocese had already been settled "by purely human authority." *That* fixed the identity of the particular charge to be confided to the new Bishop. The other Bishops of the Province to which that See belonged—either present at the time or acting afterward—passed upon the election. Without their consent, or that of a majority of them with their Metropolitan, nothing further could be done. When they consented, the Consecration took place, and the work was complete—the See was filled. Unless within the immediate province of Rome, the Pope had no more to do with it than the Czar of all the Russias. All the arrangements settling the lines of *jurisdiction* were preliminary, and only *inchoate*, amounting to nothing *positive* until Consecration gave them fulness of power. They resembled the work that needs to be done in preparing for the casting of a bell. Unless the mould is duly prepared, of the proper size and shape, and arrangements rightly made for the transmission into it of the molten metal, no bell can be manufactured. Yet all these arrangements are *nothing*, so far as a bell is concerned, unless and until the molten bell-metal flows in. In *that* act the limitations previously fixed in the mould are transferred to the metal in the very act of casting, and the bell—of the determined size and weight—is complete. Now *all* that precedes the *act* of Consecration—the Diocesan limits, the selection of the individual, the confirmation by the other Bishops, the order taken by the Metropolitan—all these are of the jurisdiction. But they amount to *nothing* unless Consecration actually takes place. (In later ages a Bishop-elect, when confirmed by the Proper authority, could perform—even before his Consecration—such acts as a Cathedral Chapter could perform during a vacancy. But this is a trifle which touches no *principle*.) The act of Consecration *itself* gave him full Episcopal power within the limits of his jurisdiction.

The confirmation and ordination of Bishops is thus

provided for in Canon IV. of the General Council of Nicæa :

It is by all means proper that a Bishop should be appointed by all the Bishops in the Province ; but should this be difficult, either on account of urgent necessity or because of distance, three at least should meet together, and the suffrages being taken, those of the absent [Bishops] also being communicated in writing, then the ordination should be made. But in *every* Province the ratification of what is done should be left to the *Metropolitan*.

Here there is not a word about the Pope, nor any space left within which his action would be *possible*. The Bishops of the Province *alone* are to *act*. And the "ratification of what is done" is "left to the Metropolitan" of the Province, and *not* to the Pope of Rome.

So again in Canon VI. of the same great Council we find some exceptions made to this rule in regard to the three great Sees of Rome, Alexandria, and Antioch. In all these *custom* had already brought about the grouping of *several* Provinces around each of these three great centres, thus forming what were afterward called Patriarchates.

Let the ancient customs prevail in Egypt, Lybia, and Pentapolis ; so that the Bishop of Alexandria have jurisdiction in all these Provinces, since the like is customary for the Bishop of Rome also. Likewise in Antioch and the other Provinces, let the Churches retain their privileges. And this is to be *universally* understood, that, if any one be made Bishop *without the consent of the Metropolitan*, the Great Synod has declared that such a man ought not to be a Bishop. If, however, two or three Bishops shall, from natural love of contradiction, oppose the common suffrage of the rest, it being favorable, and according to the Canon of the Church, then let the choice of the majority prevail.

Now these exceptions are expressly based upon *custom*, and not upon *inherent transmitted right*. *Custom* had given a certain jurisdiction to the Bishop of Rome over the Provinces in his immediate vicinity. The same "ancient customs" had given to the Bishops of Alexandria a certain jurisdiction over Lybia and Pentapolis—adjoining countries to the west. The same "ancient customs" had done the like for the Bishop of Antioch.

And yet, even while ratifying these "customs" with canonical authority, the Canon *expressly reasserts* the rights of the *Metropolitans* even in those associated or subordinated Provinces. It "is to be *universally* understood, that if anyone be made Bishop without the consent of *the Metropolitan*, the Great Synod *has declared* [to wit, in Canon IV.] that such a man ought not to be a Bishop." The *general principle* is laid down as a matter of *fundamental law*, and that which was only "custom," no matter how ancient, could not, and should not, abrogate it. Now if, instead of "Metropolitan," the Canon read that no one should be made Bishop "without the consent of the *Pope of Rome*," it would suit our Roman friends exactly. But there is not a word by which it would appear that the Bishop of Rome had any more power than the Bishops of Alexandria and Antioch; and it is clear that the rising power of *all three* rested *only* on "custom." Of any power of "sole jurisdiction over the whole Church Catholic" transmitted from S. Peter to the Bishops of Rome alone, there is nothing more said in the Nicene Canons than there is in the "Digest" of our American Church.

So clear is the meaning of this Nicene Canon, that Hefele—a Bishop who, since 1870, has swallowed the Vatican decrees, though with a wry face—in commenting on this Canon, says, "that the Latins interpreted it as though it determined these two points only: (a) that for the *ordination* of a Bishop three Bishops at least are necessary; (b) that the right of *confirmation* rests with *the Metropolitan*." He goes on to say, with unmistakable correctness and candor: "In the Latin Church this right of confirmation PASSED, in *course of time*, from the *Metropolitans* to the *Pope*, particularly by the concordats of Aschaffenburg." This gives away the Papal theory *completely*. These concordats were not made "in the beginning." They were crafty bargains made, by Kings and Popes, for dividing between themselves the original rights of Clergy and People, of Provincial Synods and Metropolitans. The Kings took the power of Clergy and People in choosing their

Bishops: and the Pope took the power of Synod and Metropolitan. And each august plunderer maintained that his new power was Divine. One was a part of the "divine right of Kings." The other is a part of the "divine jurisdiction of the Pope of Rome." And one was just about as "divine" as the other!

Canon XIX. of Antioch tells the same story as that of Nicæa at a little greater length:

A Bishop shall not be ordained without a Synod and the presence of the Metropolitan of the Province. And when he is present, it is by all means better that all his brethren in the Ministry of the Province should assemble together with him; and these the Metropolitan ought to invite by letter. And it were better that all should meet; but if this be difficult it is by all means necessary that a majority should be present, or take part by letter, in the election, and that thus the appointment should be made in the presence, or with the consent of the majority; but if it should be done contrary to these decrees, the ordination shall be of no force. And if the appointment shall be made according to the prescribed Canon, and any should object through natural love of contradiction, the decision of the majority shall prevail.

Here there is not the slightest hint at anything to be said or done by any one outside of the Province and its own Metropolitan. So, too, Canon XII. of Laodicea, more tersely:

Bishops are to be appointed to the ecclesiastical government by the judgment of the Metropolitans and neighboring Bishops, after having been long proved both in the foundation of their faith and in the conversation of an honest life.

Here, too, there is *nothing* about any authority to be exercised beyond that of the Metropolitan and the neighboring Bishops.

The canons of the General Council of Constantinople set forth the same principle of local self-government very distinctly. In Canon II. we read:

The Bishops of a Diocese are not to invade Churches lying outside of their bounds, nor bring confusion on the Churches; but let the Bishop of Alexandria, according to the Canons, *alone* administer the affairs of Egypt; and let the Bishops of the East manage the East *only*, saving

the privileges of the Church in Antioch, which are mentioned in the Canons of Nicæa; and let the Bishops of the Asian Diocese administer the Asian affairs *only*; and the Pontic Bishops *only* Pontic matters; and the Thracian Bishops *only* Thracian affairs. And let not Bishops go beyond their Diocese for ordination or any other ecclesiastical administration, unless they be invited. And the aforesaid Canon concerning Dioceses being observed, it is evident that the *Synod of every Province* will administer the affairs of *that particular Province*, as was decreed at Nicæa. But the Churches of GOD in heathen nations must be governed according to the custom which has prevailed among their forefathers.

No "universal jurisdiction" of the Pope of Rome can be found in *that* Canon! And Canon VIII. of the General Council of Ephesus proves that *all* Dioceses and Provinces were not included in the Patriarchates. Cyprus was under no Patriarch, but had *only* her own Metropolitan. The Bishop of Antioch had attempted to annex that Province to his own Patriarchate, and had held ordinations there. The Council therefore decided (Canon VIII.) that—

. . . the Rulers of the Church in Cyprus shall enjoy, without dispute or injury, according to ancient custom and the Canons of the blessed Fathers, the right of *performing for themselves* the ordination of their excellent Bishops. The same rule shall be observed in the other Dioceses and Provinces *everywhere*, so that *none* of the most religious Bishops shall assume control of *any* Province which has not heretofore, from the very beginning, been under his own hand or that of his predecessors. But if any one has violently taken and subjected (a Province), *he shall give it up*; so that the Canons of the Fathers may not be transgressed; nor the vanities of worldly honor be brought in under pretext of Sacred Office; nor *we lose*, little by little, and *at length forget*, the *liberty* which our LORD JESUS CHRIST, the Deliverer of all men, hath given us by His own Blood. Wherefore, this Holy and Œcumenical Synod has decreed that, in *every* Province, the rights which heretofore, from the beginning, have belonged to it, shall be preserved to it, according to the old prevailing custom, unchanged and uninjured; every Metropolitan having permission to take, for his own security, a copy of these Acts. And if any one shall bring forward a rule contrary to what is here determined, this Holy and Œcumenical Synod *unanimously decrees that it shall be of no effect*.

This is as clear as the noonday sun. It is *declared to be perpetual*. All contrary legislation (and this includes the entire modern Papal system) is *unanimously* decreed

to be "*of no effect.*" This justifies the Anglican position *completely.*

The Council of Chalcedon not only declares, in Canon I., "that the canons of the Holy Fathers made in every Synod even until now, should remain in force," but it also adds a prohibition of delay in the filling of vacant Sees. In Canon XXV. it "decrees that the ordinations of the Bishops *shall* take place *within three months*, unless an inevitable necessity should some time require the term of delay to be prolonged. And if the [Metropolitan] shall not do this, he shall be liable to ecclesiastical penalties.

Now, if we subtract the time necessary for the election and confirmation of the Bishop-elect, and the distance of many of the Sees of the then Catholic Church from Rome, and the difficulties and dangers of travel, it will be seen that to apply to Rome within the time named would be impossible *in fact*; just as impossible as to find anything about Rome in *the words* of the Canon itself. In the presence of such Canons the Roman claim is mere moonshine!

But there is another and most important branch of this business of jurisdiction which remains to be considered; and that is, not so much the *giving* the power, as rather the controlling it afterward, or taking it away altogether, by the disciplinary authority of the Church, when heresy or schism or evil life makes it requisite for the good of the flock.

And here we meet, at the outset, the principle that those who gave, can also take away that which they gave. The *collective* idea prevails here, as in the Consecration of Bishops, and the making of Canons. No *one* Bishop could be disciplined by any other *one* Bishop. But every erring Bishop was first of all to be dealt with by *the Bishops of his own Province.* The dead silence in regard to any right of appeal to Rome is complete.

In the Apostolic Canons (Canon XXXVII.), we find the old law for the meeting of the Provincial Synod twice in each year:

Twice in the year let a Synod of the Bishops be held ; and let them *mutually examine each other* concerning the doctrines of religion ; and *let them settle the ecclesiastical disputes that have arisen.*

And again (in Canon LXXIV.), we read :

If a Bishop be accused of anything by trustworthy men, it is necessary that he be summoned *by the Bishops* ; and that, if he appear and confess, or be convicted, *they* should *determine the penalty.* But if he be summoned, and will not obey, let two Bishops be sent to him, and let him be summoned a second time. And if he will not then obey, let two Bishops be again sent to him, and let him be summoned the third time. And if he shall even then despise [the summons], and will not appear, let the Synod pronounce against him *what they think right*, that he may not evidently be a gainer by avoiding a trial

That is the whole. Not the slightest syllable about a particle of revisory or appellate power *anywhere.*

In Canon VI. of the General Council of Constantinople, after declaring what persons may make accusation against Bishops—

. . . the Holy Synod bids them first to lay their charges before *all the Bishops of the Province*, and before them to prove the accusations, whatsoever they may be, which they have brought against the Bishop. And if it should come to pass that the Provincials should be unable rightly to settle the charges brought against the Bishop, then the parties must betake themselves to a greater Synod of the Bishops of that Diocese called together for this purpose. . . . And if any one, despising what has been decreed concerning these things, shall presume to annoy the ears of the Emperor, or the courts of temporal judges, or, dishonoring all the Bishops of his Province, shall dare to trouble an Œcumenical Synod, such a one shall by no means be admitted as an accuser ; forasmuch as he has cast contempt upon the Canons, and brought reproach upon the order of the Church.

Now this is most instructive and significant. Every accusation against a Bishop is to be tried, first, by the Bishops of the Province, as from the beginning. If this is not decisive, a greater Synod of the same *Diocese* [meaning what we commonly call a *Patriarchate*, or union of several Provinces] is to decide. And what *next* ? The Pope of Rome ? Oh, no ! Not an idea of the sort seems to have passed through the minds of the Fathers of Constantinople. Accusers *might* go to the

Emperor, or to the civil courts, or to an Œcumenical Council ; but to *the Pope* ? Never ! And yet this very Canon was among those *approved* by the then Bishop of Rome !

At the Council of Chalcedon a step further was taken in the way of providing remedies ; but still there is not a syllable about any recourse to Rome. In Canon IX. we read :

If a clergyman have a complaint against his own or any other Bishop, let it be decided *by the Synod of the Province*. And if a Bishop or Clergyman should have a difference with the Metropolitan of the Province, let him have recourse to the Exarch of the Diocese [Patriarchate], or to the throne of the Imperial city of Constantinople, and there let it be decided.

So clear is this that distinguished Roman Catholic writers acknowledge it in the most express terms. Thomassin—to whom a Cardinal's hat was offered, but who in his humility shrank from it—says :

It is necessary to know, that, up to the Council of Nicæa, *all ecclesiastical affairs* had been *terminated* in the Councils of *each Province* ; and there had been but very few occasions in which it had been necessary to convoke an assembly of several Provinces. The Council of Nicæa, even, only speaks of *Provincial Councils*, and orders that *all* things should be *settled therein*.

De Marca, also, the learned Archbishop of Paris, says :

The better to understand the order of Episcopal *jurisdiction*, it is necessary beforehand to lay down that the Church *in the beginning* suited herself to the arrangement of the Roman Empire, and therefore appointed Bishops in the chief cities of each country, but assigned the first place and *the confirmation of everything* to the Bishop of the Metropolis of *the Province*, with the Council of his colleagues. Thus Episcopal *ordinations* and *Ecclesiastical judgments* took place by the Council of *each Province* with the authority of the *Metropolitan*, so that *it was not allowed to appeal* from the judgment passed in a *Provincial Council*.

Pope Julius himself, writing to the Eusebian Bishops in regard to the intrusion of Gregory the Arian into the

Alexandria after Athanasius had been condemned Council of Tyre, says :

pointment ought not to have been made thus illegally and to the Canon of the Church ; but *the Bishops of the Province have ordained one in that very Church, of that very Priest-very Clergy, and the Canons received from the Apostles* thus to be set aside. . . . Dearly beloved, we speak as in the presence of God, and declare that this proceeding is not pious, nor lawful, nor ecclesiastical.

is so clear that Mr. Allies adds :

even rest *the whole question* on this important point, for it is *necessary to the Papal theory* ; and I do not think *any vessel* such a doctrine can be found in *the first eight centuries*. At it be shown ; for, to *assert* it, in the face of *Canons* which *impose forth palpably* a system *the very reverse* of it, is merely *the whole question*.

ie West there was no canonical foundation for departure from the Nicene system of Provincial Councils until the passage of the famous Canon of the Council of Sardica. This was intended to be a General Council, but turned out to be only a Western Synod. At many troubles had arisen out of the question of Councils, and some Provinces were much divided in Council. The venerable Hosius said : " If a Bishop, once condemned, feels so assured of his right, he is willing to be judged anew *in a Council*, let us *if you think it good*, the memory of the Apostle be for us ; let those who have examined the cause write to the Bishop of Rome ; if he thinks proper to order a trial, let him name judges ; if he does not think there is reason to renew the matter, let what he has decided be kept to." This was ordered, with the following explanation suggested also by Hosius :

a Bishop, deposed by the Council of the Province, shall have recourse to the Bishop of Rome, if he judge proper that the matter be examined afresh, he shall write to *the Bishops of the Province* to be *the judges* of it ; and if the deposed Bishop shall desire the Bishop of Rome to send a priest from his own person, he

shall be able to do it, and to send commissioners to judge by his authority, *together with the Bishops* ; but if he believes that the Bishops are sufficient to settle the matter, he will do what his wisdom suggests to him.

Here there is a *total absence* of the slightest hint of absolute appellate power *inherently* belonging to the See of Rome from the beginning. They are introducing a *new thing*—entirely discretionary with the Council:—“ *if you think it good.*” It looks like a merely temporary expedient for troublous times, and not a permanent law: otherwise the name of the then Pope, “Julius,” would hardly have been inserted in the Canon. And it is not properly an *Appeal*, to be heard *at Rome*, by the *Pope himself*, but it was only a new trial, to be made in the locality where the first was held, with fresh Bishops *from the neighborhood* as “judges,” with or without a Roman priest or commissioners sitting and judging *with the rest*. This is a very humble beginning for the enormous fabric of Appellate Power at Rome in Mediæval times !

In the case of Apiarius—a bad priest of an African Diocese, whom the Pope undertook to restore in spite of deposition and excommunication by his own Bishop—the African Church, *and S. Augustine among them*, denied that Rome had any right to interfere. The Pope claimed that the Sardican Canon gave him the right, and his legates insisted that *that* Canon was one of the Canons of the *Council of Nicæa*. The Africans replied that there was no such Canon among *their* copies of the Nicene Canons. They therefore sent to the great *Eastern* Sees, to get authenticated transcripts of the Nicene Canons. And when these showed that there was no such Canon passed by the Council of Nicæa, the Africans utterly and finally *refused* to recognise the Sardican Canon at all. Moreover, they boldly advise the Pope not to send any more “legates” anywhere. They say: “Whoever desires you to *delegate* any of your Clergy to execute your orders, *do not comply*, lest it seem that we are introducing *the pride of secular dominion* into the Church of CHRIST.” Their tone is so manfully inde-

pendent, and thoroughly Anglican, that we cannot forbear a liberal extract, which shall almost close this part of our discussion :

Premising our due regards to you, we earnestly conjure you, that for the future you do not readily admit to a hearing persons coming hence, nor choose to receive to your communion those who have been excommunicated by us, because your Reverence will readily perceive that *this has been prescribed even by the Nicene decree*. For though this seems to be there forbidden in respect of the inferior Clergy, or the Laity, how much more did it will this to be observed in the case of Bishops, lest those who had been suspended from communion in *their own Province* might seem to be restored to communion *hastily or unfitly* by your Holiness. Let your Holiness reject, as is worthy of you, that unprincipled taking shelter with you of Presbyters likewise, and the inferior Clergy, both because *by no Ordinance of the Fathers* hath the *Church of Africa* been *deprived of this authority*, and *the Nicene decrees* have *most plainly committed* not only the Clergy of inferior rank, but *the Bishops themselves*, to *their own Metropolitans*. For they have ordained with great wisdom and justice, that *all matters should be terminated in the places where they arise*; and did not think that the grace of the HOLY SPIRIT would be wanting to *any Province*, for the Priests of CHRIST (*i.e.*, Bishops) wisely to discern, and firmly to maintain, the right: especially since whosoever thinks himself wronged by any judgment, may appeal to the Council of his Province, or even to a General Council [of Africa]: unless it be imagined that GOD *can inspire a single individual* with justice, and *refuse it to an innumerable multitude of Priests* [Bishops] *assembled in Council*. And how shall we be able to rely on a sentence passed beyond the sea, since it will not be possible to send thither the necessary witnesses, whether from the weakness of sex, or advanced age, or any other impediment? For that your Holiness should send *any on your part*, *we can find ordained by no Council of Fathers*.

It is almost impossible to resist quoting the summary of Mr. Allies in regard to this unanswerable case of Apiarius :

As to the whole case of Apiarius, I confess it was not without astonishment that I first read this passage of history; so exactly had the African Bishops, in 426, when *the greatest Father of the Church was one of them* [S. Augustine], anticipated and pleaded the cause of the *English Church* in 1534. It is *precisely the same claim* made in both instances, viz., that these two laws should be observed, on which the stability of the Government of the whole Church Catholic rests; as Thomassin remarks: first, that the action of *the Bishop* in his *own Diocese*, in matters proper to that Diocese, should *not be interfered*

with ; secondly, that the action of *the Metropolitan with his Suffragans* in matters belonging to *his Province* should be *equally free*. Who ever accused the African Bishops, and S. Augustine, of *Schism*, for maintaining a *right* which had *come down to them from all antiquity*, was possessed and acted on *all over the Church*, was specifically enacted at *the greatest Œcumenical Council*, and recognised in *every Provincial Council* held up to that time ? This was all that the Church of England claimed : she based her claim on the *unvarying practice* of the *whole Church*, during, *at least*, the *first six centuries*. I repeat, it is *not* a case of *doubt*, of *conflicting testimony*. . . . It is the Church of the Martyrs, the Church of the Fathers, of Athanasius, Basil, Gregory, and Chrysostom, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, and Gregory the Great, bearing *one unbiassed indisputable witness*, attested in a *hundred councils*, *denied in none*, for the Patriarchal System, and *against* a power assumed by *one Bishop*, though the greatest, most venerable, and most illustrious in his own See, to *interfere*, *dispense with*, *suspend*, or *abrogate* the authority of *the Bishop* in his *Diocese*, and of the *Metropolitan* in his *Council* ; to exercise singly, by himself, powers which belong only to an Œcumenical Council, and to *annul* the *enactments* of at least the *first four Œcumenical Councils*. Had an advocate been instructed to draw out the abstract case of the English Church, he could not have described it more exactly than the African Bishops in stating their own. . . . I do not think it makes at all in favor of the Papal Supremacy that the liberties which the African Church, under S. Aurelius and S. Augustine, so nobly maintained, grounding them at once on the *inherent rights of Bishops*, and on the authority of *the Nicene decrees*, were in process of time wrested from them by the Popes, probably when they were enfeebled by the irruption of the Vandals, and were in greater need of transmarine assistance. I cannot imagine how a *divine right* can be constructed out of a *series of successful encroachments*.

The Sardican Canon did not prevent—what was felt to be a great evil—the recourse to the *Emperor*. Thirty years later, in 378, we read that “a Council of *all* the Bishops of Italy, assembled at Rome, besought *the Emperors*, Gratian and Valentinian, *to issue a general edict*, of which they suggested the terms, in order that Bishops might not for the future be compelled to approach *the Emperor* on every occasion.” Accordingly “a decree was passed *by the Emperors*, that *Pope Damascus*, with a Council of five or seven Bishops, should judge accusations *at Rome*. . . . If the accused were in distant Provinces, the whole cognisance of the cause should belong to the Metropolitan. But if the accused be a Metropolitan, he must of necessity go *to Rome* to be

judged, or take those Bishops for judges whom *the Pope assigns*. If the Metropolitans should happen to be suspected by the accused, they may at their option *appeal to the Roman Pontiff*, or to a Council of fifteen neighboring Bishops." *The Emperors likewise decree* that whatever has been decided by the Roman Pontiff, or by the judges nominated by him, or by the Metropolitan, or likewise by the Council of fifteen Bishops, is to be final, and not to be on any pretext reconsidered.

So far as concerns the right of Metropolitans to judge in their Provincial Councils, this decree would seem to be merely a repetition of the Nicene Canons. The "fifteen neighboring Bishops" are only another form of the old principle, that every case shall be settled in that part of the Church where it arises. But the option of appealing to Rome, and the compelling of Metropolitans to be judged at Rome anyhow, are *quite new*. This new thing is found to rest, however, not on S. Peter, or on inherent right, or ancient custom, or anything of the sort. It is a *novelty*, resting solely on the *decree of the Emperors* Gratian and Valentinian—or, as we might say in modern phrase, an *Act of Parliament*! That Gratian and Valentinian should give coercive *jurisdiction*, in *spiritual causes*, to *the Pope* is all right, but for the Crown to give it to Bishops in *England*, is *all wrong*.

One point more. Monsignor Capel quotes a plausible editorial from the *American Literary Churchman*—a periodical whose editor displays his literary ability and his largeness of mind chiefly in coddling his enemies and abusing his friends. In this editorial, after mentioning the cutting off of "Gnostics, Montanists, Arians, Donatists, and the like," we read: "Later on came the Greek Schism, which was dealt with by a *precisely similar method* and on *precisely similar principles*." And afterward speaking of the Church of England, the editor says: "She is treated exactly like all other bodies that have acted in the same way, and is cut off from the Communion of the Church." And again: "If the Church, as recognized by the whole West, had no right to excommunicate the English, then the United Church

d no right to declare that the East had fallen into schism, and the primitive Church had no right to declare that the Arians had fallen into heresy." There never was a greater mistake, *historically*, than to assert that the Great Schism with the East, and the excommunication of the English Church in the sixteenth century were accomplished "by a precisely similar method, and on precisely similar principles," with the condemnation of the Arians and other early heretics. In *all* the cases of the heretics, their condemnation—their cutting off from the Church—came from the legitimate action of *Councils*—commonly, in the first place, *local*, in that part of the Church where the difficulty arose, and almost invariably *afterward* ratified and confirmed by the action of Œcumenical Councils, as Arianism and other heresies were condemned at the Council of Nicæa. *None* of the ancient bodies of heretics was ever cast out of the Church by the act of the Bishop of Rome alone. An excommunication by the Bishop of Rome *alone* might safely be treated as it *was* treated by S. Cyprian and the African Bishops, by S. Firmilian, S. Basil, S. Theophilus, and others of the Saints and heroes of the Church, with entire disregard. It was the voice of the *collective* Episcopate, in Council assembled, that *alone* had the *power* to cast any out of the Church.

But at the time of the Great Schism between the East and the West *there was no such Council held*. The Pope excommunicated the Patriarch of Constantinople, and *he* returned the compliment in kind; but there was no *Council* on either side. Ffoulkes says (p. 452): "In their formal assemblies, their meetings of the Clergy celebrated in the name of CHRIST and opened with prayer, the conduct of the two Churches [the East and the West] toward each other has been characterised by singular forbearance and amenity. *No Council of the East has ever anathematised the Western Church by name, or any Council of the West the Eastern*. Excommunications were doubtless exchanged between Photius and Nicholas, Michael Cerularius and the legates of Leo IX., in the early part of the quarrel, but particular care was

taken on both sides to *limit the sentence* to the *individuals* who were the objects of it, and to *declare* that it was *intended to go no further*." At the Councils of Lyons and Basle, where reconciliation was attempted, there was never the slightest suggestion that the Orientals were cut off from the Communion of the Catholic Church, and needed to be restored.

In each case (Lyons and Basle), as has been shown conclusively from official statements, the programme for discussion was said to be "the division of the Eastern and Western Church." Each side, therefore, recognized the other at starting as forming part of the Church that was divided so far, and in need of re-union. 'The net of Peter had broken, and wanted mending. Israel and Judah were desirous of keeping the Passover again as one people. . . . Unless, therefore, they met as hypocrites, *they met as equals*, one regarded as much a part of the Church as the other. . . . The Latin Church ranked second in antiquity, the Greek Church in headship. Both sides were fully alive to the strength of their respective claims, and never failed to make the most of them ; otherwise *they met as equals*.

This is totally different from the way in which the Arians were dealt with at the Council of Nicæa ! Indeed, *no* Council short of one truly Œcumenical *could* have undertaken so tremendous a work as the cutting off from the Catholic Church no less than *four* out of the *five* Patriarchates of which it was then composed. And can we conceive of such an utter absurdity as the supposition, that, in an Œcumenical Council, fairly representing all Christendom, a minority of *one-fifth* could have cast out and excommunicated the other *four-fifths* ? —or that such a decree would have been *accepted* and *acknowledged* as binding, by the four-fifths thus proposed to be cut off ? The excommunication of the Pope, therefore, *could* not, and *has* not cut off the Orientals from the Catholic Church, any more than S. Cyprian, S. Theophilus, S. Cyril, and S. Meletius were cut off by another Pope in the days of old, before them. It was not, and *could not possibly have been*, the act of "*the United Church*."

So in the case of the excommunication of the English Church by the Pope. It was *his* act, not that of an

Œcumenical Council, and, therefore, belongs precisely in the same class as the case of the Orientals. Neither the "method" nor the "principles" are identical in *any* sense, with those of the Œcumenical Councils against the ancient heretics.

Another point needs also to be taken into account. In the ancient Councils, whether Provincial or General, no sentence of excommunication was *ever* launched against an entire Diocese or a whole Province; much less a whole group of Provinces, thus including in one condemnation multitudes who had given no personal adhesion to error. "An heretic, after the first and second admonition reject," is the injunction of S. Paul. None but obstinate *individuals* were ever excommunicated by *Councils*. Any excommunication of whole countries, and entire Branches of the Church must, from the nature of the case itself, be null and void.

The Church of England has never retaliated the excommunication of the Bishop of Rome in any manner whatever. On the contrary, she has, in her Canon XXX. distinctly declared that "so far was it from the purpose of the Church of England to forsake and reject the Churches of Italy, France, Spain, Germany, or any such like Churches, in all things which they held and practised, that, as the Apology of the Church of England confesseth, it doth with reverence retain those ceremonies which do neither endamage the Church of God, nor offend the minds of sober men; and *only* departed from them in those particular points, wherein they were fallen both *from themselves in their ancient integrity*, and from *the Apostolical Churches*, which were their first founders." The Church is, in Holy Scripture, compared to a House. In this House there are many apartments, all under the same roof, and we may regard each Branch of the Church as occupying its own apartment. There may be quarrels among them, so that they refuse social intercourse with one another, and may even nail up the doors of communication between them; but no one of them can turn all the rest out of the House! Monsignor asks of us: "Why are they angered when individ-

uals leave the Protestant Episcopal Branch to perch on the Roman?" Yet no twig can be cut from one branch, even to be grafted on another of the same tree, without leaving a wound behind. And especially is this wound felt when the avowed reason given for leaving is, that the deserted Branch is declared to be no part of the Tree at all. He asks, again, whether "the Unity now presented by the 'Branch Theory' in any way resembles the Unity in the Trinity?" To which we reply that it resembles it quite as closely as the Roman Unity, which—as his edition of "The Faith of Catholics" has told us—permits the "liberty" of entertaining "*discordant notions*" on points "avowedly undefined by the voice of the Church." He asks, also, "How could the same individuals reasonably hold and practise 'Romanism,' 'Anglicanism,' 'Photianism,' travelling six months successively to Rome, London, and Constantinople?" To which we reply that if Monsignor Capel, "coming," as he tells us, "with commendatory letters from Cardinal Simeoni, Prefect of the Propaganda, to the Bishops, and exercising the ministry with the approbation and authority of the respective Ordinaries," thus "*prima facie* giving the assurance that his teaching is *Catholic*,"—if he can publish here in America, now, that "It is *no article of the Catholic Faith* to believe that *the Pope is, in himself infallible*, separated from the Church, *even in expounding the Faith*," even when the Vatican Council has decreed *the contrary*; we do not see why any one holding the *ancient Catholic Faith* might not be admitted to communion equally in Rome, London, and Constantinople, be his "private opinions" about Romanism, Anglicanism, and Photianism what they may.

One other part of Monsignor's case our limits compel us to dismiss more briefly than we should like. It might easily occupy a volume by itself. It refers to the history of the Church in England, before and after the Reformation. In "Catholic," after mentioning handsomely the *Magna Charta* (by the way, he utterly forgets to tell us

how the Pope declared *that* to be "null and void," and what his excommunication of those who won it amounted to), he gives this charming general description of the ante-Reformation period: "Church and State grew side by side in harmony, rendering mutual aid, and formed 'Merrie England.' So was it until the accession of the Tudors, under whom a mighty and radical change was effected." What sort of "history" can Monsignor have been reading? For some hundreds of years before the Reformation it had been the *law of the land* that no prelate could even leave England to visit the Pope without first getting the King's permission; and no Bull or other official document could lawfully be brought into England except by the King's leave; nor could *any* appeal to Rome be lawfully made except by the sanction of the King. Moreover, there was an express *prohibition* that any one should receive or acknowledge any Legate sent by the Pope, and there was no reservation of *any* power in the King to dispense with this law. The terrible penalties of *Præmunire* were provided against all who should violate this Act, including the forfeiture of *all* lands and goods to the King. All these Acts were on the statute-book *before* the Tudors ascended the throne. Now, Henry VIII. had actually procured the legatine power for Wolsey, both of them knowing that it was against the law, and that the King had no power to dispense with the obligation of that law. Wolsey doubtless supposed that there was honor enough in the King to prevent him from taking advantage of his own wrong. But he found out his mistake! When the King changed his policy, he had the *whole realm* at his mercy—*by law*. He cunningly exercised the Royal power of *pardon*, so far as the *laity* were concerned, *at once*; and they, grateful for his mercy, were ready enough to join him in squeezing the clergy, who, *as a body*, had—by law—forfeited all their lands and goods to the King, besides being at his mercy for anything further. The clergy of no kingdom has ever been caught in so terrible a trap as that! They were willing enough to pay about *five millions* of dollars of our

money to save the rest of their property; and, besides that, no pressure of tyranny on the part of the absolute King could induce them to recognise his supremacy, except "so far as the law of CHRIST allows." But the entire machinery for this tremendous pressure was provided *in the days of "Merrie England."*

The power of the Kings, too, in selecting the persons who were to be consecrated Archbishops, or Bishops, or even Abbots of the greater monasteries, was for many reigns exercised, as a matter of course, without recurrence to the Popes in anywise previous to their consecration or installation. This power was also exercised by the Kings of France and Spain, and by the Emperor of Germany. Indeed, even after the Emperor Henry IV. had been declared *deposed* by the Pope, he nominated Bruno as Archbishop of Treves, and he was consecrated—no "confirmation" or permission being given by the Pope; nor was any fault found with him at Rome for this, although he was censured for other things.* The removal of obnoxious Bishops from their sees was also a common exertion of Royal power; and one King of England actually beheaded an Archbishop of York as a traitor, without asking leave of the Pope. He was the same King, too, in whose reign was passed the Act concerning the Burning of Heretics—an Act which should never be forgotten in describing "Merrie England." The foundation for the worst abuses of power during the Reformation period was laid in the legislation of the preceding centuries. And the most barbarous relic of that period, which still remains on the statute-book—the Act of *Præmunire*—while it is a shame to the legislation of England, may be excused on the ground that, *since the Reformation*, there has been no attempt to put it in force against anybody. It was quite a lively Act *before!*

As to the undue preponderance of the civil power in some things, we have no defence to make, except only that it has never been such as to kill the Divine life of

* Bossuet, *Defensio*, etc., Lib. III., Cap. vi.

the Church. If there are hardships to be borne for a while, so have there been in other parts of the Church, and in other ages. As to appeals, let us look at a Roman case, in the time of Constantine. The Donatists—contrary to the Canons—carried their case to “the Churches across the sea.” They appealed to the Emperor, who “*delegated* the discussion and terminating of it to Bishops.” Now we have heard about the Court of Delegates in England, that, though it might be composed of Bishops, yet as they were delegated by the Crown, they had no power of jurisdiction except such as the Crown could give. Well, here is the Emperor doing the same thing! and one of his delegates is Melchiades, Bishop of Rome! Only think of a Pope being *delegated by an Emperor* to hear a case of appeal in a matter of *schism*! But even the Emperor did not delegate the case to the Pope *alone*, but to “many of his colleagues with him.” After they had decided, the losing party, still dissatisfied, appeal again, and “yet, a second time, the *most indulgent Emperor assigned other Bishops as judges*, at Arles, in Gaul.” This is stranger yet! An appeal, once settled by the Pope with his Council, is carried up to a much larger Synod of Bishops, at Arles, in Gaul!—and this by order of the *Emperor*! When the Donatists were condemned again there, they still persisted in appealing “to the *Emperor himself*,” and “*he, too, heard the cause*, and pronounced Cæcilianus innocent, and them false accusers.” So there was an appeal from the Pope and his Council to a much larger Council, and a further appeal from that larger Council to the *Emperor*, who gave the *final* decision. And the *Emperor* had “delegated” both the previous appeals to the Bishops who heard them! And this, too, when the said Emperor was not even a baptised man! Did the existence of courts like these prove that there was *no* spiritual jurisdiction in the Bishop of Rome, or any other Bishops, except what they received from *the Emperor*? Did such trials as these prove that the Church of Rome was, in those days, deprived of every shred of Divine jurisdiction? If not, how can cases

much less strong prove any such thing in regard to the Church of England?

There are many other tempting points which Monsignor offers to us, but we have already much exceeded our limits, and must close. Our authorities have been taken almost exclusively from Romish writers—Bossuet, Thomassin, De Marca, Tillemont, Ffoulkes, Hefele—and most freely from that Mr. Allies whom Monsignor commends to our special confidence. We have omitted *ten times* as much as we have quoted; but probably the reader will think that we have given enough!

We have *demonstrated* that to be out of communion with the Pope of Rome is *not* the same thing as to be out of the Catholic Church.

We have *demonstrated* that the Apostolic Succession is *certain*; and that the Papal succession is *uncertain* or rather, on their own theory, *impossible*.

We have *demonstrated* that the Church is founded upon *the Bishops collectively*, and not upon the Pope.

We have *demonstrated* that the strong phrases about the *Primacy* of Rome, do not prove the *Supremacy*.

We have *demonstrated* that phrases equally strong, about other Bishops, are *not* interpreted as proving a *Supremacy in them*.

We have *demonstrated* that the ancient and Œcumenical Canons secure to the Provincial Councils, without *any* action of the Pope, the *entire* work of consecrating Bishops.

We have *demonstrated* that the Pope had *no part* in giving jurisdiction to any Bishops outside of his own immediate Provinces.

We have *demonstrated* that the Pope had no canonical power of disciplining Bishops or others, outside of his own immediate Provinces.

We have *demonstrated* that there was nothing even resembling the right to order a new trial, before the Sardican Canon was passed.

We have *demonstrated* that the first real power of hearing appeals *at Rome*, was granted by *the Emperors* at the request of the Pope and his Italian Council; that

request being an open acknowledgment that the Civil authority had *power* to *grant* the Spiritual jurisdiction *asked for*.

We have *demonstrated*, out of the writings of Popes themselves, that the Canons are as binding upon *them* as upon any others; and that those same Canons shall so continue "*till the end of the world*."

We have *demonstrated* the difference between excommunication by a Pope, and excommunication by Councils.

We have *demonstrated* that divisions *in* the Church are one thing, and being cut off from the Church is a very different thing.

We have also *demonstrated*—in a few particulars—what sort of a "Merrie England" they had before the Reformation.

And especially, we have *demonstrated*, from "The Faith of Catholics," published by Monsignor Capel himself, that it "*is certain*" that a belief in the infallibility of the Pope "*is not* an essential term of Communion;" that whether it belongs to the deposit of Faith or not, is left to "the private opinions of individuals;" that ever so many bulls of ever so many Popes may be thrown overboard by any Catholic, on the ground that "both Scripture and History testify against" the doctrine taught in them "being either a term of communion or a revealed truth;" that the Infallibility of the Pope is one of the "points *avowedly undefined* by the voice of the Church;" and that therefore "the opinions of men" have "liberty" for the "discordant notions" that have been entertained. All of which will be great news at Rome! What will "His Eminence Cardinal Simeoni,"

I. H. HOPKINS.

DOCTOR JOHN FULTON TO MONSIGNOR CAPEL.

MONSIGNOR AND BROTHER IN CHRIST:—When your Pamphlet entitled “Catholic, etc.,” was issued from the press, I was lying at the point of death in an illness from which I did not recover for several weeks. Before I could resume my usual work several more weeks elapsed in the weary process of convalescence, and, since then, the exacting duties of a parish priest have occupied my whole time. These circumstances will account for the fact that, until within a day or two, I had not read, nor even seen the interesting monograph in which you have done me the honor to refer to an imperfectly reported speech of mine, as if such an expression of my personal opinion were decisive of something more than my private personal opinion. But for the cause above named it is almost certain that I should have read your pamphlet, and it is possible that I might have replied to it long ago; for I have learned from the Rev. Dr. Hopkins and others that he and I, having been both named as persons who might properly notice the address which you had made to our Church, he promptly declined the task in my favor, and was subsequently induced to comment upon some parts of your *brochure* only on hearing that my life was despaired of.

Sometimes, since I have heard of this, I have wondered whether I should have ventured to assume the responsibility of the task which might thus have been laid upon me. A far better known and more competent person might well have hesitated to lift the gauntlet of so renowned a champion as yourself at a time when

your appearance could have been caused by no ordinary necessity. Great men are not brought out on slight occasions. Some important cause must have existed to induce a "Domestic Prelate of His Holiness, Leo XIII., happily reigning," to forsake the pious culture of that august soul in order to engage in controversy with the youngest and least learned of all Catholic Churches. Something like a crisis must be supposed to exist when a "Member of the Roman Congregation of the Segnatura" (whatever that is) abandons his post to occupy himself in the conversion or confusion of a handful of "Protestant Episcopalians." That a "Priest of the Arch-diocese of Westminster" should transfer himself to a country in which he has no commission implies the existence of a necessity so great in his opinion as to justify a disregard of the ancient Catholic canons which require all ecclesiastics to confine themselves to the Dioceses to which they canonically belong. Can it be possible that the accession of so many hundreds of Romanists in Louisiana and other parts of the United States to our Communion has excited alarm both at Rome and at Westminster? Surely nothing short of a profound sense of duty could have induced you to place yourself in a position which indicates the existence of some grave emergency, and which, to say the least, implies no compliment to the authorities and theologians of your Church in this country. It is interesting to observe that there exists both among the Clergy and among the laity of your Church here an intensity of national feeling, even in their Church affairs, which is very remarkable considering the invariable aim of Rome to uproot the nationality of Churches which obey her. The Propaganda sends us any number of foreign priests, but in ten years' time those very priests have become Americans; and, while they maintain "the Supremacy of Peter" and all that, they are not by any means so fond of Roman things and Roman ways as their education might lead you to suppose. Some years ago I was startled to hear a distinguished Roman Catholic clergyman "thank God he was an American

Catholic and not an Italian Catholic." Just how he could be a *Roman* Catholic without being an *Italian* Catholic was not perhaps quite obvious, but his meaning was clear enough, nevertheless. He meant to say that the ways of your Church in this country are more Catholic and more Christian than they are where Rome has more complete sway than she can have here. In this I believe he was entirely right. American Roman Catholics do not seem to be too proud of the observations which they make when they visit the "Mother and Mistress of all Churches." Therefore, the holding of national councils of your Church in the United States is grateful both to their love of country and to their love of religion; and by innumerable signs they show that the intervention in American affairs of any foreign priest, not sent by the Holy Father, and not belonging to any of the established Orders, is not regarded with complacency. When controversy is in order, it is to be supposed that they conceive themselves to be as competent to persuade or to confound neighbors with whose modes of thought they are conversant as any stranger possibly can be; and they are not to be blamed if they are of the opinion that it is for them, and not for strangers to designate the times at which controversy should be deemed to be in order. The truth is that in your Church, and indeed among all the Christian people of the United States, controversies among Christians seem by common consent to have been adjourned until a more convenient season than the present. All devout men are appalled at the rising flood of materialistic atheism with which we are threatened, and all earnest men find their energies taxed to the utmost in repelling this common enemy of all religion and of all morality. For example, the Fathers of the Society of Jesus in this city, than whom no abler controversialists are to be found anywhere, are not devoting their splendid abilities and massive learning to the confounding of the faith of their Protestant neighbors, but are more nobly earning the thanks of their fellow-Christians by their masterly grappling with the scientific infidelity

which is so prevalent and so ensnaring. The good work they are doing is cordially recognised by Christian people of every name ; and if their course is prompted by any other cause than that which appears on the surface, it must be admitted by the bitterest of their enemies that the success of their propagandism is as successful as it is adroitly veiled. It is not by controversy that the Archbishop of Saint Louis has earned and gained the high place which he holds in the affectionate honor of all classes of his fellow-citizens. It is by "pureness, by knowledge, by long-suffering, by kindness, by the HOLY GHOST, by love unfeigned, by the word of truth, by the power of GOD, by the armor of righteousness on the right hand and on the left,"—it is by these and by such as these that the "ministers of GOD approve themselves" and win men's love for their cause. To me it costs no pang to recognise these sacred virtues wheresoever they are found, and I rejoice to think that it is perhaps because they are abounding more and more among your priests and prelates in this country that the love of controversy seems to have grown less and less among them. Of the fact that acrimonious controversy has declined there is no doubt ; and you must have felt yourself impelled by some imperious necessity, or you would not have tacitly rebuked the priests and prelates of your Church here by inaugurating or renewing a contest in which they, in their wisdom, have not seen fit to be engaged at this time.

It is part of the responsibility assumed by him who opens a controversy that he lays upon the other side a moral compulsion to take up the challenge, or virtually to confess defeat. True, it is not to every one that such power would be conceded ; but to a Prelate so distinguished in both hemispheres it cannot be denied. *Your* challenge confers an honor and demands a reply. Hence, if any general judgment of my equals, or any request of my ecclesiastical superiors had assigned to me the duty of replying to your tractate, however keenly I might have felt the danger and the responsibility of engaging with an adversary of your world-wide reputation, yet I

should not have declined the task assigned me. Theology after all is a department of letters; in the republic of letters it is not men's names or titles that count, but their facts and arguments; and in the kingdom of truth neither do the men count, nor their titles, nor their arguments, but the facts alone. Hence, if I had been called to repel your assault upon our Church, I should have depended upon facts, and very little upon the force of argument. In your *brochure* you have taken a different course, choosing and limiting the ground of your attack with great skill, handling your theme with the ease of an accomplished rhetorician, and perverting some facts, while ignoring others, with a calm content which shows how little facts concern you in the conduct of an argument. Undesignedly, I doubt not, your reference to my speech in the General Convention has applied to it a meaning which is very far from that which I had in making it. Some disclaimer of the interpretation which you have so publicly put upon it seems to me and to my friends to be due to truth. As I would not, however, intrude upon your notice for so slight a matter only, and as it is possible that, without some insight into the temper and habit of thought which prevails in the minds of many of us, you would hardly be able to understand the true convictions of men belonging to our Church who speak as I spoke, I will take the liberty to tell you in outline, and in outline only, how I should have set about my reply to you. As my method would have been radically different from that of Dr. Hopkins and not less different from that of Mr. Greaves, it may serve to show you that there are many ways in which your brilliant attack might have been met and perhaps repelled.

I.

1. At the outset I should have pointed out to you that the facts to be considered would not admit of the limitation implied in the choice of ground which you have so shrewdly made. It is true, as you say, that "Catho-

licity" is "an essential and exclusive attribute of the true Church;" but it is not exclusively so. There are other equally essential attributes of the true Church apart from which the question of Catholicity cannot be rightly or profitably considered. The Catholic Church, in a document which neither you nor I will dispute, has declared the notes of the true Church to be not only Catholicity, but also *Unity*, *Sanctity*, and *Apostolicity*. I could never have consented to dismiss the note of Unity with less than fifteen lines, and the note of Sanctity with less than fourteen lines of mere assertion, as you have done. Least of all could I have consented to pass by the note of Apostolicity without one single line of consideration. I should, therefore, have insisted that these three must of necessity be brought into the ground of debate; and then I should have undertaken to show that the Church of Rome is too seriously lacking in all of the four notes of a true Church to entitle her to summon us to surrender to her vaunted superiority. For I should have undertaken further to show that the Anglican Church, since her happy escape from Roman domination, has been more clearly possessed of every one of these four notes of a true Church than Rome is now of any one of them. Such a discussion must contain many painful references, but for these you would have been responsible; and, of course, you would not shrink from the responsibility to which you have called yourself.

2. The *unity* of the Church in the Apostles' days is described in these words: "And they" (*i.e.*, the whole number of the baptised) "continued steadfastly in the Apostles' doctrine and fellowship, and in the breaking of bread, and in prayers." In other words, to receive the doctrine of the Apostles, to seek communion with them, and to join in their fellowship of public worship, entitled every baptised Christian to be included in the Unity of the Church; and to refuse communion with him would have been a breach of Unity. No ordinance of CHRIST or of His Apostles has ever abrogated this fundamental law of Catholic Unity. What shall be said, then, of the test of Unity applied to the Church of Rome

which would reject from her Communion to-day every man who was baptised by the Apostles themselves, unless he would submit to regulations and profess to believe doctrines of which there is not a particle of evidence that the Apostles ever heard or ever thought? The Unity of the Church is always perfect; it cannot include more at one time and less at another; it always includes all who rightly belong to it; so that a man who is a saint to-day cannot, *without change in himself*, be a heretic to-morrow. What, then, shall be said of the Unity of the Church of Rome, which would to-day expel from her Communion S. Bernard, who was justly called "the last of the Fathers," unless he would recant his letter to the Canons of Lyons, in which he declared the modern doctrine of the Immaculate Conception to be without foundation in Holy Scripture, Catholic tradition or human reason? Again, the note of Catholic Unity at least implies that the Church, in whose behalf it is claimed, has not been historically conspicuous in the creation of schism. But will any one, having the facts before him, pretend to say that Rome was not responsible for the contemptible squabbles concerning local jurisdiction which led to the great schism between the East and the West? It is a pregnant fact that Rome is not to-day in visible communion with any one of the other ancient Patriarchates any more than with England. When that gigantic breach of Catholic Unity shall have been repaired, but not till then, may the Roman Church begin to claim the essential note of Unity. Again, you boast complacently of the unity of faith and morals which prevails among you; but the boast is ill-sustained by facts. On what is the Jesuit doctrine of *probabilism* based but on the confessed fact that your doctors of moral theology maintain doctrines touching every possible human obligation which are not only diverse but reciprocally destructive? And in the matter of Faith, silence does not always signify assent. Nay, it is well understood that the Bishops who denounced the Infallibilists of the Vatican Council as "an insolent, aggressive faction," and who have since that time "assented"

to the action of the Council, draw a quite clear distinction between *assenting* and *defining*. The silence of the large and distinguished minority of the Vatican Council since the promulgation of its ill-omened decree is not an evidence of Unity or of moral unanimity, but of tyrannous oppression. *Solitudinem facitis; pacem appellatis!* Rome plants her heel upon men's hearts, and intellects, and consciences; and calls upon the world to magnify her Unity!

3. As touching the note of *Sanctity* in connection with your Church, it would not have been necessary to rake up the scandalous lives of infamous Popes and Prelates. There is, indeed, a sorrowful abundance of such; and the inference would be but reasonable that a Church ruled by infamous Pontiffs cannot at the same time be conspicuous for Sanctity. To no such painful facts in the history of your Communion would it be needful to refer in detail; but that your Church shall be judged by her consistent corporate action and by her approved doctrinal standards, or, in other words, by her *system*, is too manifestly just to admit of reasonable objection. To these, therefore, I should have confined myself. Now, if Cæsar's wife ought to be above suspicion, much more ought the Bride of CHRIST to be utterly *chaste* in word as well as work; and yet you would hardly venture to deny what I am far within bounds in asserting, namely, that in the writings of some of your moral theologians, and particularly in the works of one who has been honored with the most emphatic approval that it is in power of the See of Rome to give, there are doctrines so shocking to the most elementary conceptions of morality, that merely to read them inspires both shame and disgust. It is not easy to imagine how a Church which permits and approves such teaching can be notable for Sanctity. "Not that which goeth into the mouth of a man defileth a man, but that which cometh out of the mouth, this defileth the man." This saying of our SAVIOUR will apply to the teaching of Churches as well as to the conversation of individuals. No *pure* spring can vomit filth. But to leave this point, I maintain the thesis that t'

Roman system of compulsory sacerdotal celibacy virtually bargains for a constant, though irregular quantity of clerical unchastity (and necessarily of lay unchastity along with it), the amount of which can never be known. We have the authority of our LORD Himself for saying that the power of continence is a gift which is not conferred on all men. It follows, therefore, that in any given class of men compelled to abstain from marriage there must reasonably be expected an amount of open or secret incontinence which will vary with times and circumstances, but which will rarely be absent from such a class of men. I cheerfully and thankfully admit the generally and deservedly high reputation of your clergy in all Protestant countries; but in most Latin countries now, and throughout the world before the Reformation, the whole history of compulsory clerical celibacy is one long, sorrowful, and utterly shameful confirmation of the inference which follows from our SAVIOUR'S words. And yet, in the face of this abundantly attested record, and in face of the fact that S. Peter himself, and probably all the other Apostles except SS. Paul and Barnabas, were married men, the Church of Rome, for the sake of certain obvious economical advantages, imperiously condemns her clergy to the temptations of a compulsory celibacy, and calmly accepts the varying percentage of incontinence which must attend her unnatural system. I venture next to affirm that the law and practice of the Roman Church concerning marriage have been and still are a shame and a scandal to all Christendom. In this assertion I have no reference to that long period of the middle age when preposterous regulations of the Church's enactment rendered it impossible for any man to be certain that his marriage was not incestuous or that his children were lawfully begotten. I freely admit that the Fourth Lateran Council removed a large part of that scandal which had become utterly intolerable; and that the Council of Trent carried the needed work of reform very much further. It is conceivable that a future council may hereafter perfect the work of Trent *on paper*; but what will be the use of it, if Rome continues to

claim, and daily to exercise a right to nullify *all* legislation on the subject by her system of dispensations to break the Church's most solemn law, such dispensations being unblushingly bought and sold at a fixed schedule price according to their enormity? What is the use now of the Canon of Trent forbidding a man to marry *the widow of his third cousin*, when he can obtain a dispensation from Rome permitting him to marry not only such a remote relative by affinity, but even his own aunt? What is the use of having any canonical impediments to marriage when any or all of them can be set aside "*pro certis rationalibus causis*," that is, according to one of your most eminent authorities on the subject, *for no cause in the world* except that Rome happens to have a particular reason for obliging some person to whom the laws of GOD and of the Church are irksome? That these flagrant facts are a grief and a shame to some of your most eminent Bishops cannot be unknown to you; and how a Church which thus unblushingly sells for money its license to violate the sacred laws of marriage can justly claim for itself the note of special Sanctity you would not find it easy to show. But chastity is not the only virtue included in the note of Sanctity; *Charity*, which is greater than either Faith or Hope, cannot be left out of it. Cruelty and sanctity are not compatible. A cruel Church cannot be a holy Church; and the Roman Church has been the cruelest Church in Christendom. It will not do to say that the horrors of the Inquisition were the hideous work of a semi-barbarous age; for it is the boast of Rome that she is "*semper eadem*" and that she cannot change. It is assuredly the fact that in this particular she has not changed. The Inquisition was of her creation. It was maintained with all her power. Its atrocities did not cease until this present century, nor then with Rome's consent. Its horrible principles have never been repudiated. On the contrary, they were emphatically re-enunciated by Pius IX. in his famous "Syllabus," less than twenty years ago. I learn that you yourself have quite recently been lecturing in defence of the Inquisition and its principles.

I cannot wonder at that; for whenever and wherever they shall have the power, it will be the duty of Roman Catholics, according to the "Syllabus" of an infallible Pope, to restore the Inquisition and return to the good old way of mercifully burning heretics to death, so as "to prevent the effusion of blood!" And the Church which invented, and which declares that it would still, if it dared, employ this frightful hypocrisy of cruelty claims before God and man a special character of *sanctity*! *Proh pudor!*

4. In the matter of *Apostolicity* the Church of Rome has done its best to destroy all but the bare name of the thing. It is not possible for any writer of your Church to discuss the subject without virtually refuting his own argument. You, in your late tractate, have conspicuously done so. It is true that you maintain the ordinary Roman interpretation of Our LORD's figurative saying "Thou art Peter," etc., but the very moment you begin to appeal to the facts of Apostolic history, your theory begins to fall to pieces. However it may suit the Papacy of Pius IX., there is nothing like it to be found in the Acts of the Apostles. *There* we find the Apostolate acting on occasion as a *College*, and then not under the presidency of S. Peter, but of S. James, who occupied the See in which the Apostles were convened. In their several spheres the Apostles of the New Testament story were equals. Not only is there no evidence that any one of them exercised authority over the rest, but we have S. Paul's indignant declaration that he would not have submitted to such a claim, if it had been preferred, "no, not for an hour!" In your tractate you repeatedly tell about "the Apostles," but the unconscious *naiveté* with which you transfer to S. Peter alone, and through S. Peter to the Pope alone, all that the New Testament, according to your own showing, ascribes to "the Apostles" is a singular but most significant admission that in the Church which you represent the Apostolate has no place, except so far as the functions of the entire Apostolic College have been usurped by the Papacy. In terms you affirm that the Episcopate "represents"

the Apostolate ; but in your theory of the Church, as in the actual Church of Rome, the Episcopate has no place corresponding to the place of the Apostolate in Apostolic times.*

Moreover, it would be easy to show that nothing in the history of the Papacy has been more conspicuous than its consistent degradation of the Episcopate in theory and in practice :—in theory, by teaching that it is an office of the Priesthood, rather than the Order which confers the Priesthood ; and in practice, both by reducing the Bishops to the position of mere Vicars at will of the Roman Pontiff ; and, as at the Vatican Council, by subjecting all the genuine Bishops of the Roman Obedience to a horde of fictitious Bishops of defunct Sees, mere creatures of

* After writing these last sentences I had some fears lest my language might be too strong, and I was about to modify them accordingly, when I discovered in your "Rejoinder" to Dr. Hopkins the following passage, in which my words are more than justified with a simplicity which is truly admirable :

"Christ has established two indestructible elements in his Church :

"(1.) The Apostolate, consisting in universal jurisdiction derived directly from Christ.

"(2.) The One Episcopate, exercising corporate jurisdiction in the whole world.

"The first resides in the Successor of S. Peter, who is, therefore, the Supreme Governor, the Supreme Teacher of the Church, with whom there must be communion in order to be in the Visible Organic Body, the Fold of Christ.

"The second resides in the body of Bishops, conjointly, who thus together represent the Apostolic College, each Bishop not having a share of the Episcopate, but a part in it. The Episcopal jurisdiction is plainly subordinate to the Apostolate."

In this brief passage you set forth a theory to which I imagine not all of your divines would be willing to subscribe. It includes these plain admissions, not to insist on any corollaries which must flow from them.

(1.) You admit that in the Roman Church there are *no Apostles*. Whereupon one might fairly ask why you appeal to the New Testament to show the commission which Christ gave "to the Apostles whom He had chosen."

(2.) The Apostolate, according to your theory, now exists in the Roman Church only in the Popes as successors of S. Peter. Under which head one is reminded of a certain saying of our Lord : "Were there not *ten* cleansed ? but where are the nine ?" What has become of the rest of "the Apostles ?" When, where, how, and by whom were they abolished ?

(3.) The Apostolate, you think, *consists* in the universal jurisdiction of one Bishop over all the rest ; which is singularly unlike the jurisdiction exercised by "the Apostles" over Peter, when "*they* sent" SS. Peter and John on a particular mission to Samaria.

(4.) You frankly avow that the Episcopate of the Roman Church *is not* the Apostolate. It is not for us to deny an assertion of the truth of which you ought to be better informed than we ; and yet one wonders how the Episcopate of the Roman Church can confer the Apostolate on a man by admitting him to the Episcopate. If you, Right Reverend Sir, were to be elected by the Conclave of Cardinals to the Popedom, you would be forthwith consecrated to the office of a Bishop by the hands of Bishops. Precisely how your admission to the Episcopal Order could invest you with the Apostolate, unless Bishops are Apostles, is not apparent.

the Court of Rome, supported by a number of mitred monks who are destitute of even the poor pretence of a spurious Episcopate. But, were we to admit that any Church can have the right to subject the Apostolic College to a single member of it, how does the attitude of the Papacy compare with the Apostolic bearing and demeanor of S. Peter? That he was chief among his equals nobody denies; that he ever claimed to be supreme among them no witness of antiquity affirms. His style of address was unaffectedly simple:—"the elders which are among you I exhort, *who am also an elder*." Such was the style of "the Prince of the Apostles," and his conduct was answerable thereto. For, when the Centurion Cornelius cast himself at the feet of the Apostle, and would have paid him the exaggerated worship of oriental reverence, S. Peter rejected the intended honor. "Stand up," were his words, "I myself also am a man." In phrase it is true that the Pope equals the humility of Peter when he calls himself "*servus servorum Dei*;" but is the papal ceremonial answerable thereto when the Pope is exalted upon the Altar of God, and the prostrate Cardinals are compelled to pay him the homage of adoration? * S. Peter mildly submitted to be rebuked by the youngest of the Apostolic College, who "withstood him to the face because he was to be blamed." Do you think that fidelity to the Faith committed to him would have permitted S. Peter to submit to censure in the presence

* Do you think S. Peter would ever have permitted this blasphemous prayer to be made to him?

"Sanctissime et Beatissime Pater, Caput ecclesiæ, Rector Orbis, . . . cui **claves Regni Cœlorum** sunt commissæ, quem Angeli in cœlis reverentur, portæ inferorum timent, totusque mundus adorat, nos Te unice veneramus, colimus et adoramus, et nos omniaque nostra paternæ et plusquam divinæ dispositioni ac curæ submittimus."

How does that sound in English, Monsignor? Let us see.

"O most holy and blessed Father, Head of the Church, Ruler of the World, . . . to whom the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven have been committed, whom the Angels in Heaven revere (before whom) the gates of Hell are afraid, and whom the whole universe adores, we venerate Thee supremely, we worship and adore Thee, and to thy paternal, and more than divine care and disposal we commit ourselves and all that is ours."

Monsignor, if any one had ever addressed such blasphemy to S. Peter, he would have said, as the Master once said to himself: "Get thee hence, Satan, for thou savorest not of the things which be of God." "Stand up, for I also am a man!" "Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and Him only shalt thou serve."

of his subordinates if he had supposed himself to be possessed of the infallibility claimed for the Roman Pontiff by the Vatican Council? "When the Apostles which were at Jerusalem heard that Samaria had received the word of God (through the preaching of Philip) *they sent* unto them Peter and John," and S. Peter went with S. John on the errand assigned to them by the authority of their brethren. Thus did the conduct of S. Peter prove that he was willing to be, and not merely to be called, a servant of the servants of God; but how does that conduct compare with the pretensions of the Popes to the allegiance and obedience of all other Bishops? There is no comparison between them. It is a case of contrast; and so flagrant is the contrast, that, in view of that alone, one might be content to leave it, together with your consistent degradation of the Episcopate, as sufficient objections to any high claim on behalf of Rome to the attribute of Apostolicity.

4. And so, at length, omitting a hundred points which might be named, and entering into no elaboration of the few which have been mentioned, I might have consented to take up the note of *Catholicity*, to some few elements of which you have chosen to call the special attention of our Communion. As might have been expected from a writer of your eminence, you have not enlarged on the imaginary Catholicity of statistical majorities. Between men of ordinary information, to say nothing of professed theologians, there is no need to do more than exchange snuff-boxes (with a harmless regret that such an exchange is uncanonical) while people, whose time is of no use to them, discuss the Catholicity of arithmetic and geography. Yet time and space have necessarily some connection with Catholicity in a world like ours; and the genuine signs of that Catholicity which you rightly describe as "an essential and exclusive attribute of the true Church," are included in the well-known rule of S. Vincent, "*semper, ubique, ab omnibus*," to which you have too briefly referred; so that, whatever is said to be Catholic, must be proved to have at least existed in all ages of the Church, and that with universal moral una-

nimity of consent or allowance. Lacking any one of these three evidences of Catholicity, a doctrine or practice may be true in the one case, or it may be lawful in the other, but it cannot be justly called Catholic; to adhere to it may be no sign either of heresy or of schism; but to reject or discard it, cannot possibly involve a forfeiture of Catholicity. This is the plain, natural sense of the dictum of the Roman Catholic S. Vincent of Lerins. Let us apply it, in the matter of doctrine only, without carrying the investigation further in this connection.

5. Let me ask you to read the following decree of the greatest of all the Synods of the undivided Catholic Church, by which you and we to-day are equally bound. At the assembly of the six hundred and thirty Bishops who composed the Œcumenical Council of Chalcedon, it was found to be sufficient to the complete refutation of the Eutychian heresy that it should be compared with the plain words of the Nicene Symbol, and the more complete formula of the Council of Constantinople. Thereupon, after the reading of both these documents, and after an explicit condemnation of the heresy of Eutyches, the Fathers united in the following decree:

These things, then, having been expressed by us with all possible precision and carefulness, The Holy and Œcumenical Synod decrees that it is not lawful for any man to propose, or compile, or compose, or hold, or teach to others, any different Faith. But those who presume to compose a different Faith, or to propagate, or teach, or deliver a different Formula to persons desirous of turning to the knowledge of the truth from heathenism, or Judaism, or any heresy whatsoever, if they be Bishops or clergymen, shall be deposed, Bishops from the Episcopate, and clergymen from the clergy; and if they be monks or laymen, they shall be anathematised.

Right Reverend Sir, this decree of an undisputed General Council is to-day the unrepealed Constitutional law of the Catholic Church of CHRIST; and every Church which bears the Catholic name must be prepared to show that she is not justly liable to the sentence of excommunication pronounced upon all who, under any circumstances, shall presume to impose, as conditions of communion, any doctrines except such alone as are

clearly involved in the Nicæno-Constantinopolitan symbol. Most assuredly a Church which arrogates to itself the exclusive attribute of Catholicity, ought at least to be able to show that it has not been excommunicated from the Catholic Church.

Now, unless the decree of Chalcedon is merely a dead letter, every Bishop and clergyman of the Roman Church who has been morally responsible for her innumerable additions to the Faith, is lying to-day under an unconditional sentence of excommunication of the Council of Chalcedon. I beg you to observe that, in making this statement, I am entering into no discussion of the truth or falsehood of the doctrines which Rome has promulgated since the days of Chalcedon. That is not necessary; for, if every one of them were true, that would not make them part of the sacred deposit which is essential to Christianity, and which alone will bear the application of the rule of S. Vincent. Into the question, therefore, of their truth or falsehood there is no occasion to enter. If they are not at least implicitly contained in the doctrine of Chalcedon, they are no part of the Catholic Faith. Whether true or false, they are novelties, and if they are proposed as conditions of communion, all who so propose them are under the sentence of Chalcedon for un-Catholic conduct.

I have no desire to make the case against you any stronger than truth compels me to make it. I ask you only to observe that the following things, when compared with the Creed of Chalcedon, are *ipso facto* convicted of being novelties; and every one of them contained in the Creed of Pope Pius IV., to which every Bishop, at his Consecration, is required to swear fidelity.

(a.) The seven Sacraments and the whole doctrine of Trent concerning the same.

(b.) The Roman theory of the Sacrifice of the Mass.

(c.) The doctrine of Transubstantiation.

(d.) The doctrine of the entirety of the Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ, though received in only one kind.

(*e.*) The doctrine of Purgatory ;
(*f.*) Of the Invocation of Saints ;
(*g.*) Of the Veneration of Relics, and of Images ;
(*h.*) Of Indulgences ;
(*i.*) Of the Papacy ; the Bishop of Rome being recognised as " Successor to S. Peter, Prince of the Apostles, and Vicar of JESUS CHRIST."

(*k.*) The whole body of doctrine and discipline set forth by the Council of Trent.

(*l.*) Every one of these novelties is declared, under oath, to belong to the Catholic Faith, " without which no one can be saved."

To this list must now be added :

(*m.*) The doctrine of the Immaculate Conception promulgated in 1854.

(*n.*) The definition of the personal Infallibility of the Pope by the Vatican Council in 1870.

To this already sufficiently long list it would be easy to add many other items doctrinal and practical, such as the Confessional, the denial of the Cup to all except the Celebrant of the Mass, the use of an unknown tongue in public worship, Dispensations to violate the law of God concerning marriage, etc., etc., but the list is sufficiently long without these. Let me repeat that it is a list of manifest novelties, with the truth or falsehood and the good or evil of which I have nothing to do in this connection. It is enough that they are *novelties*, and that to set them forth to be believed or to be done, as a condition of communion, is to incur the condemnation of the Catholic Church according to the decree of an undoubted Œcumenical Council of the Catholic Church. That, Monsignor, is precisely what your Church has done. So far from standing unquestioned as *the* Catholic Church, she herself has forfeited her right to be recognised as *a* Catholic Church. It is but right to add, however, that the Creed of Pope Pius IV. does not call the Church of Rome *the* Catholic Church. That extremity of audacity was reserved for uncautious propagandists. The Creed of Pope Pius calls the Church of Rome " The Holy Roman Church," and " The Catholic Apostolic Roman Church."

The Roman Church, so described, *together with all other Churches*, is "The Holy Catholic Church" of the Fathers of Trent and, therefore, also of Pope Pius IV.

If I should thus insist that all four of the essential notes of a true Church must be examined, and that your own Church must be subjected to the test of all of them before admitting her right to challenge our submission to her, I should not for a moment decline an equally rigid examination of the justice of our claim to be regarded as a true Church of Christ. To the same measure as we have proposed for you are we ready to conform ourselves, and whereinsoever we may be found to be wanting, we shall be ready, with God's help, to repent and amend our ways. We are well aware that our administration of the Catholic system committed to us is not all that it ought to be; there are some faults that trouble us sorely in our work; but we are not prepared to rid ourselves of any of them by accepting what we must consider the far greater faults of your system; certainly not, unless we should find, on an impartial examination of the facts, that we are more defective than you are in the essential notes of a true Church. Thus far we have found no reason to think that we are so.

1. If we apply to our Church the test of *Unity*, we find, in contrast with the facts existing in yours, that no man receiving the doctrine of the Apostles of Christ and desiring to enjoy the fellowship of the Church on the conditions imposed by the Apostles in like cases, would be debarred from our Communion by any laws or regulations of our Church's making. No breach of unity in that direction can be justly alleged against any branch of the Anglican Church. The humblest communicant of any Catholic Church in any of the ages would find himself repelled from our Altars by no novel invention, whether of Faith or of practice. Again, we find with joy that not one schism in the history of the past can be justly laid to the charge of the Anglican Church. It is true, and we greatly lament it, that we were involuntarily involved by our connection with the Roman Patriarchate, in the great schism between the East and the West; but

that was our misfortune, not our fault ; and if the separation still continues between us and the Orientals, we feel that the cause does not lie with us. As to the separation between you and us, we cannot suffer you to forget that it is altogether of your making. We never excommunicated you. You excommunicated us for reasons which the Canons of the Catholic Church would not justify. We are in no sense rebels against you ; you are in rebellion against the fundamental laws of Christendom. Whenever Rome is ready to content herself with the Primacy to which she is entitled as the Chief See in the Patriarchate of the West, I trust and believe that the Anglican Churches will concede that Primacy. Though it has been fairly forfeited by Rome's attempt to subjugate them, they could not do otherwise. In point of fact they do so now. At present, however, Rome is not content with Primacy ; she claims Supremacy ; and to concede that would be treason to the Catholic Church. The Anglican Churches have not forgotten the deep debt of gratitude which they owe to Gregory the Great, of whom our Saxon forefathers used to say that he " sent us Baptism." They have not forgotten the benefits of the Papacy as the representative of Western Christendom during many centuries. Not even the recollection of many an injury suffices to blot out the memory of ancient kindness and communion. Whenever you are willing to accept the Primacy of rightful honor which ancient canons recognise as yours, it will be willingly conceded ; or, in other words, whenever you are ready to offer us such terms of intercommunion as one Catholic Church may lawfully, under the ancient canons, propose to another, the schism between us will be at an end. We shall accept precisely those conditions, and none other. Until you are prepared to be content with what the canons of the Catholic Church concede to you, you, and not we will be responsible for the schism. Until God's good time for bringing us together again shall come—and that it will come I have no doubt in the world—we must be satisfied to be forbidden to approach your Altars, while to our Altars

we shall never fail to welcome any child of yours who may otherwise feel free to come there. Again, if there is apparently much greater diversity in matters of opinion among us than among you, it is because we pretend to no right to impose upon our people, as conditions of communion, any more extensive articles of Faith than those which we are authorised to impose by the Council of Chalcedon. That certain disadvantages attach to a frank acceptance of the restraint of that Council is unquestionably true ; but we are comforted by thinking that even those disadvantages are easier to be borne than the sentence of excommunication to which we should otherwise subject ourselves. After all, the supposed disadvantages are less than you might think ; and, to our minds, they are incomparably less than any system of tyrannical oppression from above, or of disingenuous evasion from below. At any rate the differences among us involve no lack of unity in truly Catholic Faith, since all of them are concerned with matters which the Catholic Church has declared are not to be proposed as matters of Faith.

2. If we next apply to the Anglican Church the test of *sanctity*, we have no reason to blush for our Mother. She has no way of canonising her holy ones, and there are some forms of extraordinary sanctity which perhaps she does not so highly value as her elder sisters of the Catholic Church value them. For these reasons she makes small display of the sanctity of her members ; but I can nowhere learn that display of sanctity is a guarantee of its reality ; and this at least is beyond question, that among the people whose morals have been formed, even indirectly, by the Church of England there prevails a general veracity, an honesty, a household virtue, and an earnest spirit of religion which would do no discredit to any age or province of the Church. Negatively speaking, the Anglican Church has done no outrage to morals of any sort. None of her Doctors, in the use of the large liberty allowed them, have done so ; and of the Church herself it may be said without contradiction, that she has never in her corporate capacity sanctioned

one crime nor justified one wrong. The State, acting in the name of the Church, and applying the evil lesson it had learned from Rome, did for a time after the Reformation treat Dissenters with disgraceful severity; and Laud (who, it is said, would have been glad to restore the Church of England to the Obedience of Rome) did undoubtedly earn a bad eminence by his eager pursuit and persecution of Nonconformists. For these things the State and the man were to blame; no corporate action of the Church either enacted or justified the crimes. To the people of England, fostered by the Reformed Church of England, it is due that, all the world over, the right of religious liberty is recognised, save and except in the "Syllabus" of Pope Pius IX. If we glance at the more recent history of our Church throughout the world, we find it fairly gleaming with its glorious record of missions and martyrs, and with a general revival of religion at home and abroad. It is not for us to boast: "*Non nobis, Domine!*" But for that of which it is not lawful to boast it is a duty to give thanks to God; and the children of the Anglican Church have ample reasons to give thanks to God that the Spirit of sanctity has been poured out upon her in these last years exceeding abundantly.

3. The *Apostolicity* of the Anglican Churches is conspicuous in the simplicity of their internal order, and not less so in the even-handed justice and equality of their relations to each other. When our writers show, in much the same way as yourself, the power and authority given by the Head of the Church to "the Apostles," and when they then affirm, as you cannot do, that the same Apostolate is continued in the Episcopate, they are not obliged forthwith to explain away more than half of what they have been saying, in order to make the facts of our present constitution square with the constitution of the past. As a matter of fact, to-day, in every branch of the Anglican Communion, we find the College of Bishops *exactly* corresponding with the ancient College of Apostles. As in the College of Apostles, so in the College of Bishops, we always find that some

one is recognised as chief, so that all things may be done decently and in order. Nowhere do we find any supremacy of any one over his fellows. I believe it may be said that our actual system in these respects corresponds as precisely to the system of the Apostolic Church as it would be possible for the system of any institution in the nineteenth century to correspond to the same system as practised in the first. In the relations of our Mother Church of England to her sister Churches in Ireland and Scotland, to the colonial Churches, and to our own Church in the United States, there is an exact reproduction of the system of the Apostolic Churches, and of all the Churches of the primitive age. Each one of them all is perfectly autonomous in the administration of its internal affairs ; but, when occasion requires, there is found to be no difficulty in convening an assembly of our whole Episcopate. Nothing more is necessary than to respect the old rule that "the ancient customs shall prevail," and all goes well and easily. As we are ready to meet with all our brethren of the Church throughout the world on the conditions of primitive Unity, so in our relations with each other we need no elaborate rules to prevent schism *in* the body. Apostolical simplicity, or, if you prefer the phrase, simple Apostolicity is found to be sufficient.

4. With respect to our *Catholicity* we find no occasion for alarm. We hold the Catholic *Faith* in its integrity, as it was set forth by the undisputed General Councils. We have taken nothing from it ; and, obeying the unrepealed law of Chalcedon, we have added nothing to it. In *Discipline* we find ourselves perfectly at home among the ancient canons of the Catholic Church.

As to the accidental matters of local custom, we have our ways, as the early Churches had theirs, and some of ours are not improvements ; but there is no essential difference between the system of Discipline which actually exists among ourselves and that ancient and unquestionably Catholic system of which we find the evidence in the ancient canons. Even so of our *Worship*. Some among us would, perhaps, prefer a

more ornate ceremonial than our Church has thought to be either necessary or desirable for people of the English race ; and it may be admitted, as one of the things which we ought to amend, that the system of Worship which our Church has actually appointed is not as faithfully or fully carried out among us as it ought to be. Nevertheless, we are confident in the belief that the Worship of the Anglican Communion, as it is prescribed in the Book of Common Prayer, is not only simple and sublime, but as utterly Catholic as that of any ancient Liturgy.

III.

Because we are thus glad to recognise in the Church of our Baptism and of our love the four notes of a true Church very much more clearly than in yours, it does not follow that we would declare that yours is no longer a true Church of JESUS CHRIST. From the First Epistle of S. Paul to the Corinthians we may well learn to be slow in concluding that any Church of GOD has ceased to be included in the Body of CHRIST. Though the Corinthian Church had marred its *Unity* (for there were divisions among them), and though it had forfeited its reputation for *Sanctity* by tolerating shameful fornication, and though it had cast away the note of *Apostolicity* by forsaking the ways of the Apostle almost immediately after he had left them, and though it had erred from the *Catholic Faith* by not firmly holding the resurrection of the dead, and though it had mutilated and profaned the very mystery of the Holy Eucharist, and though it would appear that its ministry had utterly neglected the gift of GOD which was in them ; nevertheless, and notwithstanding all these grievous faults, the Apostle calls them “the Church of GOD which is at Corinth,” and thanks GOD for other evidences that the grace of GOD had not forsaken them. What a lesson have we here of Apostolic patience ! What a rebuke to that furious spirit of cursing which from time to time has taken possession of the Churches of CHRIST ! There-

re, when we consider how your Church has obscured and tarnished the glory which was once hers, it would be our duty, if she would suffer us so to do, to turn our backs upon her faults, and hide them from our eyes. And when, by the enormity of her pretensions and by the arrogance of her claims, she compels us to investigate the foundation of the former and the validity of the latter, so as to ascertain what fidelity to God and to the Catholic Church requires of us, our task is ended when our duty has been ascertained. We are not eager, even if we pretended to the right, to pronounce judgment upon you or upon your Church. We abominate, as contrary to all right reason and the first principles of Christian charity, that foul misuse of language which describes the Church of Rome as "Anti-CHRIST." We hold, and we desire to hold, no brief against you. On the contrary, we rejoice to recognise every enrichment of the grace of God which is manifested in you. We hold your Church to be included in a *Unity* which is greater than your Church, or any single Church, and which embraces you in spite of all the wounds you have inflicted on your brethren. We praise God for the triumphs of His grace in the *sanctification* of so many members of your Church. Some sorts of Sanctity which you hold in high esteem we may rate less highly; but, when I have heard a dying monk preaching the Gospel of CHRIST—and a very simple Gospel it was—to the Indian people of Lake Superior, in the midst of monuments of Jesuit missionary zeal of centuries ago, and when I have been nursed by the hands of your holy women, and (who knows?), perhaps, restored to life in answer to their prayers, why should I be slow to see the grace of God in these His holy servants? Why should I desire to think unkindly of the Mother at whose breasts they have been nourished? And then, who would wish to forget that you *have* the Apostolate, greatly as your system distorts it? Or why should we be anxious to forget that the *Catholic Faith* is still yours, in spite of all the novelties and all *aberglaube* with which you have overlaid it? Monsi-
this was once the rule of conduct towards a brother

had abandoned the ways of Apostolicity: "If any man obey not our word by this epistle, note that man, and have no company with him, that he may be ashamed. Yet *count him not as an enemy*, but admonish him *as a brother*." Why should not the same rule prevail among the Churches of CHRIST? I believe, Right Reverend Sir, that the time may not be very far off when they all may be one, outwardly before the world as well as inwardly through CHRIST, the great Head in whom they are spiritually one even now. If the learned men, the scholars, the theologians, the divines, the pastors of all of them would devote themselves for but a few years, not to the rending of each other like enemies, but to the charitable work of considering how their differences might be reconciled, how can we doubt that God would bless such efforts of His servants? Might it not at least be tried? Surely controversy has not thus far served to draw us to each other. Is it not conceivable that conciliation might have more success? To my mind, it was a great misfortune to Christendom at large, and not to the Church of England only, that after John Henry Newman had shown in the celebrated "Tract XC" how a serious effort to reconcile differences might be hopefully made, he himself abandoned the task, and left that charitable work undone and almost untouched. That, Right Reverend Sir, was long before my day. It was nearly a score of years later before I read Tract XC, and it is now too long ago since I read it for me to recall all that it contained; but I have never doubted that some of the principles of that tract will yet be found of service in the reconciliation of the separated Churches of CHRIST. It assumes that reconciliation, not the subjugation of one to another is desirable. To that end it maintains that apparent differences are not to be presumed to be irreconcilable; but that, on the contrary, the utmost latitude of honest explanation must be permitted in the interpretation of formularies which appear to contradict each other. In every case the plain grammatical sense of doctrinal formulas must be taken, and no corollaries or apparently logical consequences must be pressed unless they are explicitly main-

tained. By such a method many serious difficulties might be overcome. The principles of Tract XC, applied to the interpreting of the XXXIX Articles, tended to show that the differences between the doctrine therein contained and the doctrine of the Council of Trent are not necessarily irreconcilable. You know what an alarm the Tract inspired in the average Protestant mind, and what unworthy charges of double-dealing and insincerity were cast upon poor Newman and the Tractarians in general because of it. It was all very silly and very shameful, and one cannot wonder that Newman felt himself almost compelled to abandon a Church in which he could no longer remain without submitting to such outrage. And yet I believe that if he had but had the courage to remain at the post to which the providence of God had called him, and there to fight the good fight which he had been inspired to begin, he might have won a victory for God and for the Church which he has not won as a Cardinal of Rome. It is of no importance in this connection, and yet it may be well to say, that I am, perhaps, one of those to whom the removal of doctrinal difficulties is of the very least personal importance. I find myself perfectly satisfied with the Catholic Faith as it has been set forth by the ancient Councils of the Church. I believe many other things, of course; but whatever else I believe, I believe on very different grounds. Nevertheless, I am frank to declare that nothing I have ever read has inspired me with greater admiration than the canons and decrees of the Council of Trent. When I reflect on the miserable condition of the Church in all parts of Europe when that Council was convened, the universal outcry for reform, the reluctant hesitation in some, and the angry aversion in others, with which the work of reform was begun, I marvel greatly at the wisdom, the moderation, the firmness, and the general fidelity to truth by which the acts of that venerable assembly were characterised. It is a matter of infinite regret that England was not represented in that great Council. The reason is said to have been that the invitation intended for the Anglican Bishops was kept from them by some unworthy

intrigue ; and if so, grievous was the sin. If the English Bishops had been present at Trent, it is probable that the work of the Council might have been carried further, so that, while the continental Churches would have been satisfied, the Church of England need not have been repelled. It is pleasant to be informed on high authority that the Fathers of Trent refused to declare the Bishops constituted by or under Elizabeth not to be true Bishops, so that the Church of England received no wound from them. It is almost pitiful to think of the things that might have been, and of the other things that might *not* have been, if the English Church had been present by representation at the Council of Trent.

The facts, however, which we have to face are these : that the Church of England was not represented there, and that her lack of representation was caused by no fault of hers ; so that she is not bound by the decrees of a Council in which she had no representation. And, since the same Council was not an Œcumenical Council of the whole Catholic Church of CHRIST, but only a general council of the single Patriarchate of the West, and did not even include the whole of that, neither its canons of discipline nor its definitions of doctrine can rightly challenge the adhesion of the rest of Christendom. In face of the unrepealed decree of Chalcedon, I do not believe it would be lawful, even if it were possible, for the re-union of Christendom to be proposed on the basis of the Tridentine reformation, or on any other mediæval or modern basis of adjustment. The primitive unity of the Catholic Church can be restored on none other than the primitive Catholic conditions. Let those be recognised by all, and every schism is forthwith at an end without need of *pour parlers* or diplomatic negotiations. Hence, I am compelled to acknowledge my belief that the particular scheme which dazzled Newman's imagination was neither just nor practicable. But, were it otherwise, the elements of the problem have been much enlarged since then. The difficulties in the way of re-union have been indefinitely increased by the events of the reign of Pius IX. of most unhappy memory. The promulgation of

the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin by his sole authority, the monstrous declarations of the "Syllabus" which he published, and the decree of the Vatican Council concerning the personal infallibility of the Pope, are three barriers to the re-union of the Churches which I believe will never be surmounted. Never, till these un-Catholic monstrosities have been discarded, or ignored, will re-union be possible. Are we, therefore, to despair of ultimate re-union? Now God forbid! The good citizen never despairs of the Republic; much less ought a Christian man to despair of the Church of CHRIST. Not all that has happened either before or since the beginning of the Pontificate of Pius IX. should cause despair. If there were no other ground of hope known to us, do we not know that the Vatican Council is not yet closed, and that its decrees are still in its own power? Or, if that be disputed, is it not true that the more extreme your theory of infallibility may be, and the more blindly you maintain the exclusive supremacy of the Pope as the sole existing representative of the Apostolate, the more readily must you admit that it is in the power of any Pope, at any time, when acting as Pastor of the whole Flock of CHRIST, to set aside every cause of division which has ever arisen in matters of Faith by commanding that the old decree of the Council of Chalcedon shall thenceforward be observed. That is not very likely, you may well say; and yet it would not be half so wonderful as some other works of God. And if you say that a Pope, who should deny the doctrine of infallibility, would be a heretic, and his decree of no effect, then the answer is that the contemplation of such a possibility is, on the same ground, a heresy. For how shall it be possible for an infallible Pope to be a heretic? Besides, if a validly elected Pope should make such a decree, it would not be necessary to deny any doctrine whatever, but only to enjoin a strict observance of the Chalcedonian decree in the reconciliation of Separatists, or, in other words, to forbid any doctrine to be imposed as a condition of communion except that which is contained in the Nicæno-Constantinopolitan Creed. To

such a decree every infallibilist would be bound to conform, and yet it would at one stroke remove every existing doctrinal obstacle to the re-union of Christendom. So easily might that apparently insuperable difficulty be set aside. I am firm in the belief, that, if the hearts of Christian people were but filled with the spirit of Unity, the Great HEAD of the Church would speedily grant re-union in answer to their prayers ; but, if it is inevitable that we must, for the present, remain apart from each other, I hold it to be at least our duty to add nothing to the existing causes of division. We ought never to rejoice in proving each other to be worse, or in any way more hopelessly defective, than the facts compel us to believe beyond all peradventure.

IV.

It is for this reason, Monsignor, that I deprecate controversies between your Church and mine. The delight of controversy is too apt to "rejoice in the iniquity" which it can attribute to the other side rather than to "rejoice in the truth" which tells to its advantage. In your tractate I admit that you have been as courteous as any person well could be in saying such things as you felt it your duty to say ; I believe you have been quite veracious in your intention. True, it is your great difficulty in your professed appeal, either to Holy Scripture or to the evidence of history, that you hold your theory—and profess to hold it—independently of both of them. It follows, that since you cannot adjust your theory to the facts and evidence, the facts and evidence must be adjusted to your theory. Of that we make no complaint, of course, though it compels us always to question any such appeal which you may make. But you have said some things against our Church for which you have no infallible authority, and which you would probably not have said if you had been laboring for Unity, instead of holding a brief, for the time being, against us. In other words, if there were to-day any reasonable hope of

DOCTOR JOHN FULTON TO MONSIGNOR

the re-union of the Church of England, as a body, with the See of Rome, I have no doubt that you would find it easy to discard, or even to disprove, the argument which you have made against us. It is because no such reasonable hope exists that you find it lawful to induce Anglicans to abandon the Church of their Baptism for the Communion of Rome, on account of reasons which you do not know to be infallibly true, but which you think sufficient to sway their private judgment. In this suggestion I have not the least intention of intimating that you are practising duplicity. All I have in mind is to show, as clearly as possible, that in making your argument against us, the particular opinions which Rome maintain are not only not authoritatively affirmed by Rome herself, but that, on the contrary, you yourself might, in a supposable case, argue as earnestly against your present thesis as you now argue in its favor. From the Roman stand-point, there is no certainty in the matter. Your own apparent certainty is not so certain as it seems. It is merely a strong personal opinion which you might easily change. I shall not detain you long in the examination of the points to which I think it worth while to pay attention.

1. It ought not to be otherwise than satisfactory to you to know that in the citations from S. Cyprian, S. Cyril, and S. Pacian which cover nearly one-third of the pages of your monograph, there is not a line which any Anglican would not subscribe *ex animo*. I regret to add—and I might use a stronger word than *regret*—that we are obliged to admit the truth of much that you have quoted from our common enemy, Lord Macaulay, concerning the Church of Rome; for unfortunately few things are inherently so bad as the best things may be come when they are perverted from their proper use. If your address to us had been seriously intended for us alone, but for the public in general, whose you wished thus indirectly to prejudice against Anglican Communion, it might have been an adroit not unusual controversial strategy thus to publish whole composition of a Father like S. Cyprian

large extracts from the others, as if, because they are true, they must, therefore, contradict us. I do not suppose that you intended any such small trickery as that; but I suppose, nevertheless, that the majority of your unlearned readers will presume that these patristic authorities must somehow or another militate against our position, merely because there is no other obvious reason why you should allege them in your contention against us.

2. Intelligent readers of your monograph will take a different view. For while they will not, perhaps, be able to understand why you should have loaded down *your* pamphlet with forty-two pages of quotations from the Fathers which admirably express *our* beliefs, without containing a single syllable to sustain your argument against us, they will not be able to withhold their tribute of admiration from the frank ingenuousness which has prompted you to select passages which as flatly contradict your own theories as it would be possible for the pen of Anglican to contradict them. There are several such passages from S. Cyprian, but I shall be content to call your attention to one. It will be found on pages iv and v of the Second Part of your monograph. There the Saint says:

This will be, most dear brethren, so long as there is no regard to the source of truth, no looking to the Head, nor keeping to the doctrine of our Heavenly Master. If any consider and weigh this, he will not need length of comment or argument. Proof is ready for belief in a short statement of the truth. The LORD said unto Peter, *I say unto thee (saith He) That thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth, shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven.* To him again, after His resurrection, He says, *Feed My Sheep.* Upon him being one He builds His Church, and though HE GIVES TO ALL HIS THE APOSTLES AN EQUAL POWER, and says, *As My Father hath sent Me, even so send I you; receive ye the HOLY GHOST: whosoever sins ye remit, they shall be remitted to him, and whosoever sins ye retain, they shall be retained;* . . . yet, in order to manifest unity, He has by His own authority so placed the source of the same unity, as to begin from one. CERTAINLY THE OTHER APOSTLES ALSO WERE WHAT PETER WAS, endued with AN EQUAL FEL-

LOWSHIP BOTH OF HONOR AND POWER ; but a commencement is made from unity, that the Church may be set before us as one ; which one Church in the Song of Songs, doth the HOLY SPIRIT name in the Person of our LORD : *My dove, My spotless one, is but one ; she is the only one of her mother, elect of her that bare her.*

After this the Saint demands with energy, " He who holds not *this* Unity of the Church, does he think that he holds the Faith ? " If he had ever heard of such a thing as the Supremacy of S. Peter, which you maintain, S. Cyprian could hardly have contradicted it more emphatically. According to him

(a.) All the Apostles were of equal power.

(b.) They were consecrated to their offices as Apostles with a form of words which was substantially identical with that which CHRIST addressed to S. Peter.

(c.) If to S. Peter it was said, " Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church," it was said to others by the same " Priest forever," " As my Father hath sent me, even so send I you ; " in which mission assuredly there was no signification of that abolition of the Apostolate, except in the sole person of the Pope, which your theory maintains.

(d.) There was absolutely no difference between the Apostolic office of the Eleven and that of S. Peter. " The other Apostles also were what Peter was." Theirs was " an equal fellowship both of honor and power." Would it be possible for man to frame a phrase more comprehensive ? It is not only an explicit denial of the idea of *Supremacy*, but it precludes the notion of any form of *Primacy* which might for a moment imply a shadow of inequality.

(e.) The Primacy of S. Peter, according to S. Cyprian, was simply a *priority of Consecration*, or rather of *designation* to his office, such as gives to every Bishop a sort of precedence over another whose Consecration is of later date ; and, still according to S. Cyprian, this bare priority had no other reason than that the idea of Unity might be impressed upon the Church by the beginning of the Apostolate in the person of one of the Twelve who were equally called to it.

(f.) The whole argument of S. Cyprian is based upon the hypothesis that the Constitution of the Church, such as it was made by CHRIST Himself, was permanent. Of the merging of the entire Apostolate in the person of S. Peter there is not a hint. If the Saint had ever heard of your theory, he would undoubtedly have given some sign of it in such a treatise. His silence alone on this one point is a significant evidence of the fact that in the days of S. Cyprian it had not been invented. The fact is that in the days of S. Cyprian there was nothing to which your theory would have applied.

(g.) From beginning to end the Unity of the Church, as set forth in the treatise of S. Cyprian, means Unity in the equal fellowship of the Apostles. He knows no other idea of Unity, nor has he heard of any change in the Apostolic conditions of Unity. It is that alone that he defends. To that alone he appeals, and Anglicans join in his pregnant question, "He who holds not *this* Unity of the Church, does he think that he holds the Faith?" Where we find a flagrant renunciation of the Apostolical Constitution of the Church of CHRIST, how shall we expect to find fidelity to the faith of CHRIST? *

3. Your selection from S. Cyril is equally unhappy for you and equally consolatory to us. When the Saint is telling why the Church is called Catholic, this is his language:

* Permit me to call your attention to an error of quotation into which you have fallen, doubtless through inadvertence. In the quotation which you have made from the tractate of S. Cyprian in the text of your pamphlet, I find you using these words, of which, for a reason, I have included some in brackets:

"He who holds not this Unity of the Church, does he think that he holds the Faith? He who strives against and resists the Church [he who abandons the Chair of Peter upon whom the Church was founded], does he feel confident that he is in the Church?"

Now, Monsignor, on referring to the translation of the passage given at the end of your tractate, I find that the words which I have bracketed are *not there*; and the reason is that they have no right to be there because *they are a forgery*. I do not for a moment either charge or suspect that you remembered this fact when you made your quotation; but I pray you to observe that some one not only committed an error in the case, but committed a forgery by which you have been misled. That forgery, however, was made *in the interest of your theory*, like all the innumerable forgeries of the False Decretals which might well be called the most prodigious disgrace of Christian literature, and of which a history, and a complete translation would be the most crushing reply to the modern Papal pretensions.

Now it is called Catholic because it is throughout the world, from one end of the earth to the other ; and because it teaches universally and completely one and all the doctrines which ought to come to men's knowledge, concerning things both visible and invisible, heavenly and earthly ; and because it subjugates in order to godliness every class of men, governors and governed, learned and unlearned ; and because it universally treats and heals every sort of sins which are committed by soul or body, and possesses in itself every form of virtue which is named, both in deeds and words and in every kind of spiritual gifts.

Not one syllable in all this, nor anywhere else in all you have quoted from him, does S. Cyril say which tends to the support of one single particular of your theory of Catholicity. His only reference to S. Peter does not indicate any difference of opinion between himself and S. Cyprian concerning the equality of the Apostles. All that he says of S. Peter is simply to repeat the saying of CHRIST, "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church," as a promise of the replacement of the ancient Jewish Church by the Church of the Gentiles. Of your theory of the Apostolate or of the Papal prerogative existing in S. Peter, or of S. Peter as the centre of unity, there is not a glimmer.

Rather the reverse. For while his silence in treating of Catholicity, concerning every one of the things which you set forth as of the essence of Catholicity, is an evidence that S. Cyril knew of no such Catholicity as that which you profess ; his account of the constitution of the Catholic Church, as he understood it, shows clearly enough what he considered as its chief characteristics. Concerning these he says that, "when the first Church was cast off, God, in the second, which is the Catholic Church, *hath set first Apostles, secondarily Prophets, thirdly teachers, after that miracles, then gifts of healings, helps, governments, diversities of tongues*, and every sort of virtue." That is all, every single syllable, that S. Cyril says concerning the organisation of the Catholic Church. He begins with Apostles ; but he does not end, like you, by abolishing them.

4. From S. Pacian your cause has just as little support. "There ought," he says, "to be no contest

about the name of Catholic." That is true, and what a rebuke it implies to you and your whole Church, who have made the most precious name of the Church of CHRIST an occasion of acrimonious contest. "Christian," he cries, "is my name, but Catholic my surname." The Catholic name is the common surname of all churches which have not forfeited it by heresy or schism. No man who respects his father or his mother will bastardise their other children by refusing them the family surname. Pacian does nothing of the sort. It is you, Monsignor, and your Church who raise contests about the name of Catholic, by arrogating to yourselves alone the name which is ours as well as yours. An accusation of spiritual bastardy may be easily made. Thank God, it is not so easily proved in our case ; and the example of Pacian does not seem to me to encourage contests of the sort which is the chief occupation of your spiritual artillery.

S. Pacian professes exact agreement with the doctrine of S. Cyprian which we have already examined. Speaking of that "most blessed martyr and doctor," he asks : "Do we wish to teach the teacher ? Are we wiser than he was, and are we puffed up by the spirit of the flesh against the man, whom his noble shedding of blood, and a crown of most glorious suffering, have set forth as a witness of the Eternal God ?" I see not how these words of his and those which next follow shall be other than a scathing rebuke to those who have invented a system for CHRIST'S Church such as SS. Cyprian and Pacian never heard of. "Shall the Fathers (he asks) follow our authority, and the antiquity of Saints give way to be emended by us, and times now putrefying through their sins pluck out the grey hairs of Apostolic age ?"

Some little the Saint says which bears on one particular of your favorite theory. He is arguing that the Bishops have the power of binding and loosing which was given by CHRIST to the Apostles. He shows that it is not reasonable to suppose that this power was restricted to the original Apostles. His ground is that

such an hypothesis would prove too much, since it would involve this consequence, that the power of baptising, etc., was in like manner restricted to the original Apostles. But his last argument is that "lastly, Bishops also are named Apostles, as saith Paul of Epaphroditus, *My brother and fellow-soldier but your Apostle.*" A little further on he says: "Let no one despise the Bishop on consideration of the man. Let us remember that the Apostle Peter hath named our LORD, Bishop. '*But are now* (he saith) *returned unto the Shepherd and Bishop of your souls.*' What shall be denied to the Bishop, in whom operateth the name of God?" Finally, concerning the whole Episcopal prerogative, S. Pacian declares that "the whole has descended in a stream from the Apostolic privilege." To say the least, this sounds extremely like the doctrine of Apostolical Succession which Anglicans have been maintaining, lo, these many years. It may be that we are in error; but, if we are, we are content to err with S. Pacian!

To close this section, let me ask you to refer to your own concise statement of your theory which I have given in a foot-note, and then to ask yourself which one of all its monstrous assertions of radical revolution in the Constitution of CHRIST'S Church since the days of the Apostles, is sustained by the Fathers whom you have adduced for our confusion? I will answer for you, Monsignor, *Not one!* If these quotations had been set forward merely *ad captandum vulgus*, they might have been expected, perhaps, to have some effect upon the ignorant; but, with what purpose you have set them before the minds of the members of the General Convention of our Church, it passes my utmost ingenuity to imagine. I fear, Right Reverend Sir, you must have a poor opinion of the intelligence even of our Bishops; but I can assure you that I do not know a single member of our Lower House who would do otherwise than marvel that you should be at pains to furnish us with documents which are not unknown to us, and which confirm the teaching of our Church, while they as positively contradict the theory to which you invite our adhesion.

5. A very large portion of the first two sections of your discussions of the nature of the Church of CHRIST contains as little to which we object as do your quotations from the Fathers. Indeed, it is not easy to imagine why you should have been at pains to write it in an address to us, unless you are inconceivably ill informed of our opinions and beliefs, in which case you could hardly be qualified for the controversy you have undertaken ; or else because you are not really addressing us at all, but a different public on whom you wish to make a false impression concerning us—a clever trick to which no one could assume that you would resort. Such, however, is the fact ; and it would be as unprofitable as threshing straw to comment on statements which have no relevancy to your argument against us. I trust you will pardon me for saying, without meddling in your affair with Dr. Hopkins, that my reason for not discussing this part of your tract is really not that I am incapable of understanding the meaning of “an organism,” as you suppose Dr. Hopkins to be. Unless you use that word in some non-natural sense, I think I understand what you mean by it.

6. Though I am happy to agree with much of what you have written about the nature of the Church of CHRIST, there are, nevertheless, a few things which you have inserted there to which I should by no means assent. In the midst of so much that is indisputable, you calmly insert your theory of the Petrine Supremacy, as if it required no proof whatever, instead of being the very question in dispute. In the most authoritative way, and without one single syllable of proof, nay, without even the pretence of proof, you assert (on page 25) literally all that you would have us think you are establishing by some irrefragable evidence. Assuredly, Monsignor, we are not quite such infants as you seem to suppose us to be. Here is your statement :

Timothy and Titus were consecrated Bishops, but the Episcopate of Authority, in which they were participators, was one, indivisible, sovereign, and independent.

That is all true, but how about what follows ?

It was given first in its fulness to Peter *separately* ; later the power of binding and loosing was given *collectively* to the Apostolic College. Thus was granted to the Head "fulness of supreme power, ordinary and immediate, over all and each of the pastors and of the faithful" in the whole Church.

Prove that to us, Monsignor, and we shall trouble ourselves and you about very little else ; but you must positively not expect us to surrender at discretion merely because you make an assertion which begs the whole question at issue. Allow something to the operation of our private judgment ; for most assuredly we cannot, on such slight personal acquaintance, entrust everything to yours. We feel the more entitled to demand some sort of proof of your assertion that S. Peter received "supreme power, ordinary and immediate, over all and each of the pastors," because it is to be supposed that the other Apostles were "pastors," and it is not apparent to an unenlightened Anglican understanding how that assertion is compatible with facts of Apostolic history to which I have referred, or with the declaration of S. Cyprian that our SAVIOUR "gave to all the Apostles an *equal* power" by virtue of which "the other Apostles also *were what Peter was*, endued with an *equal fellowship* both of honor and power." In the meantime, we are obliged to await your further elucidation of the subject ; because, since your main proposition is left without even the pretence of proof, we cannot admit any conclusion either concerning your Church or our own which is based on that mere hypothesis. You must, therefore, understand, Monsignor, that we may comment upon the rest of your *brochure*, but that we cannot admit your right on any ground of reason to expect very serious attention to an argument which rests entirely on an unsustained hypothesis. Until your gratuitous assertion of an unlimited Petrine Supremacy shall have some more adequate support than your personal statement that it was such, you must not think that we shall pay much attention to your inferences from it. *Omne*

vivum ab ovo is good Latin, and good philosophy ; but we positively must have an egg to start with, not merely a cackle.

7. The same remark applies to your assertion, for again it is a mere assertion, that "the power of binding and loosing was given *collectively* to the Apostolic College." At first, I confess, I could not satisfy myself that you meant to say that the power of binding and loosing was not given to the several Apostles, but only to them all, as a Corporation. I find, however, that you say elsewhere that "by the most elementary law of grammar in the first passage" ('whatsoever thou shalt bind,' etc.,) "there is given separately to ONE what in the second" ('whatsoever you shall bind,' etc.,) "is given collectively to the TWELVE." From this it is evident that you mean to teach that none of the individual Apostles, except Peter, had the power to bind and to loose. This proposition is contrary to the whole tenor of Apostolic history ; it is supported by no fact whatever ; the distinction which it implies is unknown to Holy Scripture. The whole statement is a flat contradiction of your own favorite, S. Cyprian. It is not less contrary to the teaching of your other favorite, S. Pacian, who says : "That which He (God) does through his Priests, is His own authority. Else what is that He saith to the Apostles, '*Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven ?*' Why said He this, if it was not lawful for *men* to bind and loose. Is this allowed to *Apostles* only ?" Small trace here of the notion that the power to bind and to loose was a corporate power only, and not personal power, like that of S. Peter. Yet, against such authorities of your own choosing, you expect us to accept your personal *ipse dixit* ! You expect too much, Monsignor.

8. There is a large and fruitful chapter of ecclesiastical history from which you have withheld your research. The Canons of the Primitive Church give us a better insight into the actual system of the Church of the earlier centuries than can be gained from any other source with-

out them. In them we find precisely the relations of all ecclesiastical persons and of all Churches to each other, as they may be presumed to have been developed from the condition in which they were left by the Apostles and their immediate successors. What, then, do we find in these authoritative documents? Anything corresponding to your imaginary sketch of the unquestioned Supremacy of the Pope? Not at all. If anything resembling it in any particular had really existed in the Church of the first four centuries, we should certainly be able to discover some sign of it in the Acts and Canons of the first four Œcumenical Councils; also, one would think, in the Canons called Apostolical, which date from the second century, or in the Canons of the Provincial Councils of Ancyra, Neo-Cæsarea, Gangra, Antioch, and Laodicea, all of which were confirmed by the Œcumenical Council of Chalcedon, or, certainly, in the African Code of the same age. Well, Monsignor, you and I both know that of the Papal theory of which you are the champion, there is to be found in all of these not a shred nor an indication; no, sir, but abundance of as flat contradictions, positive and negative, as any Anglican could desire. I do not wonder that in your treatise you have fought so shy of the testimony of ancient councils. But did you seriously expect us, whose appeal before God and man is to the testimony of antiquity, and especially to "the Undisputed General Councils," to allow you to drop them from your subject, as your Church seems to have dropped them from her thoughts? You have given us too much credit for complaisance, Monsignor. What, then, do the Apostolical Canons say about the Bishop of Rome? *Not a word!* So far as these venerable documents go—and they contain the oldest extant legislation of the Christian Church—no one would know that Rome ever had a Bishop at all; and precisely the same statement is true of the Canons of Ancyra, Gangra, Neo-Cæsarea, Antioch, and Laodicea! If Rome had been the recognised visible centre of Unity and Catholicity in those days, it is simply incredible that in such documents her very existence should be

ignored. The fact that it is so is incompatible with your claims.

9. When we come to the Œcumenical Councils it is inevitable that we should find some mention of the See which was situated in the capital of the civilised world. Accordingly we do find Rome there, and the conditions on which she was there. She was not held to be supreme there as she would have been if your theory of Papal Supremacy had prevailed. Rome did not convene them, and her representatives did not preside in them; nor did anybody pretend that to be in communion with her was a decisive test of Catholicity. In those days and at those Councils it was the constitutional right of every Church in Christendom to be represented by its Bishop, unless he were lying under sentence of his own Province, or of an Œcumenical Council, for heresy or other crime. Unless in such a case, it was the duty of Rome and of every other Church to be in communion with him. If they were not, so much the worse for them; the Œcumenical Councils paid absolutely no attention whatever to any judgments other than the two which I have named above. A curious evidence of the disregard of a General Council (which was afterward recognised as an Œcumenical Council) is found in the history of the Council of Constantinople. I condense the story from "The Papacy" by the Abbé Guettée, premising the remark that Meletius, Bishop of Antioch, presided for a time at the Council of Constantinople.

For a long time (says the Abbé), there has been a schism at Antioch. That city had two Bishops, Meletius and Paulinus. The Bishop of Rome was in communion with the latter, and consequently regarded Meletius as schismatic. . . . *The Second Œcumenical Council was, therefore, under the presidency of a Bishop who was not in communion with Rome.* Meletius died during the sitting of the Council. Those who were well known for eloquence among the Fathers pronounced his eulogy. . . . He was regarded by all as a Saint; and when his body was transported to Antioch, the journey was an uninterrupted ovation ("The Papacy," Eng. Ed., p. 110).

Evidently the Fathers of Constantinople had not heard that the first and indispensable sign of Catholicity is to

be in communion with Rome, since they admitted to their number, chose as one of their presidents, and regarded as a Saint, a man whom Rome refused to recognise as a Catholic, but denounced as a schismatic ! I submit that the Fathers of Constantinople would have read your pamphlet with some amazement.

Actions are the most positive of declarations, and the action of the Council of Constantinople was sufficiently significant ; but we must interrogate the Œcumenical Councils further, and demand what they *say* concerning Rome, and in what terms they say it. In truth they say but little, but that little is enough *for us*, and it ought to be enough for you. The first place to which I shall invite your attention is the Sixth Canon of Nicæa, in which the following words occur :

Let the ancient customs prevail in Egypt, Libya, and Pentapolis ; so that the Bishop of Alexandria have jurisdiction in all these Provinces, since the same is customary for the Bishop of Rome also. Likewise in Antioch and the other Provinces, let the Churches retain their privileges.

What, then, *was* the jurisdiction here referred to ? Simply this, that, as the Bishop of the Metropolis in every Province had the right to ordain the Bishops of the other Sees in his Province, so the Bishops of Alexandria were to have the right to ordain the Metropolitans of the Provinces designated, this privilege being conferred both as a matter of ancient custom, and because the Bishop of Rome had similar jurisdiction in the Provinces over which he presided. Here is no more hint of jurisdiction of the Bishop of Rome over the Bishop of Alexandria than the New Testament gives of your supposed Supremacy of Peter over his brother Apostles. Whatever rights the Bishop of Rome enjoyed in his own Patriarchate, the same were to be enjoyed by the Bishop of Alexandria in his. In other words, the two Patriarchs were to enjoy equal privileges in their several Patriarchates.

The next reference to the See of Rome occurs in the Third Canon of Constantinople. It is short and simple :

The Bishop of Constantinople shall have the privilege of rank next after the Bishop of Rome ; because Constantinople is New Rome.

The building of Constantinople and its erection into the capital and seat of imperial government of the Eastern part of the Roman Empire required, in that punctilious age, that the rank of its Bishop in Councils and elsewhere should be authoritatively settled. Hence this regulation that the Bishop of Constantinople, as presiding in the second capital of the Empire, should rank next to the Bishop of the ancient capital. Of any Apostolical right of the Bishop of Rome to the precedence which was conceded to him there was apparently no thought. The whole reason of the rank conceded to him and the Bishop of Constantinople was a political reason, namely, the political eminence and prestige of the cities in which they held their office.

To this canon of the Council of Constantinople the Bishop of Rome objected ; not because he complained of injury done by it to himself, but on the ground that it conferred on the Bishop of Constantinople a precedence over other Bishops whose Sees were of greater antiquity, and even of Apostolical foundation. The matter was, therefore, again brought up at Chalcedon. The delegates of Rome made their objection ; but the Fathers with entire unanimity adopted the following, which is numbered as the Twenty-eighth Canon of that Council :

Following in all things the decisions of the holy Fathers, and acknowledging the canon which has just been read (of the one hundred and fifty most religious Bishops who were assembled in the imperial city of Constantinople, which is New Rome, by the Emperor Theodosius, of happy memory), we do also enact and decree the same things concerning the privileges of the most holy Church of New Rome or Constantinople.

For the Fathers rightly granted privileges to the throne of the elder Rome because that city was the capital ; and the one hundred and fifty most religious Bishops, actuated by the same design, gave equal privileges to the most Holy Throne of New Rome ; justly judging that the city which is honored with the Sovereignty and the Senate, and enjoys equal privileges with the elder Imperial Rome, should in ecclesiastical matters also be magnified as she is, and should rank next after her.

And, therefore, in the Pontic, the Thracian, and the Asian Diocese,

the Metropolitans only (and such Bishops of the Dioceses aforesaid as are among the barbarians) shall be ordained by the aforesaid most Holy Throne of the most holy Church of Constantinople ; every Metropolitan of the aforesaid Dioceses, together with the Bishops of his Province, ordaining his own provincial Bishops as a matter of course, as has been declared by the Divine canons. But the Metropolitans of the aforesaid Dioceses shall be ordained, as aforesaid, by the Archbishop of Constantinople, the proper elections having been held according to custom and to him reported.

Thus the judgment of Rome was set aside by a body of Six Hundred and Thirty Bishops of the Catholic Church in Œcumenical Council assembled. The act of Constantinople was confirmed ; its declaration of the reason of its enactment on political grounds was re-affirmed ; the Bishop of Rome was significantly reminded that he held his own precedence, such as it was, not by any inherent or Divine right, but because the Church had seen fit for political reasons to grant it ; the same right of ordaining Metropolitans in certain Provinces, which already existed in Rome and Alexandria, was now explicitly conferred on Constantinople ; but the rights of the Provinces to a free canonical election of Bishops was explicitly declared. This defeat, one might have thought, would have been sufficient ; or, if not, it might have been expected that Rome would have thrown herself back on her inherent rights, if she had supposed herself to have any. Not so, however. On the day after the adoption of this canon the delegates of Rome applied to the Imperial representatives to annul the solemn act of the Council ! In the presence of the assembled Fathers their allegations were heard ; and the event was that the "*judices*" gave an unqualified judgment against Rome, and in favor of the Council. Thus was the deliberate plea of Rome formally heard and re-heard, and was set aside both by the decision of the Council and by the lay judges before whom the regularity of that decision was impeached. How does that transaction square with the notion of Papal Supremacy ? Monsignor, at that time the modern idea of the Papacy had not begun to enter into human imagination ; and that is the last reference to Rome that you will find in the canons of

the First Four undisputed General Councils. The Fifth and Sixth Councils passed no canons.

In the African code I find one significant reference to Rome, though the name of Rome is not mentioned. It is this: In Africa, as elsewhere, there were unfortunately too many disagreements from time to time. In other places the parties to the contentions which arose were in the habit of endeavoring to secure decisions in their favor from the secular power; and no wonder if they did so, since we have seen how Rome did precisely that thing at Chalcedon. Therefore, many canons were adopted forbidding any such appeal to be made. In Africa, however, it appears that some persons who were aggrieved at decisions rendered against them by the regular canonical authority betook themselves to Rome in order to gain there the moral support which the countenance of so great a See could not fail to give; and the African Church, without expressing the displeasure which the course of Rome had evidently inspired, and, indeed, without mentioning the name of Rome at all, quietly adopted the canon numbered Twenty-eight (in the Greek code, Thirty-one), in which they imposed the penalty of excommunication upon any one who should attempt to prosecute an appeal beyond seas!

In thus consulting the canons and customs of the Church in her Councils of the first four centuries, I have done more than was incumbent upon me, since upon you rests the burden of proving that your theory of the Papacy is sustained by the facts of those days. I have chosen, however, to do more than was necessary by proving the negative of your theory, as completely, I think, as any one could wish. I repeat that, in view of the facts which I have named—and I have brought in none that can be denied—your theory of Catholicity is disproved as a thing which was not known to the Catholic Church of the early centuries. In other words, it is not a Catholic verity, but a gratuitous hypothesis, unverified and unverifiable.

10. Your statement of the connection of Gregory the Great with the mission of S. Augustine is mostly true,

though it is hardly correct as to the share which the Bishops of the British race had in the conversion of our Saxon forefathers. The truth is that Augustine, as a missionary, was not successful; and in his dealing with the British Bishops his conduct was such as to deserve the failure which it met. A little common sense might have won the Celts to the Roman Obedience; but he lacked precisely that element of common sense in superiors which enables them to win the service of inferiors by divesting it of servility. The Archbishop lacked tact; and clumsily contrived to wound the sensibilities and offend the prejudices of the Celts. Hence, as Dr. Bright says, in his magnificent "Chapters of Early English Church History," the Roman Archbishopric "continued to be little else than a high dignity shut up in a narrow area; it had no practical effect on the general life and work of the Church; it was like a great force lying dormant until the epoch that was to wake it into energy." That epoch came when Saxon heathendom had been converted, not by Roman missionaries, but by the despised and persecuted Celts. Canon Bright has demonstrated, beyond all possibility of disproof, that the conversion of our Saxon fathers was not the work of Augustine, nor the work of Rome, and that it was not accomplished by any elaborate organisation, but by the personal labors of Aidan, and Finan, and Colman, and Cedd, and Diuma, and Celloch, and of others like them whose names are written in the Book of Life but not in the diptychs even of the Church which they brought into the Fold of CHRIST. It was when they had done so that the splendid talent of government and organisation which Rome has always possessed was brought into requisition. There was nothing uncatholic or improper in the instructions given by Gregory and his immediate successors to the Archbishops of Canterbury, nor in the grants of power addressed to them. England at that time was missionary ground; and the Church which undertook its conversion was, by every ancient custom of the Catholic Church, entitled to exercise authority over its own mission. From the Twenty-eighth Canon of Chalcedon,

which I have given in full, it will be seen that the missionary Bishops in Pontus and Thrace were under the authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople. Every missionary Church is under the authority of some other Church until it has attained to its ecclesiastical majority; and then it remains under such obligations to its spiritual benefactor that the influence of the benefactor is not likely to be disregarded, unless it is misused. So it was in England; and if the power of the Papacy had not been shamefully misused in ways of which the statute books of the nation bear ample record, the influence of Rome might to-day have been greater there than elsewhere in the world. *That* story is too long to be recited here; and I must frankly confess that, in my own private opinion, it was not so much the doctrine of the Church of Rome as the enormous crimes and usurpations of the Court of Rome that drove the English people into the unwelcome measure of cutting adrift from all the traditions of a sacred past by severing their connection with the Papacy. Even so, it was from the Papacy, and not from the Church of Rome, that their severance took place. If there had then been wisdom at Rome it is probable that the present schism might have been averted. If there shall be wisdom in Rome hereafter, there will be reunion at some future time, but never on the same conditions as once might have sufficed.

11. I admit your distinction between Orders and jurisdiction according to your own terms.* The important thing is that you charge us with the loss of jurisdiction because of our separation from the communion of the See of Rome. To this the reply may well be brief. Either the Church of England has fallen into heresy or she has not. So long as the Chalcedonian decree shall remain

* I must here ask pardon of my friend Dr. Hopkins for the remark that I regret the misconception of your meaning which has taken place in this connection, because it is in my opinion a misconception. It is accounted for by the simple circumstance that what you call *Orders* we usually call *mission*, and what you call *mission* (or *commission*), we are in the habit of calling *jurisdiction*; so that when you speak of "Orders and mission (or commission)," we should rather say "mission and jurisdiction." Except in the matter of phraseology, I think there is no difference between us in this matter; and I repeat my regret that a needless appearance of difference has occurred.

and the Church of England shall continue to obey it, so long will she be Catholic in Faith, and not heretic. So long as the Church of England shall be willing to maintain communion with all other Churches of CHRIST on the old terms of Catholic communion, so long she will not be schismatic. Now if a Church is neither heretic nor schismatic, it is of necessity Catholic, and is possessed of all and sundry the powers and functions of a Catholic Church of CHRIST. No fault of others will deprive it of its inherent jurisdiction ; nor will anything within itself have that effect except heresy or schism. Unless because of heresy or schism, no Church nor Bishop can deprive it of the jurisdiction which is always to be presumed where there are valid Orders. As you have well said, Monsignor, Orders and mission are often conferred together. But when once both have been rightly obtained, no power on earth can withdraw jurisdiction otherwise than for cause ; and the only rightful cause for withdrawing jurisdiction from a whole Church is heresy or schism. Hence I pass without serious notice all that you say about the supremacy of the Crown in the Church of England. I like that feature of our Mother Church but little. I have no hesitation in saying that I regard it as a stain on her escutcheon ; but it is not the bar sinister by any manner of means, and if I were to concede all that you say about it (which I do not), I should still deny your conclusion, on the simple ground that it is not a heresy to maintain it, nor an act of schism to submit to it. You are too well learned a man, Monsignor, not to know that the *principle* of the thing is recognised and allowed, however unwillingly, in every Concordat into which the Pope enters with the sovereign of any nation, and, therefore, cannot on your ground involve forfeiture of jurisdiction, for, else what of the jurisdiction of the Pope ? You know also that the volumes of the Corpus Juris Civilis are full of imperial decrees concerning the Church which surpass in the extent of the prerogative assumed anything that the Tudor sovereigns of England ever claimed. You would not find it very difficult to discover instances, and if you could not, I could help you,

in which the Pope has acknowledged and ratified, not merely condoned, many much more extreme acts of the secular power than any which are involved in the present prerogative royal in the Church of England. For the defence of the rash opinions of individual men in Parliament or elsewhere, I am no more concerned than you for like utterances of your co-religionists; but this I assert, that you have no warrant of your own Church to affirm the proposition that a Church which admits the royal supremacy in the sense in which *the Church* of England admits or submits to it is, *ipso facto*, deprived of jurisdiction *for that cause alone*. That being the case, great though our respect is for your private opinion, we cannot be expected to accept it as a final determination of so weighty a matter. In short, Monsignor, you have again in this part of your argument given us a strong assertion but no evidence.

12. It is to your credit, Monsignor, and I think it due to you to acknowledge a circumstance which does you honor, that you have not condescended to the vulgar assaults upon the validity of our Orders of which in times past we have had a superabundance. You have not even mentioned the Nag's Head fable or any of the other myths which were invented to destroy our ecclesiastical legitimacy. That those vulgarities have long been worn to shreds is true, but I willingly believe that you are silent concerning them, not because they are no longer available, but because the use of such artillery is not respectable, and certainly *not fit for a gentleman*. Knowing the affection which still prevails in the Anglican mind for John Henry Newman, you have been satisfied to tell us the subjective conviction which came to him after he had left us, that in the nature of things there could be no Apostolical Succession in the Church which he had abandoned; but with all our love for Newman, and it is both deep and sincere, we cannot accept his vision, or rather want of vision to see what we ourselves still continue to see clearly. We observe too, and with pleasure, both at the fact and at your candor in reminding us of it, that if the Pope were ever to declare that New-

man is wrong, Newman himself would find it perfectly possible to believe in our Orders. Believing in our own Orders now, we are satisfied to observe that a gentleman like yourself does not, and, perhaps, could not, stoop to the arguments by which less able and less honorable controversialists have vainly endeavored to assail them.

13. You will pardon me, I trust, for saying that your knowledge of our Church in the United States is too limited to enable you to speak to us concerning it with the authority which you assume as an expositor of its history and ecclesiastical status. Of your ignorance, and I regret that I can find no less pungent word to designate the fact, there is a flagrant instance in your assertion that the clergy of the Church in the United States "pledge themselves by oath" to the Thirty-nine Articles! Why, Monsignor, we do not even subscribe them, either before our Ordination or afterward. Permit me then to tell *you* the genesis of our Church in this country, and then to ask you what there was in it which is not valid and Catholic in the strictest sense.

Many generations ago there came to this country a number of baptised members of the Church of England, devout communicants of the Church in which they had been baptised. They were neither in heresy nor in schism. They gathered together in congregations for the worship of Almighty God, under the ministry of regularly ordained Clergymen. It was a misfortune that the ministry in the colonies was not sooner completed by the sending of a Bishop to take the oversight of them; but for that misfortune they were no more responsible than their Roman Catholic neighbors in Maryland, since they begged the Mother Church again and again to send them a Bishop. Immediately after the revolution these scattered congregations took the most energetic steps to complete their ecclesiastical organisation, and within a short time they succeeded in obtaining the requisite number of Bishops to enable them to continue their Episcopal Succession according to the Nicene Canon, which requires that every Bishop shall be consecrated by three Bishops at the least—a canon, permit

me to say, which was not observed by the Church of Rome in the Consecration of the first Bishop of the Roman Obedience in the United States. Further, the Dioceses formed by the Bishops, together with the Clergy and laity of the Church in the United States, did not make the least innovation on the Catholic system of which they had now acquired every necessary element; but from that time to the present they have "continued steadfastly in the Apostles' doctrine and fellowship, and in the breaking of bread, and in prayers;" nor have they ever refused the Bread of Life to any Christian man, woman, or child for any reason which would not have been approved by the original Apostles. or by any one of the undisputed General Councils of the undivided Catholic Church. Now, Monsignor, unless we admit your theory of universal Papal Supremacy and jurisdiction, which you have asserted, but *not proved*; or unless we admit your thesis of the loss of jurisdiction by the Church of England, which you have likewise asserted, but have likewise *not proved*; we are at a loss to imagine in what respect the organisation or the conduct of our Church in this country has been, or is lacking in the attribute of Catholicity. With all due respect to your adverse opinion, I maintain that it has been organised, and that it has behaved itself in every essential particular as becomes a Catholic Church of CHRIST.

14. With respect to the question of conflicting jurisdiction in this country, there are difficulties which may some day require a consideration such as would be premature at this time. If the contest shall then be settled on the sole ground of priority of occupation, your Bishops in the original thirteen States of the Union will have to yield to the prior right of ours, since ours were established before yours. In Florida, and also, I suppose, throughout the territory formerly occupied by Spain and afterward ceded to France, from whom we acquired it, a contrary rule would prevail. It is not probable that any such rule will prevail in the happy hour of reconciliation; for the Catholic Church had, and still has, an abundance of ancient rules and pre-

cedents for the settlement of all such cases ; and those rules, with such modifications as justice or charity may require, will always be applicable whenever the grace of God shall grant the Unity of his Church to the prayers of His people. In the meantime, neither your Church in this country nor ours is to be held responsible for the existing schism. You have inherited your position, as we have inherited ours, and the time for undoing the bad work of the past has apparently not yet come to either of us. We must, therefore, stand for the present as Catholic Churches of different rites stand in Oriental countries, with this unhappy difference, that for certain reasons, at present insurmountable, the Bishops of the Roman Obedience refuse to us that Catholic communion which we have never refused to them or theirs. If our position is the less arrogant, Monsignor, we are glad to believe that it is the more Christian, the more charitable, and by long odds the more Catholic.

15. Of the hope of an ultimate, and not, perhaps, very far distant reunion of our Churches in this country, I have reason to know that some of your Bishops and other Clergy have not despaired ; and of the appreciation of the strength of the Anglican position on the part of the very highest Roman authority, I could give you, if I were so minded, some evidence that might surprise you. There are probably many who would be glad to see that for which they do not dare to hope ; and there are many more, who, if they could regard reunion as possible, would cut off their right hands rather than raise an obstacle of a feather's weight against it. To this last class, Monsignor, I do you the justice to believe that you yourself belong. I myself believe that reunion is not only possible—for with God what shall be impossible?—but I believe that it is delayed only because of the sinfulness and faithlessness of Christian people. Whatever share in the general fault there may be in me, God knows that it is a fault of infirmity, not of wilfulness or lack of charity. I have never ceased to pray for the unity and peace of Jerusalem ; in my poor place in the Councils of our Church I have always endeavored to

promote the things that make for peace among all who profess and call themselves Christians ; and in particular I have striven, I think, without any exception for which I can reproach myself, to prevent the doing of anything that might add one hair's weight of difficulty to the restoration of Unity to the blessed Body of our LORD JESUS CHRIST.

V.

And now, Monsignor, to conclude a letter which has grown under my hand to proportions which I did not contemplate when I began to write it, I have given you, in the preceding lines, the reason why I came to make in our General Convention the speech to which you have referred, and which I suppose you to have misapprehended. The proposal before us at the time was to change the local name of our Church from that of "The Protestant Episcopal Church" to that of "The Holy Catholic Church of the United States of America." To the adoption of this name there were many objections which might have been urged, and I have no doubt that many good reasons were urged by others than myself. I cannot now recall all that was said, and there is no need that I should. The few moments I used in the debate were occupied in the statement of but one out of many objections which I might have been glad to make had there been occasion or opportunity. The objection which I did press was the immodesty of a Communion so small as ours is in this great country assuming so great a name as that of the Holy Catholic Church of the United States of America. I do not at all admit the Catholicity of statistical majorities. There was a time when the whole body of Christian believers consisted altogether of a company of *one hundred and twenty souls*, all of *one nation*, and all *dwelling in one city*, but that little company was the Catholic Church of Christ ! There was a time, less than three hundred years afterward, when the world wondered to discover that the Church had become Arian ; in fact, it was almost true

that for the moment Athanasius stood alone against the world. In those days it was the Arian heretics who appealed to the Catholicity of figures and geography ; but the true Catholic minority knew and maintained that if all the world except Athanasius had verily become heretic, then Athanasius alone would have been the Catholic Church, and that the Great HEAD of the Church would have found means to provide that the gates of Hell should not prevail against him. Even so in this country, if it were a heathen country I should hold it to be our duty to call ourselves, few as we are, the Holy Catholic Church *in* the United States of America, until we should become entitled to be called the Holy Catholic Church *of* the United States of America. The facts of the case, which show us to be a very small minority of the people of this country, would make it at present not only an immodesty, in my opinion, but an untruth, to call ourselves by that name.

There is another reason, however, not less imperative as an objection to the adoption of the name proposed, namely, that it involves a denial of whatever claims of your own Church in this country we, as Catholics, are bound to recognise ; for unless we are prepared at all hazards to maintain that you have ceased to belong to the Catholic Church of CHRIST, so that your people must be converted from Romanism precisely as heathen people are converted from idolatry, I cannot see that we have any right to arrogate to ourselves a name by the exclusive assumption of which we virtually declare you to be apostates. It is true that this is precisely what you have done and continue to do to us, by sacrilegiously repeating our Baptisms and our Ordinations when any of our people go over to you ; but of such offences it is best that we should suffer you to have a monopoly. It is also true that our complaint against your Church includes this among many other particulars, that you have made the Catholic name a matter of contention and debate by your unauthorised assumption of it as the exclusive designation of your own particular Communion. It would be strange indeed, if we ourselves were to

commit the very offence against the Church of which we complain in you ! We could not well stultify ourselves in such a way, and if we did, I think we should deserve severe rebuke. It is true that our local designation is not without serious disadvantages. That we are Protestants, I, for one, do not feel called to deny nor ashamed to confess ; but I dislike the name nevertheless, because it is the name which rings with the thought of calamitous divisions of the body of CHRIST, no matter who is responsible for them ; and I should be glad if the name “ Protestant ” could be removed from the title-page of our Book of Common Prayer. In our late General Convention I supported, with voice and vote, a proposal to strike the two words “ Protestant Episcopal ” from that place. If ever I have the opportunity to do the same again I shall surely do it ; but I shall no more intend by it to signify a renunciation of any of the principles of our Church, than to repudiate Episcopacy. The Constitution of the Church is Catholic and permanent ; the causes which led to the adoption of the name of “ Protestant Episcopal ” were incidental and transitory. It is not worth while to name a permanent body by a characteristic which cannot be permanent, and is not rightly descriptive. Hence our present name in the United States may be regarded as an inherited misfortune without admitting the propriety of adopting another name, which would assume more than truth warrants us in assuming. Therefore, while no one in our Church more fervently believes in the validity and Catholicity of all that she does, and of all that she is, yet I would not have her assume as her peculiar designation a name which is not exclusively hers, but which would imply a foul imputation upon your Church in this land ; and although the only reason given in the short speech which I made against the assumption of the proposed name was the arrogant impropriety of the name proposed, yet I had many other reasons for objecting to it, of which the present occasion calls me to tell only that one which I have given above.

And now, Monsignor, farewell ! We shall not again

cross the foils of argument. I leave you, as is just, the last word, if you shall think it worth while to say that word. Only once before, in a ministry of seven-and-twenty years, have I felt it right to join in controversy, and then, strangely enough, with one who had assailed doctrines as dear to you as to me. With the closing of this letter I trust that I shall close my share of controversial work. Let me end by saying one thing to you. When we are called to lay aside all the charges and duties of this present life, and when we are laid out for our burial, you and I, you in the vestments of a Roman Prelate, and I in the simple surplice of an Anglican Priest, you will not go to God with any firmer faith in the Catholicity of Rome herself, than I will go with certainty of the Catholicity of the Church of England, and of her daughter the "Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States of America." I do not believe that in any utterance of mine I ever gave reason to any man to think that I felt or thought otherwise; but if I ever did, that word was more unjust to me than to the Mother whom I serve. I would to God that when I come to die, it might be as true of my spiritual state as it will be of my ecclesiastical convictions, that I shall die "in the Communion of the Catholic Church, in the confidence of a certain Faith, in the comfort of a reasonable, religious, and holy Hope, in favor with God, and in perfect Charity with the world." So may you also die, Monsignor; and may we both live and deport ourselves as becomes men who hope so to die.

I am, Monsignor, and Brother in Christ, with all respect, your Servant,

JOHN FULTON.

INSURANCE CO. OF NORTH AMERICA.

Company's Building, 292 Walnut St., Philadelphia.

One Hundred and Eighty-second Semi-Annual Statement of the Assets of the Company.

January 1 1985

LIABILITIES

CHAS. PLATT INC. 7 CHARLOTTE HENRI 1000 WILLIAM STREET
HUNTSVILLE ALABAMA 35894

1850.

55th YEAR

1475

MANHATTAN LIFE INSURANCE CO.,

156 and 158 Broadway, New York.

Assets.	\$11,000,000.00
Net surplus, New York standard	2,140,550.50

10. *Rate the confidence you have in*

[illegible]

HENRY STOKES, President.

H. Y. WEMPLE, Sec'y.
S. N. STEEBINS, Act'y.

J. L. HALSEY, 1st Vice Pres.
H. B. STOKES, 2d Vice Pres.

D. APPLETON & CO.

HAVE JUST RECEIVED

Bancroft's History of the United States.

Author's Last Revision. Sixth edition, including a volume

on the History of the United States from 1860 to 1876, by Dr. H. W. Henshaw, of the University of California. The work is now complete. It is a history of the United States from the first settlement to the present time, and is the most complete and accurate history of the United States ever published. It is a history of the United States from the first settlement to the present time, and is the most complete and accurate history of the United States ever published.

The Historical Reference-Book.

Containing a full and complete list of the names of all the Presidents, Vice-Presidents, and Members of Congress, from 1789 to the present time. Also a full and complete list of the names of all the States, Territories, and Possessions of the United States, from 1789 to the present time. Also a full and complete list of the names of all the cities, towns, and villages of the United States, from 1789 to the present time.

This book is a valuable reference work for all who are interested in the history of the United States. It is a full and complete list of the names of all the Presidents, Vice-Presidents, and Members of Congress, from 1789 to the present time. It is also a full and complete list of the names of all the States, Territories, and Possessions of the United States, from 1789 to the present time. It is also a full and complete list of the names of all the cities, towns, and villages of the United States, from 1789 to the present time.

The Hundred Greatest Men.

Containing a full and complete list of the names of all the Presidents, Vice-Presidents, and Members of Congress, from 1789 to the present time. Also a full and complete list of the names of all the States, Territories, and Possessions of the United States, from 1789 to the present time. Also a full and complete list of the names of all the cities, towns, and villages of the United States, from 1789 to the present time.

This book is a valuable reference work for all who are interested in the history of the United States. It is a full and complete list of the names of all the Presidents, Vice-Presidents, and Members of Congress, from 1789 to the present time. It is also a full and complete list of the names of all the States, Territories, and Possessions of the United States, from 1789 to the present time. It is also a full and complete list of the names of all the cities, towns, and villages of the United States, from 1789 to the present time.

This book is a valuable reference work for all who are interested in the history of the United States. It is a full and complete list of the names of all the Presidents, Vice-Presidents, and Members of Congress, from 1789 to the present time. It is also a full and complete list of the names of all the States, Territories, and Possessions of the United States, from 1789 to the present time. It is also a full and complete list of the names of all the cities, towns, and villages of the United States, from 1789 to the present time.

This book is a valuable reference work for all who are interested in the history of the United States. It is a full and complete list of the names of all the Presidents, Vice-Presidents, and Members of Congress, from 1789 to the present time. It is also a full and complete list of the names of all the States, Territories, and Possessions of the United States, from 1789 to the present time. It is also a full and complete list of the names of all the cities, towns, and villages of the United States, from 1789 to the present time.

This book is a valuable reference work for all who are interested in the history of the United States. It is a full and complete list of the names of all the Presidents, Vice-Presidents, and Members of Congress, from 1789 to the present time. It is also a full and complete list of the names of all the States, Territories, and Possessions of the United States, from 1789 to the present time. It is also a full and complete list of the names of all the cities, towns, and villages of the United States, from 1789 to the present time.

This book is a valuable reference work for all who are interested in the history of the United States. It is a full and complete list of the names of all the Presidents, Vice-Presidents, and Members of Congress, from 1789 to the present time. It is also a full and complete list of the names of all the States, Territories, and Possessions of the United States, from 1789 to the present time. It is also a full and complete list of the names of all the cities, towns, and villages of the United States, from 1789 to the present time.

D. APPLETON & CO. Publishers

135 N. 3rd Street, New York

Boyle

III

AMERICAN
CHURCH REVIEW

For Frequent Sunday School

For Sunday Church and Bible

For Sunday Day Class

EDITED BY THE

REV. HENRY MASON BUCH

APRIL, 1885

VOLUME XLV

WHOLE NUMBER CXLII

PUBLISHED QUARTERLY

IN THE MONTH OF

JANUARY, APRIL, JULY, AND OCTOBER

NEW YORK

THE CHURCH PRESS ASSOCIATION

1885



ESTLEY

Organ

Estley-Organ-Co.
Brattleboro-Vt.

The fame of the "ESTLEY" cannot cease as long as the love of music holds sway in American homes.
Illustrated Catalogue sent Free



Design Copyright, 1895, By J. & R. Lamb

THe illustration above has been selected as a fine example of the true use of decoration applied to metal-work. It represents a receiving-basin of sterling silver, elaborately tooled and chased, in which skilful workmanship is combined with beauty and significance of design. The leading motive is the passion-flower, with leaves and vine stems gracefully uniting the larger masses of the flowers, in silver relief on a dark ground. The clover leaf, emblem of the Trinity, is used to fill in the ground of the middle bar, throwing forward the large letters and symbols—the I. H. S., the gloria, the cross, the three nails, and the scourge. The small compartments dividing the words along the edge are designed in clover-leaves in relief against a black ground. We have here a design which is of necessity conventional, but it is treated without conventionality or the ecclesiastical stiffness which the term religious art frequently pre-supposes. The natural forms are closely followed and skilfully combined. The impression is that of breadth, and the details of execution show perfect mastery of the medium on the part of the worker in precious metal, while emphasizing the designer's knowledge of the possibilities underlying this most graceful of the decorative arts.

Sterling Silver ALMS-BASIN in Repoussé work. New and original design by
J. & R. LAMB, 59 Carmine Street, New York.

Houghton, Mifflin & Company's NEW BOOKS.

RIVERSIDE ALDINE SERIES.

A new series of books which have already won great popularity, but which, in an attractive new edition, and at a popular price, should be in every public and private library. They are printed from new electrotypes plates, with a peculiarly inviting page, and are bound in a simple and tasteful style. Two volumes are now ready. Price, \$1.00 each.

MARJORIE DAW, AND OTHER STORIES.

BY THOMAS BAILEY ALDRICH. [Including three stories not embraced in former editions.]

MY SUMMER IN A GARDEN.

BY CHARLES DUDLEY WARNER.

FIRESIDE TRAVELS.

BY JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL.

THE LUCK OF ROARING CAMP, AND OTHER STORIES.

BY BRET HARTE.

Other volumes in preparation.

NATHANIEL PARKER WILLIS.

BY HENRY A. BEERS. Vol. IX. of "American Men of Letters." With steel portrait. 16mo, gilt top, \$1.25.

This interesting book commemorates a man who was, for years, one of the most popular and conspicuous men of letters in America. It is not devoted solely to Willis's life and writings, but treats, to some extent, American literary development and character in his time.

CONTINUITY OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

BY ALEX. V. G. ALLEN, D. D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 12mo, \$2.00.

We can hardly give too high praise to this volume. Dr. Allen is not more noticeable for exceptional learning than for unusual constructive power. He has his learning all at command. He grasps the leading principles of each writer he discusses; he sees the bearing of every controversy; and thus is able to trace the tangled course of thought through so many ages clearly and with effect. He is also gifted with a clear, popular, modern style: if anything, too modern, too American. The book reads like a novel, and demands little effort to grasp its meaning. A first reading leaves upon the mind a clear and definite notion of the principles it inculcates. It is not often that we find combined in the same person learning, grasp of thought, and power of expression. It is an honor to the American Church that so remarkable a treatise has been produced by one of her clergy.—*American Literary Churchman*.

The tone is usually grand and uplifting; it draws the reader on with restless fascination. . . . There is no book within our knowledge which condenses so much into a single volume, and that, too, without becoming obscure.—*The Literary World* (Boston).

For sale by all booksellers. Sent by mail, postpaid, on receipt of price, by the Publishers,

HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN & CO., BOSTON.

11 East 17th Street, New York.


IMPERIAL GRANUM

SUPERIOR
NUTRITION
THE LIFE

•THE SALVATOR FOR INVALIDS AND THE AGED•



THIS has become one of the most popular and best appreciated articles of diet for the last comers into the household. They thrive on it, get fat, make muscle and have plenty of lung capacity, though they generally smile rather than bawl, especially when Imperial Granum is placed in their sight. **IT IS REALLY A CAPITAL FOOD**, one that can be commended as furnishing the best principles for infant diet. It is called for not only for babes, but **IT HAS A VERY LARGE SALE AS A FOOD FOR INVALIDS**, and we learn from its proprietors that the sales are not only increasing constantly, but those who use it **SEEM BETTER PLEASED THAN EVER** with its results — *New York Pharmaceutical Record*



SOLD BY DRUGGISTS • JOHN CARLE & SONS • NEW YORK •

1850.

35th YEAR.

1885.

MANHATTAN LIFE INSURANCE CO.,

156 and 158 Broadway, New York.

Assets,	\$11,000,000.00
Net surplus, New York standard,	2,389,550.59

The new plan of the Manhattan Life Insurance Company continues to meet the popular favor. It combines the protective features of Life Insurance with the investment feature of the endowment policy, while it avoids the expense attending the latter by the ordinary method. An improvement has also been added to this new form of policy within the year, which gives the assured the option at the end of the period of taking the endowment in cash or of continuing the insurance for a much larger amount without any further payment of premium, independent of the condition of health.—*Philadelphia Inquirer*, January 31, 1884.

Write for information—give your age.

GENERAL AGENTS AND CANVASSERS WANTED in desirable territory, to whom permanent employment and liberal compensation will be given.

Address

HENRY STOKES, President.

H. Y. WEMPLE, Sec'y.

J. L. HALSEY, 1st Vice-Pres.

S. N. STEBBINS, Act'y.

H. B. STOKES, 2d Vice-Pres.

Webster's Unabridged Dictionary

IN VARIOUS STYLES OF BINDING.



Supplied at small extra cost with **DENISON'S PATENT REFERENCE INDEX.**

"The greatest improvement in book-making that has been made in a hundred years."
The cut gives but an incomplete idea of its utility.

The latest edition has **3000** more Words in its vocabulary than are found in any other Am. Dict'y and nearly **3** times the number of Engravings.

Its condensed Biographical Dictionary (nearly **10,000** names) is a valuable feature.

Published by **G. & C. MERRIAM & CO.**, Springfield, Mass.

THE STANDARD

of authority in

The Government Printing Office,
and with the

United States Supreme Court.

Recommended by the

State Supts. Schools in 36 States,
and by

Over Fifty College Presidents.

For supplying Schools,

Every State Purchase

has been of Webster.

The London Times, of England,

Says: It is the best Dictionary of the Language.

Hon. Geo. Bancroft, the Historian,

Says: It is superior to all others.

Toronto Globe, Canada, says:

Its place is in the very highest rank.

Similar testimonials have been given by hundreds of the best American and European Scholars. **GET THE BEST.**

—THE—

American Church Review

Vol. XLV.—No. 137.

APRIL, 1885.

COMMUNION WINE—A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF SCRIPTURE WORDS, AND HISTORIC TESTIMONY.

Communion Wine and Bible Temperance. By WILLIAM A. THAYER. National Temperance Society, New York, 1878.

Wines: Scriptural and Ecclesiastical. By NORMAN KERR, M.D., F.L.S. National Temperance Society, New York, 1882.

The Divine Law as to Wines. By G. W. SAMSON, D.D. National Temperance Society, New York, 1883.

ONE of the prominent, unsettled questions of the day is whether it is right to use fermented wine at the LORD'S Table. For many years the matter has been under debate. Christian bodies in their ecclesiastical councils have had it in careful consideration, and have issued formal recommendations as a guide to uneasy consciences. But still the question is perpetually reopened. Only a few weeks ago, the present writer received a letter from a prominent Congregational Pastor, containing the following inquiry: "Is the wine of the LORD'S Supper as referred to by CHRIST and Paul *fermented* wine? How does the best New Testament Greek scholarship answer this question? Has the Episcopal Church in the United States, in any of its higher ecclesiastical courts, made any

declaration on this question? If so, when, where, and what?"

Nor is it surprising, considering the general ignorance on the subject, that much uneasiness is felt. The demon of drunkenness is blighting and cursing his victims in all parts of the land. His debasements and cruelties rest with withering power in impoverished homes and on crushed hearts. And if wine—not to mention other liquors—in its ordinary meaning, *i.e.*, the fermented juice of the grape, is in itself an evil, discountenanced by God, as is strenuously maintained by a large and influential body, its use in any form must also be evil. If the results lamented flow not from excess in use, but as a natural and unavoidable consequence of participation in any way or degree, then the manufacture and sale should be prevented, if possible, by legislative enactments; and it should be the special duty of every Christian body to remove a deadly temptation from the weak when participating in the most solemn services of their holy Faith.

In addition to what has been done by individuals and Church Synods, there has been an extensive literature prepared by the National Temperance Society, designed expressly to enlighten the Christian mind, and guide the Christian conscience on this question. But all such agencies, to be a real and permanent blessing, must have their foundations firmly laid upon the rock of truth. Unwise, though well-meaning advocacies will usually do more harm in the long run to any cause, than open opposition. It is reported as a saying of one of England's greatest statesmen, "If a thing is not true, we should not lie that it may be true." Certainly God does not need man's lies, and the cause of our Blessed REDEEMER will never be permanently advanced by unreflecting fanaticism, or misguided prejudice.

Among the more recent works having this object in view, published by that society, are those mentioned above. The first, published in 1878, was a review of an article written for the *Bibliotheca Sacra* of January, 1869. The second, published in 1882, is an expansion of a lecture delivered before the Church Homiletical Society in

the Chapter House of S. Paul's Cathedral, London, November 1, 1881, and the last, but a short time out of the press,* is designed as an unanswerable argument in favor of unfermented wine. According to the prospectus, "it is a new and thoroughly scholarly book, which has been several years in preparation, examining the entire wine question from two thousand years before CHRIST to the present time, and conclusively showing that the Bible nowhere sanctions the drinking of intoxicating liquors."

Several marked features are common to all these works. They all adopt the same logical processes, marked by most glaring *petitiones principii*. They all abound in mistaken references. And in the main they all follow the etymological guidance of the Temperance Bible Commentary, published in 1870, by Dr. Frederick Richard Lees, F.S.A., and the Rev. Dawson Burns, M.A.

On the title-page of Dr. Samson's book there is a marked instance of the fallacy mentioned. "All the fresh unfermented wine" (*chêleb tirosh*) they shall offer unto the LORD—MOSES' LAW AS TO OFFERINGS. The verse quoted, Num. xviii. 12, is as follows: "All the best of the oil, and all the best of the wine, and of the wheat, the first fruits of them which they shall offer unto the LORD, them have I given thee." Gesenius defines the word חֵלֶב, *chêleb*, "*fat, fatness* of victims." Metaph. for the best, richest part of a thing, as *chêleb haaretz*, the fat of the land, *i.e.*, its best fruits, richest productions. The word occurs seventy-nine times in the Hebrew original, seventy-one times of animal fat, chiefly the fat of sacrificial victims, and eight times figuratively of vegetable products offered as first-fruits, or as heave-offerings. Four times only is there any reference to the product of the vine, and then it is manifestly to the quality of the wine offered, as of the other things mentioned, without any allusion whatever to the question of fermentation. The word "fresh" may be applied to the cognate *châlâb*, חָלָב, "new milk, and so called from its fatness"

* The last edition published 1883.

(Gesenius); or "from which butter is made" (Fürst); but "*fresh*, unfermented," or "the fresh of tirosh," page 317, is language utterly foreign to the Hebrew original. The Septuagint renders the words *chêleb-tirosh*, ἀπαρχὴ οἴνου; the Peshito Syriac, *shumno d'chamro*,* i.e., *adepts vini*; the Vulgate, *medullam vini*.

With sublime indifference to all this, however, and with an equally sublime assurance, Dr. Lees, in his comments on this verse, after maintaining that the wine and oil denote the fruits of the earth in their solid state, tells us "This is a case in which the Jews of the Captivity seem to have lost the true and certain sense of the words *tirosh* and *yitzhar* (vine and orchard fruit), and to have narrowed their meaning down to that of a liquid prepared by man." And so reasoning by analogy (*Prelim. Dis.*) from the fact that words occasionally become obsolete, or change their meaning, as *villain*, *prevent*, this nineteenth-century Solomon waives aside magisterially not only the translations made by ancient scholars, with whom both languages were in great measure vernacular, but also the grand labors and decisions of modern lexicographers. For over two thousand years, he would have us believe, the whole scholarly world has been in error on this point. "The modern versions also," he adds, "all follow in the same rut." It might have occurred to Dr. Lees to examine whether "the Jews of the Captivity" (whatever that may mean) had lost the true and certain sense of other articles of daily use, as bread, butter, oil, honey, etc. Had he done so he would have found that from the earliest book in the Old Testament Canon to the latest, none of those words became obsolete, or varied in the least from their original meaning. *Lechem*, both in its generic and specific senses, was equally used by Moses, David, Isaiah, Nehemiah, and Malachi, and equally so were the others.

From the above example furnished on the title-page of Dr. Samson's book, it is easy to imagine what may be looked for in the body of the work itself. A man

* *شومرو د'حامرو* ?

who is capable of changing a Hebrew noun in the construct state, meaning etymologically and properly *fat*, or *fatness* of, into a double headed adjective, rendered "*fresh-unfermented*," is equal to any amount of linguistic legerdemain.

On page 46, it is stated that the terms in which Moses, commenting on his own record, characterises the wine with which Noah was drugged, calling it the "wine of Sodom, the poison of dragons" (Deut. xxxii. 32, 33), "indicates the recognition of the two classes of wine, intoxicating and unintoxicating, which he makes throughout his connected writings." Here is both a "begging of the question," and a mistaken reference, not to say anything worse of it. That there was any such recognition of "two classes of wine" by Moses, in this or in any other passage of his writings, is the merest assumption; and whatever comment he may have made on Noah's wine at some time or place not recorded, there is certainly none in the passage referred to.

On page 92, when commenting on Hosea iv. 11, and vii. 5, we are told, "Finally and specially noteworthy, he declares the offering of wine to JEHOVAH as displeasing to him, ix. 4, a declaration which illustrates and confirms the view of Moses' law above stated as excluding alcoholic wines." It might have been well to mention that the prophet disparaged equally the offering of sacrifices, and it would not have been uninteresting to state, that the Hebrew word *Yayin*, in that passage, is the very same word, יַיִן, which is uniformly used by Moses when issuing the Divine command touching drink-offerings—*e.g.*, "The meat-offering thereof shall be two-tenths deals of fine flour mingled with oil, an offering made by fire unto the LORD, for a sweet savor; and the drink-offering thereof shall be of wine," נֶסֶךְ יַיִן — *Yayin*, "the fourth part of a hin," Levit. xxiii. 13.

But to the main question. •What wines were in use among the Jews, in so far as we can learn from their sacred writings, and other reliable sources? The true answer, I need scarcely say, will be found not within the sphere of imaginative sentimentalities, but in a scientific

induction of etymological and historical facts. The word most commonly used by the sacred writers is the one just mentioned, *Yayin*, which is found one hundred and forty-one times, and is rendered uniformly in the Septuagint, with one exception, Job xxxii. 19, by οἶνος. In accordance with that law common to Semitic tongues, by which substantives usually derive their specific meanings from the generic conception expressed in the verbal root, *Yayin* means etymologically a fermented liquor, from the root, *Yōn*, יָן. Gesenius gives the definition, "to boil up, to be in a ferment." The substantive itself he defines, first, "*wine*, so called from its fermenting, effervescing; second, Meton. of cause for effect, *wine* for drunkenness, intoxication." Fürst traces the word to a supposed root now obsolete, יָנַן. *Yavan*, meaning "to stamp, to press." But the best Hebrew scholarship of the day rejects Fürst as reliable authority. Professor Robertson Smith, in the new edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, vol. xi., p. 602, writes: "Far superior to all other lexicons is the Thesaurus of Gesenius, completed by Rödiger (Leipsic, 1829–1858). The Handwörterbuch of Fürst (2d ed., 1863. English translated by S. Davidson, 1871; 3d ed., by Ryssel, 1876) proceeds on very faulty etymological principles, and must be used with great caution."

The next word used with the greatest degree of frequency is *Tirosh*, תִּירוֹשׁ, which occurs thirty-eight times, and is rendered in the Septuagint by οἶνος, except in Isaiah lxv. 8, where we find the word ῥώξ, evidently in reference to the *bacca* or berry of the grape; and Hos. iv. 11, where the rendering is μεδυσμα, *ebrietas*. The verbal root is *Yarash*, יָרַשׁ, meaning as defined by Gesenius, "to take, to seize, to get possession of." Hence the substantive *tirosh* is defined *new wine*, so called, because it gets possession of the brain and inebriates. Hos. iv. 11, "Whoredom, and wine, and new wine take away the heart," *i.e.*, the understanding.

Another word in occasional use is *Chemer*, חֶמֶר, occurring but twice in the Hebrew, and six times in the Chaldean portions of Ezra and Daniel. In every instance

the Septuagint translates by οἶνος. The verbal root, according to Gesenius, means “to boil up, to foam, to ferment, to be red, from the idea of boiling, being inflamed,” etc. Hence the substantive, “*wine*,” so-called as being fermented. The cognate Arabic,* *chamr*, and the Syriac,† *chamro*, are used with few exceptions in the Arabic and Syriac versions in place of the Hebrew *Yayin* and *Tirosh*. Of importance also to consider is the word, *Shekar*, שֵׁכָר, which is found twenty-two times, and is usually rendered in the Septuagint by σίκερα, and in English by “strong drink ;” or “strong wine,” as in Numb. xxviii. 7. Its verbal root in all the Semitic tongues means to “drink deeply, to be drunken.” Gesenius defines the substantive, “strong drink, any intoxicating liquor whether *wine* or an intoxicating drink prepared from barley, honey, or dates.”

In addition to the above, I will mention the word *Asis*, אָסִיס, used five times, from the verbal root *Asas*, “to tread, to press,” hence “what is trodden out, and so put for *new wine*, the product of the same year, like new wheat ;” *Sove*, סָפָא, used but three times from a root meaning “to drink to excess, to tope ;” *Shemer*, שֹׁמֵר, used Isa. xxvii. 6, in the plural, of “generous old wine purified from the lees ;” and *Mezeg*, מֵזֵג, found only once, Cant. vii. 3, referring to mixed or spiced wine.

From the above it is evident that the word *wine*, as usually understood by the Jews, referred primarily and etymologically to a fermented liquor. Certainly, in so far as anything can be gathered from the several contexts, the word *Yayin* has, in the vast majority of cases—one hundred and thirty-two times out of one hundred and forty-one—its commonly accepted signification ; or, by Meton. wine for drunkenness, as in Gen. ix. 24. Five times it is used figuratively, as in Ps. lx. 3, “wine of astonishment ;” twice proleptically of the grape itself, as the material from which wine is derived, Jer. xl. 10, 12 ; and twice of God’s judgments preventing its manufacture, Isai. xvi. 10 ; Jer. xlviii. 33. It would be difficult, in view of

these facts, to find any ground upon which to rest the theory of "two classes of wine," in so far, at least, as *Yayin* is concerned. One thing is very sure, the same word is used both commendingly and disparagingly, or, rather, in the latter case, the abuse of it. It was *Yayin* which Melchisedec brought forth with bread for the refreshment of Abram and his servants. It was *Yayin* in which, according to the prophecy of dying Israel, the garments of royal Judah should be washed, and with which his eyes should be "red," as his teeth should be "white" with milk. It was *Yayin* which formed, according to divine command, an integral part of the legal sacrifices, or drink-offerings. It was *Yayin* which the Psalmist declares "maketh glad the heart of man," as oil causes the face to shine, and bread strengthens his heart. It was *Yayin* which Isaiah, by a figure, exhorts the thirsty souls to buy, together with milk, without money, and without price. On the contrary, it was *Yayin* which Solomon tells us is a "mockery," as "strong drink," *Shekar*, "is raging." It was *Yayin* which he says is the cause of woe and sorrow, through *long tarrying thereat*. It was *Yayin* which he cautions against looking upon "when it is red," and which "biteth like a serpent and stingeth like an adder."

The Rev. W. M. Thayer affirms, nevertheless (page 32), "that the Bible speaks of two kinds of wine, there can be no doubt. It pronounces one of them a *blessing*, and the other a *curse*." And in this, equally with Drs. Kerr and Samson, he follows the guidance of Dr. Lees, Moses Stuart, and other early agitators of the question. President Nott innocently asks, "Can the same thing in the same state be good and bad; a thing to be sought after, and a thing to be avoided?" as though the same might not equally be said of *fire* and *water*, and a multitude of things in daily use, which are a *blessing* or a *curse* according as they are used. Professor Stuart declares, "my final conclusion is this, namely, that, wherever the Scriptures speak of wine as a comfort, a blessing, a libation to God, and rank it with such articles as corn and oil, they mean—they can mean—only such wine as

contained no alcohol, that could have a mischievous tendency; that wherever they denounce it, prohibit it, and connect it with drunkenness, they can mean only alcoholic or intoxicating wine." Upon which marvellous process of reasoning a writer for the CHURCH REVIEW of 1849 wittily says: "This modern apparatus is like that of a conjurer. You see him draw wine from a vessel, and, when he draws wine again from the same vessel, instead of the same wine coming out, you have a liquor totally different. An uninitiated man reads his Bible quietly, and thinks he knows what is meant by wine; but by this newly discovered legerdemain, when he least expects it, whisk! it is turned into a liquor totally different from what it was just before."

The main standpoint taken by these advocates of "two classes of wine" centres in the second word mentioned, *Tirosh*—all the others being used more or less frequently in connection with intoxication. *Sove*, *Shekar*, and *Mezeg*, show etymologically their meaning as well as *Yayin*; and *Asis*, in two out of five instances of its use, refers unmistakably to an intoxicating drink, Isa. xlix. 26, and Joel i. 5. In the latter instance, the Septuagint rendering is peculiarly strong—*οἶνον εἰς μέθην*, i.e., "wine unto intoxication." Of *Tirosh*, however, the Rev. W. M. Thayer says: "All the direct endorsements of wine in the Bible are connected with the word *Tirosh*. We affirm that in every passage claimed to refer to the liquid product of the vine, it is spoken of as a blessing. There is no denunciation of this beverage, no warning against its use. This is not true of one of the other words translated *wine* in the Old Testament." In like spirit Dr. Samson writes (page 70): "Modern investigations lead to the conclusion that *Tirosh* was *Must*, or unfermented wine."

As already stated, the word occurs thirty-eight times. Of these it is used thirty-four times in connection with corn, or oil, or with both, as the annual products of the land. In Isa. lxv. 8, the Septuagint translation is *ῥῶξ*; the Peshito Syriac *Tutitho** or *Odsho*, i.e., the

* *ܬܘܬܝܬܗ* or *ܕܫܗ*—the MSS. differ.

berry ; and the Vulgate, *granum*. In Judges ix. 13, and Isa. xxiv. 7, although in both instances the Greek rendering is *οἶνος*, and the Latin *vinum*, the reference may be also to the grape itself as that from which the wine is made. Without going further, therefore, in the light of all these facts, the untruth of the statements made by Professor Stuart and the Rev. W. M. Thayer must be evident.

Tirosh is *never* used in the Mosaic law of the Divinely prescribed "drink-offerings." There, as already shown, *Yayin* is the only word used. In Deut. xiv. 26, we find also a striking permission to drink not only *Yayin*, but strong drink, *Shekar*. As we learn from the context, when the Israelites lived at a distance from the house of God, they were to be permitted to sell the tithes of their flocks, and of the products of their land, and purchase with the money such things as they required at the end of their journey to worship at the annual festivals. "Thou shalt bestow that money for whatsoever thy soul lusteth after, for oxen, or for sheep, or for wine, or for strong drink ; or for whatsoever thy soul desireth ; and thou shalt eat there before the LORD thy GOD, and thou shalt rejoice, thou and thine household." And in that prophetic passage, Isa. xxv. 6, in which the spiritual blessings of the Gospel dispensation are portrayed under the figure of a "feast of fat things, of wines on the lees, well refined," the word used is *Shemarim*, the plural of *Shemer*.

There is one other passage, however, Hosea iv. 11 which is a very difficult one for the advocates of the two classes of wine, and the exclusive commendation given to *Tirosh*, to manage. "Whoredom and wine—*Yayin*—and new wine—*Tirosh*—take away the heart," *i.e.*, the understanding. It is quite amusing to see how Drs. Lees, Samson, and others wrestle with the difficulty. The first, true to his assumption that *Tirosh* always means the unpressed grape, or, as he calls it, "vine fruit," allegorises the whole verse. "By whoredom," he says, "is here to be understood illicit worship rendered by the chosen people to heathen gods. By *Yayin*,

wine—the type of sensual gratification, their hearts also had been captivated. By *Tirosh*, the fruit of the vine—the type of natural, earthly good—their hearts had been taken away from God, as the infinite Goodness, and the fountain of spiritual joy.” Dr. Samson, following here the etymological guidance of Fürst, derives the word from a secondary use of *Yarash*, which he translates “to expel, to drive out”—hence “*must*” like new cider, is an expellent. Speaking (page 180) of the word “*tham-rig*,” used by a paraphrast of *Tirosh*, he says, “it was evidently an *aperient* used *internally*; thus illustrating the effects of ‘*Tirosh*’ already cited, as also of the unfermented Greek ‘*gleukos*,’ and the Roman ‘*must*.’” As the Rev. Mr. Thayer informs us that “all the direct endorsements of wine in the Bible are connected with the word *Tirosh*,” and that “*Tirosh* is always associated with *blessings* in the Bible,” the great value and blessedness of wine would thus seem to centre around it as “an *aperient* used *internally*.” What sort of a thing “an *aperient*” used *externally* might be, we are not prepared to say.

Unfortunately for these gentlemen there is an array of testimony in opposition to their views, which can never be set aside. The Rev. Mr. Thayer indeed tells us “there are what scholars and commentators call ‘epochs of exegesis.’” Luther evidently had come upon one, when he proclaimed the Epistle of S. James “*Epistola Straminea*.” Dr. Lees and others have, in their own judgment, come upon another. But it will take more than their *dictum* to convince the world, that all exegetes before their day had been incompetent to do the work they undertook—that the grand scholars of antiquity had “lost the true and certain meaning” of words which in substance were on their tongues daily. In the passage before us, the prophet seemingly rises to a climax in the use of the word *Tirosh*. *That* the ancient translators and targumists manifestly felt, and rendered the word accordingly. As the new wine *Tirosh* would naturally be more plenty than the older wine, *Yayin*, kept from former years, there would be

more opportunity and temptation in it to drink to excess. Hence the Septuagint version has *μὲθυσμα*, explained by Schleusner, "*potus inebrians*." * The Peshito Syriac has *Ravoyutho*, rendered by Castell, *ebrietas*, *vinolentia*, i.e., habitual drunkenness. With this the Targum of Jonathan agrees, the same word in its Chaldee form being used as in the Syriac. The Vulgate rendering is *ebrietas*, drunkenness. In the Peshito the word is especially strong, as may be seen from its use in the New Testament, S. Luke xxi. 34; Rom. xiii. 13; Gal. v. 21; S. Peter, iv. 3. In the last of these, our English rendering is, "excess of wine." As a further confirmation, I give the following from Gesenius, under the head of *Tirosh*: "All the passages go to show that *Tirosh* is new wine of the first year, the wine crop or vintage of the season, and hence it is mostly coupled with corn and oil as the products of the land. That it was regarded as intoxicating is shown by Hosea iv. 11" (Lex., p. 1129).

We are now ready for the inquiry, What evidence can be found in the Old Testament Scriptures in favor of "two classes of wine," in the sense contended for? Our answer is unhesitatingly, *none*. Wine, under every name given, *when immoderately used*, would intoxicate. What was done by the Greeks and Romans in preserving *must* in an unfermented state will be considered further on. If, however, there is even ONE *unmistakable reference* in the Word of God to *Tirosh*, *Yayin*, or any other word translated wine, in the sense of *must*, preserved permanently in an unfermented state, let the scholars of the Temperance Society produce it. We challenge them to do so. In fact, the term *unfermented* wine, in Scripture phrase-

* It is quite possible that a traveller passing through the country at some seasons of the year, might not see a single case of intoxication, and hastily infer that drunkenness was a total stranger in the land; but let such a one make a tour from village to village during the months that occur between the vintage and the beginning of Lent, when the new wine is abundant, and he will find intoxication in its most disgusting forms. This is the principal season for betrothals and weddings, the principal attraction of which occasions is a plentiful supply of wine.—Rev. B. LABARRE, Jr., *Missionary among the Nestorians*. Biblio. Sac., vol. xxvi., p. 180.

ology is a misnomer and self-contradictory. Etymologically, in every Semitic tongue the word implies fermentation as much as butter implies and presupposes agitation or churning, and cheese coagulation or curding. Bread, it is true, is spoken of as both leavened and unleavened. But *two distinct words* are uniformly used, derived from verbal roots of opposite significations. The first, *חָמֵץ* *Chametz*, i.e., bread soured, or leavened, from the root *Chametz*, to be sour, was used of the bread ordinarily eaten; while *מַצָּה* *Matzah*, i.e., bread sweet from the root *matzatz*, to be sweet, was used of the flat cakes or crackers eaten during the Passover season. In the case of wine, however, there was no such distinction made. Why this should be, it becomes the advocates of "two classes of wine" to say. A language rich enough in words to employ at least *eight* for *wine*, might have furnished, or restricted *one* to mark so important a distinction. But there is not even an adjective, or any qualifying word employed to distinguish fermented from unfermented wine. That such is the case, can be accounted for only on one supposition—*no such distinction existed!*

As a final confirmation of the position above taken, we quote the following: "The impression formed on the mind by a general review, is that both *Yayin* and *Tirosh*, in their ordinary and popular acceptation, referred to *fermented* intoxicating wine. In the condemnatory passages no exception is made in favor of any other kind of liquor, passing under the same name, but not invested with the same dangerous qualities. Nor again in these passages is there any decisive condemnation of the *substance itself*, which would enforce the conclusion that elsewhere an unfermented liquor must be understood" (*Smith's Bible Dictionary*).

The next source of authority to examine before proceeding to the writings of the New Testament, is the literature of the Jews during the five centuries subsequent to the close of the Old Testament canon. This may be classed under the heads—1, The Apocrypha; 2, the Targums; 3, the writings of Philo and Josephus.

1. In the Apocrypha the word wine, οἶνος, occurs sixteen times, and in each instance having its ordinary meaning of a fermented liquor. Certainly, as in the Canonical Scriptures, there is nothing in the several contexts to mark any difference in the nature of the thing itself. Rational and temperate use is commended, while *excess* is condemned, and the evil consequences thereof are vividly portrayed. "Wine is as good as life to a man," affirms the Son of Sirach (Ecclus. xxxi. 27-29), "*if it be drunk moderately*. What life is there to a man that is without wine? for it was made to make men glad. Wine moderately drunk, and in season, bringeth gladness to the heart and cheerfulness to the mind. But wine drunken with excess, maketh bitterness of the mind, with brawling and quarrelling."

As a comment on this we have a characteristic specimen of juggling from Dr. Samson. These verses, unfortunately for his purpose, stand where they will ever be found, and of course they were very much in the way. Something must be done, so we have a sudden change in the *dramatis personæ* introduced. After quoting verses 25, 26, he says, "Then follows the drinker's plea, verses 27, 28." We need surely to be informed that this is the "drinker's plea," for there is nothing in the narrative itself to mark any change of writer or speaker. The narration flows steadily on without break or hindrance such as would mark the introduction of another person. But what the Germans call the *Einbildungskraft*, i.e., the power of imagination, is at times highly developed, and if allowed free range, it will carry its possessor over many a difficulty. Indeed, it would appear all but an impossibility not to see that the position thus taken is substantially that taken by Solomon, in those passages quoted on all occasions as denunciatory of wine itself. His instruction, to be rightly understood, must be dealt with honestly—*taken as a whole*—and not used piecemeal; and it is a strange logic which would show that because excess in any matter is denounced, all use whatever is forbidden—that *abusus tollit usum*. "Hear thou, my son, and be wise" (Prov. xxiii. 19-21). "Be

not among wine-bibbers ; among riotous eaters of flesh ; for the drunkard and the glutton shall come to poverty ! ” Now in this passage, if the injunction is against all drinking of wine, it is equally so against all eating of flesh. But no one untrammelled by a theory would dream of reading any such thought into the words. Thereupon follows a warning against “ the strange woman,” connected almost immediately with the inquiry, “ Who hath woe ? Who hath sorrow ? ” etc., together with the answer, “ They that *tarry long at the wine* ; they that go to seek mixed wine.” In this connection we give a striking passage from Pliny, who asserts that nothing is more beneficial than wine for strengthening the body, when moderately used ; and that nothing is more injurious when used immoderately—thus not only endorsing the opinion of the Son of Sirach above given, but expressing the general idea entertained on the subject by heathen philosophers and moralists—“ *Prorsus ut jure dici possit, neque viribus corporis utilius aliud, neque aliud voluptatibus perniciosius, SI MODUS ABSIT.*” (Lib. xiv. cap. vii.)

The Rev. Mr. Thayer tells us, notwithstanding, “ the fallacy of the plea, It is the abuse and not the use of intoxicating liquors which the Bible prohibits, is apparent. As Bible temperance is the moderate use of good things, and abstinence from evil things, any use of that which is injurious must be an abuse of it. Besides, it is not the abuse of wine that is called a ‘ mocker,’ but wine itself. Solomon does not teach us to avoid the *abuse* of wine, or not to drink to excess, but not to look upon it.” We will leave Solomon to settle the point with each man’s own reason and conscience. But if being among “ wine-bibbers,” and “ riotous eaters of flesh ” unto drunkenness and gluttony, and tarrying “ long at the wine,” do not imply “ *abuse*,” we are utterly unable to comprehend what they do imply. One FACT, however, is very clear, *there is not a line or a word in the Apocrypha* which gives any support to the “ two classes of wine ” theory.

2. As regards the Targums the evidence therein

1. In the Apocrypha the word wine, οἶνος, occurs sixteen times, and in each instance having its ordinary meaning of a fermented liquor. Certainly, as in the Canonical Scriptures, there is nothing in the several contexts to mark any difference in the nature of the thing itself. Rational and temperate use is commended, while *excess* is condemned, and the evil consequences thereof are vividly portrayed. "Wine is as good as life to a man," affirms the Son of Sirach (Ecclus. xxxi. 27-29), "*if it be drunk moderately*. What life is there to a man that is without wine? for it was made to make men glad. Wine moderately drunk, and in season, bringeth gladness to the heart and cheerfulness to the mind. But wine drunken with excess, maketh bitterness of the mind, with brawling and quarrelling."

As a comment on this we have a characteristic specimen of juggling from Dr. Samson. These verses, unfortunately for his purpose, stand where they will ever be found, and of course they were very much in the way. Something must be done, so we have a sudden change in the *dramatis personæ* introduced. After quoting verses 25, 26, he says, "Then follows the drinker's plea, verses 27, 28." We need surely to be informed that this is the "drinker's plea," for there is nothing in the narrative itself to mark any change of writer or speaker. The narration flows steadily on without break or hindrance such as would mark the introduction of another person. But what the Germans call the *Einbildungskraft*, i.e., the power of imagination, is at times highly developed, and if allowed free range, it will carry its possessor over many a difficulty. Indeed, it would appear all but an impossibility not to see that the position thus taken is substantially that taken by Solomon, in those passages quoted on all occasions as denunciatory of wine itself. His instruction, to be rightly understood, must be dealt with honestly—*taken as a whole*—and not used piecemeal; and it is a strange logic which would show that because excess in any matter is denounced, all use whatever is forbidden—that *abusus tollit usum*. "Hear thou, my son, and be wise" (Prov. xxiii. 19-21). "Be

not among wine-bibbers ; among riotous eaters of flesh ; for the drunkard and the glutton shall come to poverty ! ” Now in this passage, if the injunction is against all drinking of wine, it is equally so against all eating of flesh. But no one untrammelled by a theory would dream of reading any such thought into the words. Thereupon follows a warning against “ the strange woman,” connected almost immediately with the inquiry, “ Who hath woe ? Who hath sorrow ? ” etc., together with the answer, “ They that *tarry long at the wine* ; they that go to seek mixed wine.” In this connection we give a striking passage from Pliny, who asserts that nothing is more beneficial than wine for strengthening the body, when moderately used ; and that nothing is more injurious when used immoderately—thus not only endorsing the opinion of the Son of Sirach above given, but expressing the general idea entertained on the subject by heathen philosophers and moralists—“ *Prorsus ut jure dici possit, neque viribus corporis utilius aliud, neque aliud voluptatibus perniciosius, SI MODUS ABSIT.*” (Lib. xiv. cap. vii.)

The Rev. Mr. Thayer tells us, notwithstanding, “ the fallacy of the plea, It is the abuse and not the use of intoxicating liquors which the Bible prohibits, is apparent. As Bible temperance is the moderate use of good things, and abstinence from evil things, any use of that which is injurious must be an abuse of it. Besides, it is not the abuse of wine that is called a ‘ mocker,’ but wine itself. Solomon does not teach us to avoid the *abuse* of wine, or not to drink to excess, but not to look upon it.” We will leave Solomon to settle the point with each man’s own reason and conscience. But if being among “ wine-bibbers,” and “ riotous eaters of flesh ” unto drunkenness and gluttony, and tarrying “ long at the wine,” do not imply “ *abuse*,” we are utterly unable to comprehend what they do imply. One FACT, however, is very clear, *there is not a line or a word in the Apocrypha* which gives any support to the “ two classes of wine ” theory.

2. As regards the Targums the evidence therein

1. In the Apocrypha the word wine, *οἶνος*, occurs sixteen times, and in each instance having its ordinary meaning of a fermented liquor. Certainly, as in the Canonical Scriptures, there is nothing in the several contexts to mark any difference in the nature of the thing itself. Rational and temperate use is commended, while *excess* is condemned, and the evil consequences thereof are vividly portrayed. "Wine is as good as life to a man," affirms the Son of Sirach (Ecclus. xxxi. 27-29), "*if it be drunk moderately*. What life is there to a man that is without wine? for it was made to make men glad. Wine moderately drunk, and in season, bringeth gladness to the heart and cheerfulness to the mind. But wine drunken with excess, maketh bitterness of the mind, with brawling and quarrelling."

As a comment on this we have a characteristic specimen of juggling from Dr. Samson. These verses, unfortunately for his purpose, stand where they will ever be found, and of course they were very much in the way. Something must be done, so we have a sudden change in the *dramatis personæ* introduced. After quoting verses 25, 26, he says, "Then follows the drinker's plea, verses 27, 28." We need surely to be informed that this is the "drinker's plea," for there is nothing in the narrative itself to mark any change of writer or speaker. The narration flows steadily on without break or hindrance such as would mark the introduction of another person. But what the Germans call the *Einbildungskraft*, *i.e.*, the power of imagination, is at times highly developed, and if allowed free range, it will carry its possessor over many a difficulty. Indeed, it would appear all but an impossibility not to see that the position thus taken is substantially that taken by Solomon, in those passages quoted on all occasions as denunciatory of wine itself. His instruction, to be rightly understood, must be dealt with honestly—*taken as a whole*—and not used piecemeal; and it is a strange logic which would show that because excess in any matter is denounced, all use whatever is forbidden—that *abusus tollit usum*. "Hear thou, my son, and be wise" (Prov. xxiii. 19-21). "Be

not among wine-bibbers ; among riotous eaters of flesh ; for the drunkard and the glutton shall come to poverty ! ” Now in this passage, if the injunction is against all drinking of wine, it is equally so against all eating of flesh. But no one untrammelled by a theory would dream of reading any such thought into the words. Thereupon follows a warning against “ the strange woman,” connected almost immediately with the inquiry, “ Who hath woe ? Who hath sorrow ? ” etc., together with the answer, “ They that *tarry long at the wine* ; they that go to seek mixed wine.” In this connection we give a striking passage from Pliny, who asserts that nothing is more beneficial than wine for strengthening the body, when moderately used ; and that nothing is more injurious when used immoderately—thus not only endorsing the opinion of the Son of Sirach above given, but expressing the general idea entertained on the subject by heathen philosophers and moralists—“ *Prorsus ut jure dici possit, neque viribus corporis utilius aliud, neque aliud voluptatibus perniciosius, SI MODUS ABSIT.*” (Lib. xiv. cap. vii.)

The Rev. Mr. Thayer tells us, notwithstanding, “ the fallacy of the plea, It is the abuse and not the use of intoxicating liquors which the Bible prohibits, is apparent. As Bible temperance is the moderate use of good things, and abstinence from evil things, any use of that which is injurious must be an abuse of it. Besides, it is not the abuse of wine that is called a ‘ mocker,’ but wine itself. Solomon does not teach us to avoid the *abuse* of wine, or not to drink to excess, but not to look upon it.” We will leave Solomon to settle the point with each man’s own reason and conscience. But if being among “ wine-bibbers,” and “ riotous eaters of flesh ” unto drunkenness and gluttony, and tarrying “ long at the wine,” do not imply “ *abuse*,” we are utterly unable to comprehend what they do imply. One FACT, however, is very clear, there *is not a line or a word in the Apocrypha* which gives any support to the “ two classes of wine ” theory.

2. As regards the Targums the evidence therein

1. In the Apocrypha the word wine, *οἶνος*, occurs sixteen times, and in each instance having its ordinary meaning of a fermented liquor. Certainly, as in the Canonical Scriptures, there is nothing in the several contexts to mark any difference in the nature of the thing itself. Rational and temperate use is commended, while *excess* is condemned, and the evil consequences thereof are vividly portrayed. "Wine is as good as life to a man," affirms the Son of Sirach (Ecclus. xxxi. 27-29), "*if it be drunk moderately*. What life is there to a man that is without wine? for it was made to make men glad. Wine moderately drunk, and in season, bringeth gladness to the heart and cheerfulness to the mind. But wine drunken with excess, maketh bitterness of the mind, with brawling and quarrelling."

As a comment on this we have a characteristic specimen of juggling from Dr. Samson. These verses, unfortunately for his purpose, stand where they will ever be found, and of course they were very much in the way. Something must be done, so we have a sudden change in the *dramatis personæ* introduced. After quoting verses 25, 26, he says, "Then follows the drinker's plea, verses 27, 28." We need surely to be informed that this is the "drinker's plea," for there is nothing in the narrative itself to mark any change of writer or speaker. The narration flows steadily on without break or hinderance such as would mark the introduction of another person. But what the Germans call the *Einbildungskraft*, *i.e.*, the power of imagination, is at times highly developed, and if allowed free range, it will carry its possessor over many a difficulty. Indeed, it would appear all but an impossibility not to see that the position thus taken is substantially that taken by Solomon, in those passages quoted on all occasions as denunciatory of wine itself. His instruction, to be rightly understood, must be dealt with honestly—*taken as a whole*—and not used piecemeal; and it is a strange logic which would show that because excess in any matter is denounced, all use whatever is forbidden—that *abusus tollit usum*. "Hear thou, my son, and be wise" (Prov. xxiii. 19-21). "Be

not among wine-bibbers ; among riotous eaters of flesh ; for the drunkard and the glutton shall come to poverty ! ” Now in this passage, if the injunction is against all drinking of wine, it is equally so against all eating of flesh. But no one untrammelled by a theory would dream of reading any such thought into the words. Thereupon follows a warning against “ the strange woman,” connected almost immediately with the inquiry, “ Who hath woe ? Who hath sorrow ? ” etc., together with the answer, “ They that *tarry long at the wine* ; they that go to seek mixed wine.” In this connection we give a striking passage from Pliny, who asserts that nothing is more beneficial than wine for strengthening the body, when moderately used ; and that nothing is more injurious when used immoderately—thus not only endorsing the opinion of the Son of Sirach above given, but expressing the general idea entertained on the subject by heathen philosophers and moralists—“ *Prorsus ut jure dici possit, neque viribus corporis utilius aliud, neque aliud voluptatibus perniciosius, SI MODUS ABSIT.*” (Lib. xiv. cap. vii.)

The Rev. Mr. Thayer tells us, notwithstanding, “ the fallacy of the plea, It is the abuse and not the use of intoxicating liquors which the Bible prohibits, is apparent. As Bible temperance is the moderate use of good things, and abstinence from evil things, any use of that which is injurious must be an abuse of it. Besides, it is not the abuse of wine that is called a ‘ mocker,’ but wine itself. Solomon does not teach us to avoid the *abuse* of wine, or not to drink to excess, but not to look upon it.” We will leave Solomon to settle the point with each man’s own reason and conscience. But if being among “ wine-bibbers,” and “ riotous eaters of flesh ” unto drunkenness and gluttony, and tarrying “ long at the wine,” do not imply “ *abuse*,” we are utterly unable to comprehend what they do imply. One FACT, however, is very clear, *there is not a line or a word in the Apocrypha* which gives any support to the “ two classes of wine ” theory.

2. As regards the Targums the evidence therein

given is abundant and explicit. Although the precise time of their formation cannot be stated, the generally received opinion is, that the leading ones date from just before, or about the time of our SAVIOUR. In any view of the matter, they fall so early within the Christian era, as to bear important witness to traditions and customs further back than His day. As such Dr. Samson himself regards them. After commenting upon several passages he tells us, "the Targums, therefore, confirm in every respect, the view of '*Tirosh*,' to which all the authorities compel the Bible scholar." On page 179 he says, "the words 'yayin' and 'tirosh' are usually rendered by the common term 'chamra,' corresponding to the Hebrew 'chemer,' which, as we have seen, is doubtless an effervescing or light wine." By referring back to page 65, we read: "The fourth product in order of preparation seems to be the 'chemer' or effervescing wine, prepared doubtless by checking the fermentation at an early stage. . . . Hence the 'chemer' is manifestly a light wine." Now, all this is a mere flight of the imagination, having no authority but Dr. Samson. The word, as previously shown, comes from a root meaning to boil up, to foam, to be agitated, etc.; and it is the leading word for wine in the other Semitic tongues as "*Yayin*" is in Hebrew. What "*Yayin*" implies, therefore, in the inspired Original, that as its full equivalent implies "*chamro*," "*chamr*," and "*chamra*," in the Peshito Syriac and Arabic translations, as well as in all the Chaldee Targums, *e.g.*, the Syriac renders, Gen. ix. 21,* "*Et bibit de vino*," *V'ashthe min chamrah*;" the old Arabic in like manner, "*Wa shareba min 'al cham-ri*." † And as illustrating the fixedness even of word meanings in the "unchangeable East," we may mention that in the new Arabic translation, made some time since under the auspices of the American Bible Society, the rendering is precisely the same. In the Samaritan Pentateuch also the word is used interchangeably with the

* واحد من سدره.

† وشرب من الخمر.

cognate "omar." "*V'shithah man 'omrah.*" * But in the twenty-fourth verse, "Noah awoke from his wine," the words are "*man chamrah.*" † Whether "*Chemmer*" was light or heavy, therefore, it was that with which Noah got drunk. According to Onkelas, Noah drank, and awoke from his "*Chamra*;" and it is that which Solomon, according to the Targum or the Proverbs, affirms is the cause of woe and sorrow.

We are also informed that "Jonathan paraphrases in the important passage, Hosea iv. 11, the words 'yayin' and 'tirosh' by 'chamra' and 'ravyetha.' The Hebrew verb 'ravah,' used fourteen times by writers from David to Jeremiah, always means 'to drench,' while its adjective, 'reveh,' used three times, and its noun, 'raveyeh,' have also the same signification. They never refer to intoxicating wine; they are usually figurative." Now this is a very strange passage, considering the purpose for which it is employed. Even supposing we granted that the words in Hebrew are usually figurative, it would be aside from the point before us. The question is not about the Hebrew original, but the Chaldee paraphrase, and the confirmation thereby given to Dr. Samson's view of *Tirosh*. "Yayin" in Hosea iv. 11 is rightly rendered by "chamra." But what about the rendering of "tirosh" by "ravyetha"? Surely the author has been playing with sharper and more dangerous tools than he was aware of. Instead of *R'vah*—the Chaldee form of the Hebrew *Ravah*—never referring to the effects of intoxicating wine, *that*, in both Chaldee and Syriac, is its *primary* meaning. Buxtorf, the highest authority here, gives "Inebriari, Irrigari; Respondet Hebræis Shekar et Ravah." And, as the first illustration of its use, he quotes Onkalos in Gen. ix. 21, *et-bibit ex vino et inebriatus fuit.*‡ The adjective "raveh" and "ravyah" he translates *ebrius, ebriosus, temulentus*, and the noun "ravyetha," "inebriatio." In fact, it is the same word in its Chaldee form as that used in the Peshito Syriac

* *וְשִׁיתָהּ מִן הַחֲמֶרֶת*

† *וְשִׁיתָהּ מִן הַחֲמֶרֶת*

‡ *וְשִׁיתָהּ מִן הַחֲמֶרֶת*

in the same verse, which, as previously shown, Castello renders by "*ebrietas vinolenta*"—habitual drunkenness—and which occurs four times in the N. T. Peshito, with substantially the same meaning. To make further quotations would be useless, as the testimony throughout all the Targums is abundant and uniform; and one instance such as the above is enough to show the absurdity of the position taken.

But what, we may ask, has either of these references, made to Targum renderings, to do with confirming Dr. Samson's view of "*Tirosh*"? And, with one or two others, equally irrelevant, they are all he makes. The simple truth is, the whole argument is a mere cloud of words, fit only to blind the understanding, and give an impression, to the unreflecting and unlearned, the very opposite of the truth. The voice of the Targums, from first to last, like that of the inspired Originals, gives no uncertain sound. But there can be no testimony found therein to two kinds of wine, *evil* and *good*, *per se*. And the critic would have very sharp eyes who could find the slightest reference to *must* preserved permanently in an unfermented state.

3. The writings of the Jewish philosopher Philo demand the next consideration. He was born at Alexandria probably a few years before the birth of CHRIST. A descendant of the priestly tribe, and occupying a position of high social and political influence, his writings, which are numerous, were greatly esteemed in his own and subsequent ages. Philosophising as he does at great length on the legal system of his nation, and on peculiarities of custom, an unusual opportunity was given for noting distinctions in the nature and uses of wine. Dr. Samson therefore tells us (page 178), "Philo is full of important statements. In his treatise on *Monarchy*, he cites, as indicating the duty of entire abstinence from wine, the prohibition to the priests, and says it was given for 'most important reasons;' that it produces hesitation, forgetfulness, drowsiness, and folly." This is the only quotation made from Philo which has any real bearing upon the question before us; and surely, a more

dishonest one was never made by any man. That Philo adduces the legal prohibition to the priests as "indicating the duty of entire abstinence from wine," is UNTRUE. The statement made by Philo corresponds exactly with a similar one made by Josephus, given below; and neither of them had the least idea of supporting the notion thus asserted. Both refer to the fact that *during the time of their actual ministration*, the Mosaic Law forbade the priests to drink wine. But the prohibition covered only that period. At other times they were not only allowed to use wine, but, by Divine appointment, as Philo mentions in a number of instances, they received from the people, for their support, the first-fruits of *wine*, as well as of oil, flour, etc. In his treatise on "The Rewards of Priests," he writes, "God commanded the nation also to give them the first-fruits of their other possessions; a portion of *wine** out of each wine-press; and of wheat and barley from each threshing-floor." In his treatise *On Humanity*, also he writes: "The laws command that the people should offer to the priests, first-fruits of corn, and *wine*, and oil," etc. In his "Questions and Solutions," moreover, when dwelling upon the statement made of Noah, "He drank of the wine, and was drunken," after allegorising somewhat, in his usual manner, he says, "The expression 'he was drunken' is here to be taken simply as equivalent to 'he used the wine.' But there are two modes of getting drunk: the one is that of an intemperate sottishness which *misuses* wine, and this offence is peculiar to the depraved and wicked man; the other is the *use* of wine, and this belongs to the wise. It is therefore in the second of these mean-

* The word in the original is *οἶνος*, and not *γλεῦκος*—καθ' ἐκάστην μὲν ληνὸν οἶνον. That the unfermented juice of the grape could have been uniformly presented to the priests, especially where the legal offerings had to be carried some distance, is impossible. "Within half an hour, in ordinary summer weather, the clearest juice of the grape begins to appear cloudy, to thicken, and to give off bubbles of gas. Fermentation has already commenced; and within three hours a sensible quantity of alcohol has been formed in the body of the liquid."—JAMES F. W. JOHNSON, *Chemistry of Common Life*, vol. i., p. 262. The supposition, therefore, that every Jew hurried with his newly pressed *must* to the priests before it had time to ferment, is equalled in absurdity only by Dr. Lees' theory, that the "vine and orchard fruit" in their "solid state," were offered, and that the priests had to press out the oil and wine for themselves!

ings that the consistent and wise Noah is here called 'drunken,' not as having *misused*, but as having *used* wine." Whatever we may think of Philo's logic, it is evident that he is here speaking of an intoxicating wine, and that his condemnation is confined to its *misuse*. Among his numerous treatises there is one on *The Planting of Noah*, another on *Drunkenness*, and still another on *Sobriety*, in all of which there are abundant references to wine and its uses. On several occasions he condemns strongly, as he does in some of his other works, the free use of "unmixed wine;" but in *no instance* can it be shown that he uses the word οἶνος except in its ordinary meaning. Throughout all his writings, there is absolutely no intimation of any knowledge possessed by him of two varieties of wine, opposite in nature—one intoxicating and the other not.

By turning to the writings of Josephus, we reach the same results. Born probably about A.D. 37, and giving as he does a history of the political and social condition of the Jews from the beginning of their separate existence as a nation until his own time, as well as a brief account of the race from the time of Adam, some reference might legitimately be expected in his works bearing upon this question. Indeed, Dr. Samson would have us believe that such was actually the case. "The historian Josephus," he says, page 178, "but confirms allusions already noted in the Old Testament histories." It would have been well if Dr. Samson had been more explicit in pointing out the confirmation thus given. The careful examiner will be surprised to find how infrequently Josephus refers to the use of wine in any way. In his autobiography he mentions a piece of shrewd diplomacy to which he resorted on one occasion, in order to obtain important information from a soldier. "I perceived that he loved money, and that he was to be caught chiefly by that means, and I said to him, 'If thou wilt but drink with us, thou shalt have a drachma for every glass thou drinkest.' So he gladly embraced this proposal, and drank a great deal of wine, in order to get the more money, and was so drunk, that at last he could not

keep the secret he was entrusted with." In the Eleventh Book of his Antiquities, also, he records the answer given to King Darius' question, which was the strongest, *wine, kings, women, or truth*: "Wine, O ye men, I find exceeds everything. It deceives the minds of those who drink it, and reduces that of the king to the same state as that of the orphan; . . . it quenches the sorrow of those that are under calamities, and makes men forget the debts they owe to others; . . . it takes away the remembrance of their friends and companions, for it arms men even against those that are dearest to them; . . . and when they are become sober, and have slept out their wine in the night, they arise without knowing anything they have done in their cups." Now in both these instances, there can be no doubt either as to the *kind* of οἶνος used, or the *manner* of its use. In a few instances, he connects wine with oil and flour, or wheat, in the sense of provisions, as the canonical Scriptures and Philo do. He mentions that the Nazarites use no wine—that the priests are not allowed to drink wine during the time of their service in the Temple, "lest otherwise they should transgress some rules of their ministration"—and that in the Divinely appointed sacrifice, "they bring the same quantity of oil which they do of wine, and they pour the wine about the altar." But in cases where a good opportunity was given to speak in condemnation of wine, or of some special kind of wine, he says nothing whatever. He does not mention the drunkenness of Noah, or of Lot; or moralise upon the wisdom of Solomon's injunctions about wine as a "mocker." The simple truth is, we have in the above assertion both a *suppresio veri* and a *suggestio falsi*. Josephus "confirms" no "allusions" whatever, such as the unwary reader would naturally be led to suppose. From first to last his references to wine are merely incidental; and he gives not a line, or even a hint, to distinguish *good* wine from *evil* wine—fermented from unfermented—one variety in itself a blessing, and the other a curse.

One main argument used in discussions on this subject

is, that the Greeks and Romans preserved *must*, unfermented, for at least a year. The fact being undisputed, it is an easy step to the assumption that the same customs obtained among the Jews. Drs. Stuart and Nott used this argument with great zeal. "Facts show," says the former, "that the ancients not only preserved wine unfermented, but regarded it as of a higher flavor and finer quality than fermented wine." "That unintoxicating wines existed from remote antiquity," declares the latter, "and were held in high estimation by the wise and good, there can be no reasonable doubt."

That *must* was thus preserved is, of course, well known. Cato, Columella, and Pliny not only refer to the custom, but describe the methods used for that purpose. But that these preparations were regarded as *wine*, in the proper sense of the term, is mere assumption; and that they were ever spoken of as *unfermented wine*, is untrue. Such a conception would never be formed in the mind of a native of any wine-producing country. "To me," said the distinguished Father Gavazzi, "as an Italian the expression [unfermented wine] imports downright nonsense. In fact, wine is only wine by fermentation, and to speak of unfermented wine is to speak of dry water, of nightly sun, of unelectric lightning" (*Belfast Witness*, May 14, 1875).^{*} Still, innumerable changes are rung upon the term, and even the words of the Latin writers above mentioned are pressed into giving a testimony which their authors never dreamed of, *e.g.*, Pliny, lib. xiv., ii., describing a method of preserving *MUST*, which the Greeks called *Aigleucos*—always *must*—says: *Medium inter-dulcia vinumque est, quod Graeci aigleucos vocant, hoc est, semper mustum. Id evenit cura, quoniam fervere prohibetur; sic appellant musti in vina transitum. Ergo mergunt e lacu protinus in aqua cados, donec bruma transeat, et consuetudo fiat algendi.* Dr. Lees translates the first clause thus: "There is an intermediate [article] between *dulcia* [sweets] and [what is techni-

^{*} Presbyterian Review, January, 1881.

cally] wine," etc. The last clause in the brackets is Dr. Lees' own *gloss*, and it stands in manifest opposition to Pliny's thought and language. In classic Greek, *gleucos* is the equivalent of *mustum*, and therefore, as distinct from anything which could properly be called *wine*, this preparation was called *aigleucos*, *semper*, or ALWAYS MUSTUM. And the reason why it was thus called, he states, *quoniam fervere prohibetur*—"since it is kept from fermenting." That fermentation was necessary to its becoming wine he then proceeds to show, "*sic appellant musti in vina transitum*—thus they call (*i.e.*, that is the common expression for) the passing of *must* into wines." Even here Dr. Lees cannot suffer what is the simplest possible Latin to pass without a gloss. He renders, "so. they call the passage of *musts* into [common] wines." Now if anything is, or can be clear and certain, it is that Pliny here marks the difference between *must* and *wine*. Before the *transitus* it was *must*, subsequently it was wine. When the *transitus* was prevented, as in this case, it remained what it was—SEMPER MUSTUM AIGLEUCOS.

Another instance equally marked. Mr. Thayer, as a "proof of the existence of unfermented wine in ancient times," quoting from Dr. Lees' work, *Wines Ancient and Modern*, says: "The original is in Columella, '*De re Rustica*' (xii., c. 27), *vinum dulce sic facere oportet. Uvas legito, in sole per triduum expandito, quarto die meridiano tempore calidas uvas proculcato, mustum lixivium, hoc est, antequam praelo pressum sit, quod in lacum musti fluxerit, tollito, cum deferbuerit, in sextarios quinquaginta iridem bene pinsitam nec plus uncia pondere addito, vinum a fecibus eliquatum diffundito. Hoc vinum erit suave, firmum, corpori salubre*—Gather the grapes in the bunches—spread them out in the sunshine for three days; on the fourth day, at the noontide hour, *proculcato*, tread out the grapes, *calidas*, while they are hot [by several hours' exposure to the sun's rays]; take the *mustum lixivium*, that is, such as should flow into the lake of *must* before it [the mass of grapes] should be pressed by the beam; *cum deferbuerit*, when it shall

have cooled down [the grapes having been trodden while hot], add to every fifty sextarii [of must] not exceeding an ounce of iris well pounded, rack off the wine by pouring it from the dregs [this being a more careful operation than straining]. This wine will be sweet [or smooth], sound-bodied, and wholesome to the body." The brackets here are made to do splendid service. But what about the rendering of "*cum deferbuerit*, when it shall have cooled down [the grapes having been trodden while hot]?" We can well imagine what a hearty laugh Columella would have had at such a twisting of his words. But this is not enough for Dr. Lees. He further explains: "He here bids you spread out the grapes to the heat of the sun long enough to thicken the juice *to the degree known to prevent fermentation*." Unfortunately for Mr. Thayer and his preceptor, Dr. Lees, with their unfermented wine (which, in this case, was certainly fermented, as the expression "*cum deferbuerit*" honestly rendered shows),* no such exposure to the heat of the sun would prevent fermentation. "Grapes were anciently trodden after being exposed on a level floor to the action of the solar rays for TEN days, and were then placed in the shade for five days more, in order to mature the saccharine matter. *The fermentation* is facilitated greatly by this process" (Redding, *On Wines*, p. 55). Not even boiling *must* for a time will prevent fermentation, although Mr. Thayer, with his customary garbling, after quoting Dr. Eli Smith's statement, "The juice of the grape is boiled down before fermentation," says, "It was boiled to *prevent* fermentation." Dr. Eli Smith's own statement, given in his description of the various methods of making wine in Syria, is this: "(b.) The *must* is boiled down from four to five

* Since writing the above, we have discovered the following reference to this "*Vinum Dulce*" of Columella, in the article on "Wine" in Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities, in which the same view of "*cum deferbuerit*" is evidently taken—"for the *Vinum Dulce* of Columella (xii., 27) the grapes were to be dried in the sun for three days after they were gathered, and trodden on the fourth day during the full power of the midday heat. The *mustum lixivium* alone was to be used, and after the fermentation was finished an ounce of well-kneaded iris-root was added to each fifty sextarii; the wine was racked off from the lees, and was found to be sweet, sound, and wholesome" (p. 1203).

per cent., *and then fermented*. (c.) The grapes are dried in the sun from five to ten days, they are then pressed, and *must*, skins, stems, and all are put into open jars to ferment about a month" (*Biblio. Sac.*, January, 1869). Without adducing further instances, therefore, we hesitate not to affirm, that in the writings of no classic author is the distinction between *mustum* and *vinum* disregarded. Both in Greek and Latin, there is an occasional use of the latter, as in the Scriptures, by Metonym. or proleptically; but, in ordinary usage, the discrimination between the juice of the grape before, and after fermentation, is always made. *Unfermented* wine, in fact, would have been as much "downright nonsense," to Cato, Columella, and Pliny, as "dry water," or "un-electric lightning."

Granting all, however, that can be demanded with regard to these Greek and Roman customs of preserving *must*, the point legitimately to be determined is, how far they were known to, and practised by the Jews? That abundant opportunity was given to acquire the knowledge, especially after the Macedonian conquest, is certain. And it might be impossible to prove, that in some instances and localities, the knowledge was not practically applied. But, on the other hand, it is impossible that the practice could have been general, without leaving some trace in the language and literature of the nation. Even if the Aramean tongues were too sterile to furnish native words for these artificial productions (Pliny speaking of them says, "*ingenii, non naturæ opus est*"), the Greek or Roman names could, and would have been introduced. This was done, as we well know, in other cases. That it was not done in this, however, is certain. Neither in the Apocrypha nor in the Targums, in the writings of Philo or of Josephus, can one word or sentence be found, to prove that the customs were either known or practised in Judea.* Indeed on this point the artillery of the Temperance Society scholars can be turned

* In what abhorrence all Gentile wines were held by the Jews, may be seen in No. LIV. of Dr. McCaul's *Old Paths*.

against themselves. Dr. Lees tells us in his article on wine, in Kitto's *Bib. Cyclop.*, p. 956 (which article was dropped from the later revised edition by Dr. W. Lindsay Alexander), that "the Jews carefully eschewed the wines of the Gentiles." And as a reason therefor, he states, "The prohibition had reference chiefly to the Roman practice of fumigating them with sulphur, the vapor of which absorbed the oxygen, and thus arrested the fermentation." Now, if the Jews were thus careful to avoid unnatural or artificial productions, which resulted from an interference with a simple natural law, when offered by the Gentiles, what reason have we to suppose that they would make equally *unnatural* ones for themselves? The *onus probandi* at least lies with those who maintain that such was done; for certainly no evidence has yet been produced from any Jewish source to make the matter even probable. In short, the juice of the grape kept permanently unfermented, was, in so far as anything can be shown to the contrary, as unknown anciently in Bible lands as in the Bible record itself.

That such is the case now, and has been during all the intervening centuries, is equally certain. The testimony of missionaries and others, whose interest and prejudices in some instances might have influenced them to at least a withholding of the truth, is very full and explicit. Dr. C. V. A. Van Dyke, after a residence of more than a quarter of a century in Syria, writes: "In reply to your question about wine for Communion, there is not, and so far as I can find out, never was (in Syria) anything like what has been called unfermented wine. The thing is not known in the East. . . . In Syria, and as far as I can learn in all the East, there is no wine preserved unfermented. . . . The native churches—Evangelical, Maronite, Greek, Coptic, and Armenian—all use fermented wine at the Communion. They have no other, and have no idea of any other" (*Biblio. Sac.*, vol. xxvi., p. 167). To this testimony may also be added that of the Rev. Eli Smith, twenty years missionary in Syria. "Unintoxicating wines," he says, "I have not

been able to hear of. All will intoxicate more or less. So in regard to fermentation. When inquiring if there exists any such thing as unfermented wine, I have uniformly been met with a stare of surprise. The very idea seems to be regarded as an absurdity. The name for wine in Arabic, *chamr*, the same as the Hebrew *chemer*, is derived from the word which means to ferment. I have not been able to learn even that any process is adopted for arresting the vinous fermentation before it is completed" (*Biblio. Sac.*, vol. iii., p. 388).

With regard to the testimony thus given by the latter of these writers, we have another characteristic piece of shuffling with evidence from Dr. Samson as cowardly as it is contemptible. Instead of *denying* and *disproving* Mr. Smith's statements, if that were possible, he intimates that he was an ignoramus, unqualified to give reliable testimony. "He was," we are told, page 248, "when he accompanied Dr. Robinson, an observer but not a scholar." . . . "His lack of logical reasoning is seen in the report of the second witness called to confirm the conclusions sought. In an article on *Produce of Vineyards in the East*, Rev. Henry Homes, missionary at Constantinople, reports no less than *twelve* artificial products of the grape." After referring to several of them, he concludes thus: "All unconsciously Mr. Homes' statements are in entire harmony with all history." But why, we ask, did not Dr. Samson report this witness fully and honestly? Why did he pass over, without one word of comment or allusion, the confirmation given in that same article to the reports of Dr. Van Dyke, Mr. Smith, and many others? Mr. Homes asserts distinctly, "In the present use of language an unfermented wine is an impossibility. All that which is now called wine in the East is as truly wine as that which is called wine in France. Whether boiled or not, whether sweet or sour, all the known wines are intoxicating. The boiling which the people of certain districts give to their *must* for the purpose of securing a wine that will keep better, should not be confounded with the boiling of the same *must*,

for the purpose of making sugar and molasses " (*Biblio. Sac.*, vol. v., p. 292).

In like manner an effort is made to extract the sting from the following statement:

"We, the undersigned, missionaries and residents in Syria, having been repeatedly requested to make a distinct statement on the subject, hereby declare that during the whole time of our residence and travelling in Syria and the Holy Land, we have never seen or heard of an unfermented wine: nor have we found among Jews, Christians, or Mohammedans, any tradition of such a wine having ever existed in the country. Rev. W. M. Thomson, D.D.: Rev. S. H. Calhoun: C. V. A. Van Dyke, D.D.: Rev. James Robertson: Rev. H. H. Jessup: Rev. John Wortabet, M.D.: James Black, Esq.: Michael Meshaka, doctor: Rev. John Crawford: R. W. Brigstocke, M.D., F.R.C.S.: Rev. Wm. Wright, B.A. May, 1875."

Utterly disregarding the high character of the signers of this important document, Dr. Samson says: "It was a prejudged and formulated statement, prepared in Scotland by interested parties, and sent to Syria for *ex-parte* testimony." Are we to understand by this that those "missionaries and residents in Syria" subscribed an array of falsehoods? Or were they like Mr. Smith, "observers but not scholars"? A straightforward and manly course would have been to rebut these statements, if it could be done, by others equally well endorsed of an opposite character. *Why has it not been done?* An honest man will not have far to go to find the answer. There is more, however, than an implication against the honor of those gentlemen in Dr. Samson's assertion. The assertion itself is **UNTRUE**. As we learn from a very able article, in the *Presbyterian Review* of January, 1881, by the Rev. Dr. Moore, the Rev. W. Wright, a former missionary at Damascus, drew up the document, and in reply to Dr. Moore's inquiries states the following: "I deeply regret to observe that so good a cause should be advocated by the ignoble use of misrepresentation. It is not a fact that the paper which I submitted to the General Assembly was 'prepared in Scotland by inter-

ested parties, and sent to Syria for *ex parte* testimony.' The paper was prepared by me, and submitted to the men most competent in the whole world to speak on the subject. The document was not the result of any suggestion from home. London, September 6, 1880."

Alas for the claims of truth and righteousness when men have hobbies to ride! We turn back to and admire with fresh zest the noble maxim, "If a thing is not true, we should not lie that it may be true."

EDWARD H. JEWETT.

AUTHORITY AND CONSCIENCE.

IN this familiar antithesis I conclude that the term Conscience is intended to be equivalent to Private Judgment, or the firm resolve of earnest souls to know the truth at first hand. Thus, then, in the mere mention of our subject we encounter one of the persistent difficulties of all religion, and of the Christian religion in particular. It is a difficulty which each successive age has to restate and analyse for its own satisfaction—a difficulty which is always fresh, because to thoughtful minds it is always personal. The objection to authority in matters of religion is as old as the world. It is a sort of spectre that has haunted thorough thinkers generation after generation, fretting them with fears as to the sufficiency of their dearest convictions. It represents at first a state of feeling, rather than of intelligent argument. It is one of the labels by which mankind are wont to ticket off views and motives of which they are suspicious.* For, even when their language is most positive, the great body of men are secretly but profoundly aware of their real haziness of vision in all matters that touch the border-line between the seen and the unseen, the true and the untrue. And so, feeling their way gingerly, men are accustomed to set up their instinctive prejudices as sign-posts of danger, seldom taking time—seldom being able to take time—to investigate whether these prejudices are well founded, or whether, if used as sign-posts, they are trusty. This habit of mind is by no means always unwise. For if you have a prejudice, and have not the ability to dispel it, you are usually safer in

* See Liddon, *University Sermons*, second series, p. 190.

complying with that prejudice than in running counter to it. Popular judgments, though crude, are seldom quite unjust. Although they disparage much that is good, they do certainly forefend a great deal that is evil.

The prejudice against Authority in religion does both these things: it certainly prevents evil, but it likewise disparages much that is good. On the one hand a man's religion is his most intimate possession. In secular matters we are not so sensitive about resting on our fellows; for so long as the heads and hands and circumstances of the few are more fortunate than those of the rest, in secular matters, at any rate, the many are compelled to be in the hands of the few. Modern progress has done much for human liberty, something for fraternity; but for real equality even a French Revolution could accomplish nothing. To this day there is a sacerdotalism of wealth, of art, of science, of social prestige. But is there not a difference in religion? I shall die alone; and all through life, therefore, must not my religion be lonely? This precious truth of *personality* in religion is what the above-mentioned prejudice protects. But unfortunately the objection is too sweeping to be quite thorough. When we observe that the charge of excessive authority is now brought against all who bow to any Revelation as Divine—against a serious Presbyterianism no less than against Episcopacy; against the Westminster Assembly no less than against the Conference of Savoy—nay, when, worst of all, a brilliant living writer has not scrupled to describe our Blessed LORD Himself as a sacerdotalist—then we begin to suspect that the objection which underlies these tirades is not so *ethical* as at first appeared. We are apprehensive that there must be here a serious confusion of thought, even if there be not in some cases a disposition to hide the temper of absolute skepticism under the garb of religious jealousy and conscientiousness. We question whether the very Conscience which it is here proposed to protect, must not disavow such spurious protection, crying, "Save me from my friends!" For we know that in secular matters also personality has rights;

and if Conscience is respected there, in spite of so much Authority, we are inclined to think that in religion likewise the two can work together.

In order to show this, we must first consider what Truth is, and how man apprehends it. For man, the essential feature of a noble life is the struggle for truth. That which marks off human life from the existence of the brutes is the power to think, and through thinking to arrive at the truth. *Geist ist Wissen*. Man starts out with the conviction that absolute Truth *is*. Just as in the physical life man, when confronted with the world, makes, and must make, the tremendous assumption that the world is real, external, objective, so that the very first step of natural science is an unhesitating act of faith; so in the spiritual life, over against its ideas, emotions, and desires, its struggles and its peace, the human soul confronts a Spiritual Reality which underlies them, and which they presuppose. The spiritual life, like the physical, begins with an act of faith. You cannot in thinking cut away the ground of your own thought. Your very skepticism is a creed. The bare conviction on which all denial and all affirmation, all knowledge and all feeling, alike repose is, that Truth exists; that although my thought and your thought may err, there is an absolute Thought or Intelligence which cannot err, which it is impossible to doubt, which is the bond of connection between one man's thought and another man's thought, between one man's life and another man's life. There you are face to face with God. If there be in this world aught that is more positive than private opinion—something better than men's passing "views," that can be binding on none but the individual that has them, and which in the general stream of tendency are of no permanent significance—if your idea of Truth, as such, is valid—then so soon as you analyse it, your idea of Truth takes you inevitably to the idea of God.

It follows that man's effort to *find* the truth is a very different thing from trying to *invent* truth. Truth cannot be invented; it can only be apprehended. Strictly

speaking, there is no such thing as *new* Truth ; it is new to us, that is all. Truth already *is*. There is now all there ever was or will be, for truth and God are one. The question for every man is, How much of Truth he and his age will be able to take in? Of course no one man, no one passing age, can contain the whole of truth; it is too long, too large, too many-sided. But this does not prove that truth is in a flux, or insecure, or doubtful, any more than the sun is doubtful because earth and grass and flowers take up his light in part and reflect it in part, until they vanish away. Truth is the expression of God's Being, eternal in the heavens. It is the revelation not so much *from* God, as *of* God. It is not an explanation of the universe, or a plan of humanity, done up in a parcel, or registered on rocks, or written in a book, and so handed down from God to man that you can put it away and hold it apart from the present living Deity. Truth is like a flower : it withers, if cut off from the parent stem. Truth is the nearness of the ALMIGHTY, the echo of His voice, the history of His operations, the prophecy of His purpose. "All things are from Him, and to Him, and by Him all things consist." Hence comes the unity of nature and of human life. In the smallest pebble and in the heaven of stars, in the darkling desire of single souls and in the experience of the whole human race, one common bond runs through—the same Almighty and Eternal Being is working, speaking, in them all. Man's search for truth, wherever he is searching, is a search for God.

In this search the individual is assisted chiefly by two guides—a Voice from within himself, and a Voice from without—Conscience and Authority; and it is this fact which binds together the common lives of common men, and the best life of better men. For in the case of all of us, at those moments when our soul-life is at its highest—those moments when the lower motives of our nature have been withstood; when we have been enabled to resist the evil and to choose the good; when in the din of intense action or the stillness of intense thought we have been stimulated, each

of us, by the simple consciousness of the two supreme realities — God and one's own soul — in such moments, above all, we have been hearkening dutifully to these same sister Voices—Authority and Conscience. The epithets, it is true, are misleading, for the inner and the outer Voice are both authoritative, since each of them alike implies and indicates that one supreme Being whose eternal will declares itself to the personal soul, now from without, and now from within. Just as the bare ideas of Truth, and Private Judgment, or Conscience, carry with them the underlying idea of God ; so, too, in the last resort, there can be no such thing as authority without God to fall back on. If, then, by a convenient antithesis, we term the Voice within, Conscience, and the Voice without, Authority, we do well to remember that in both there is the same implicit reference to the Absolute Mind outside ourselves which is involved in man's very nature as a rational creature. And if extent of dominion be taken as the measure of Authority, it can hardly be questioned that the majority of mankind are more subservient to the Voice without than to the Voice within. For what we call Authority begins to speak earlier, and continues to speak much louder than the other. My Conscience said nothing, at any rate, until I was weaned from babyhood ; but Authority was governing me when I hanged yet upon my mother's breasts. It spoke in the character of my parents, in the traditions of my neighborhood, in the Church where I was christened, in the nation wherein I was born. And as I grew to boyhood, Authority shaped my life beforehand, inspiring my prejudices, selecting my books and teachers and companions, assigning to me my standards of etiquette and duty. To this day the Voice of all that past and present exterior Authority is strong with me. I never shall get away from it. But the interior Voice came later, and then only by fits and starts. I could be deaf to this, but I could not and I cannot disobey, with even apparent impunity, the Voice without. It is too much for me.

Now, when we come to the case of the Christian

in his allegiance to the authority of JESUS CHRIST (and to this, for brevity's sake, we must confine ourselves in this paper), we note an important distinction. JESUS CHRIST is occupied directly with only one department of truth—Salvation. CHRIST's message did, indeed, modify and enlarge man's apprehension of the truth in many other of its departments, so that the Christian era marks a new and decisive epoch in our whole civilisation; but the essential purpose of JESUS was our release from sin and our hope of everlasting life. Human thought can afford to wait; but the soul must be *saved now*. Unquestionably, whenever GOD speaks, He speaks with Authority, provided only we can be certain what He says. But the authority of JESUS CHRIST has direct reference to one thing: the salvation of the soul. For the scope of this paper, then, we refer the general question of Authority in religion to JESUS CHRIST. As to that, CHRIST spoke with authority, and we can safely leave the matter in His holy hands. If a man is not convinced by CHRIST Himself of His Authority in general, it is idle for us, His ministers, to argue with such a man on any of the minor methods and applications of CHRIST's Authority. Such a man must be approached with sympathy and perseverance, it is true, but by other ways and from a different standpoint. The Christian, however, takes his religion on the strength of JESUS CHRIST. Christianity is CHRIST. I believe CHRIST. I try to copy His example, because I am once for all assured of His personal authority to save my soul. Through Him ALMIGHTY GOD was pleased to make a difference between the Truth of Nature and the Truth of Grace. As for the truth of nature—all that concerns mere human civilisation, government, literature, science, art—man could afford to wait, to investigate painfully, to discover for himself. But there was one thing which man must know definitely, one thing which must be supernaturally *revealed* to him—Salvation. "How can a man be just with God? How can he be clean that is born of a woman?" As to that the SAVIOUR of the world has spoken the final word. In the economy of this world the fact of sin and moral

evil stands apart. It works disorder in the Kosmos. It is inscrutable. Few scientific men care to touch it, and theologians are equally at a loss to correlate it with any theory of nature. Hereby man is the great exception. So far as we have any evidence to go upon, free-will, sin, religion, belong, in this world, to man alone. It is one thing for skepticism to *explain away explanations* of sin, quite another to *explain away the sin itself*. That no philosophy, not even Mr. Spencer's Ghost Theory, has been able to accomplish. But eighteen hundred years ago the Son of God came down to man, and *revealed* to him, not the explanation of sin, but the cure for it—CHRIST JESUS has the words of eternal life.

Nevertheless, all this being so, there yet remains a difficulty for some who mean to bow completely to our LORD Himself—a difficulty which is very real indeed to some thoughtful Christians, especially at this distance from the time of CHRIST—and that is, what should be the attitude of CHRIST's individual disciples towards that *delegated* authority which is claimed to-day by the Church on CHRIST's Commission? This is the question which our topic includes; and in order to answer it we must recall what has just been said on the general function of authority as brought to bear on the individual from without in all the departments of his life. This control of the individual, exercised by exterior authority, is the law of our entire existence. It is the way GOD deals with mankind in their whole search for truth, no matter what direction their search may take. JESUS CHRIST simply found among men this principle of authority—this natural and healthy disposition to lean upon authority—and took it into His peculiar service. Once accept JESUS CHRIST on His own terms, and the institution of His Church follows naturally, in view of all that we know of human life. For, as Aristotle long ago pointed out, in the idea of Society the πόλις comes before the πολίτης, the State before the Citizen; and even so in Christianity, the idea of the Church as CHRIST's Body comes before that of the individual Christian. Comte, with his Religion of Humanity, on the one side,

and the ultramontane Romanist, with his fictitious Catholicism on the other, have alike wrested this fact from its legitimate application. But, taken rightly, the thought of Aristotle suggests one of the fundamental facts of humanity, viz., that a man's general position, intellectually and spiritually no less than morally and physically, is largely dependent on his environment. It is to membership of a social organism that man owes the furniture of his mind. Few of us, I suppose, have ever gone through a period of controversy of any kind—religious, political, social, or scientific—without perceiving in ourselves a certain drift towards this or that conclusion. Were it otherwise, all upright men of equal intelligence must ultimately agree; but as it is, not even an angel of light, however infallible in himself, could be infallible to all men, for the reason that men are too imperfect and too variously circumstanced to appreciate the angel's infallibility. Hence the SON of GOD Himself did not convert all of His own nation even; and, if He had, assent would have been no longer assent, but compulsion. Truth can only come with the force of infallibility to the man whose entire being is ready for it. It is not the understanding alone that measures truth, but man's whole nature. Besides Reason, there is in man's constitution a large department which is not, indeed, irrational, but non-rational, and which yet is essential to the success of the rational.* Instincts and habits and affections are a part of insight. We cannot divide the feeling of our nature from the reason of it. *Aimer, c'est comprendre.* Who of us has not observed in his own case that nothing produces a more forcible sense of certainty in the mind than powerful impressions for which we can give no reason. Hence it comes to pass that *the claim of Infallibility is by no means essential to the claim of Authority*; nay, it would be destructive of it; for unless, to begin with, two rational persons are in perfect agreement, the one could not be infallible to the other without demolishing the other's reason. But Au-

* See Mozley, *Lectures and Other Theological Papers*, Nos. I., II., XVII.

thority does not demolish Reason; it only sways Reason by many and subtle influences, direct and indirect, conscious and unconscious. And doubtless it is for this cause that, *as a matter of fact, Holy Scripture itself was probably in no single portion intended directly for the world at large, but rather for those already in covenant with GOD and members of His Church*, whether of the Old Dispensation or the New.*

Thus we arrive at a practical explanation of CHRIST's delegation of His authority to His Church, and we see why the Church is justified in perpetually reasserting this authority. Our LORD was merely taking account of this profound characteristic of humanity. The authority of the Church is working on different lines, but, in a similar way, to the various other Authorities to which men are subjected. The mere existence of a body of sinners or unbelievers in the world gives rise to an authority that tells against the truth. There is an atmosphere of *untruth*. Believers do not so much lose their own faith, as they lose their faith in other men's faith; they hesitate to believe because others hesitate. Unbelief and evil are standing facts. They carry weight as institutions. They are a continual assertion. They get themselves credited from the sheer force of impression. Hence the SAVIOUR of the world determined to found a counter-institution, possessed of no less authority wielded to different ends. And if the infidel should assert that hereby CHRIST prejudices the question in the minds of Christians, the LORD would answer that that is precisely what He meant to do. Reason, if we attempt to make it act alone, becomes morbid. Pure Reason is like a shark; it gorges itself with proofs. It wants more and still more. It never knows when it has had enough. The authority of the Church was not intended to quell Reason, but to prevent it from becoming morbid. The human soul is thus made cognisant of other motives and alive to other influences. He that hath eyes and ears to hear and see, is helped to hear and see. CHRIST bade

* See *English Church Quarterly Review*, April, 1882, p. 83.

His Apostles not to make their appeal exclusively to the ripe minds of adults, but to start out with the children—to baptise infants—to train them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord; to throw around them an atmosphere which should prejudice them beforehand in favor of Himself, making them *de facto* Christians before their reason had so much as sifted the claims of Christ or the consequences of allegiance to Him.

To begin with, CHRIST would intensify man's sense of sin,* not merely as a weakness or an obstacle, but as a mystery; for if sin is a mystery, then we shall not be surprised if the Atonement for it be a mystery likewise. Then over against the idea of GOD as the Supreme Mundane Being, the Impersonation of the Forces that cause, sustain, develop the visible world, CHRIST makes vivid through His Church the complementary idea of GOD as the Moral Governor and Judge that inhabiteth eternity, keeping mercy for thousands and that will by no means clear the guilty. And when these two ideas have worked their way, CHRIST blends and transmutes them into the richer, lovelier conception of GOD as our Father; and hereby a whole foundation is laid of thought and feeling and aspiration that prepare the growing soul to apprehend the sacramental life of the Incarnate GOD. Yet long before there has been any formal assent of the pure intellect to these sublime aspects of the truth, CHRIST, by the authority of His Church, has brought them to bear upon the actual life of His thriving disciple. Through the influences of the HOLY GHOST Christianity is vital in the youth. It is a *fact* of his mind before it is once presented to his mind as a *question*. He cannot as yet defend Christianity to another, perhaps. He is not acquainted with dialectics. But his faith is self-witnessing to him, and he approaches the evidences of Christianity from that base. When he meets the skeptic he has no less momentum than the skeptic, but the momentum is in the contrary direction. And if the infidel claims that all this is to beg the ques-

* See Mozley, *ubi supra*.

tion, then the Churchman answers that he is thankful to have had the question begged for him by the Church, rather than by the infidel. Taking life as it is, one or the other must have been. As the education of John Stuart Mill showed plainly, for a man to grow up impartial in religion, or in anything else, is as impossible as it would be absurd. We say it with all reverence—the devil had taken pains enough to bias men on his side of the question, and through the institution of the Church GOD in CHRIST has seen to it that steps were taken to counteract that bias. The man who is true to his breeding in the Church of JESUS CHRIST feels to the core of his being an impulse and a longing to be on the Christian side. As some one has exquisitely said: “In Astronomy I should be sorry to disagree with Newton, and in religion I would not differ from the saints.”

Nor should any one suppose that all this stress of authority, if lawfully used, tends to obliterate Conscience. It is only the claim to Infallibility that does that. Authority respects Conscience: it is an appeal to Conscience; it works along with, and helps to develop, Conscience. Although Authority commands Conscience she yet obeys it; though she guides it, yet she follows. There are but three conceivable methods whereby I can arrive at truth: I invent the truth, or it comes to me by the compulsion of Infallibility, or else I assent to it on reasonable authority. CHRIST through his Church adopted the last method. For the end of all this machinery is simply the salvation of so many single souls, and Conscience is the centre of the soul. Personality is the ultimate mystery of man's nature, and to that Conscience holds the key. Personalities differ, and Conscience gauges the difference. Some men are never in doubt: their Conscience accepts instinctively the truth submitted to them. They are like the sailor who takes the moon's period and the time of high-water from his nautical almanac, and who, for all practical purposes, is as well off as the Astronomer who calculated the tables. Life is so short and its duties so practical, that it must have been intended that most men should take much for

granted. Other men, however, have doubts about their religion, and have to settle them. Yet such must not suppose that truth is true because it seems to them so. It is true anyhow. Any other view would reduce God's Truth and Government of the world to a *Deus ex machina* of special providences and manifestations and individual revelations. But if once men find themselves in doubt about the truth, the only way for them to believe it is to ascertain that, after all, it does seem true to *them*. How this comes about is, perhaps, beyond our ken. The method of human assent defies analysis, and contains quite as much of salutary impulse and affection as it does of pure Reason. But at any rate nothing that is wholly alien to each peculiar personality can, while it remains so, become part of the personal convictions: even though *the expression of such convictions seldom amounts to more than a re-statement of the old truth*, or a personal assertion as to what the truth *is not*. The argumentative processes are neither necessary nor blind. The soul is no mere machine, giving off inevitably the impression of the types with which it is charged. In the inevitable mystery of his own free will, each man has something to do with setting up the types. That mysterious something which each man does to the process of his own thinking is what we mean by conscientious private judgment. Authority is indeed intended for nothing else but to bring the soul to JESUS; once there, the soul and its SAVIOUR must be left alone together. The very Conscience, which Authority has helped to educate, rises up now and asserts its rights; for although Authority may provide the soul with truth, Conscience alone can inwardly digest it. So certain is this that we find even John Henry Newman, in a well-known passage of his letter to Mr. Gladstone, protesting: "Certainly, if I am obliged to bring religion into after-dinner toasts (which indeed does not seem to be quite the thing), I shall drink—to the Pope, if you please—still to Conscience first, and to the Pope afterwards." *Conscience is not a claim of the individual to get to JESUS singly and alone; but it is the individual's*

claim to think for himself in choosing on what authority he will lean in order to reach JESUS. The very essence of Conscience is the recognition of authority; but it must be *my* recognition, and not another's. Intellectual idleness is impossible to the conscientious man. You may have more light than I have: you may take in more of the truth, or a different side of the truth. If so, our respective consciences will declare it. Sooner or later in our day it comes to almost every true and thoughtful Christian, each in his own small and inconspicuous place, to do what Luther did so publicly and grandly at the Diet of Worms. It is a tremendous responsibility, a very humbling action. Those who prate glibly about the glory of private judgment, would probably say less, if, by personal experience, they knew more of it. As the proverb goes, it may be a comedy to those that think merely; but it is tragedy to the conscientious man—for he *feels*.

GEORGE WILLIAM DOUGLAS.

JAMES EMOTT.

A MEMOIR.

IN the days of the past, if one who was formed by nature to be intellectually and morally a leader of men, commenced his career with a strong sense of personal responsibility to God and man, and, under the stimulus and ever increasing power of this motive, labored in season and out of season to his life's end, he stood forth as a beacon light to his generation and became as a city set on a hill among the mass of irresponsible characters that surrounded him. But, in the present time, when, in the progress of Christian civilization, the sense of duty has become the ruling motive of so many noble lives; and when the servants of God are beginning to be a race of leaders, priests, and kings, on this earth, contrasts are not so strongly marked or so vivid as they were in days of yore; and men who, in the usefulness and worth of their lives, stand side by side with those whose names are treasured on the imperishable pages of history, quietly do their work and pass down to their graves "leaving no wake behind them on the billows of time."

The late Judge Emott was one of these men. His life is an illustration of the fact that true greatness is oftentimes independent of fame, resting more in what a man *is* than in what he is called, in what he does rather than in the mere human recognition of the worth of his actions.

James Emott was born in the year 1823. His father, the Hon. James Emott, of Poughkeepsie, was a man of earnest Christian character, of wide learning, and of un-

impeachable integrity, who, in the course of his life, had been a member of both the State and National legislatures, the first County Judge of Dutchess County, and a Justice of the Supreme Court. His mother, the daughter of General Archibald Crary, an officer of the army in the war of the Revolution and a member of the Cincinnati Society, was known to a large circle of friends as an accomplished lady, devout in her religious life, and with much grace of manner and sweetness of disposition.

Under these favoring circumstances the boy grew up in the kind of atmosphere which in England has produced so many high-principled leaders, who are at once Christians and statesmen. His father was severe in his demands as to reading and study, and watched the moral and intellectual development of his child with sleepless fidelity, guiding him with a firm hand, yet never so austere as to allow authority to usurp the place of parental affection. While he was looked upon as somewhat reserved and unapproachable in his intercourse with others, he made a companion of his boy. The latter was always ready to forsake those of his own age when his parent approached, and they were often seen together, in those early days, accompanying each other in long country walks and rambles; while under the shadow of the home roof, the mother's influence was ever at work, developing those social and genial traits of character which were so much more prominent in the son, after he had attained manhood, than they had been in the father.

Such progress did the boy make in his studies, under this careful training, that, at the early age of fifteen, he entered the Sophomore Class of Columbia College, where he was thrown in closer contact with those of his own age than he had previously been, through his somewhat isolated childhood. In the midst of his college career, the death of his mother brought a sorrow that long left its trace upon his young life and deepened the earnestness of his character as he stood on the threshold of manhood.

After three years of close application he graduated

from Columbia at the head of his class, and with the highest honors his Alma Mater had to bestow.

Under such influences James Emott grew up and returned to Poughkeepsie to take his place in the world; a grave, staid, reliable youth; tall and handsome in appearance, and, in his manner, at once courteous and reserved; quick in his sympathies, yet ever holding his sympathy in abeyance to a discriminating judgment; with a natural taste for all kinds of books, which had been generously cultivated, and with those trained habits of study and careful analysis that he carried with him to the grave. The next few years of his life he spent in preparing himself for the practice of law, under the direction of his father, in the office of Messrs. Johnson and Cole. When he had reached the necessary age he was admitted to the bar, and, a year later, he married Mary, the daughter of Charles Crook, of Poughkeepsie. All who watched the young man at this period of his life, saw in him the promise of a brilliant future. He not only commenced the active practice of law with all the prestige which his father's long and honorable career at the bar and bench was able to give, but he began to display an original and quiet force of his own, in the consideration of all legal questions, that was quickly recognised. Nor is it difficult to trace in him what was the source of this power. James Emott was preëminently, both by nature and education, a truth-loving man; loyalty to truth was the master passion of his life, and the effort to bring all things to, and measure them by, this exact standard, is the explanation of that rigorous mental self-discipline, those painstaking habits of research, and that fearless, outspoken expression of the opinions he had formed, which won for him the respect and confidence of those that knew him.

He was not sought by clients on account of eloquence, though he lived in a day when a ready flow of words and magnetic powers of persuasion were more highly valued than they are now; but he drew men to him by the weight and solidity of his judgments. He spoke

with the authority of the truth. Writes one who afterward rose with him to distinction in the legal profession: "He seemed to care little or nothing for the forensic struggles of his profession, but bent his energies to the enforcement of legal questions, which he unfolded with a quiet, unostentatious, and masterly clearness which gradually lifted him into consequence as a profound jurist in the weightier matters of the law."

But it was not only in his own profession that James Emott began to attract attention.

The same earnest desire to live at a high level of existence, betrayed itself in the deeper and wider sphere of his religious life; and in many of the letters that he wrote at this time to those who were in sympathy with him, he reveals the character of his high aims. Our space forbids us to give an extract from more than one of these, but it is sufficient to show the character of those thoughts he was pondering in mind. Speaking in November of the beauty of the autumnal days amid the decay of nature, he writes:

Such days inspire, I think, a gentle and peaceful frame of mind, which, with a clear conscience and pure spirit to enjoy [them], must resemble the calm repose that attends a good man at the end of a well-spent life. The more I reflect upon it, the more satisfied I become that it is quite impossible to enjoy the gifts of Providence and the beauties and order of nature without a pure conscience. Turbulent, passionate joys there may be, and superficial, hollow-hearted enjoyments, which only cover the bitterness of an unsatisfied spirit, but such pleasures are unreal as well as short-lived. Our very laugh, unless it be the clear, ringing tone of early childhood, or the kindly merriment of one who has a conscience void of offence, has in general something of bitterness and unkindness in it. * * * Is not [this] the secret, the only secret of true happiness: To get rid of every unkindly feeling toward all, so that we can rejoice in all that is good, or that is called good, in every one, and to do our duty in everything humbly and self-denyingly? * * * I assure you this is one principal ingredient in the visions of happiness in which I sometimes indulge, and I believe it to be a reasonable and a permitted source from which to look for certain and enduring satisfaction. It is independent of other people and unaffected by circumstances or condition.

Perhaps in this glimpse of his inner life, in which thoughts of CHRIST in nature, CHRIST in duty, and CHRIST

in social life, are commingled together, we can catch the tone of Mr. Emott's mind as he turned his attention to theological questions.

As we have said, the father was a man of high Christian principle. He had held for many years previous to his death the position of Senior Warden in Christ Church, Poughkeepsie, and had united with his wife in surrounding the childhood and youth of their son with religious influences. James had thus grown up under the shadow of the Church. He was fond of her liturgy, and in the musical rendering of her services he frequently bore his part, being, for that day, not an unskilled musician and organist; and when, on the death of the former rector, Dr. Reed, the Rev. Homer Wheaton, a son of Judge Wheaton and a man of pronounced opinions in ecclesiastical matters, assumed charge of the parish, he found in Mr. Emott an ardent and sympathising friend. At that time the Tractarian movement brought in a rising tide of religious life that bore many strong and energetic spirits on the crest of its wave. It followed in the wake of the Evangelical revival, as that, in turn, had succeeded Wesleyanism, and was in many respects the direct effect of Evangelicalism.

The Low Church movement, which at the beginning of the nineteenth century carried with it such spiritual power, and which accomplished such blessed results in England and America, gradually lost its force through the expansion of the very Christian zeal to which it had given birth; and, as enthusiasm waned, the conviction grew in thoughtful minds that something more was needed for the balance of the religious life than the introspective study of self, upon which the great Evangelical teachers had laid so great a stress, and that Christianity had its objective as well as its subjective side. Thus, insensibly, a reaction took place in which the sacramental aspect of religion and ideas regarding the corporate life of the Church, assumed great prominence.

It was this in the Tractarian movement which awakened the sympathies of such men as James Emott. It stimulated practical activity; it cultivated unselfishness

and social feelings of brotherhood ; it was free from the exaggerated ideas regarding experimental religion, into which the older Evangelicalism had drifted ; it gave due weight to questions of authority and of historic and ecclesiastical continuity.

Mr. Emott was called at the time, by those who differed with him, an ardent "Puseyite." He soon, however, showed in his theological attitude the same characteristic equipoise and independence of thought that he had displayed in his legal profession. Warm as the expression of his sympathies was with the Tractarian movement, he never completely identified himself with it ; on the contrary, the more closely he watched its development, the more clearly he saw that its tendency, like that of all the great revivals which had preceded it, would be to an abnormal extreme ; and after a few years he appeared to others to be drifting in an opposite direction, not because he had lost all sympathy with what had so deeply interested him before, but because, in the growth of his own mind, his attention was fixed less on outward forms of Church life and more upon the silent evolution of Christian thought and religious feeling which gave spiritual power to those forms.

One who knew him intimately in those early days, and who, though differing with him strongly in theological convictions, preserved a friendly intercourse with him that never was broken, describes him at this period of life as possessing a strongly marked character which early matured, and as a man of most decided ability.

"From one of the highest of the high," writes this friend—himself a man of exalted position in the Church—

he became one of the broadest of the broad. I had with him innumerable theological discussions in which we agreed to differ, and in which he acquitted himself with decision and ability. * * He was firm in his opinions, but tolerant of those who differed from him, when they did not pass points which exceeded the limits of his toleration. He was a man, too, of the largest culture, having used to the full the educational advantages which were placed before him. He was devoted to books, and he knew their contents, having gathered a library which contained all, or well nigh all, the works which it was desirable to possess.

After his father's death in 1850, Mr. Emott, although then but a young man of twenty-seven years of age, rose rapidly in his profession. Not only did the oldest and best of his father's clients flock to the office of the son, and a wide and lucrative practice flow in which would have absorbed the energies of a less active and large-hearted man, but he found time and leisure to identify himself with the best interests of his native place. He became the chosen successor of his father, as President of the old Dutchess County Bank, a position which he afterward held to the time of his death.

When Poughkeepsie became a city, he was elected its first Mayor; and, in 1855, when, amid a fierce political contest that was being bitterly waged between old, rival factions, Mr. Emott's name was presented by the Hon. John Thompson, as the candidate of the rising Republican Party for the office of Justice of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial District, such influence had he already attained among the people that he was at once elected, although then but a young man of thirty-two years of age.

This event marks the turning point in James Emott's career.

Heretofore his reputation had been chiefly local and his interest confined to local matters, but, after he became a Judge of the Supreme Court, his life began to expand and reveal its latent force. His travels through the circuit which embraced the river counties on both sides of the Hudson, from Dutchess to New York, as well as Long Island and Staten Island, enlarged his professional acquaintance and his reputation, and prepared the way for his removal to a wider sphere of activity.

In 1857 one of those sudden financial thunderstorms took place, which seem to be periodic in American history, and necessary to clear the commercial atmosphere of those impurities which have been slowly gathering in preceding years. In the midst of the crash and the scene of disaster and gloom which then ensued, the news was circulated, that, under the great

pressure brought to bear upon all financial institutions, one bank after another was being forced to suspend specie payments. The crisis was imminent. A period of even greater disaster loomed up in the future, if so many banks were allowed to fail, and yet the law seemed to afford no relief. In this emergency a conference of the judges of New York was called to devise, if possible, some way of escape. Eight or ten of these came together, and they gave it as their opinion, that no injunction should be granted against a bank which suspended specie payments at a time when suspension of specie payments was general. The bold stand taken by those judges at that time, met with public approval; it restored confidence and will ever be looked back upon by the city and country with gratitude. It is one of the traditions of the New York Bar, that the true solution of the difficulty was first presented, at this almost historic conference, by Judge Emott himself.

In 1861 the war of the rebellion broke out, and the newly-formed Republican Party, which had just elected its first President in Abraham Lincoln, was brought into sudden and unexpected prominence at the North.

While it was yet in its infancy, and comparatively inexperienced in conducting the affairs of Government, it was called upon to take the lead in the gravest crisis of all American history since the Revolution. The leaders of that party realised the tremendous weight of responsibility which was thus thrust upon them. And Judge Emott, who had been a Republican from the first, sharing in this feeling, at once stepped to the front and became a prominent actor in all the public movements of the day.

While, with his habitual humility and love of retirement, he shrank from holding office, he never refused to occupy responsible positions where he felt that a principle was involved.

It is beyond the limits of this memoir to rehearse the many ways in which he evinced his profound sympathies with the North. Suffice to say that, while in New York, he was appointed one of the Committee of Seventy and

acted as a Vice-president of the Union League Club, at his own home in Poughkeepsie he organised the first regiment that Dutchess County sent to the war, and was with difficulty restrained by his friends—who implored him not to forsake the pressing duties of the sphere he was already occupying—from placing himself at its head, and going forth to fight the battles of his country.

The impression which the stirring events of that period left upon his life never lost its freshness. To the time of his death he never ceased to regret that he had not borne his share of active military service at the front, nor in his later years could he speak of the early years of the war without deep emotion.

The last part of his term he served as a Judge of the Court of Appeals, where his opinions did not suffer by comparison with his eminent compeers. A year later—1863—he retired from the bench and became an active member of the New York Bar. Carrying with him the same large-heartedness which had formerly animated him in his old home on the banks of the Hudson, he became henceforth identified with the men of public spirit who labored for the best interests of the great metropolis.

Shortly after, he took up his residence in that city. Associating himself with others, he became one of the founders of the Bar Association of New York, and he will be remembered as not only for many years serving on its Executive and Library Committees, but as being one of the recognised leaders in that movement of the Bar which culminated in the forcible purification of the New York Bench.

All this time he was becoming more widely known in ecclesiastic circles as a layman who was excelled by few in his theological reading and his knowledge of Church history; and who bore the interests of the Church at heart, side by side with those of the Commonwealth. After his removal to New York he was profoundly interested in some of the questions that were then agitating the Church, and, associating himself with Calvary Parish, became one of the intimate friends of the late

Dr. Washburn. There were many points of congeniality and sympathy between these two well-known men.

Both were essentially progressive men who had passed through an almost identical experience; sympathising in their early days with the advance movement in England and America which pointed to a revival of Church life, and drawing off at a later period when they felt that the tendency of this movement was as far to the extreme of objective, as that of the Evangelical revival had been to the extreme of subjective religion.

Both were at heart constructive, while from their critical attitude they appeared to many as destructive thinkers and laborers; and of both it might be said that their native sympathies were more with principles than with persons.

Few were more deeply interested in all the social, political, and ecclesiastical movements of the day than they; but each, being more fitted to be a leader of thought than of men, shrank back from taking a prominent position in every movement that he had helped to inspire and create; and, rebelling against the idea of losing his independence and coming under the lash of a party whip, ended his life without rising to the high position in the world that, in the judgment of his generation, was commensurate with his ability.

By a kind of natural gravitation Judge Emott made his appearance among the counsellors of the Church, first at the Diocesan, and then at the General Conventions, in both of which the quiet force of his influence and his learning was felt through a very formative and expansive period of American Church life. While in the freer sphere of the American Church Congress he was no mere honorary vice-president; but, especially in the beginning of the movement, when Dr. Washburn stood forth so prominently, he became as active in advocating and pushing the cause as the impaired state of his health would allow.

The thoughtful articles that he contributed to this *REVIEW* on liturgical revision and other subjects, evince his appreciation of the needs of American religious life,

as also of the way in which our Church is gradually expanding in her efforts to adapt herself to those needs, and meet those issues which are ever arising into greater prominence in American Church history.

Little more remains to be told. The career that began with so much promise became, in the zenith of its powers, the victim of physical weakness. Said one who had watched him from his boyhood, "The life which beyond all others that I ever knew had been indefatigable in labor, in study, in execution, now wore itself out through incessant filing of the brain."

Shortly after 1870, and before Judge Emott had reached the age of fifty, came the first warning of disease in the form of a slight paralytic stroke.

Though the immediate effects of this shock apparently passed away, his health, which had been undermined by years of severe mental labor, from this time gradually failed. The work which henceforth he was to perform, was only to be done after an amount of toil and self-control that is inconceivable to those who have never passed through a similar experience.

Spinal disease appeared, and in a few years greatly disabled him. Through all these years of suffering, however, he continued to maintain his professional relations and to do his work, until actually incapacitated by bodily weakness from appearing at court. It is scarcely more than a year ago, that he resigned the many and various positions that he had so long and efficiently filled; yet up to the very end, none could distinguish any difference in the painstaking accuracy, or any abatement in the conscientious diligence with which he discharged his several duties. Whatever the position was, whether that of chairman of a committee, or of a lawyer whose advice was sought in chamber counsel, or a vestryman of his church, he continued to be, what he had always been, a power to the very last.

It is impossible to say what such a life might have been, if it had not been arrested in its upward progress, and, through the last quarter of its human career, prevented from rising to still greater heights by the heavy

hand of disease. Nor can any measure the keen disappointment and anguish of spirit through which such a strong and energetic nature must have inwardly suffered, in meeting with such a reverse; yet all through these years, not one word of complaint was he heard to utter, even in the bosom of his family, against God or man, as thus amid hourly pain and weakness the end of life drew near. And when, on the eleventh of last September, at his country home in Poughkeepsie, the summons at last came, Judge Emott died as he had lived, a white soul, whose purity had challenged the reverence of all from the early days of childhood, whose watchword through its mortal career had been, "Work while it is called to-day," and whose depths had through life unfailingly responded in devoutest loyalty to Him who said, "Every one that is of the Truth heareth My voice."

Looking back upon Judge Emott's life, one thought, I suppose, must be more or less in the minds of all in the Church who knew him intimately. He represented the type of character that is more often witnessed in these days in England than in America. While he was not only a distinguished counsellor-at-law, and, in the best sense, a statesman and a politician, he was equally a Christian and a Churchman, an earnest and humble follower of God, carrying a religious aim and motive into all his actions.

Yet, although he was thus respected among his peers for his Christian character, there were few who could heartily sympathise with him; and hence, in his religious life, he stood more or less isolated and lonely among them. For the time is not yet, when, among laymen of high position, the teachings of CHRIST are acknowledged as setting forth the highest, truest philosophy of life.

To-day we are living in more hopeful times; the religious aim is more and more asserting its prominence; the position and worth of a Christian layman in the community are becoming more fully recognised and appreciated; and it is safe to say that men like Judge

Emott will, in future, occupy a larger sphere in the Church and in American religious life, than they have done in the past.

The day has dawned, when, in the expanding life of the times, the Church should open her doors more widely and extend a more generous welcome to all, who, in their vocation and ministry, are able to serve her. She needs to utilise all the forces that are at her command: to increase the sphere and the work of the Christian laity; to avail herself of the large wisdom and trained powers of judgment which the laity possess, and thus to break down the barrier of reserve and distrust which has existed in the past between the Clergy and the people.

This is one of the great problems which it is the province of the American Church to solve. And if in this land we can develop the principle that there is a Christian ministry of the Laity as well as of the Clergy—a principle which our Church has already emphasised when she admitted the Laity to her highest councils—we shall perhaps discover that there is still left in the Church an unexplored mine of wealth.

HENRY Y. SATTERLEE.

THE RESTORATION OF CATHOLIC UNITY.

NO large-hearted and philosophic student of the moral phenomena in the midst of which we are now living, but must feel something of the convergent drawing which marks the most earnest religious thinking of the day. It is time to ask what is to be the outcome of such thinking.

In this period of skepticism, agnosticism, and materialism, and even, in some quarters, of decay of practical Christian Faith in Christian Churches, and in this land of seemingly endless ecclesiastical disintegration, nothing would, at first sight, appear less likely than the rise of a great, all-embracing, Faith-inspired, Spirit-energised Church of CHRIST. But—given three distinct causes, neither alone, perhaps, affording sufficient ground for such a hope—given these three causes, at one time, and GOD granting His blessing, few results are less unlikely than the emergence from all the spiritual decay and ecclesiastical confusion which now characterise American Christianity, of such a witness for the Christian Faith and such a power for GOD against the godlessness of the world, as Christendom has not seen for many and many weary ages gone.

Before stating, however, the grounds for such a hope, let it first be clearly understood what is here meant by a united Church of CHRIST.

There is a Christian unity which has long been offered, and, indeed, urged upon Christendom by the See of Rome. This is the unity of an enforced religious uniformity. It is the unity which would constrain the religious world to receive one common impress from a single human hand; to become one in a general self-surrender of conscience, through a general suppression of all those

diversities of Christian character and life which are psychologically inevitable wherever there be any real life or any genuine character. This unity is, of course, still insisted on, but it is by no means the Christian unity which our times need or which CHRIST designed for His Church.

It is scarcely needful to refer, on the other hand, to such a so-called Christian unity as is from time to time presented to the Christian world at the meetings of the Evangelical Alliance—for this after all is but the profession of wordy sentiment, not a life-giving principle. It is but the mere utterance of the Christian conscience, constrained to confess the wrong of our religious divisions, while yet not prepared to make any real attempt to heal the breaches it deplures.

But there is a practical, or, at least, a working unity honestly attempted by certain societies, of which the Young Men's Christian Association have been resultful on the largest scale. This Christian unity, unlike that pressed on us by the Church of Rome, does not seek to compose our religious differences at all. It leaves us, and it professes to leave us all—Puritan or Churchman, Baptist or Lutheran, Methodist or Presbyterian—to those differences, and is satisfied to ignore the fact that they exist. Just so far as such differences *can* be ignored, the experiment of such a Christian unity can succeed and has succeeded. Beyond that point it fails. No unity based upon conditions so unreal, so factitious, can be otherwise than limited in its scope and purposes, and still more partial in its comprehension.

If the attempts are equally futile to suppress or to ignore the inevitable differences of those great types of the religious character which more than all else have practically determined our diverse ecclesiastical allegiances—there remains, and there can remain only such an organic unity as nature everywhere presents to us—such as the Apostle has ever held up before the Church of CHRIST. This is a unity in diversity—a unity of recognised and accepted differences, co-ordinated and co-working in the one Body of CHRIST.

It is no new illustration to speak of the Church as an

army in which there are of necessity different arms of the service. But in using this illustration, it seems often to be forgotten that the several divisions of an army organised for serious warfare—infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineer corps, riflemen, commissariat—do not go into battle or carry out a campaign, each without the slightest reference to the movements or operations of the others; far less do they engage in rivalries or contests with each other for the possession of advantageous positions on the field. They have not only one common purpose, but they are also directed to that purpose, in organic and mutually related action, by and under one common authority.

So, in such a unity as S. Paul sketched for the Church, if to one type of the Christian character "is given, by the Spirit, the word of wisdom; . . . to another faith, by the same Spirit; . . . to another the working of miracles," it is because "the body is not one member but many," so that "the eye cannot say unto the hand"—the Churchman to the Puritan, the Presbyterian to the Methodist—"I have no need of thee!" In such a unity alone shall we or can we obey the Apostle's charge that there should be no schism in the body, but that the members should have the same care one for another."

Such was and is the *Divine* conception of a Catholic Church. Such a truly Catholic unity is now at last within the reach of our American Christianity; and the causes which have concurrently brought it within the reach of faithful hope are these:

First. Great gradual *changes* in the several Churches of the land, slowly subordinating, if not dissolving quite away, on one side or on both—the issues out of which the ecclesiastical divisions of the past have primarily arisen, and by which these divisions have been continued, and bringing into greater prominence a new class of questions and issues which are rather common to all the Churches and run parallel in them—creating thus common sympathies and identical interests in lieu of the old antagonisms.

Second. A great and definite *motive* for ecclesiastical re-union, rising at last to a strength sufficient to overcome the ultra-conservatism and the inertia, and even the vested rights in which the present conditions of American Christianity have entrenched themselves.

Third. Such a state of the public Christian conscience as would be prepared to respond to such a motive and be ready to press forward, rather than to keep back, those who first move in this direction, and who must, of necessity, go forward to explore and open up the possibilities of such a momentous advance.

It is the purpose of this paper to claim that the experiences of the generation now passing away have effected such internal changes, and largely removed the only insuperable obstacles to such a re-union of the Churches; and that they have illustrated, before the face of the whole Christian world, the utter needlessness of our Christian divisions; that the nature of the issues which have now arisen between Christian Faith and the faithlessness, and even the reckless godlessness of the present times has furnished the sufficient motive; and that a study of the prevailing tendencies and currents of public thinking will reveal grounds for hope that no thoroughly honest, earnest, and wise leading in this direction will from this time forward lack an effective support and a resolute following.

Such are the propositions upon which the present argument is based, and which must, therefore, be now examined one by one.

I. Fifty years ago—to go no further back—the controversies which enlisted general interest and which absorbed so much of the attention of the religious public turned on purely *doctrinal* issues, indeed upon issues which were the logical outcome of metaphysical theology, or, to speak more accurately, soteriology. Such issues kept the Calvinist and the Arminian in irreconcilable antagonism; and kept wide the gulf between the Presbyterian, the New England Congregationalist, and the Baptist on the one hand, and the Wesleyan and the

Lutheran on the other. Nay, what to those without seemed but a minor issue between Calvinists of different degrees of logical consistency, was sufficient to subdivide the Presbyterian Church itself into its Old and New Schools, as different views of prevenient grace had already subdivided the Methodists into different "connections." The polemic power of the larger controversies may be judged by the disruptive force of such subordinate issues.

But the unity of the Presbyterian Church, at least, has been restored. The sons of those who fought out even the larger Calvinistic controversies to the extremest consequence have since freely exchanged pulpits without dread of heresy for their respective flocks; and their grandsons in the faith now find it very difficult to understand how scholarly and godly men could get so excited over such metaphysical abstractions. The present age, so far from keeping up these issues, has rather become latitudinarian in doctrine, and Christian men are now more in danger of losing their firm grasp upon the great Theological and Christological dogmas of the Faith and upon those anthropological principles upon which the Churches have ever admitted their substantial concurrence, than of maintaining their divisions, because of those doctrines in respect to which they have differed, and, perhaps, still suppose that they differ from each other.

To these theological issues succeeded a class of questions more *ecclesiastical* in their character. The Churchman now came forward with all manner of tracts, pamphlets, and sermons on Church history, the Apostolic Succession and the Divine origin of Episcopal government in the Church of CHRIST, as against the Presbyterian, doing battle for ministerial parity, and as against the pure Congregationalist; while these two latter, however they might agree about the Divine decrees, were now set as stoutly in array against each other on the issue whether there were or were not *any* organic visible continuity whatever, or *any* institutional character given to the Christian Church beyond its local unity. The Presbyterian found the Wesleyan Methodist, who had before

been his most resolute opponent, now his ally ; while to the Baptist, who had fought side by side with him in the theological strife, he now stood opposed.

These ecclesiastical controversies, then, if they did not create new divisions, at least asserted new grounds for earlier separations, and certainly broadened and deepened some of these.

Yet, within the memory of most of us, these issues also have, in their turn, become comparatively abeyant. The great offense of the Churchman, in the eyes of other Protestants, was now not so much his Episcopal Ordination as his Prayer Book, and the fact that he laid so much stress upon ceremonial observances. The offence of the Methodist, on the other hand, in those of the Churchman, was his lack of reverence and his illy regulated fervor. That of the Baptist, in the regard of both the others, was the stand he took about the admission of infants to the Covenant with CHRIST, and his exclusion from religious fellowship of those who had not received the initial Sacrament in what he held to be its integrity ; in other words, the dividing controversies now turned no longer on questions either of doctrine or of organic polity, but on those of worship or sacred ordinances, gradually developing into the ritualistic issues of later years.

But now again even these issues are beginning to lose their vital importance in men's eyes ; or rather they have become far less issues *between* the different Churches than questions of less or more within each Church severally. There is no one of them all in which there has not arisen its own virtually ritualistic movement. Some of the noblest Gothic churches in the land are Methodist or Baptist, without prejudice to the ecclesiastical standing of those who built them ; eminent Congregational Ministers have proposed to their respective parishioners partially liturgic forms ; anthems and flowers mark the joyous Eastern morn, even in Unitarian places of worship ; and distinguished Presbyterian writers have declared liturgical services a necessity of their Church.

Indeed, a scheme of Christian harmony was, about two years since, submitted to the religious world in the *Century*, which, while full of food for serious thought, was, perhaps, somewhat prematurely and rashly pressed to a proposal for, at least, ecclesiastical unity, on the tacit and apparently unconscious assumption that, whatever other differences exist between the various denominations, there need now be no practical difficulty in waiving all questions of doctrine, and even in the common acceptance of the principles of a purely Congregational polity. Whatever reserve must needs yet be made in that assumption, certainly these articles and the interest they seem to have awakened very strikingly illustrate the extent to which public attention has been drawn away from the theological issues, and from questions of organisation and ministerial authority to differences which lie more upon the surface, and to which even these latter are losing their repellent power.

There remain, then, among American Protestants at least, no living controversies appealing, as vital issues, to Christian men's convictions, with a force which, if they were not already separated into distinct Churches, would now divide them. No questions of doctrine seriously stir up the *odium theologicum* between different bodies of the followers of CHRIST; questions of ecclesiastical polity and discipline are rarely now the subjects of angry debate; even questions of ritual and worship, as just stated, are less argued between the adherents of different systems as such, than between the more conservative and the more advanced severally in them all.

Why, then, should the Churches be longer kept asunder by mere ecclesiastical inertia—by the propellent momentum of the controversies of the past?

It is answered, that the result of those controversies, and of the different systems of doctrine, discipline, and worship engendered by them, has produced in the different Churches such distinct types of Christian character, and such widely different habits of religious thought and action, that they cannot now either work or worship together.

To meet a presumptive difficulty with a presumptive reply it were sufficient to answer that such an objection would have weight were the Christian unity aimed at a unity in *uniformity*; but, that the existence of such different types of Christian character is the very condition of such a Catholic unity *in diversity* as that here under consideration. To meet this presumption, however, rather with *facts*—so far as Protestant Christendom is concerned—the Young Men's Christian Associations, beginning with those who were young men from twenty to thirty years ago, have now set before the religious world a body of earnest Christians, in or past middle life, and the greater part active and more or less influential in their respective ecclesiastical relations, who are witness that such men can, at least, *work* together. Whatever else that organisation may or may not have done or attempted—however it may even have fairly exposed itself at times to hostile criticism for excessive zeal in certain directions—it has none the less demonstrated to our day that there is no practical reason why we cannot be united in a very large measure of those labors of Christian charity which are the charge of the Church of CHRIST, if we but wished it.

And surely the American Churches in Europe, and notably that organised some five and twenty years ago in the Rome of the last Pope-King, and cordially supported from the first both morally and financially by all American Protestants of every name, are equally conspicuous witnesses that they *can* also worship together, “in one holy bond of love and peace, of faith and charity,” when it is a necessity that they should do so.

What has thus been shown on one side has also been as strikingly illustrated on the other—on the part, that is, of those other Churches which have indeed common organic principles and a common historic claim; but which have been, if anything, far more widely sundered by the divergent forms in which the Faith has, during centuries of separation and in far distant lands, addressed

itself to races widely different. In the Bonn Conferences of 1874 and 1875, Bishops and Clergy of the Churches of England and Ireland and of the American Episcopal Church, met with a Greek Archbishop and Bulgarian Bishops, and with Greek and Russian ecclesiastics and learned laymen; and also, on the other hand, with German theologians and with French and Swiss divines—the learned Döllinger, the loving Reinkens, and the earnest, yet unpretending Herzog—representatives of the best elements of Latin Christianity, and found, because they were sincerely and prayerfully desirous to find it, how little there really was to forbid them each other's ecclesiastical fellowship and communion.

Surely the 10th of August, 1879, when the Anglican Bishop of Edinburgh, the German Bishop Reinkens, the Swiss Bishop Herzog, and the French Père Hyacinthe met, worshipped, and, after a fervent and eloquent sermon from the latter, communed together in the Cathedral of Bonn, was an earnest of a still brighter day yet reserved for Christendom.

The age of the Young Men's Christian Associations and of the Bonn Conferences cannot refuse to admit that no insuperable obstacles longer forbid the re-union, in one visible and organic Church Catholic of CHRIST on earth, of "all them that love our LORD JESUS CHRIST in sincerity," save only those who still adhere to the Roman Papacy.

This exception must as yet be made, for Roman Catholicism, as such, exists in this country, as everywhere else (as already noted), for the assertion of a wholly different theory of Christian unity. Moreover, re-union—such re-union, at least, as that here considered—implies a mutual willingness to concede, and no concession is any longer possible for Rome. With Rome it is not a question of concessions to others, but only of submission to her.

When the temper of the Church of Rome shall in these things be changed, or when Roman Catholicism in this country shall have become so far Americanised that it can cease to be Roman, and become really and

only Catholic, then—but not till then—will it be possible to include that organisation in this hope, and a perfect Christian re-union be fully realised among us.

But it is not merely that old obstacles have thus been removed and that old issues have so largely been laid aside; let us ask, further, what new questions are arising to succeed the controversies of the past—what new issues are already revealing themselves as those of the near future?

What questions are beginning seriously to occupy Christian minds to-day? What anxieties are now beginning to press upon devout hearts? What problems are beginning to present themselves which *must* be solved?

Are they questions of Augustinian anthropology and soteriology? Are they questions of organic polity? Do they relate to forms of worship and matters of ritual? Neither of these. Are they issues which will once more divide Presbyterian from Methodist, or array Churchman and Puritan anew against each other? By no means.

They are questions which will stir each and all of these alike with a common anxiety. They are issues which will arouse every really earnest Christian heart, of whatever name, to common study, to common efforts, and to united prayer.

For the world has again brought forward the question above all questions, “What think ye of CHRIST?” and a united Christianity must answer it so clearly that none shall fail to hear; so distinctly that none can fail to understand; and so positively that none may suspect her of uncertainty.

For the reproach is now brought against us all alike that our tolerance of doctrinal differences has gone to the extreme of faithless indifference to all doctrinal truth, and that we are even doubtful about the Scriptures themselves, the warrant for whatever we deem divine truth; that we are careless about the basis of our ecclesiastical authority, because we are ceasing to believe that the ministry are in any special sense CHRIST’S

representatives ; that we are less disposed to contend about our respective forms of worship, because all forms are alike less and less real to us.

Honest and high-toned moral men decline on such grounds as these to unite with any of our religious organisations, and hold aloof from all forms of Christian discipleship. The secular press gravely pleads with the Churches, or the semi-skeptical review taunts them with falling away from their professed principles ; and devout Christians of whatever name sadly confess to each other, that with all our activity and our energies there is a great increase of superficial show and of sensational and blatant profession, and a great loss of spirituality on every side.

How to make CHRIST more real to Christians themselves? How to awaken a more enthusiastic loyalty and love for Him in our own hearts? How to revive a deeper spirituality among ourselves? How to arrest the present deterioration in the quality of our ministry? How to restore it to its true status as the embassy of CHRIST? How to inspire it with spiritual courage and devotion to Him? How to rescue the Churches from undue subjection to mere wealth? How to arouse an unselfish, self-consecrated missionary spirit throughout the land? What are the true, because Divine principles of finance for the Church of CHRIST? How most effectually to employ and to economise not only money, but men? How to bring most resultfully to bear upon the work which Christianity has to do in our land the intellect, the energies, the affections, the devotion, the zeal which are at the Church's service for the work?

These, and others like these, are the living questions of the day ; and these are questions which, so far from dividing Christians anew on denominational lines, will rather tend to draw closer and knit together in spite of their differences all who are thoroughly resolved that with GOD's help they shall be answered. They are questions, indeed, which can, perhaps, be fully answered only by the united thought and common determination of all. And it needs only that those who, above

all things else, are in earnest to solve such questions,—not in theory and on paper alone—but in practice and in the very midst of the struggle against wrong and shame and sin—it needs only that such Christians should set about it with the resolution which animated those who organised the Young Men's Christian Associations of America, and with the deep yearning for Christian unity which filled the hearts of the theologians at Bonn—it needs only this to insure the solution of these problems and the reform of our Churches, and in that reform the restoration of such a Christian unity as we have scarcely dreamed of as yet—such certainly as we have not heretofore even seriously sought to attain.

II. But is there in our day and among us a *motive* sufficiently powerful to set in motion forces such as these?

It is no new thing to be told that the divisions of Christendom are a sore hindrance to the success of all our Protestant missionary operations, whether among the heathen of other lands or among those who are none the less practically heathen in our own.

But there are probably few who realise also that these divisions among us furnish the unanswerable argument with which, when all else fails, the Latin Catholic reformer is at last brought into submission to the terms upon which the Vatican dictates unity. None who have not enjoyed familiar personal intercourse with such men can have any idea of the effect of the spectacle of our divisions—a spectacle too which it would seem that the various Protestant missions to Italy and to Spain, equally blind and reckless of the consequences, are resolved to keep ever before their eyes. The more conscientious these reformers themselves, the more earnest to contend for the Faith, and the more devout in their personal religious character, the more incomprehensible are we to them, seeming, as to them we do, to set our own self-will deliberately above the Divine command as our only law; seeming to believe just as much or as little as personally pleases us; and to turn the worship of God into a wanton display of our religious anarchy. To such men

there is no explanation of our divisions which can be given. To such men even the acknowledged corruption in doctrine, the despotic centralisation in discipline, and the wretched morals, which they frankly confess and so deeply deplore, are yet at the worst better than a state of things which is, to them, the virtual disbanding of the Church of CHRIST in the face of the great Arch-Enemy.

It was before the dread of such an alternative, to which alone they seemed to be shut up, that the Bishops of the minority in the Vatican Council finally drew back from the faithful resistance to the dictates of the Curia which they had so long and so steadfastly maintained. It was from this, as the worse evil of the two, from which at the last moment the American Kenrick and Fitzgerald shrunk. It was this terrible dread of schism which finally silenced even Hefele and Haneburg. It was this last argument, which was pressed upon Döllinger by the Archbishop of Munich, and to which even he, though he resisted it, could only answer: "I know; I know; but I am an old man, and I cannot go down to my grave with a lie in my mouth!"

But more than this. Our divisions do not merely throw the whole weight of our Protestant Christianity into the scale against the hope of a Scriptural and a spiritual reformation of the Latin Churches, they offer every encouragement to Papal hopes and endeavors to reduce us and our children to ecclesiastical bondage. It needs only that we listen to hear the steady tread of the serried and well-ordered hosts, which under Jesuit marshalling are gathering in every part of our land, planting churches, opening schools, and holding missions, and to assure ourselves that, whether we are in earnest or not, *they* are resolved that nothing shall deprive them of the eventual possession of the ecclesiastical, nay, even of the political future of this country. Those only for whom history has been written wholly in vain can doubt what, as between a compact and resolute Romanism on the one side, and on the other the divided counsels and irresolution of Protestant anarchy, must be the sure result; they only can flatter themselves that we

have any reasonable grounds for trust in the sufficiency of our ecclesiastical defences. It were simply to ignore the past and to shut our eyes obstinately to facts to expect it: and nothing so forcibly illustrates our danger as the general apathy which is so blind to it.

If it were possible to bring the conscience of American Protestantism into the presence of the relations of its divisions to the future of Romanism, either in this country or in its own; if it were possible to bring it to realise that there is no real source of strength left to the Papal system in our day, comparable with what we thus furnish it, there should surely be *motive* enough to stir it to its very depths, and to rouse every energy to a search for the conditions of a practicable restoration of organic unity among ourselves.

Nor is even this the worst. Turning in exactly the opposite direction, let us consider the future which the Socialism and the infidel Communism, ever flowing in upon us from abroad, are preparing for us. Can we hope that our self-distracted American Christianity is able to forefend or to cope with this danger? Were lawless labor to rise up against capital, and despairing poverty against wealth; were the dregs of a godless populace to surge through Fifth Avenue, to pour over Beacon Hill, or to crowd Chestnut Street and Monument Square with rioters; were fierce brute force to rush upon culture and refinement, and the drunken mobs of our cities to proclaim the sack of our private palaces, and the wreck of our fashionable churches, then, when it would be too late, we should realise the Christless religious selfishness and the reckless wilfulness with which we have been expending, in the maintenance of our wretched divisions, the thought, the energies, the zeal, the time, the money, and the lives which should all have been concentrated in preaching CHRIST to those whom the Providence of God has sent to us to be brought back to Him, and whom, if we continue to neglect, He will assuredly make the instrument of our punishment. Faithful to our trust we should have saved both ourselves and them.

Is a loose aggregation of a score of Christian Churches, each and every one with its own several distinctive and often disaccordant views and convictions of the principles upon which such work should be attempted, each and every one with a large part of its ministry and laity far more intent upon contending for the pre-eminence among the faithful, than for "the Faith itself once delivered to the saints," or with "the world, the flesh, and the devil," is such a Protestantism competent for such a work? No one who soberly considers this question, with the facts all before him, but must realise that the practical reform of all our Churches on the lines indicated by the questions above proposed, and the organic cworking, to say the very least, of the now utterly unrelated Christian agencies of the land, are the conditions of the faintest hope of it.

Shall we be told that Education is the remedy, the sufficient remedy for this state of things? That therefore it is to our well-developed and widely spread public-school system that we must look for safety? Those who once urged this are for the most part silent now. Our statisticians no longer flatter us with such a hope. Sanguine confidence in mere education, that is in an education which is purely secular and entirely divorced from religious instruction and influence, is giving way now on every side. Surely the State of Massachusetts may safely be taken as a favorable illustration of the working and moral success of such a public-school system. If we may rely upon the education of the intellect, without the concurrent education of the conscience, surely we may do so in that State, if anywhere. And yet we have lately been told by Mr. Stetson (in the *Andover Review* for December last), that increased educational advantages have, at least, been accompanied in that State by an increase of immorality and crime. Even if we hesitate to admit that this education of the intellect alone only qualifies the immoral and godless for more successful crime, none the less we must admit that it is proving utterly powerless to restrain it.

But, as Bishop Littlejohn tells us plainly (*“Christian Ministry at the Close of the Nineteenth Century,”* p. 90), the withdrawal of Christian teaching, and of a positive religious training of the conscience from our public schools, is not because a secular State is necessarily irreligious. “This is not due,” says he, “so much to the hostility of the State, as to the disagreements and divisions among Christians themselves,” which make it impossible that the civil authority should decide between them, and give to any one form of Christianity, rather than to another, such an opportunity to influence and mould the coming generation. The very extent of this danger to a sectarian jealousy is the measure of the protective power which is thus lost to us.

Well may the Bishop add (p. 299) that as the clergy “lost their power in modern life by the long-continued disagreements and schisms of Christendom; so they can regain their power only by the reunion of Christendom;” not, that is, by the merely subjective unity of “our common Christianity,” but by the objective and organic “unity of the one Catholic and Apostolic Church. Every step toward this is a step toward the restoration of the Church, as of the clergy as representing the Church, to their normal and ideal function as educators of the people.”

Motive enough there is for such a re-union, were there only also Faith. And that will be developed on every side, when godly men once set in earnest about preparing each his own heart, each their own Church, to meet the spiritual necessities of the times; when they ask, and ask again in tones which cannot be silenced, the great religious questions of the day; when they resolve upon the reform of the serious practical evils which at present chill and deaden the Christian enthusiasm of our young men and waste the best energies of those who would gladly have laid upon the altar of God the ripest fruits of their maturer years; when the fires of a great living faith burn within them once more—*then*, the barriers of the past being all, at last, removed, that faith will stir, as by one common impulse and energy,

on every side, and it shall not only be said once more, "See how these Christians love one another," but the long divided, shattered, enfeebled Church of CHRIST will close up her ranks and address herself, in solemn earnest, to the one great work given her to do in these days, with a singleness of spirit which has not for centuries been possible.

III. But what reason is there now, more than in the past, to hope that the Christian conscience of our time and land will at length respond to the oft repeated, and heretofore as often suppressed, demands for such reforms? In a land and at a time when, whatever the different theoretical principles of our Churches, all actual power, all real ecclesiastical authority, is in the hands of the people, or in the hands of those only who are put forward and sustained by popular sympathy and favor; when, whatever the need, there seems to be little or no opportunity for Christian statesmanship; what hope is there of reform in the methods and practical working of our Churches, when these methods are wellnigh of universal acceptance, of such reforms as will make re-union possible?

There is *this* hope:

We have seen the good sense and the political conscience of the people rouse up to demand reforms in the civil life and in the political methods, whose evils were certainly as strongly, if not far more strongly entrenched in the heretofore almost universal acceptance of all political parties. The religious conscience of the more devout portion of the community will not assuredly prove less sensitive to those evils and ill-workings which are undermining our Church life and efficiency, and be harder to waken than the political conscience of the people at large to the evils which have been eating into the life of the body politic.

The very habits of political thinking and the political motives and purposes, which are now engendered all around us must inevitably beget, sooner or later, earnest religious thinking and a very similar class of resolves and purposes with reference to more sacred interests. The

Christian laymen who have done battle patiently and stoutly, and at last successfully, for truth, honesty, and unselfish devotion to public secular interests, will be keensighted to discover and quick to realise selfishness and unreality in the old accustomed Church methods of the day; and, so discovering them, they will be no less earnest to find out the remedies, and resolute and fearless in applying them, or in sustaining those who are earnestly seeking and endeavoring to do these things.

And Church reform in such lines as those already indicated would, under present circumstances, be inevitably followed by—if it would not almost inevitably involve—*Christian unity*. Parallel, almost identical interests—one and the self-same great motive pressing alike upon all, one and the self-same great purpose energising all—the glorious dream would silently, insensibly become to one after another an inspiring hope, ere long a reality so nearly at hand, so manifestly attainable, so clearly essential to all our common hopes and aims and purposes, that nothing could or would long interpose either between the Churches whose leading laity in their younger years organised the Young Men's Christian Associations, or between those whose representative theologians sat side by side at Bonn.

Let but a few scholarly, earnest, and devout Christian men—men representing fairly the best elements in the different Churches of our now divided American Christianity—men from whose hearts is utterly excluded, as sacrilege, not only that self-seeking which so defiles all “movements,” but also all desire of mere sectarian victory—let but a few such men join quietly, informally, in humble dependence upon the guiding SPIRIT of GOD, but with a firm purpose that, GOD so helping them, they *will* find out a way to accomplish this, and then the Christian world will not be far removed from the blessed day for which so many now wait and pray like Simeon.

WM. CHAUNCY LANGDON.

ANOTHER VIEW OF NATURAL LAW IN THE SPIRITUAL WORLD.

Natural Law in the Spiritual World. By Prof. HENRY DRUMMOND. New York: James Pott & Co. 1884.

MR. DRUMMOND'S book has been read by many intelligent and educated Christians (judging by my own acquaintance) with such admiration as to preclude criticism; and one of our own Bishops, in a recent number of this REVIEW, has given it a very strong recommendation. It is indeed a most interesting, instructive, and suggestive book, and seems well calculated, in the present phase of scientific criticism, cavil, and pretension, to give a new and perhaps a wholesome direction to Christian thought and feeling as well as to Christian apologetics. The vividness with which the author portrays, and vigor with which he enforces, the necessity of the newness of life, must induce self-examination and watchfulness, and stir up holy aspirations.

Yet while opening up a new field for Christian exploration, in tracing the continuity of the laws of natural life as developed by the yet comparatively recent sciences of biology and biogenesis, into the supernatural life, as revealed to us in the Gospel, he has certainly accidentally or designedly omitted to take proper notice of some of those laws, and misinterpreted others, which seem to us to qualify his conclusions. This was unfortunate and has misled him, and his book may mislead others. Without pretension to scientific education, beyond what is common in these days, but with some acquaintance with the Book that tells us of spiritual life, and an author's

plain recognition of all that we shall offer, we venture to suggest some views, not altogether concurrent with his.

To set out fairly, we should understand the terms used. What is natural law? Law primarily implies a law-giver. To be *law*, it must be the expression of Sovereign Authority. The Law-giver must, by his Sovereign Will, prescribe the rule by which his subjects or agents must conform their acts or agency. But the term is often applied in such a way as to ignore a Supreme Law-giver, and even to suggest some other. Thus, Naturalists and scientific men often speak of what our author calls natural law, as a law of Nature (as he also does sometimes), seeming to personify *Nature*, and thus mislead the unlearned to regard Nature as a law-giver. Our author makes no such mistake: for he says at page 5:

In its true sense, Natural Law predicates nothing of causes. The Laws of Nature are simply statements of the orderly condition of things in Nature; what is found in Nature by a sufficient number of competent observers. . . . The Natural Laws originate nothing, sustain nothing. . . . They are modes of operation; processes, not powers. . . . Newton did not discover gravity—that is not discovered yet. He discovered its law, which is gravitation, but that tells us nothing of its origin, of its nature or of its cause.

Again, at page 44 he says:

It has been stated already, although apparently it cannot be too abundantly emphasised, that laws are only modes of operation not themselves operators.

We need not attempt to give a perfectly accurate definition of Natural Law, but shall venture to express our idea of it in our own words. A Natural Law, according to our conception of it, is, a generalisation deduced from a careful and continued observation of facts and phenomena, cognisable by our senses, occurring and appearing in the world around us—such generalisation being found to embrace and harmonise all such facts and phenomena, in each department, when tested by experience or experiment. It is only to be regarded as the intellectual

perception and comprehension of that rule or law which the Supreme Law-giver has chosen to adopt to govern His creation, and has impressed upon things created, at the time of their creation ; and which He has given man the ability to investigate and discover ; and so to prove to him that order and design are present throughout the whole creation. And thus, to proclaim in all things, a Creator infinite in wisdom and power. There is no higher intellectual gift or faculty with which man has been endowed, than this capacity and ability to attain to such generalisation and acquire acquaintance with those laws, to learn their application to the practical needs of his physical nature, and to lead to the expansion of his intellectual scope of vision. For such generalisation requires the exercise of the highest of intellectual powers and processes : Abstraction, analysis, classification, arrangement, combination, correlation, induction, invention, and unflagging continuity of thought and contemplation, fixed earnestly upon such facts and phenomena, intent only upon the attainment and development of the truth. Such an employment of such faculties would seem to be a search for a revelation of the mind of the Creator in His works ; yet it is one of the mysteries of our nature, that some who have been richly endowed with such faculties and powers, who have faithfully devoted them to this object, have been found “not to have God in all their thoughts,” some, even to deny Him, and others, to thrust Him as far back as possible in His work of creation, so as to persuade themselves, that as to the present aspects of creation, they are only the product of Nature or what they please to call Natural Selection. Our author seems to be one of these last.

Mr. Drummond very properly confines himself to tracing the law of biology, and more particularly its special branch, biogenesis, into the spiritual world, and we need not venture beyond these.

As to the continuity or extension of natural law, as it is known to us, on our planet, to our solar system, certainly—and possibly, from the revelations of the spec-

troscope as reported to us, that even the fixed stars are composed of some or all of the same elements, as matter is with us, we may suppose the visible universe and that still more extensive portion invisible to us, to be subject, at least, to the law of gravitation, and, therefore, probably to all the other natural laws we have discovered. It does not, therefore, seem irrational to entertain the belief that such law does extend also throughout the Spiritual world, in so far at least as that world may have subjects fitted for the operation of those natural laws. And if there be any natural law which can find such subjects, it is that of biology, as we are sure from Revelation that life exists and abounds in the spiritual world. Hooker said, nearly three hundred years ago, that "both (Angels and men) having one LORD, there must be some kind of law which is one and the same to both." "Eccl. Pol.," Bk. I., Ch. XVI., Sec. 4.* And it is certainly much easier for us to suppose it to extend to that life which is to be connected with our natural life in this world, than to angelic life; and our author ventures no further than this; for he says at page 239 of "Eternal Life:"

Eternal Life as a question of *life* is a problem for biology. The soul is a living organism and for any questions as to the soul's life we must appeal to Life Science.

According to our conception of natural laws (as herein before explained), we cannot expect to attain to any scientific acquaintance with the laws of spiritual life. This our author asserts, also. On pp. 302-3 he says:

No man has ever seen this life. It cannot be analysed or weighed, or traced in its essential nature. But this is just what we expected. This invisibility is the same property which we found to be peculiar to the natural life.

Still, if any of the more important biological laws can be traced into spiritual life, we might reasonably hope, if not expect, to discover traces of all of them there; but the view elaborated by our author in his first two

* See 1 Cor. vi. 3.—"Know ye not that we shall judge angels? and surely we should as judges have some knowledge of the law governing angels."

and in his last chapters, seems to us to exclude the possibility of the existence of any other than that particular portion of this law which he has selected and endeavored to exhibit in proof of his theory, that man's life is as inorganic matter to the spiritual. Some of the more conspicuous and important laws of natural life as ascertained by biology and its special department biogenesis, seem to us to have been unnoticed, or not sufficiently noticed in our author's book.

We shall have occasion to refer to these three or four more especially :

1st.—That there can be no spontaneous generation of life from inorganic matter (so dwelt upon by our author); nothing but life can produce life—*Omne vivum ex vivo*—which is not so much a law of life as a law of Nature, proving that *life* in its origin required special creation.

2d.—Growth as an attribute of life.

3d.—The transmission of life from life in modes specially provided and perfectly well known—wherever there is life—as a law of life ever since its creation.

4th.—The certainty that the specific characteristics of the life transmitted accompany the life that is produced, that is, heredity.

These seem to us to be the most important biological laws, and not one less conspicuous and important than another. Our author says at page 146 :

To a physiologist the living organism is distinguished from the not living by the performance of certain functions. These functions are four in number, Assimilation, Waste, Reproduction, and Growth.

Again, at pp. 291–2:

In the zoological laboratory of Nature it is not as in a workshop, where a skilled artist can turn his hand to anything—where the same potter one day moulds a dog, the next a bird, and the next a man. In Nature one potter is set apart to make each . . . one artist makes all the dogs, another makes all the birds, a third makes all the men. (*Sed quere.*) Moreover, each artist confines himself exclusively to working out his own plan. He appears to have his own plan somehow stamped upon himself.

And page 292 :

According to this law every living thing that comes into the world is compelled to stamp upon its offspring the image of itself (and cites Darwin's *Origin of Species*, page 166).

It seems to us that either of three of these laws would have afforded our author an equally good illustration of his main proposition; that natural life could never, by its own energy, produce spiritual life; as all attest the same truth. Unfortunately, however, as we think, he relies entirely upon the first proposition, as law, namely, that there can be no spontaneous generation of life, and then treats the natural life of man as inorganic matter. To show that we are not mistaken in this, a few of his sentences will suffice. On page 75 he says:

The natural man's relation, not only to the spiritual man, but to the whole spiritual world, is regarded as *dead*. He is as a crystal to an organism. The natural world is to the spiritual as the inorganic to the organic.

He had said a little before, on page 72:

The exclusion of the spiritually inorganic from the kingdom of the spiritually organic is not arbitrary. Nor is the natural man refused admission on unexplained grounds. *His admission is a scientific impossibility.* Except a mineral be born from above—from the kingdom just *above* it, it cannot enter the kingdom above it. . . . The plant stretches down to the dead world beneath it, touches its minerals and gases with its mystery of life and brings them up ennobled and transferred to the living sphere.

We unreservedly accept his proposition that the natural (human life) can never of itself produce spiritual life, because we believe it to be so revealed to us; and have no hesitation in uniting with him in saying that “no (merely human) modification of environment, nor mental energy, nor moral effort, nor evolution of character, nor progress of civilisation can endow any single human soul with the attribute of spiritual life,” and yet we must altogether dissent from the whole scope and purpose of the passages we have quoted. How can it be said that the passage from the natural life of man to the spiritual is “a scientific impossibility.” This seems to us a strange confusion of thought. We have no scientific knowledge of spiritual life. Science can give us no account of spiritual life, and therefore can afford no hint of

its scientific relation to natural life. Our knowledge of spiritual life is primarily, and chiefly (but perhaps not wholly), derived from Holy Writ, as possibly we have some glimpses of it as it may be seen in its influence and effects on our human life and nature; but there can be no scientific observation of its origin or phenomena to enable science (without revelation) to entertain and express any opinion or theory upon its relations to the natural life. All this our author fully recognises and clearly admits, when he says, at pages 302-3, of the spiritual life, "no man has ever seen this life. It cannot be analysed, or weighed, or traced in its essential nature." Yet, insisting upon his theory that human nature is as inorganic matter, and excluding such laws as we have mentioned, our author has certainly gone astray, and we cannot but suspect has been led astray by a desire to present a scientific vindication of a species of Calvinism. Avoiding mention of predestination or eternal decrees upon the fate of individuals, yet sustaining it, in its feature of special individual election, as a necessity under a law of life ascertained by science. We shall insist that the science of biology does not sustain his position, but really is opposed to it. It may be made to appear so by limiting biology to its teachings about the relations between organic and inorganic matter; but if we bring into view all that it teaches about natural life, it will appear that such a necessity is unknown to its conclusions.

To exclude arbitrarily any essential portion of biological laws clearly established by science from the spiritual world, destroys the continuity of the natural law of life, in its integrity, into that world; and this would seem to be fatal to our author's whole scheme, and to the great purpose of his book. His illustration of the plant procuring nourishment for itself from the inorganic soil, does not seem very happy. The inorganic matter of the soil, under the power of the life of the plant, is resolved into its elementary atoms, and these are taken up and become parts of its material form, but have no real life in themselves which they can transmit, and, when the plant dies,

what had been assimilated by it returns to its inorganic state—mere *atoms* or *molecules*, without any power of reproduction. When the spiritual life touches and converts the natural life of man, it is not to acquire food, to sustain its own life from the disintegrated elements of the natural life, but to make the lower mortal life immortal.

Then, as has been said before, this view must be fatal to our author's whole scheme or theory of the continuity of *the law of natural life* into the spiritual world. For if the natural life is to be regarded as mere inorganic matter in relation to the spiritual world, then the creative power must act upon it as such inorganic matter; and each individual Christian must be a separate, distinct, and new creation, just as Adam was; and there can be no *natural law* in the spiritual world, such as he supposes. For creation is entirely outside of any order of nature. All nature, that is, all created things, have law imposed upon them, at their creation, and that law may be discerned by man's senses; but creation is a special act of the Creator, in which His will and power alone can be discerned (Rev. iv. 11), and it can have no law, because it is purely an energy of the Creator which exerts itself only at His sovereign will and pleasure, and can have no law to govern or regulate it. So this whole spiritual world, in its relation to humanity, would be a lawless realm; at least, a realm into which man's intelligence never could penetrate to observe phenomena. And the real question which has disturbed the Church for the past two hundred years has not been about spontaneous generation of spiritual life, as our author puts it, but *whether there is any law for the generation of spiritual life in man*.

To answer this question in connection with the teachings of science, we must consider other laws of natural life, herein before mentioned. While we believe we have truly presented the logical result of our author's theory of the inorganic condition of man's natural life, he does not hesitate to say (however inconsistently with his theory) that "man has something to do with the acquisition of spiritual life." On pages 311-12 he says, "In

maintaining this natural life, nature has a share and man has a share. This will indicate, at least, that man has his own part to play. Let him *choose* life; let him daily nourish his soul, let him for ever starve the old life. . .” This is not a mineral to be disintegrated, but a free agent to will and act.

The law of natural life we shall now direct attention to is that, wheresoever life exists, it has the power of transmitting itself by means specially provided; perfectly subject to investigation and well known wheresoever life is. Our author seems to recognise this, at page 292, as an invariable attribute of life, and if there be nothing to correspond with it in the spiritual world, the continuity of the law of natural life into the spiritual *fails*. At page 292 he says:

In the zoological laboratory of nature, it is not as in a workshop where a skilled artist can turn his hand to anything—where the same potter one day moulds a dog, the next a bird, and the next a man. In nature one potter is set apart to make each. It is a more complete system of division of labor.

Then he goes on to say, rather inaccurately for a man of science:

One artist makes all the dogs, another makes all the birds, a third makes all the men. Moreover each artist confines himself to working out his own plan.

Our author may have had some perception of this failure, or of his inconsistency, and either unconsciously turned himself, or skilfully turned the attention of his readers, to a feature of generation of natural life, which, although curious and interesting in itself (and even significant in his theory), was entirely aside of the real question about generation which he should then have considered, viz., the transmission of life. He gives an account of the bioplasm or protoplasm as a thing inscrutable, so that no effort of science has yet been able to detect any difference among bioplasms of different species, so as to discover from whence they came or

their respective natures. At pages 287-8 our author says :

If the first young germ of these three plants (oak, palm-tree, and lichen) are placed before him (a botanist) and he is called upon to define the difference, he finds it impossible. He cannot even say which is which. Examined under the highest power of the microscope, they give no clue. Analysed by the chemist with all the appliances of his laboratory, they keep their secret.

The same experiment can be tried with the embryos of animals. Take the ovule of the worm, the eagle, the elephant, and of man himself. Let the most skilled observer apply the most searching tests to distinguish one from the other, and he will fail.

This effects an entertaining diversion, but eludes the real point then to be considered. For it is very well known that such bioplasms, although in themselves mysteriously alike, each nevertheless has the unconscious beginning, and all the potentialities, of that special life which engendered it, and, once known from what life it came, any one, scientific or unscientific, can foresee what it will become ; and the scientific may even tell us something about the processes, or changes, through which it may pass before it reaches conscious life, and how it will develop afterward. Although this life may itself remain unconscious through its whole embryonic period, there is no mystery as to how it was begotten or produced, either in plant or animal. Just here it seems to us our author has been led away from his true course in tracing Christian biology, to support a favorite dogma. The important point or matter for consideration and elucidation, was not the *structure*, but the *origen* of the bioplasm. How it came to be, not what its structure revealed. How it was generated, not how it was to be distinguished from other germs, ovules, or bioplasms. On the true point for consideration and elucidation the law of natural life had no secret, but was clear, definite, and invariable, and among the best known and most important in the science of biology, and ought to be traceable into the spiritual world, if there be continuity of the law of natural life *there*. And we should not be regarded as presumptuous in venturing to suggest some traces of

this continuity, although our author did not choose to direct his learning and brilliant intellect into this pursuit, which might perhaps have led him to a better interpretation or perception of the true analogies or correspondences between the natural and the spiritual life. And we shall do this the more boldly because our search must be pursued, not only into the labors and discoveries of men, but also into that Book which is open to all Christians alike.

Our first observation is that the texts asserting that unregenerate human nature is dead, and the carnal mind is death, cited by our author to sustain his theory that the natural life is to the spiritual, only as inorganic matter in nature in relation to natural life, seem to us to prove the contrary. Death can never be applied to that which never had life. Death is the extinction of life that had previously existed. No one should speak of a diamond or of any other mineral as dead. It never had life, and can never die. It has subsistence, but no life, and yet this subsistence may continue beyond the life of man. Our author himself says, at page 178, of a soul that never had spiritual life, "If so, having never lived it cannot be said to have died." Yet soon after, on the same page, he says of it, "To the spiritual world, to the Divine environment, it is dead, as a stone which never has lived, is dead to the environment of the organic world." There is in these sentences great inconsistency, a great want of any clear perception between that which never could have lived, and that which was organic and had lived, but had died; and it is essential to his theory that there should be a clear discrimination between the two. This even affects the question of the Resurrection, as well as the condition of our nature, as that which had had spiritual life, but had fallen and lost it.

The whole scheme of the Gospel rests upon, and all its provisions and teachings are addressed to, human nature as an organism, although deranged by Adam's disobedience. Yet still, an organism formed and adapted to the reception or acquisition of spiritual life, in order to its restoration. Our author, in spite of his theory,

sees this and states it as clearly as we can. At page 300 he says :

The protoplasm in man has something in addition to its instincts, its habits. It has a capacity for GOD. In this capacity for GOD lies its receptivity ; it is the very protoplasm that was necessary. The chamber is not only ready to receive the new life, but the guest is expected and, till he comes, is missed. Till then the soul longs and yearns, wastes and pines, waving its tentacles piteously in the empty air, feeling after GOD, if so be that it may find Him. This is not peculiar to the protoplasm of the Christian soul. This is what fits it for CHRIST. And again,

The other quality we are to look for in the soul is mouldableness, plasticity. Now plasticity is not only a marked characteristic of all forms of life, but, in a special sense, of the higher forms of life. It increases steadily as we rise in the scale. The highest animal, man, is most mobile, the most at leisure from routine, the most impressionable, the most open for change. This (man's) marvellous plasticity of mind, contains at once the possibility and prophecy of its transformation. The soul, in a word, is made to be converted.

Again (at pages 218-19), after speaking of the intelligence of animals :

And as manifested in man, who crowns creation with his embracing consciousness, there is but one word to describe his knowledge : it is Divine.

The fact that we have a Bible is proof of this, and of his error in supposing man's life to be only inorganic matter as to spiritual life. What impression can that Book make upon inorganic matter ? It is exactly suited to man as described by our author in the passages just quoted.

As our author sees in human life nothing but inorganic matter, it is but consistent in him to have no conception of association, or any kind of cohesion or union, among Christians. Each Christian is a separate and distinct atom of creation in the spiritual world. He does not regard S. Paul's teaching in 1 Cor. xii. and Rom. xi. 3 to 8. There is no Christian organism according to his theory, but Christianity on earth, as a whole, is purely inorganic. He sees no Kingdom of Heaven upon earth

as an organism, no Church, and, as we can remember, alludes but once to the sacraments. He, therefore, as we think, misunderstood our LORD's declarations to Nicodemus, and misinterpreted them. If he had simply accepted those declarations, as then uttered by our LORD, he might have found great use for his bioplasm.

Our LORD tells Nicodemus, "Except a man be *born again*, he cannot see the Kingdom of God." This is the foundation of all our knowledge of the subject. It is a *birth*, and a birth enabling us to recognise a kingdom. And when Nicodemus asks, "How can a man be born when he is old? Can he enter a second time into his mother's womb and be born?" certainly Nicodemus understood our LORD to speak of another *birth*, not of a new creation. And our LORD's answer confirms his understanding: "Verily, verily, I say unto thee, except a man be *born* of water and the Spirit he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God. That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is Spirit. Marvel not that I said unto thee, ye must be born again. The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but cannot tell whence it cometh or whither it goeth; so is every one that is *born* of the Spirit." Throughout the whole it is *birth*, not creation, which our LORD insists upon, and the new life of the Christian, like the natural life, must have a *birth*. And this *birth* is *another birth on earth*, for our LORD says (v. 12) that He is telling Nicodemus of earthly things, and therefore the Kingdom of God, into which this *birth* is to introduce us, is God's Kingdom on earth, and that can be nothing else than the Church of God. Our LORD's commission to his Apostles was, "Go preach, saying, 'The Kingdom of Heaven is at hand'" (Matt. x. 7). Every particular mentioned by our LORD is important to be considered, in order to correct the theory that human life is as inorganic matter to the spiritual world and life. And everything we shall thereby learn, is in some way analogous to what we know of the beginning and birth of natural life. Here we have our LORD's account of the origin of spiritual

life in man, and this must control and interpret everything said of this life by His Apostles.

In directing attention to some particulars of the spiritual life, as thus declared by our LORD, which may seem to find analogies in the law of natural life, we shall not pretend to offer them as *proof* of any doctrine or dogma whatever, but shall only attempt to show how the law of the natural life may be discerned in the spiritual life, in these particulars, quite as well and distinctly as in that which our author described.

1. This life comes from a *birth*. Birth here certainly includes the period spent in the womb. Nicodemus so understood it when he exclaimed, "Can a man enter a second time into his mother's womb and be born?" and our LORD gives no intimation that he was misunderstood. This, therefore, implies and includes conception and the embryonic stage as well as the birth. So, when S: Matthew tells of the birth of CHRIST, he says, "Now the birth of JESUS CHRIST was in this wise," he immediately proceeds to tell of His conception by the HOLY GHOST in the womb of the virgin, and uses the Greek word *γένεσις* (coming from the same verb as used by our SAVIOUR and Nicodemus), which includes all this, to signify what is translated *birth*. And our LORD in the same way tells how the spiritual life is to be brought about. "Except a man be born (*ἐγεννήθῃ*) of water and of the SPIRIT, he cannot enter into the Kingdom of GOD." Here our LORD not only insists upon the necessity of the new birth, but reveals how it is to be brought about. Science could not acquire this knowledge, and our LORD therefore reveals it. If it is a birth, it should be derived from life, and the Spirit is the life-giver. Thus we have the source of all life, associated with a natural element, which is represented in Revelation as the type of life flowing from the throne of GOD, and it is here made necessary to the new birth that this natural thing should be associated with the Spirit, to produce this new birth. What can this mean but that an outward, visible sign should be employed in the transmission of the spiritual grace of the new birth. John the Baptist said he was

sent to baptise with water, but JESUS CHRIST would baptise with the HOLY GHOST. So we have it declared that baptism is to be the means employed to transmit the spiritual life to man. JESUS CHRIST, when taking His departure from earth to heaven, told His disciples, according to S. Matthew (xxviii. 19), "Go ye therefore and teach all nations, baptising them in the name of the FATHER, and of the SON, and of the HOLY GHOST;" according to S. Mark (xvi. 15-16), "Go ye into all the world, and preach the Gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptised shall be saved." S. Peter, even after the centurion and his friends had received the HOLY GHOST, had them baptised (Acts x. 44 to end), and so Ananias with S. Paul. And S. Paul says (Rom. x. 14), "How then shall they call upon Him in whom they have not believed? and how shall they believe in Him of whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher? and how shall they preach except they be sent?" And S. John says (xx. 31), "But these are written that ye might believe that JESUS is the CHRIST, the Son of GOD, and that *believing ye might have life* through His name." And our LORD himself said, John v. 24: "Verily, verily I say unto you, He that heareth my word, and believeth on Him that sent me, *hath* eternal life, and cometh not unto judgment but *hath* passed out of *death into life*." See Titus iii. 5, 6, 7.

According to Revelation, it seems clear that spiritual life is imparted to man in a way and by a law perfectly comprehensible, and adapted to man's peculiar organism. It is the word *ὁ λόγος*, the same word our LORD employs in the parable of the Sower, and describes as the seed which produces this life—that word, *ὁ λόγος*, must be preached by those who are sent by the Church, or learned through the holy records it has preserved; and that word—the *logos*—leads the heart of man to believe, and that belief of the *logos* is faith, which is the bioplasm! which at first may be inscrutable to the most experienced Christian, and be unknown for a time even by the recipient, as natural life is wholly unconscious

during its embryonic stage of development, and perhaps for some time after it may be apparent to others, and yet it is life from the very first. This is in entire accord with our author, who says at page 295 : "Is there any fallacy in speaking of the Embryology of the New Life? Is the analogy invalid? Are there not vital processes in the Spiritual, as well as in the natural world? The bird being an incarnation of the bird life, may not the Christian be a spiritual incarnation of the CHRIST Life? And is there not a real justification in the processes of the new Birth for such a parallel?" Again, at page 390, "That this life also, even to the embryonic organism, ought already to betray itself to others, is certainly what we would expect," and at page 386, "even as an embryo it contains some prophecy of its future glory. But the point to mark is, that it doth not yet appear what it shall be." This last is said as regarding the spiritual life in man as only embryonic, through his whole life in this world. Like natural life, also, the spiritual bioplasm, in its inception, has no agency in its own origin. The organisms which generate the bioplasm are external to itself, and no organisms which we know of invariably produce life, even when brought into operation for that purpose. "The wind bloweth where it listeth, thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh or whither it goeth."

The Gospel does not regard, or address itself to man, only as an individual organism, but also for his social nature, and provides for an organic Christianity. It establishes a Kingdom of God on earth, not a scientific kingdom as our author seems to view it when he says at p. 391 :

It is obvious that each kingdom has its own ends and interests, its own functions to discharge in nature. It is also a law that every organism lives for its kingdom, and man's place in nature, or his position among *the kingdoms* is to be decided by the characteristic functions habitually discharged by him. . . .

But this Kingdom of God on earth is a social organisation of human souls, under CHRIST, that is, *the Church*.

His notices of the Church are not numerous. Two of them are as follows: At p. 139, at the end of his chapter, *Growth*, in which he says that some one "makes the Church into a workshop, when GOD meant it to be a beautiful garden." Again at pp. 350 and 351, rather significantly in his chapter on *Parasitism*, which he says is as yet "but an unnamed sin."

We begin in what may seem a somewhat unlooked-for quarter. One of the things in the religious world which tends most strongly to induce the *parasitic* habit is *going to Church*. Church-going itself every Christian will rightly consider an invaluable aid to the ripe development of the spiritual life. Public worship has a place in the national religious life so firmly established that nothing is ever likely to shake its influence . . . p. 351, and if it falls to us here reluctantly to expose some secret abuses of this venerable system, let it be well understood that these are abuses, and not that the sacred institution itself is being violated by the attacks of our impious hands.

The danger of Church-going largely depends on the form of worship, but it may be affirmed that even the most perfect Church affords to all worshippers a greater or less temptation to *parasitism*.

Our author seems here to have in his mind only places for public worship. He does not see that organic unity which S. Paul describes. Indeed Christians do not always recognise this Kingdom of GOD on earth, even when in the Church and brought up by it, while some outside of it deny it entirely, and insist, as our author seems to do, that CHRIST'S Religion is addressed to man individually *only*, and not to mankind both individually and in organic unity. Yet this Kingdom of GOD on earth has been a visible kingdom, conspicuous and recognised by all nations of the civilised world for about 1,800 years, and has been often in conflict with mighty earthly kingdoms and empires and yet survives, when most if not all of those which warred against it have passed away.

And here it may be said that even this Kingdom of GOD seems to have conformed to the laws of natural life. Its existence for eighteen centuries is beyond all doubt, and yet it would be very difficult, historically, to fix the exact moment of its origination, as now known,

although we know its author and its builders. It began without any distinct note of its commencement in history as it was to come "without observation;" and during the whole Apostolic period, seems to have been in an embryonic stage, possessing and giving some evidence of its peculiar life and organism to all believers, and being in a state of preparation and progression, to come forth and present itself to the world, a perfect organisation, full of the HOLY GHOST, manifesting its true life to all around it. Having all that time a solemn liturgy, Apostolic as is most probable, and its ministry, moulding all its features but not describing them as an external organisation, such as it was always afterward known to itself and to the world. There seems to have been no attempt or intention on the part of the Apostles, formally to sketch even its outlines, and some have used this to prove that it was left to take any form men's fancies should devise. But according to Science, it might more reasonably be supposed that the Apostles knew its life, and the power of that life—gave it a liturgy and ministry—and left that Life with that Liturgy and Ministry to develop its proper form at the proper time, for its appearance among the kingdoms it would have to struggle with in its growth.

This Kingdom of GOD (or of heaven, as it is often otherwise called), is the Church—a Divine organism for the generation, preservation, and perpetuation of spiritual life on earth. The HOLY GHOST, the Life-giver, is its life; and in the early stages of its history this life was so liberally imparted to its members, as not only to make them conscious of the gift themselves, but even to make its possession by them manifest to others, who had not received it. (Acts VIII.)

The Church we believe was Divinely instituted for the indwelling of the HOLY SPIRIT and the transmission of spiritual life, through this ordained means of grace, from generation to generation to the end of the world. It is in this character that the Church is spoken of as the Spouse of CHRIST, the SON of GOD, the second Adam, to unite His life with that of the first Adam as His own

Divine life was united to that of the first Adam in the womb of the Virgin Mary, who therefore may be considered as a type of the Church, always spoken of as the Virgin Spouse. Some of the ancient fathers, fondly, perhaps, represented the Church as having issued from the pierced side of our LORD, as Eve was taken out of Adam's side; and in every way the Church was regarded as CHRIST'S Virgin Spouse, whose life was to be found in her, to be received from and to be nourished by her. The initiation of this life is to be sought in her in baptism, and it is easy to trace its development thence in analogy to the laws of natural life. This, however, might not have afforded any argument in favor of Calvinistic theories. For instance, the constantly repeated argument against baptismal regeneration is that infant baptism does not always assure a Christian life. Very true, but this is in strict analogy to the law of natural life. It is not every seed sown even upon good ground which germinates, nor does every conjunction of the sexes in animals insure offspring. Then again, after the spiritual life has been formed in the baptised, there are many dangers to be overcome, not only to secure its progress but even to preserve it; and the failing of the baptised to reach a spiritual maturity, is just what befalls the natural life. And even when the spiritual life has attained some strength, there is yet that dreadful law of *degeneration* to overcome it, as is explained by our author in his chapter under that head. And these two fully answer the argument we have suggested, according to biology. And yet again, the analogy from *growth* as an attribute of life, does not support the Calvinistic view of conversion. Natural life begins unconsciously to itself, and grows unconsciously not only to itself in the embryonic stage, but long after, even to maturity. Now this natural life is adverse to the spiritual life, and as growth is an attribute of life, the spiritual life, which is to overcome the natural, ought to begin its growth as early as possible after the natural life is formed in man. And this leads to the expectation that it should be imparted to man in his infancy, and this expectation seems

to be warranted by our LORD Himself when He said, "Verily I say unto you, whosoever shall not receive the Kingdom of God as a little child, he shall not enter therein." Mark x. 15. Childhood, therefore, is the proper time, scientifically considered and scripturally taught, for the impartation of this life that it might be moulding the natural life into the spiritual.

This naturally leads us to consider how our author employs this law of growth. He has devoted a whole chapter to it; and we cannot but feel as we read this chapter, that he is employing all his ingenuity to exhibit science as sustaining something very much like *predestination*. He represents spiritual life as springing up, we know not how, and then growing without the least effort of those who receive it. And he takes the parable of the Lily as an illustration, *authorised* by our LORD, when He said in his Sermon on the Mount, "Behold the lilies of the field how they grow." He does not fail to see and even to recognise that our LORD used it in that sermon only to impress upon His disciples whom He was to send to preach His Gospel to all nations, without purse or scrip or even any provision for clothing, that they would be provided for in all these, and would be so provided for by Him, who had arrayed the lily more gloriously than Solomon could ever have arrayed himself. Yet he loses sight of this entirely when he undertakes to present it as an analogy of spiritual life. He says :

The lilies grow of themselves, they toil not, neither do they spin. They grow, *that is*, automatically, spontaneously, without trying, without fretting, without thinking. Applied in any direction, to plant, to animal, to the body or to the soul, this law holds. (Page 126.) At page 137 he says :

For its growth the plant needs heat, light, air, and moisture. At page 138: Does the plant go in search of its conditions? Nay, the conditions come to the plant. It no more manufactures the heat, light, air, and moisture than it manufactures its own stem. It finds them all around it in nature. It simply stands still with its leaves spread out in unconscious prayer.

This appears to us not only an improper interpretation and application of our LORD's words, but also a

most inaccurate representation of spiritual life, and such as no analogies of Science can authorise. There are different kinds of life known to biology, having different conditions of growth. The plant is recognised as a living organism certainly (page 153), but as the lowest of all living things. Rooted in the spot of earth from which it springs and from whence it can never remove itself, there it must wait for and receive its conditions of life and growth, without any possible effort of its own. But when we consider animal life, we find an ascending scale or series of life with more and more power of locomotion and capacity to employ it to meet other conditions necessary to sustenance and growth. *These must be sought for and found and properly appropriated*, or the animal life must perish.

Most animals begin life in the relation of parent and child more and more distinctly recognised and observed as we rise from the insect to the man. The offspring being least dependent in the lowest scale upon parental care, but ever becoming more and more dependent, as observed in the ascending scale or series, until we come to man, as the head of the whole kingdom of living things, or, as our author says on page 155, most living of all creatures. With him, life beginning unconsciously is preserved in its earliest stages in his mother's womb, dependent entirely upon her life and health for its preservation, and when separated from her becomes wholly helpless, and without her continued care or the care of others, although supplied with heat, light, air, and food all around, must perish. If we find this to be the natural law of this ascending scale or series of life, as ascertained by science, the spiritual life, being the highest in the scale or series known to man, however mysterious its conception or initiation, we should expect to find it most helpless of itself in its early stages and more dependent upon extraneous aid and support. This is the legitimate inference according to biological law or science.

But our author takes no account of the power of the Evil one, warring against this spiritual life, from its very

commencement, and marring its growth continually. There is absolute need for the extraneous support of spiritual life from the very first; and this we believe is to be found in the Church, the Bride, the Virgin Spouse, and mother of all spiritual life, instituted for this very purpose, and fitted for its task by the indwelling of the *Holy Spirit*, the life-giver. Now our author makes no direct attack upon the Church, but seems always to regard it as rather dangerous to spiritual life, suggesting, that it may be "made a workshop (see page 139) when God meant it to be a beautiful garden," that is, only a place for recreation, we suppose; and in another place suggests that it may make Christian parasites. Nor do we remember that he ever alludes to the Sacraments but once and then without a word as to their nature or benefit, and here in his chapter on *growth*, while describing the conditions of the spiritual life he takes no notice of our SAVIOUR'S declaration, Except ye eat my flesh and drink my blood you have no life in you.* Here is a condition of the life of CHRIST in man clearly expressed, and declared by the author of that life to be absolutely essential to that life. Yet our author does not allude to or recognise it as a condition, while he devotes his whole attention to such conditions as he professes to discern in the lily, which was only used by our LORD to make His disciples understand that their heavenly Father would take care of their earthly needs. Is this scientific? It is plain, however, that if he had entered upon the consideration of this essential condition of spiritual life, he could not have avoided some special notice of Church and Sacraments, and the discovery that there was something absolutely necessary to CHRIST'S life in man not typified by the lily, and looking very much like special food provided for sustaining that life, that it might *grow*. Can we avoid the suspicion that his conception of spir-

* These are not the very words spoken, but truly present what He said—John vi., 53-54. "Then Jesus said unto them, verily, verily I say unto you, Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, ye have no life in you. Whoso eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood hath eternal life, and I will raise him up at the last day."

itual life only as individual, without organic union of Christians, has unfitted him for his great task of tracing natural law into the spiritual world, if he would be truly scientific? It would have diverted him from his lily to consider how graciously our LORD had provided for the support of spiritual life in man. A life-long contest with Satan is no lily life, and all the teachings of our LORD and his Apostles were directed to enable us to meet this conflict. We might say more of our author's theory of spiritual growth, but must check ourselves here, that we may not transgress the proper limit of such an article as this.

The last characteristic of the law of natural life we shall notice is what is called *heredity*, *i.e.*, the transmission of the peculiar life of each species from one generation to another of the same species. This is the law of natural life we would have relied on to sustain our author's position, that natural life *alone*, with whatever environment, or surrounding circumstances in nature, can never become spiritual life, for the two lives are totally different, and we are expressly taught that these lives are not only diverse, but that the natural life is alienated from, if not positively antagonistic to, the spiritual, and therefore requires supernatural means to unite them. This supernatural means we recognise as being provided in the Church. And we seem to have the most conspicuous and conclusive evidence of the respect of this law of heredity, in the provision made for our redemption and salvation, in the Incarnation and sacrifice of our LORD and SAVIOUR JESUS CHRIST. GOD, the Creator, had at his creation imposed this law of heredity upon Adam's life, as on all other life, and, when Adam disobeyed and acquired the knowledge of good and evil, his whole nature was affected, just as we are told the life in other animals may be modified, so as to produce varieties very distinct from each other and from the original type of the species, which varieties may be transmitted to their offspring. The law was good—ordained by sovereign will and wisdom, and therefore was not to be broken; and, rather than break his own laws,

GOD the FATHER was willing to let his only Son take our nature upon him, that Adam's primitive life might receive spiritual life from Him, and thus be redeemed and restored. Nothing can impress us with a grander conception of the inviolability of GOD's law than this, nor present to us more forcibly the absolute necessity of the *new birth* which is provided for and offered to us, and yet this very deference of the Almighty to *law* makes it to the last degree improbable that this *new birth* has not a *law*, as certain as that of natural birth, and that birth in some way analogous to natural birth, as we have ventured to suggest.

S. Paul says, that as in Adam *all died*, so in CHRIST *shall all be made alive*. The *all* as applied to Adam certainly included all of Adam's race, and so we may believe that CHRIST's life, as He said Himself—He came to give life unto the world—would be as efficacious for good as Adam's was for evil. S. Peter says to all the Jews, after they had crucified JESUS [Acts xi. 39]: "For the promise is unto you and to your children;" and S. Paul certainly seems to teach that parental faith can sanctify the children. And thus we may find hope that the same law of heredity may not be wholly inoperative for the benefit of the children of the faithful; at least, when they provide for them the proper environment (as our author calls it)—the most important, because Divinely appointed, means or environment must be sought in the Church, from initiation in baptism, continual instruction afterward, and provision of that Bread which came down from Heaven to feed and strengthen and refresh our spiritual life.

To conclude. We have been very much interested in Mr. Drummond's book, and think it well deserves the study of any Christian. His estimate of science in interpreting or elucidating revelation is very far beyond ours, and we have ventured to suggest that he is not always accurate in his analogies. He sometimes fails to bring into view and consideration all the conditions proper to be weighed to justify the analogy he professes to exhibit, especially when they stand opposed to his

theories. This is not scientific. As instances, we can only now refer to the use of the lily, as representing the spiritual life, already commented on, and his defence of puritanical conversion. He professes to compare the *old* theology on this subject with the *new*, as he calls them. On page 93 he says :

Life comes suddenly. . . . A new theology has laughed at the doctrine of conversion. Sudden conversion, especially, has been ridiculed as untrue to philosophy and impossible to human nature. We may not be concerned in buttressing any theology because it is old. But we find that this old theology is scientific. There may be cases—they are probably in the majority—where the moment of contact with the living spirit, though sudden, has been obscure. But the real moment and the conscious moment are two different things. Science pronounces nothing of the conscious moment.

Yet the want of this consciousness has been a main objection to infant baptism, and the admission that in the majority of cases sudden conversion may be unconscious seems to us to be a novel idea. How can such conversion be known to be sudden, or be proved, or even recognised as sudden conversion at all? The usage in congregations where these conversions are looked for requires the convert to declare before the assembly what is called his or her experience, as we have understood, to prove the conversion. The reference to S. Paul's conversion proves nothing, for that was not only sudden, but entirely conscious. The point is the law of the beginning of spiritual life in man. And S. Paul takes care to assure us that his conversion was not any ordinary course of the *new birth*, for he says he was "as one born out of due time." No one that we know of denies the possibility of sudden conversions, or even the probable occurrence of some such conversions through the whole Christian Era. The Puritans insisted that there must be a conscious beginning of the spiritual life, and sudden conversions would always fix the time with certainty. And we here take leave of Mr. Drummond, with many thanks for his book ; although we cannot always concur with him, we think he has enabled us to see some truths much more distinctly than we did before we read his book. EDWARD MCCRADY.

THE LIVES OF THE RIGHT REV. ALEXANDER JOLLY, D.D., AND OF THE RIGHT REV. GEORGE GLEIG, LL.D., F.S.S.A.

THE recent commemoration of the events connected with the Seabury Centenary has drawn fresh attention to the history of the Scottish Episcopal Church, and especially to that portion of it which coincides with the beginning of our own independence. Mr. Walker, in the entertaining and instructive volume now under notice, provides us with much material not otherwise so accessible, from which we can, in conjunction with his admirable life of Dean Skinner, reviewed in a previous number of the REVIEW, form a tolerably clear view of those critical days. For, critical as was our own condition at that time, that of our sister (perhaps we ought to say, in view of what we owe her, our mother) Church was also one of great uncertainty and anxiety. In tracing the lives of these two prelates, we cannot but see the hand of Divine Providence as clearly manifested in the one country as in the other, preserving to struggling Churchmen, amid peril and persecution, the essential characteristics of Catholic truth and order.

With Scottish Churchmen it was a transition period. The Episcopal College, small as it was, governed the whole Church in a manner quite foreign to our American ideas and to those now prevalent in Scotland. The diocesan system had not been really restored, there was but little Canon law, and everything was in a provisional state. The persecution that set in about the middle of the eighteenth century made it impossible to undertake

any internal reforms. It was as much as the Church could do to maintain any existence at all.

The two eminent men, whose memoirs are included in this volume, were born within a short time of each other, at this very period of the Church's greatest depression; and, although, when they took Orders, her condition had begun to improve, the outlook was still discouraging enough. It was a mercy, therefore, that among her very few clergymen there should have been such representatives as Jolly and Gleig—men who by their acquirements and personal character were so well calculated to turn aside from the Church some of the prejudices then militating against her, and to prepare the minds of her own children for more prosperous days.

Bishop Jolly seems to have devoted himself from his earliest days to the services of the Church; and to have done so during times of such ecclesiastical depression proved his motives to be free from anything like sordid ambition. It is quite characteristic of one who afterward went by the name of "good Bishop Jolly," that the only traces of his University career (which would appear to have been marked by good progress in his studies), to be found among his own papers, are the prayers which he wrote and used during his course.

He was ordained Deacon in 1776, and Priest in the year following; being immediately afterward appointed to the charge of the congregation of Turriff. From the outset of his ministry he was a very diligent student, acquiring almost at once a wide reputation for learning, as well as for piety. It has been remarked of him that "those who knew him in youth remembered no time when he was not venerable." The habit of composing special prayers for all occasions of importance became more and more fixed. One such prayer found among his papers has a particular interest for American Churchmen, having been written at the time of Bishop Seabury's Consecration. It was a most appropriate one, and from its form would seem to have been used in public services.

In 1788 he removed from Turriff to Fraserburgh, where he remained for eight years, completely engrossed in duty, devotion, and study. In 1796 he was consecrated Coadjutor to Bishop Macfarlane, of Moray and Ross. There seems to have been but little work for him to do as such, and two years after he was unanimously elected to the sole charge of the disjoined Diocese of Moray, over which he presided for forty years. He continued to reside in Fraserburgh, living in great simplicity and retirement.

Although his Episcopal duties were not neglected, and their performance broke in somewhat upon his systematic course of reading and devotion, yet he adhered to it with great regularity. As showing the bent of his studies, an anecdote may be related, which was told of him by the late Dean Stanley. When asked, at the beginning of the stir occasioned by the publication of the Oxford Tracts, what he thought of the Reformation, he replied that he had not yet come down so far in his course of ecclesiastical history.

He only visited his Diocese once in three years, doing most of his diocesan work by letter. His visits were much valued, being everywhere received with the utmost reverence, and by none more cordially than by the clergy, to whom he was always most kind and sympathetic. In the direction of Church legislation he was very slow to move, being named by some the *Cunctator*. In particular, he was very averse to the calling of a General Synod; chiefly, it would seem, from a fear that it might be the means of diminishing the Episcopal prerogative.

On the death of Bishop Macfarlane, it was the wish of the Primus and others that Ross and Argyle should be reunited to Moray, but Bishop Jolly declined the additional burden on account of failing strength. Indeed, shortly afterward he had a shock of paralysis, from which, however, he rapidly rallied.

His biographer mentions as, "perhaps, the most interesting event of his life," the meeting in Aberdeen of Bishop Jolly and our own Bishop Hobart. It occurred

in 1823, and from the accounts of it written by both of them, it would appear to have been one of unmixed and mutual satisfaction and delight.

Bishop Hobart pronounced his Scotch brother one of the most Apostolic and primitive men he had ever met, and declared that the enjoyment of seeing him for two days was of itself an ample recompense for the whole journey from America. A few years after, at the suggestion of Bishop Brownell, Washington College (as what is now Trinity College was then styled) conferred upon him the honorary degree of Doctor of Divinity, and Mr. Walker justly observes, that "American degrees would rank high in this country, had they never graced a less worthy name than that of Alexander Jolly."

In 1826 he transferred his valuable library to the Church, and it was chiefly owing to his influence that Miss Pantton made the handsome bequests for ecclesiastical purposes, which have proved so useful in various ways. At the close of the year 1828, he published his most popular work, entitled "Observations upon the several Sunday Services and Principal Holy Days, etc.," a kind of prose "Christian Year." It was followed shortly afterward by a volume on "The Christian Sacrifice of the Eucharist," his doctrine on the subject being akin to that entertained by the English Non-jurors. The infirmities of old age grew upon him, but his mind continued active and unclouded, and his preparations for death became more and more devout. This event occurred in the year 1838, when he was "taken to his rest," as the inscription on the Turriff tablet has it, "when no mortal eye was near to witness his departing moments, having been found on the morning of the Feast of S. Peter calmly reposing in death." His attitude was that of solemn prayer, as if he had died in the very act of commending his soul to God, Whom he had throughout his life served so faithfully.

One cannot read his life without fully appreciating the reply of a sceptical man who had lived at Fraserburgh and never went to church, but who always reverently lifted his cap when he met the good Bishop. Upon

being asked how it was that he, who paid so little respect to the MASTER, paid so much to His servant, he replied, "*My hands winna keep frae my cap.*"

We must give a briefer review of the Life of Bishop Gleig, contained in this same volume. The two prelates thus commemorated were contemporaries, but men of diverse characters. Gleig was the elder by about three years, having been born in May, 1753. At the early age of 13, he entered King's College at Aberdeen, where his career was one of uncommon brilliancy. He was ordained in 1773, and appointed to the charge of Pittenweem, or Crail and Pittenweem. His course here was such as to win for himself among his brethren an extended reputation for ability, which caused him, upon the resignation of the Bishop (Rose) of Dunkeld, to be unanimously chosen his successor. Mr. Gleig was slow to accept, and only yielded at length to the importunities of his friends. He himself was not sorry, therefore, when his election was not confirmed, owing to the objections of Bishop Skinner, who at that time was the ablest and most influential on the bench.

These objections seem to have been largely owing to the unfavorable criticisms which Mr. Gleig expressed of the Bishop's views on theological questions, as also, doubtless, to a repugnance to his opponent's own theological views.

The Diocese of Dunkeld remained without a Bishop for six years, at the expiration of which time Mr. Gleig (who in the meantime had removed to Stirling) was again unanimously elected, only to be again rejected by the Episcopal College, and, as he himself declares, "with circumstances of insult."

His freedom from the cares of a Diocese enabled him to devote himself all the more to literary labors, which indeed were abundant. Besides volumes which he published on various subjects, he was one of the leading contributors to the *Encyclopædia Britannica*; and on the death of the original editor he was appointed to fill the vacancy, a position which brought him many friends and

much distinction. He was by no means, however, neglectful of his proper clerical duties. Immediately upon the repeal of the penal laws, he set about the erection of a regular Church, upon the completion of which the congregation greatly increased.

In 1808, he was chosen for the third time Bishop of Dunkeld, a very remarkable proof of the unswerving esteem in which he was held by the clergy, although, of course, there had been many changes among them since his first election. He, however, declined the election, inasmuch as he had no reason to believe that the Board of Bishops would confirm it, and he had resolved that he would not again subject himself to the indignity of being rejected by them.

But at length the mind of the Primus toward him underwent somewhat of a change, for not long afterward, in the year 1808, he was consecrated Bishop of Brechin, not, however, until he had signed a declaration in which he bound himself to maintain the Scotch Office, which he was already fully persuaded to do.

A man of his ability and vigor could not but be influential. He immediately introduced much needed reforms into his own Diocese, and was instrumental in effecting some improvement in the general Constitution of the Church. On the death of Bishop Skinner in 1816, Bishop Gleig was elected Primus, as it would appear, unanimously, there being but one opinion as to his preëminent fitness for the office. He himself, however, does not seem at first to have been happy in its tenure, finding it in various ways a source of such vexation that he desired to resign it.

About this time he issued a new edition of "Stackhouse's History of the Bible," a labor that called for all his energy and ability. Some of the views to which he gave expression, especially those on Original Sin, were freely canvassed, and in some quarters looked upon with suspicion.

He had had ample reason in his own experience for thinking the Canons very defective, and was very anxious for the convocation of another General Synod for their

revision. For a number of years he advocated it, but in vain, the majority of his colleagues being inflexibly opposed to it. We have already seen why, so far as Bishop Jolly was concerned.

During the latter part of 1824 and the early part of the following year, his attention was much occupied by the question of Dr. Luscombe's consecration as *quasi*-Missionary Bishop of the Anglican congregations in France and the adjacent countries. This event took place at Stirling on Palm Sunday, the three southern Bishops uniting in the act, the sermon being preached by Dr. Hook of Leeds. The northern Bishops declined to participate, as they were not satisfied that the requirements of the Scotch Canons had been complied with. This difference aggravated considerably the unpleasant feeling that subsisted between Bishop Gleig and the two dissenting Bishops.

Despairing of ever obtaining the unanimous consent of his colleagues, he at length determined to call a General Synod on receiving the consent of a majority of them. It assembled at Laurencekirk, on June 18, 1828, and did some useful work, some of which, however, was effectually undone in another Synod in the following year. This latter Synod was the last occasion of any importance on which Bishop Gleig appeared in public. Bodily infirmities were growing upon him, and his mental vigor began, naturally enough, to decline. Failing to obtain a coadjutor, his Diocese for several years remained without regular Confirmations, an enforced negligence of duty which was very painful to him. In the spring of 1837 he resigned his office, and from that time his mental faculties decayed as fast as his bodily ones, and he withdrew altogether from the outward world, though his habits of devotion never failed him. He died peacefully on March 9, 1840, and was buried in a chapel attached to the Greyfriars' Church, Stirling, where a tablet with a suitable inscription was erected to his memory. The late Dr. Neale, in writing of him, styles him "A great as well as a good man; the greatest Prelate, undoubtedly, whom the Scottish Church

has produced since the time of Rattray, if not of Campbell."

It is but an imperfect sketch that we have been able to give of these two most interesting lives; but we trust that it may have sufficed to induce many American Churchmen to obtain and read the volume for themselves. They will, I am sure, feel greatly indebted to Mr. Walker for the labor which he has performed, and join with us in hoping that both Scotland and America may have the pleasure and profit of receiving other similar volumes at his hands.

LEIGHTON COLEMAN.

THE NATIONAL CHURCH AND THE DIOCESE.

THE Constitutional and Canonical relations between the National Church and its several Dioceses seem to be undefined and vague. I have never met with any statement from those who have written or spoken on the subject, which laid down any principle by which their extent and limitations could be ascertained and measured, though assuredly I have seen very strong and ultra claims asserted by most respectable writers, in behalf of diocesan rights ; and have never attended a General Convention where objections have not been made to this or that proposed legislation, for the reason that it would be an invasion of the rights of the Dioceses, or, if not, that it was beyond the scope of the National Church's legislative powers. And on the other hand I observe, in looking over the legislative acts of this National Church, that there is scarcely found a single subject naturally to be regarded as belonging exclusively to diocesan control, which has not been assumed to be within that of the National Church, and acted on accordingly.

It would seem, then, that there is presented here a matter of great practical importance, especially for those who may be called on from time to time to act as the Church's law makers. Them, at least, it behooves to have some clear conception of the fundamental principles on which rest those powers with whose exercise they have been intrusted.

This whole question as to what power the General Convention may lawfully and constitutionally exercise as the legislative organ of our National Church, and as

to what are the precise rights of the Dioceses, if any rights there are, whether inherent or reserved, which may not be lawfully invaded by the National Church, I have examined with some care, and have reached some very definite conclusions, which I shall now present, together with the facts and reasons which have produced them.

These conclusions so widely differ from those of any other writer I have met with, and so directly antagonise the most of them, that it is with great diffidence in myself, though with great confidence in their tenability, that I lay down and shall endeavor to maintain the following propositions :

1st. That our National Church, within the proper scope of ecclesiastical legislation, and subject to the Divine law and that of the One Catholic Church, is under no restrictions or limitations whatsoever, as to its power of legislation.

2d. That our Dioceses are the creations of the National Church, and have no absolute, reserved, or organic rights, nor any of which they may not be deprived in due legal course of legislation; by the National Church.

My effort shall be to show that these propositions are in perfect harmony with the teachings of ecclesiastical history prior to the organisations of our National Church and Dioceses; that such organisations, expressly or implicitly, recognised their truth, or, at least, were in perfect consistence therewith, and that all subsequent National and Diocesan legislation has been wholly in accordance with the relations which they presuppose. In other words, my contention is that, *a priori*, such might have been presumed to be the principles upon which our National Church would organise. *A præsente co-tempore*, if I may coin the phrase, such in point of fact historically were the principles on which such organisation was had, and, *a posteriori*, the Church's subsequent legislation necessarily and unequivocally presupposes these fundamental principles as its source and sanction.

It will conduce to clearness and precision if, before

going farther, I define some of the leading terms which I shall use in this Article.

A National Church is the aggregate body of clergy and laity, citizens of an independent civil government, its territorial limits being determined by, and co-extensive with those of such civil government.

A Diocese-primitive is the jurisdiction of a Bishop, or, otherwise, the district or territory covered by such jurisdiction.

A Diocese-American is the aggregate body of clergy and laity under the jurisdiction of a Bishop and duly organised in Convention, its territorial limits being determined by Ecclesiastical law.

What light, then, does early Church history throw upon this question? How were National Churches and Dioceses originally constituted, and what were the relations between a National Church and the Dioceses composing it?

It goes without question that the Church has always adapted itself to the civil divisions of the land. During the integrity of the Roman Empire, the One Catholic Church, as being co-terminous with the civil government which embraced the civilised world, was subdivided into Patriarchates, Provinces, and Dioceses, following the sub-divisions of the State. All these sub-divisions were conventional, subject to change at the will of the sovereign power. When this Empire was rent asunder, and what had been provinces became sovereign States, the Church still adjusted itself to its new environments; and while the One Catholic Church continued to be, as in its essential nature it was, One and indivisible, actually so for a number of years, and potentially so for all time, yet the one independent National Church of the Empire became the many National Churches of the new independent provinces.

These National Churches were thus brought into being along with the civil sovereignties. The two were as twin sisters, or, by a still closer union, they were in many instances separate departments of the one sovereign State.

It was quite different as to Dioceses. Their territorial extent was entirely arbitrary, originally including simply the limits of a city ; afterward extended to embrace such territory as might by missionary efforts, emanating from the See city, be Christianised and brought under the jurisdiction of the Bishop and his suffragans, not determined by civil boundaries, but wholly conventional and fixed from time to time by a superior authority, whether vested in Pope, King, or Parliament. The legislative, judicial, and executive powers of the Diocese were united in the Bishop, who was answerable to his brother Bishops, only when assembled in the Synod of the National Church under the Metropolitan. [34th *Apost. Canon*, Fulton's *Index Canon*. pp. 19, 45.]

It would require too much space to show historically the subordinate position occupied by the Diocese in reference to the National Church.

So, without elaborating this part of my argument, I shall content myself with giving the well-considered conclusion of Dr. Fulton, who says that he is prepared on grounds of Holy Scripture, history, and common sense, to prove that the Metropolitan system (in other words the National Church system) was not formed on grounds of human reason by the voluntary aggregation of isolated Sees, but that the Metropolis, from the beginning and of Divine purpose, was intended to be, as in point of historical fact it actually was, the Mother Church of the Country or Province, with which every other See within her area was, from the first, connected as a spiritual daughter. [*Index Canon*. p. 47 (n).]

If, therefore, the Diocese, according to the American idea, was a thing unheard of prior to the organisation of our National Church, and if also the creation or organisation of a National Church by the voluntary, independent action of any number, or any kind of Dioceses, was a thing wholly without historical precedent, as I believe may be safely asserted, then the *a priori* argument is well founded, that our Dioceses did not create or organise our National Church, but, if not

themselves created thereby, were, at least, in subordination thereto. And when we find that it was organised by the institution as a governing power of a General Convention, composed of Bishops and Clerical and Lay deputies, we may safely assume that this was done on the theory that the primitive autocratic rights of the Episcopate were to some extent delegated to the National Church in General Convention, and that among these powers thus delegated were those always theretofore exercised by the Episcopate in a Synod of the National Church over the individual Dioceses, which now also were themselves about to make similar conventional organisation of Bishops, clergy, and laity. In other words (for I wish to bring this thought out clearly), while in the primitive Church, each Bishop was autocratic in his own Diocese, yet he and his Diocese were in subordination to the Synod of the National Church, which, composed of all its Bishops, and subject only to the Divine Law and that of the One Catholic Church, was invested with absolute governmental powers over the whole. Therefore the Episcopate of our National Church, invested with just such powers, if ecclesiastical precedents are of force, having delegated to the General Convention that of legislation, it must be presumed that this included their supremacy as law-makers over the several Dioceses, and, following this, that each Bishop has delegated to his Diocesan Convention the legislative department of his own primitive autocracy.

It will be noted that the judicial and executive powers of the Episcopate, though modified perhaps, have never been surrendered, and are still held and exercised by the Bishops, both individually in their Dioceses, and collectively as a Council or Synod, and further also that reference is not here made to the delegation or surrender of the Divine or inherent rights of Bishops, but only to regulations prescribing the proper time, place and mode of their exercise.

Before proceeding to the next division of my argument, which involves an investigation of the facts which

-

led to and resulted in the organisation of the American Church, it may be proper, in the light of the foregoing principles, to examine into the status of the Church, during its embryo-life between July 4, 1776, and March 4, 1789.

When the thirteen Colonies solemnly declared their independence, or at all events on September 3, 1783, when that independence was formally acknowledged, there came into being thirteen independent sovereign States or Nations, and simultaneously therewith, if our premises are sound, thirteen independent National Churches, inchoate and unorganised it is true, but still potentially such.

Until 1789, the status, both of the civil governments and consequently of the State Churches, was formative and transitional, the former gradually leading up to the Federal Union, which in that year was finally consummated. By this Union, the thirteen States became *quasi*-civil provinces, and the State Churches became, by analogy, *quasi*-provincial Churches; and thus was reversed that process by which, on the breaking up of the Roman Empire, its Provinces became sovereign States, and its provincial Churches national and independent.

I propose now to examine this question in the light of contemporaneous history; to see exactly how the organisation of the National Church did in fact take place; whether the measures which led to it, and had their consummation in it, were guided and controlled on the theory of independence in the National Church, or in the Diocese; whether there was really a compact between independent Dioceses, creating a National Church, and delegating to it those powers which it has since exercised; or whether, on the other hand, the National Church, assuming and asserting its own existence and independence, proceeded, *suo motu*, in its work of self-organisation, and in so doing invested the several State Churches with such powers and privileges as it was then thought wise and expedient, reserving the right to withdraw or modify them at pleasure.

This examination presents what I have called the historical argument, or that *a præsente co-tempore*, and involves simply a statement of the facts and circumstances which were present in or attendant upon the organisation itself. It is important in doing this to adhere closely to chronological sequence, following step by step the acts of the different agents who took part in the work, whether as individuals, congregations, State Churches, or Dioceses.

In this way only we can arrive at a correct understanding of the result, and clear away a good deal of the haze and vagueness of apprehension with which the subject seems to be surrounded, even in the minds of those who have written, and, I presume, read upon it.

The first movement towards organising the National Church, in fact, towards any Church organisation whatever, came from the Rev. Abram Beach, of New Jersey. All honor to his memory! In January, 1784, and again in April of that year, he wrote to Dr. White, of Philadelphia, suggesting that a meeting of clergy *and laity* be held at Brunswick, to take into consideration a general organised union of all the Churches.

This suggestion met the approval of Dr. White, and, general invitations having been given, the meeting was held on May 11, 1784, and was the first meeting of clergy and laity for purposes of Church organisation of which we have any record.

The meeting at Brunswick resulted in the call for a larger and more general meeting for the same purpose, to be held in New York, October 5, 1784.

Following this action at Brunswick, and undoubtedly suggested by it, an informal meeting of clergy and laity was held, May 24, 1784, in Philadelphia, not for purposes of State or Diocesan organisation, but to confer upon the subject of a general ecclesiastical government, and to appoint a committee to represent them at the general meeting soon to be held in New York.

And it will be noted also, that at this meeting the existence of the Episcopal Church in these States was

assured, and its independence declared by the first resolution adopted :

That the Episcopal Church in these States is and ought to be independent of all foreign authority, ecclesiastical or civil. [*Journals of General Conventions.* Perry's Reprint, p. 38.]

The organisation of the State Church did not take place till the next year.

The next meeting of clergy and laity, an informal one, took place at Annapolis, June 22, 1784, at which resolutions recognising the independence of the Church of Maryland were adopted, and measures were initiated for its organisation, which seems to have been effected in the latter part of the following October.

On September 8, 1784, a meeting of the clergy of the States of Massachusetts and Rhode Island was held at Boston, in which "the Episcopal Church in the United States of America" was declared to be independent, and to have "full and exclusive power to regulate its own concerns." Its independence, however, not to be so rigorously construed as to prevent the several Churches from obtaining the Episcopate from a foreign power.

At this meeting Dr. Parker was appointed to represent them at the New York general meeting.

We pause here to remark that, both at the Philadelphia and the Boston meeting, it was noted that the general ecclesiastical government should have no power delegated "Except such as could not be conveniently exercised by the clergy and vestries in their respective *congregations*," with the addition, in the former case, that the constitution should not be binding till submitted to the *congregations*, and became binding on all congregations consenting, when consented to by a majority of them. [*Journals of General Conventions*, Perry's Reprint, pp. 88-94.]

We now come to the general meeting held in New York, October 5, 1784. It called itself "A Convention of Clergymen and Lay Deputies of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America," and so

had the honor of giving the name to which some of us still so fondly cling.

It was composed of representatives from eight State Churches, not including Virginia, whose representative-elect, Dr. Griffith, did not take his seat.

It contented itself with adopting certain fundamental principles, on which it was proposed to organise the Church, and recommended that the clergy and congregations in all the States organise themselves, and send deputies to a General Convention, to be held in Philadelphia, in September, 1785, duly instructed to deliberate and act in the formation of an ecclesiastical Constitution on the fundamental principles just adopted.

Owing to difference of views as to the propriety of lay representation, and from the fact that Connecticut had obtained the Episcopate, the New England States did not further participate in these National Conventions until, at the Convention held in 1789, they accepted the Constitution then adopted, and completed the union. Meanwhile, however, in pursuance of the recommendation by the New York Convention, the Churches in some of the other States proceeded to organise and elect deputies to the approaching Convention at Philadelphia.

Virginia seems to have led off, her first Convention of clergy and laity having been held May 18, 1785, at which it was resolved to adopt, with some immaterial modifications, the fundamental principles proposed by the New York Convention, and to elect deputies to the Philadelphia Convention. It was also resolved that instructions to the deputies "should be so framed as to leave the Convention of the State at liberty to approve or disapprove of the proceedings of the General Convention."

About the same time there was an informal meeting of clergy and laity at Charleston, S. C., at which deputies were elected to the Philadelphia General Convention, the only condition being that there should be no Bishop settled in that State.

I have given more fully the proceedings in the three States, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South Carolina, and

also at the Boston meeting, because they contain everything that was done by any of the State Conventions prior to the final adoption of the Constitution in 1789, which looked or even referred to any restriction, reservation, or delegation of power as between the National and the State Churches.

And it will be noted also, that these restrictions and reservations, such as they were, concerned only the deputies to the General Convention of 1785; that in that Convention they seem never to have been referred to, but were in fact wholly ignored both by the Convention and by the deputies themselves; and, further, that the deputies to the Convention of 1789, by whose final action the Constitution was adopted, went to that Convention under no instructions whatever in regard to it, except that the deputies from Connecticut were appointed to treat with the Convention at Philadelphia upon terms of union, with the restriction that the treaty should not be conclusive "until approved by the body of the clergy, their constituents." [*Hoffman's Law of the Church*, p. 100.]

Returning now to the General Convention of 1785, we find that, after discussing and with some alterations adopting the fundamental principles proposed by the General Convention at New York the year before, a more formal draft of a general ecclesiastical Constitution was then agreed to as upon first reading.

At the next General Convention, in 1786, this draft was taken up, and with some alterations passed its third reading, and in the General Convention of 1789 it was again discussed, altered, and finally adopted on their reading, the Convention, however, having previously adopted a number of Canons for the whole Church.

This Constitution and these Canons form the code now in force in the Church, with such alterations and additions as time and change of circumstances have shown to be wise and proper.

During all these important organic proceedings I find no Legislative Act, no resolution adopted or offered, which recognised or even suggested the independence of,

or the reservation of rights by the State Churches, excepting only that the draft agreed to in 1785 contained a provision that it should be submitted to the several State Churches for ratification. This, however, was stricken out on second reading in 1786, and was never restored. And, in fact, as stated by Judge Hoffman [*Law of the Church*, p. 101], as regards the Constitution of 1789, "there was nowhere a suggestion that it should be submitted to the State Convention." Along with the Canons adopted at the same time it went into effect *proprio vigore*, without opposition or dissent from a single State Church. Virginia, indeed, recognised the validity of the Canons by passing a resolution requesting the General Convention to modify some of them in certain points.

Before going farther, let us here consider the actual composition of this Convention of 1789 as bearing upon the question of its legislative power, and what sanction its Constitution and Canons really and lawfully possessed.

It was composed of deputies professing to represent ten State Churches—not Dioceses. Of these only five had any form of organisation, and even that wholly voluntary, without law or precedent to authorise it. Of the other five not one of them had even a formal organisation; their so-called deputies were appointed by a few of the clergy and laity, or of the clergy alone, who found it convenient to meet for the purpose at the call of some leading zealous clergyman. Dr. Parker represented Massachusetts and New Hampshire, and Dr. Jarvis, Connecticut, at the request of certain clergymen resident in these States. They both served on the committees in charge of the Constitution and of the Prayer Book, and I need scarcely add that such eminent men as these took an influential part in moulding the legislation of that Convention.

Now the stream cannot rise higher than its source, and the authority of those foremost respectable clergymen and laymen who met in that Convention could not rise higher than the source from which they derived

it, and we are forced to the conclusion that the authority of a legislative body constituted in such wise lay not within the walls of the chamber where it met, but, like that of the General Councils, as held by some canonists, in the subsequent recognition and acceptance of its work by the National Church itself, clergy and laity, *ubique et ab omnibus*.

Upon what other principle can it be held that three Bishops, and a handful of clerical and lay deputies, elected for the most part by no regular constituencies, could by a single vote fasten upon this Church a Constitution which it requires sixty Bishops and four hundred regularly elected deputies three years to alter in the slightest particular? The votes by which the "Descent into Hell" was retained in the Apostles' Creed, and by which the Athanasian Creed was rejected were cast by twenty individuals.

Having now stated fully and fairly, I think, all the facts of cotemporaneous history connected with the organisation of the National Church bearing upon the particular matter in controversy, it is proper that I state fully and fairly also the positions assumed, and the conclusions arrived at by those writers who have taken the opposite side of this controversy.

It greatly simplifies an argument, when it is clearly understood what is the exact issue between the respective parties, what the matters of fact or of law, affirmed on the one side and denied on the other.

And, in doing this, I think it better to give their own language.

Mr. Hugh Davy Evans, in his speech on the trial of the Rev. Joseph Trapnell, says:

The Diocese does not derive its authority to legislate from the General Convention. On the contrary, the authority of the General Convention is derived from the Dioceses. The General Convention possesses only a delegated authority for specific purposes, and has no power beyond it.

Judge Andrews, in his recent little work on Church Law claims, [p. 52] that the Constitution is controlled

and limited by the power conferred by the Dioceses upon those who framed it. Also [p. 57], that it has always been taken for granted, that "the Constitution contemplated a federal union of, and not a central government over Dioceses." Also [p. 59], "that the Constitution confers certain limited powers essential to a National Church upon the new organisation created by it, and that the General Convention is bound to confine its action within the prescribed limits."

In an elaborate report upon this question, presented to the Virginia Convention in 1877, prepared, it is understood, by Judge Sheffey, these distinct propositions are laid down and sought to be established [*Pamphlet*, p. 16].

That in the very Act of Confederating and in the Articles of Confederation themselves, the pre-existing separate and independent organisation of the several Dioceses was fully and expressly recognised, and the continuance of such independence was provided for, except only so far as it was limited by the transfer of delegated power to a General Convention of the Confederating Dioceses.

Undoubtedly these gentlemen had satisfied themselves as to the entire correctness of their several statements; and yet I take the responsibility of asserting that neither in the Constitution itself, nor in the proceedings of the four General Conventions, in the last of which it was finally adopted, is there a sentence or a word which justifies the conclusions of Mr. Evans and Judge Andrews, and more than this, as to the statements I have quoted from the Virginia Report, and which appear to be statements of fact, I also unhesitatingly assert, that neither "in the Act of (so-called) Confederating," nor "in the Articles of (so-called) Confederation," do the words "Diocese" (except in one instance to be noted below), "Confederation," "delegation of power" or "independence," occur; and I find no words which by any possible implication recognise the pre-existent and independent organisation of the Dioceses, or provide for their future independence, that is, of the National Church or the General Convention, which is the only matter here in contention.

The only instance in which the word Diocese occurs is in Art. 4 of the Constitution of 1789, which provides that the Bishop shall confine the exercise of his Episcopal office "to his proper Diocese or district."

As to this I remark: 1st. This clause is merely a substantial re-enactment of the Thirty-fifth Apostolic Canon. 2d. The word Diocese is here used in its primitive sense, as synonymous with district, and as designating the territorial limits of the Bishop's jurisdiction. It has no reference to a Diocese in the American meaning of the term. 3d. While it may secure a Bishop from the aggressive acts of a brother Bishop, it has no bearing directly or indirectly either on his independence or on that of his Diocese in their relations to the National Church.

But hear the Virginia Report again:

Having, as a Scripturally constituted Diocese, voluntarily entered into a limited Confederation of delegated powers, it would be clearly competent for Virginia to withdraw upon sufficient cause and in the exercise of her Godly discretion. [Rep., p. 17.] And in another place, it is claimed that this right to withdraw is part of that liberty with which CHRIST has made every Diocese free. [Rep., p. 8.]

There are several answers to these extraordinary statements which at once present themselves:

1st. When the National Church was organised, Virginia was not a Scripturally organised Diocese; she was not an organised Diocese; she was not a Diocese.

2d. The Confederation then entered into was not a limited one. Its powers were not delegated; there was no Confederation entered into.

When, may I ask, did Dioceses become free, Scripturally, or otherwise? were they free in primitive times under the rule of autocratic Bishops? are they free now in the English Church, where the laity have no voice, and the clergy, even in electing their own Bishop, must vote under penalty of a *Præmunire* for whomsoever the Prime Minister may nominate?

And the Diocese of Virginia, when did it become free? Certainly not before it became a Diocese, which was not until 1790, when the Church in Virginia received

her first Bishop, and then first began her diocesan life. But, unfortunately for this claim, the Confederation had then, if ever, been formed, and the National Church was then in active exercise of its legislative powers.

But let us see upon what grounds my friend Judge Sheffey seeks to sustain his claim of Diocesan independence and Divine rights.

These, I think, will be found still more astonishing than the claim itself in the terms of its statement.

He appeals to the Divine law, to the practice of the Primitive Church, and to the history of the Reformation.

He cites 1 Tim. i. 3, and Titus i. 5, to show that Timothy and Titus were each of them assigned to the chief pastorate of a particular Diocese, and the addresses to the Seven Angels in Revelation to show that the angel or bishop, jointly with the company of believers under his charge, are rebuked or commended as an ecclesiastical unit.

He then refers to general medieval Church history, *Bingham's Antiquities* and the statutes of *Præmunire*, to show that the matter of Diocesan independence was the great bone of contention in the English Church, between the Pope and the King, down to the time of Edward VI.

Now in all this has he not in searching for Diocesan independence stumbled upon Episcopal autocracy?

Was the diocesan independence of Crete or Ephesus of the kind which is claimed for Virginia? Did Crete or Ephesus elect their Bishop? Did they hold Diocesan conventions of clergy and laity and pass canons of discipline to which even their Bishops were amenable? [See the Virginia Canon of 1785. *Journals of General Conventions*, Perry's Reprint, vol. 3, p. 50.]

Bishops shall be amenable to the Convention, who shall be a court to try them, from which there shall be no appeal—on all such occasions a president (a layman) shall be chosen by the Convention to sit as judge.

And again, coming to later times, I at least have read history to little purpose if the contest referred to be-

tween Rome and England had the remotest bearing on diocesan independence in the sense now intended. It was simply a struggle as to whether Pope or King should have the right of nomination to a vacant Bishopric. And now that in this the State has finally prevailed, what as to diocesan independence? Cannot an Act of Parliament divide, as it is now dividing Dioceses? Cannot the Prime Minister, perhaps not even a Churchman, force upon an unwilling Diocese, as within late years has been done, a Bishop whose soundness in the Faith is questioned, and that too under penalties of the very acts of *Præmunire* referred to in the Virginia Report?

The fallacy of the argument consists in confounding two things which are quite distinct, the primitive autocratic and the American democratic Diocese.

I can account for their course of argument only on the hypothesis that without very careful analysis these gentlemen, unconsciously perhaps, have suffered themselves to be governed by some supposed analogy between the Constitution of the Federal Government and that of the National Church, both of them framed and adopted about the same time.

I do not propose, nor is it at all necessary for the purposes of my argument, to say a single word on either side of the grave question of delegated powers and reserved rights, as between our National and State Governments, for the simple reason that it properly has no bearing upon that I now have in hand—any supposed analogy between the two Constitutions is in my judgment groundless, fanciful, and misleading. There may be some, however, who do not assent to this, and I will therefore state the facts on which my judgment rests.

1st. The theories as to the acquisition of power by the Church and by the State differ *toto cælo*. In the former it descends from its Divine Founder, and is distributed downward through the Episcopate. In the latter it is supposed to be lodged primarily in the people, and by them delegated upward to rulers of their own election.

2d. The National Government had no shadow of existence until created by the formal adoption of the Constitution by the individual act of nine independent States; while the National Church came into existence by the law of its own being, immediately on the adoption of that civil Constitution—unorganised it is true, but potentially a National Church, governed by the Divine law, and held together by its Faith, Order, and Sacraments, cemented as they were by the use of a pure and venerable ritual.

3d. When the Federal Constitution was formed the thirteen sovereign States which took part in its formation were fully organised, with their legislative, executive, and judicial departments in active operation; while of the thirteen State Churches only five had any formal organisation whatever, and even that, as to three of them, was irregular and without legal sanction, for want of the Episcopate. In the other eight there was not even the form of a Conventional organisation.

4th. The Federal Constitution was framed by a committee, regularly appointed for the purpose by the Confederate Congress representing all the States, while the Church Constitution was adopted by deputies elected either by the imperfect State Church organisations above referred to, or else at informal meetings of clergy and laity, without pretense of organisation. In one notable instance, Dr. Parker, a deputy who represented two State Churches, Massachusetts and New Hampshire, was appointed at informal meetings of a few clergymen.

5th. Under the provision of the Federal Constitution it was to be submitted to the acceptance or rejection of the several sovereign States, and was not to become operative until accepted by nine of them. The Church Constitution contained no provision for submitting it to a vote of the State Churches, whose professed representatives had framed it, but by its terms was to take effect, and in point of fact did go into operation, as soon as adopted in General Convention—nay, far more, so impressed were these representatives with their powers of legislation, that they adopted a code of Canons for the

•

government of the whole Church before they had taken a final vote on the Constitution itself.

6th. The Federal Constitution declared expressly what powers of legislation were delegated to Congress, while that of the Church was wholly silent on the subject, seeming to assume that the power was already in existence, and that there was only needed a properly organised body to put it into exercise. It is indeed a most notable fact, that the Constitution does not authorise the General Convention to legislate upon a single subject, except the setting forth of a Book of Common Prayer.

7th. The Federal Constitution contained a clause that all rights and powers not expressly nor by necessary implication delegated to the general Government were reserved to the States, and that no change should be made in the Constitution unless submitted to and ratified by the separate votes of three-fourths of the States ; while the Church Constitution contains not a word as to delegated powers or reserved rights, and gives the General Convention alone the right to alter the Constitution, not only without submitting the proposed alteration to a separate vote of the Dioceses, but such alteration, as I shall hereafter show, may possibly be made without the affirmative vote of a single Diocese in General Convention.

Such being the points of difference between the two Constitutions, and the circumstances attending their creation, I confess I am unable to see on what foundation an argument can find its footing drawn from any supposed analogy between them.

I am not to be considered as denying that in and by the Constitution of 1789 certain powers were vested in the State Churches. I simply claim that these powers were granted *to*, not reserved *by* those Churches.

Had the State Churches, being themselves the possessors of these powers, really by voluntary Confederation created the National Church, and reserved them from among those they were delegating to their creation, such National Church could not, it may be conceded, have afterwards acquired or abrogated them without

the individual consent of the Churches. But if on the other hand these powers were granted by the National Church to the State Churches, as being then supposed to be more conveniently or properly exercised by them, undoubtedly, also, the same authority which granted could afterwards, on proper cause *se judice*, withdraw such grant.

And so the case has proved to be, for it is only upon this theory that we can account for the fact that in all those instances where rights were vested in the State Churches, those rights have since been modified by the General Convention, and one of them to a certain extent wholly withdrawn.

Let us see as to this. I have already referred to Article IV. of the Constitution of 1789, by which every Bishop was to confine the exercise of his office to his own Diocese. In the same Article it is provided that the Bishop in every State shall be chosen agreeably to rules fixed by the State Convention. By virtue of this provision I presume it is, that each Diocese has now the right to elect its own Bishop, a right not vested in the Diocese by any œcumenical decree or canon that I can find, certainly not held by the Dioceses of the Church of England, of which our Churches had formed a part; and therefore not a right inherent in the Dioceses nor one for them either to delegate to General Convention or reserve to themselves—accordingly, we find that by simple canon this right has been so far modified and curtailed that now, though a Diocese still may elect, yet the General Convention, or a majority of the Standing Committees, have an absolute veto on such election, with no reasons to be given except the "*sic jubro*." So found it to be the Diocese of Wisconsin, and so, the Diocese of Illinois on late memorable occasions; with a narrow escape on still another, by the Diocese of my friend from Virginia.

The only other instance of rights vested in the State Churches by the Constitution of 1789 is found in Article VI.—"In every State the mode of trying Clergymen *shall* be instituted by the Convention of the Church

therein." It is sufficient to say that in 1838, the right to try their Bishop was withdrawn from the State Churches, *non obstante* the Virginia Canon I have cited, and the right to try presbyters and deacons made permissive only, by the change of "shall" to "may."

And should it seem wise and expedient to them, two successive General Conventions may, by a second change in this Article, remove the trial of all clergymen to courts established under a national system—therefore without discussing now the propriety of such a change, though well convinced of it in my own mind, I do assert nevertheless that the claim so often heard on the floor of General Convention, as to the right of a Diocese to try her own clergy being inherent and inviolable, is wholly without foundation. Admitting, then, that the General Convention, by proceeding in due form, may alter the Constitution at its pleasure, it is yet contended that the rights of the State Churches, or as now, the modern Dioceses, are substantially and sufficiently guarded by the restriction that such alteration can be made only on the vote of a majority of the Dioceses in General Convention—yet even thus, in the strongest point of view, twenty-five Dioceses would be placed at the mercy of twenty-six—in fact, however, under the construction put upon this clause, and for many years acted on by the General Convention, this restriction, so far as it may be supposed to guard the rights of individual Dioceses in voting upon any proposed constitutional change, is a delusion and a snare. The Dioceses, as such, are never asked to vote their consent, and in fact never give nor withhold it; for, as I now undertake to prove, the most radical changes may be made in our ecclesiastical system, say the entire abolishment of diocesan Conventions, and the transfer of all legislation to the General Convention, without the formal constitutional consent of a single Diocese, or at most of more than one.

This is to say, if the deliberate judgment of the House of Deputies, in construing this article, shall hold good, Article IX. provides that "This Constitution shall be unalterable unless in General Convention by the Church in

a majority of the Dioceses which may have adopted the same," etc. In 1880, the very able Committee of the House on Constitutional Amendments reported in substance (see Journal, p. 130) that the only method of voting recognised by the Constitution was that by Orders, and that when, even in the matter of constitutional amendments, there was a majority of both Orders in favor of a proposed measure, that constituted an affirmative vote of the House. A resolution to such effect was reported by the Committee and adopted by the House, and now let us see what is a possible, I do not say probable result. Say there are fifty-one Dioceses of the first twenty-five, on a vote by Orders, the clerical deputies, or a majority of them, vote "Aye," and the lay "No," of the next twenty-five Dioceses, the clerical deputies vote "No," and the lay "Aye." So far, it is evident that of the fifty Dioceses not one has voted in favor of the pending measure, and it lies with the clerical and lay deputies of Diocese No. 51 to vote "Aye" in both orders, and under the resolution of the house just referred to, the President must decide that the proposition if, even a Constitutional change, has been adopted, so far as concerns the vote of the House, by a majority of the Dioceses, but how if when concurred in by the House of Bishops, it be found that the Bishop of Diocese No. 51 has voted in the negative? Can it then be truly claimed that even one Diocese has voted "Aye?"

Where alas were my friends from Ohio and Virginia when the banner of Diocesan rights thus went down to the dust without their potential voices being raised or their votes recorded against a resolution which struck out in effect the only constitutional provision for giving effect to the Diocesan *sic volo*.

One point more in reference to alterations in the Constitution. I have heard it earnestly contended on the floor of Convention that such and such alterations would be in violation of the original compact between the Dioceses, but conceding that the Constitution was in fact such a compact, it was also a part of that compact that General Convention under certain formalities, should

have the right to alter the Constitution without restriction as to subject matter, and therefore it is too plain for argument that any alteration duly made becomes a part of the compact, as if it had been originally a part thereof.

Although in the view I take of the question there was in fact no confederation of State Churches in the organisation of our National Church; no rights delegated to the one nor reserved by the other, for the simple reason that no such rights were either possessed or asserted on the part of the State Churches; yet it may not be improper to call attention to the confusion which has been caused by the writers I have quoted, in their interchangeable use of the terms "State Churches" and "Dioceses" as if they were synonymous—what is said of State Churches, in the early canons, records, and historical documents, these gentlemen, with a seeming unconsciousness that they are thereby taking for granted one of the important questions to be proved, quote, or rather misquote, as said of Dioceses.

Whereas such an assumption is radically erroneous, and it would by no means follow that our present Dioceses are independent and possessed of reserved rights, even if it were conceded that all this could be predicated of the State Churches,* and for the simple reason that the State Church and the Diocese, though sometimes apparently identical, are yet essentially distinct.

A marked distinction between them consists in this, that the territorial extent of the former is determined by a power outside itself, because in obedience to the law of its nature it is coterminous with the civil sovereignty, absolute or conditioned, in which it is found; while the territorial extent of a Diocese, or whether indeed it have any exclusive territorial extent, is wholly conventional and a matter of purely ecclesiastical economy.

* In this article I use the term State Church to describe the body or aggregation of clergy and laity in each of the thirteen States, which prior to the Federal Union in 1789 was the National Church of that State, and after that event, became a quasi Provincial Church, known in our early records after the organisation of the National Church as the Church in the State.

A National Church might in its wisdom abolish its Dioceses, and adopt the Methodist system, or make its Bishops itinerant, and I know of no law or power to gainsay such a measure.

It is a matter which, not clearly belonging to doctrine, must, in the words of the Preface of our Prayer Book, "be referred to discipline," and as such "be disposed of according to the various exigencies of times and occasions." A Bishop who should be consecrated to take special charge of the Colored race in the United States (of course an alteration in the Constitution would be necessary for the purpose) would be no less a Bishop, and his jurisdiction no less a Diocese, although the latter would be personal rather than exclusively territorial.

That the State Church and the Diocese were not identical is also manifest in this. Before the Declaration of Independence the Colonial Churches so far as they had any ecclesiastical status had formed part of the Diocese of London. They certainly were not Dioceses in and of themselves, in any sense of the word. But as soon as the Colonies became independent of the English Crown there came into being thirteen independent National or State Churches.

This fact necessarily follows the law I have already stated as governing the birth and being of National Churches, and is clearly recognised in the celebrated Maryland Declaration of Rights made in August, 1783, by the clergy of that State in Convocation, and reaffirmed the next year in a convention of clergy and laity. It is called "A declaration of certain fundamental rights and liberties of the Protestant Episcopal Church of Maryland," and it is therein declared that "The ecclesiastical and spiritual independence of the Church necessarily follows from or *is included in* its Civil Independence." [*Journals of the General Conventions*. Perry's Reprint, page 22.]

But while there were thus thirteen National Churches, unorganised it is true, and defective in not possessing the Episcopate, there was not then a single American

Diocese, because the very existence of a Diocese which is in terms the jurisdiction of a Bishop, implies necessarily the existence of a Bishop. So that the preliminary steps towards the organisation of the American National Church which were taken in 1784–85–86 were in no sense authorised by diocesan action. And even in 1789, when the National Church of the United States came into actual being, there were then only three American Dioceses—New York, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut. And they took part in the organisation of the National Church, on exactly the same footing as New Jersey, Virginia, and South Carolina, that is to say, not as Dioceses, but as State Churches.

If these statements be denied; if, for instance, it is asserted that the deputies from South Carolina in the General Conventions of 1786 and 1789 represented the *Diocese* of South Carolina, may I ask where, by what means, and with what outward signs, did the Church of South Carolina become a Diocese? Certainly not with the knowledge or consent of her clergy and laity, because they sent their deputies to the General Convention on the declared condition that no Bishop was to be settled there. And there was not even a conventional organisation in South Carolina till 1790.

This distinction between the Church in one of the States and the Diocese, as being the jurisdiction of a Bishop in charge, was obviously in the minds of those who organised our National Church. It is brought out very clearly in Canons 8 and 9 of 1795. [*Journals of the General Conventions.* 1 Perry's Reprints, page 210.]

CAN. 8. Whereas a question may arise whether a congregation within the Diocese of any Bishop or within any State in which there is not yet any Bishop settled, may, etc.

CAN. 9. The Bishop of each Diocese or district may compose forms of prayer, etc. (for use in his Diocese or district), and the clergy in those States in which there is no Bishop may use the forms composed by any other Bishop.

It will be noted that it is the congregation within a *Diocese*, when there is a Bishop, but within a *State*, when there is not—and so, the Bishop of a Diocese, but when

there is no Bishop, it is the clergy, not of the Diocese, but of the State.

In fact, no one at all conversant with the legislative and documentary phraseology of our early Church, can have failed to observe how uniform was the use of the words "Church" or "Church in the State," in speaking of what is now erroneously understood as meaning a Diocese, while this latter word seldom, and, I think, never occurs, unless as implying the actual existence of a Bishop, and as describing the district under his jurisdiction. It was not until 1838, when the State Church of New York was, *as a Diocese*, divided into two, that the word, *ex necessitate*, took its place in our constitutional vocabulary, and the State Church became dormant, though dormant only, in name as in fact.*

Not only in the phraseology of early days, but in the legislative action of the General Convention, does this distinction between the State Church and the Diocese clearly manifest itself; upon what other principle was it undertaken to form Dioceses by the union of State Churches, or of sections of State Churches, without affecting, however, the individual existences of the latter? A notable instance of this will be found in the history of what was known as "The Eastern Diocese." In 1809 the four State Churches of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont, and New Hampshire, were, by the consent of the General Convention, formed into one Diocese under the jurisdiction of Bishop Griswold. They did not thereby lose their status as State Churches, for each of them retained its own organisation, holding annually separate State Conventions and sending each its own deputies to the General Convention; while the general Diocesan Convention was held triennially. All

* This use of the word Church as meaning a State Church, or the Church in a State, still remains to us in a notable instance, and has given rise to some difficulty of interpretation. The Rubric prefixed to the Apostles' Creed, in the Prayer Book, provides "that any Churches may omit," etc.; according to the phraseology in use at that time, this undoubtedly meant that the Church in any State might omit, not that any parish Church should have that right, much less that any Rector or minister conducting Divine Service might, of his own will, omit, etc. It was a mere oversight that when, in 1838, the word Diocese was substituted for "Church" in the Constitution, it was not also done in this Rubric.

this is consistent with the line of argument I have presented, but not with the theory that the State Church and the Diocese were identical. For if so, the anomalous phenomenon would have presented itself of four Dioceses being consolidated into one, and yet continuing their separate individual existence as active working Dioceses.

Neither was it the case of one individual being the Bishop of four several Dioceses, because Bishop Griswold had only one Diocese, "The Eastern," and sat in General Convention as the recognised Diocesan of that jurisdiction.

Other marks of the General Convention's plastic hand in forming Dioceses, regardless of State Church lines, are to be found in the journals. In 1801, the Western half of the State Church of New Hampshire and the Eastern half of that of Vermont, were authorised to unite in one organisation and put themselves under the jurisdiction of a Bishop. [*1 Journals of the General Conventions.* Perry's Reprint, p. 267.]

In 1817 a Canon was passed, authorising, under certain restrictions, the congregations of the Church in Pennsylvania and Virginia west of the Allegheny mountains to unite in conventional organisation with the Church in any of the Western States. [*Ibid.*, p. 499.]

In 1832 a special Canon authorised the formation of a Southwestern Diocese, formed of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. [*Ibid.*, p. 421.] And even now, a Diocese may be formed by the union of parts of two Dioceses in different States. I am not to be understood, however, as implying that the views I am advocating as to the nature and rights of the National Church were generally entertained to their full extent by those who took part in making her early history. Perhaps, they may have wrought more wisely than they thought. But I do claim that the work they did, and their mode of doing it, harmonise thoroughly with those views, and with no other theories of ecclesiastical relations between the National Church and the Diocese.

So then as the One Catholic Church which, as we have seen, was, during the integrity of the Roman Em-

pire, a National Church also, and lost neither its existence nor its catholic oneness, when as a National Church it was subdivided into many National Churches, the State Church also of our early days, being a Diocese as well, lost neither its existence nor its oneness when as a Diocese it was divided and subdivided into many Dioceses. And as that same Catholic Church, though now dormant, may possibly and ere long come into the active exercise of all its rights and powers, which may God grant, so the State Churches, though long dormant, are now, one by one, awakening into life, through the outward form of Federal Councils, with the possibility at least of becoming independent National Churches, should the States themselves in which they severally have their being ever become, which may God forbid, sovereign independent nations. For who, if the Maryland Declaration is true, can gainsay the assertion, that, if in the course of political events one of the States, Illinois or Texas, for instance, should peacefully or with arms proclaim and successfully maintain for herself an independent nationality, her three Dioceses would at once by a superior law outside themselves, become a National Church, and, in the case of Illinois, with a national organisation already in existence.

On the whole, then, as the organisation of our National Church was begun when there was no American Diocese in being, and was consummated when there were at most but three, and was in fact the work of Deputies claiming to represent State Churches which still retain their potential, and under the Canon of Federate Councils are gradually recovering their active, existence, any and all rights which may be supposed to have been reserved in the grant of legislative power to the National Church, though any such reservation and any such grant are equally denied, must have been reserved to the State Churches, and not to the Dioceses, and so-called Diocesan independence is vested, if anywhere, in the now dormant State Churches.

Let us now look at this question from a third point of

view, *a posteriori*, and see whether any inferences may be drawn as to the powers vested in the National Church by what she has claimed and exercised from time to time, without objection or opposition, during the century of her existence.

In view of what my own examination shows me in this respect, I have been exceedingly surprised at the following position taken by Judge Andrews; in his *Church Law*, p. 53, he says:

The authority under which the Deputies who framed the Constitution acted, was undoubtedly limited; and, if so, they could not by any action of theirs exceed such authority. The presumption is that they had no intention of so doing, and the legislation of the Church during all its history, in both the General and Diocesan Conventions, confirms this presumption.

I think I have shown already that the Deputies to the Convention of 1789, so far as appears from the record, were unrestricted as to their powers in adopting a Constitution; as to what they intended, their adoption of a code of Canons, and *then* adopting finally a Constitution without provision for submitting it to the approval of their constituents, is pretty fair proof as to the extent to which they thought their powers went. And what the history of the Church's legislation has been since then, as throwing light upon the subject, I now proceed to examine.

And in this it will be found that not only has the National Church undertaken to regulate matters of general or National concern, such as the formation of Dioceses, their relations one to another, and the relations of Bishops to their Dioceses and to their Clergy, and all too without any express grant of power for those purposes, but she has also without remonstrance, or at least successful objection, from any quarter, taken in hand to regulate those relative rights which might fairly be considered as Diocesan and not National, and to control those internal local matters of detail, even in minute particulars, which, if there is any powers of legislation reserved to the Dioceses, might be considered as properly coming within their scope; so that,

in point of fact, there is scarcely a subject matter of ecclesiastical legislation, National or Diocesan, which by well-established precedent the General Convention may not control and regulate, not excepting those which by constitutional or canonical concessions may have been placed exclusively under Diocesan control, because the same power which made the concessions or imposed the restrictions on its own actions, may at any time withdraw or remove them.

Among the very Canons referred to as adopted in 1789, one directed the Convention of each State to appoint a Standing Committee, another prohibited foreign ministers from officiating in any church except on producing certain documents; neither of them having any express constitutional warrant, however proper in themselves.

Moreover, the General Convention has assumed and exercised general jurisdiction over all parts of the United States, with systems of direct legislation over those parts which are not included within Diocesan organisations, whether States or Territories. By virtue of this power, she has organised Missionary Dioceses, elected and set Bishops over them, and continued to legislate for them, and control directly all their Diocesan machinery.*

Though long previously exercising it, the General Convention in 1859 placed on record a solemn assertion of the Church's general jurisdiction as being coextensive in Territory with the National Government. But, may I ask, whence arose this jurisdiction, if its exercise was not an inherent right of a National Church? Assuredly it was never delegated by the Dioceses to the General Convention.

If now we examine as to what matters of local diocesan concern the National Church has interfered in, we shall find that there is scarcely one which has not been

* Why these so-called Missionary "Jurisdictions" are not and should not be called "Dioceses," I cannot see; their organisation is temporary, but, so long as it lasts, they constitute the Jurisdiction of a Bishop, and therefore come within the definition of a Diocese; though not in union with the General Convention, they certainly form part of, and are in union with, the National Church; a Parish is a cure of souls—it is no less a Parish, though not admitted into union with the Diocesan Convention, nor even organised with Vestry and Wardens, but as a Mission under care of a Rector sent by the Bishop.

regulated or controlled directly or indirectly by her Canons. There is scarcely an ecclesiastical relation, whether between the Bishop and his Presbyters,* between the Clergy and their Diocese,† between the Rector and his Parish,‡ between the Bishop and Clergy and the Diocesan Convention,§ between the Bishop and the Parishes,|| or between Clergy and Parishes,¶ upon which the General Convention has not laid its legislative hands.

It has exercised control over the membership of Diocesan Conventions,** has regulated Parish boundaries,†† has imposed duties on Vestries, on Church Wardens,‡‡ and on the Secretaries of Diocesan Conventions.§§ It has undertaken to restrict the Parishes in the disposition of their own property,|||| and to direct what shall be done with the Communion Alms; ¶¶ and, while permitting the Diocesan Convention to prescribe the mode of trying its own clergymen, yet prescribes the offences for which they may be tried,*** and rules for bringing them before the Court.†††

What legislation, then, is left for the Dioceses? If we subtract that judicial system for the trial of Presbyters and Deacons which the National Church has permitted the Diocesan Conventions to institute, we shall find the proper subject matter for Diocesan Canons to be few indeed. They are concerned almost wholly with questions of organisation, and of providing the proper machinery for raising money to carry on the work of the Diocese. In fact, if the General Convention would adopt a general judicial system for the trial of clergymen, instead of leaving them as now to be tried by Drum-Head Courts-Martial, where the alleged offender is, in nine cases out of ten, I do not say unjustly, tried, convicted, and sentenced, before the Court is organised,

* Dig., § 2. Can. 11, Tit. II.

† Can. 4 and 1-13, Tit. II.

‡ §§ 11, and 1-14, 1; Can. 15, Tit. I.

** Dig., Can. 4, Tit. III., 1; also Can. 8, 1799, and Can. 3, 1804.

†† Can. 4, 2-1, 14-6, Tit. III.

§§ Can. 3, Tit. III.

¶¶ Can. 14-3, Tit. I.

††† Can. 1-2, Tit. II.

† Can. 7, Tit. II.

§ Can. 1-17, Tit. II.

¶ § 6, Can. 14, Tit. I.

‡‡ Can. 17, Tit. I.

|||| Can. 24-2, Tit. I.

*** Can. 2, Tit. II.

there would be little or no necessity for Diocesan Conventions to meet as legislative bodies after they had passed their organic laws providing machinery for carrying on general and Diocesan Church work. Having made provisions to furnish, equip, and officer their contingent for the Grand Army, which the National Church commands and directs, whose rules and orders, general or minute as they may be, must yet be obeyed by all, from its chief officers down to the humblest private, their only duties then would be to meet for making elections when occasion required, or as a Missionary Board for interchange of views and information, for advising their Bishop in Convocation, and for exciting and promoting Church life in the Diocese.

Let me illustrate practically what has been said as to the narrow scope of Diocesan legislation. I take up the Constitution and Canons of my own diocese. We have twelve Articles in the Constitution and twelve Canons. Seven of the articles concern only the organisation of the Convention, two that of the Finance and the Standing Committees, and the other three regulate the election of Bishop and of Deputies to the General Convention, and changes in the Constitution, respectively. Of our twelve Canons, two concern the composition of the Convention, one re-enacts a general Canon, one provides for office of Registrar, two for raising money, three establish a Code of Criminal Procedure, one concerns vacant Parishes, another amendments to the Canons, and the last repeals all except the above. This, and nothing more.

And now finally, how far apart would these two theories as to diocesan independence leave us, if worked out practically to their legitimate results? And what are the tests by which the truth of the one or the other could be made manifest? Grave questions, indeed, but we may all rejoice in feeling assured that history will never be able to record an answer. Still, let us consider what possibly might be; the Virginia report from which I have quoted, leads up to this, as its practical conclusion: That a Diocese has the right to withdraw from

Union with the National Church for any cause which, in her own opinion, is sufficient; it is my contention, on the contrary, that no cause can legalise or justify such withdrawal, so long as the National Church preserves intact her Creeds and her Orders, and duly administers her Sacraments. These she has received from a Law Maker superior to herself, and, therefore, she has no right to alter or impair them. All else is under her legitimate control, and her will, when formally declared, no Diocese, Parish, nor individual, may lawfully gainsay nor withstand.

But suppose the attempt to do so were made, and that the Convention of a Diocese, with the Bishop at its head, should, by an overwhelming majority and for a cause sufficient to satisfy them, resolve to withdraw from Union with the National Church, and thereupon set up an independent organisation, what would then be the ecclesiastical, and also the civil status of the different parties concerned? As to the former, all those who should remain faithful to the National Church, whether as individuals or Parishes, however small a remnant, and however unorganised and widely scattered, would compose the Protestant Episcopal Church in that Diocese; if not strong enough to organise themselves as a Diocese, they would be taken under the fostering care of the National Church, and perhaps be organised temporarily as a Missionary Jurisdiction.

As to the others, their act would be that of individuals only, being beyond the scope of their powers as members of the Convention. It would be of no legal effect, and the Diocese would still remain potentially, and, when subsequently reorganised, actually in Union with the National Church, while any subsequent organisation of the majority would be simply schismatical, especially after their Bishop had been deposed, as he would be at once.

Not only would this be the ecclesiastical status of all the parties as held by the National Church, but they would be regarded in the same light by the civil law, and with this most important consequence, that all the

property in the Diocese held in trust for Church purposes, whether by the Diocese at large, by Parishes, or by any other corporations or individuals, would remain for the use and benefit of those whom the law held to be, though in a minority, yet members of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America, and her lawful representatives in the Diocese concerned. The Courts would permit no property to be diverted by any unlawful schism, however pure and honest the motives of those promoting it, from the purposes of the original trust, nor from the use of those who regularly and legitimately represented the original *cestui que trust*.

And in determining this question, the Courts would confine their examination within very narrow bounds. They would not inquire as to the abstract right or wrong of the particular matter in controversy, nor as to its wisdom or folly as an act of legislation, but merely whether the National Church had therein violated her own fundamental law, or had exceeded her own powers. Hence, if the authority of the National Church and her relations to the Dioceses be such as I have sought to prove them, no mere doctrinal differences not affecting the Faith, no mere questions of Rites and Ceremonies or Forms of Worship, no questions of Discipline or of Organisation, however important and interesting in themselves, would in the eye of the law suffice to justify or legalise a separation, and the faithful few adhering to the old Church, and recognised by her, would retain all that Church's Civil and Ecclesiastical rights, while the Separatists would be told to depart in peace.

HILL BURGWIN.

PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIANITY.

Philosophy and Christianity. By Prof. Geo. S. Morris, Ph. D. Robert Carter & Brothers, New York, 1883.

THIS is the title of a notable book that has been too modestly put forth to receive merited notice. Dr. Morris is one of the best students of Philosophy in this country. As Professor of Philosophy and Ethics at both the Johns Hopkins University and the University of Michigan, he has within three years published three most thoughtful and expository books on Philosophy, having also been the translator of Weberweg's *History of Philosophy*. His volume on *British Thought and Thinkers*, I know only by reputation as one of the best recent criticisms of the whole English Empirical School. His volume on Kant, in Grigg's *German Philosophic Classics*, I found to be a good critical exposition, written in the light of the abounding flood-tide of German Philosophy, and critical of both Kantian and Empirical Agnosticism. His last volume is in the same vein, but passes beyond critical to constructive results.

The praise of knowledge *versus* the "Praise of Folly," would not be an inapt designation of Dr. Morris' philosophical work in all of these volumes. This is especially true of his last volume, which contains a philosophical vindication of knowledge against all forms of Agnosticism. It consists of a series of lectures given as the Ely Lectures on the Evidences of Christianity in the Union Theological Seminary of New York, and afterward repeated to his class in the Johns Hopkins Uni-

versity. It is certainly one of the most important works on fundamental apologetics, that has recently appeared. It is not a popular and captious reply to current captious assaults upon Christianity, but it is an assault upon all the bad philosophy which underlies modern unbelief, and a presentation of good philosophy, which is essential to *any* belief. It is to be regretted that such a book should not have been more noticed by students of Christian Philosophy.

Its critical part is consonant with Dr. Caird's *Philosophy of Religion*, while its constructive part is far more comprehensive and condensed. Thus it demands most patient, close, and thoughtful attention. This may account for its inadequate notice by religious journals.

Christian teachers cannot ignore or despise Philosophy, or the rational explication of the truth which they possess and which possesses them, living and working in them. Christians must reason about their Faith. Their own constitution impels, and adversaries drive them thereto. The prejudice of some religious people against Philosophy is thoroughly suicidal. The *practical* demonstration of Christianity is the real Christian life of its adherents. But the theoretical demonstration of it is Philosophy, or Christian Knowledge, or the rational explication of the Christian consciousness. There is such a thing as Catholic Philosophy developing through the ages of men's thought, or interpretation of all their relations, as well as a Catholic Faith, the true object of Philosophy. As we are constituted, these two are essentially related as thinking and object of thought. It is the object of Dr. Morris' *Philosophy and Christianity* to demonstrate the essential relation of the Catholic doctrines of Philosophy to the Catholic Faith.

The *Churchman*, in its brief commendatory notice of this volume, very conveniently saved itself the trouble of telling anything as to its real worth, by characterising it as Hegelian. A word of explanation is therefore due the author. For, to call any one an Hegelian, without making vital distinctions, is to call one a bad name. It is

too often hurled as a slur, when used by either sectarian or ecclesiastical traditionalism. Sufficient odium is professedly attached to it to pay the duty demanded by the high ecclesiastical tariff, which seeks to prevent the free commerce of ideas. Now, Hegelianism is a thing of many distinctions, shades, and schools. The monstrosities of thought that hide themselves under this name are numerous. Some of Hegel's own aberrations of thought are quite patent. Partisan discipleship of Hegel is a thing of the past. Of Dr. Morris' relation to Hegel we may say: *Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri*. And yet it is also true that he recognises the substantial thought, or the method of Hegel, as the high-water mark of philosophic attainment. He recognises the progressive development of the philosophic interpretation of the world, to which Hegel has given an "Epoch-making" contribution. He recognises his achievement, without the partisan's blindness to all the possible defects or incompletenesses of the achievement, or to the possible erroneous inferences which himself or his admirers have drawn from it.

Hegel's thought is inextricably entangled with the whole culture of the time. His method is that of the living interpretation of the world to-day, and is not more likely to be outgrown than that of Plato and Aristotle. But to call Dr. Morris a Hegelian, one must deduct the Pantheism, the determinism, the misty idealism, and the mythical view of historical Christianity, that are rightly or wrongly attributed to Hegel. This volume is utterly and radically free from the taint of all such truly philosophical and Christian heresies. The disclaimer against them is not in words only, but in the very thought of the book. A personal God, man's freedom, responsibility, and personal immortality, a real world, an historic Christianity, these are the very warp and woof of the work. I have come to the conclusion that the best type of Hegelian, if one must call a philosopher by the name of some master, is a Scotch Hegelian. I do not know Dr. Morris' nationality, but he has the Scotchman's abiding sense of God's Sovereignty, man's responsibility, a real

world both here and hereafter, that form the best corrective to the erring sides of Hegelianism.*

Upon nothing does he so strenuously insist as that Christianity is *not* the product of a dialectic process, but that it is the object of Philosophy, *i.e.*, its subject matter. Philosophy is neither the origin nor the fundamental stimulus of religion, but rather its scientific analysis, the inevitable sequent of its reception by rational beings. But the following extract from the last page of the book will suffice to show how free it is from Hegelian blemishes.

As a matter of fact, Philosophy has received illumination from the Christian consciousness in regard to its three fundamental conceptions of the absolute, of nature, and of man. And let it be remembered, that, when I say "Philosophy," I do not mean any mere jargon of words, nor any arbitrary collection of dogmatic opinions, but philosophic science, the science, in the strictest sense, of experience, and of experience taken in the deepest, most comprehensive, truest, and richest sense of the term. Under the influence of the Christian consciousness, then, Philosophy has come to a more definite and complete conception of the concrete, living unity of the absolute, as spirit. It has, secondly, been enabled to conceive and comprehend more distinctly the personal living relation of the DIVINE LOGOS to the world. It need hardly be said that, in proportion as this relation is distinctly conceived and its truth perceived, the possibility of a lapse into pure naturalism, or pure pantheism, is taken away. And, thirdly, Christianity has contributed to Philosophy a fuller sense and demonstration of the truth that man is made perfect man, not through mere "imitation" of GOD or "resemblance" to Him, but "in one" with Him, by an organic union which, so far from interfering with his freedom, is the very condition of his true, *i.e.*, his spiritual, freedom, and of his true spiritual personality.

The author gives an admirable analysis of the lectures, prefixed as a "Table of Contents." But, as that is but the condensation of very condensed thought, I may

* Since writing the above, I have read an excellent article in the *English Church Quarterly Review* for January, on *English Hegelianism and Its Religion*. It is a critically appreciative notice of the works of the two Caird Brothers, of Glasgow University, and the late Prof. T. H. Green, of Oxford, and written by one who is not an Hegelian. The spirit and the exposition are most commendable. I give but one paragraph which bears on the slur in the title "Hegelian," *i.e.*: "But an impression may probably be felt that Hegelianism is unfavorable to a distinct belief in the Divine Personality. As regards the English branch of the school, such an accusation would be wholly untrue. The very principle of the system is that the Divine Mind is in unity with the human, and that both are personal."

give some helpful exposition of the method and results of the work.

In the first lecture, it is pointed out that Religion cannot, even if it would, avoid the scrutiny of intelligence, which scrutinises all phenomena. Religion is thus first studied as a species of natural history, and the result is *a* science of religions. But intelligence goes on to ask what the *being* and the worth of Religion are. Has it a foundation in reality, or is it an illusion arising from limitations of human faculties? The answer gives a Philosophy of Religion, which must be a science of knowing, against which Nescience, Religion, and Philosophy, have a common cause. But, this overthrown by the philosophy of concrete experience, the question remains whether this philosophy confirms or invalidates the positive presuppositions of religion concerning God, man, and the world, which are also the objects of philosophic investigation. The plan of the work is to expose the philosophic theory of *knowing and being*, and then to state and compare the Christian presuppositions on the same subjects, with the view of showing that the Christian conceptions are not repugnant to the conceptions of Philosophy, but rather that they are the fulfilment and enrichment of the latter.

The second lecture gives the philosophic theory of knowing, its critical side being directed against the whole English school of Empirical Philosophy from Locke to Spencer. The positive and constructive portion gives the true account of full concrete experience, passing, by necessity, from man's knowledge to God's—the Absolute Thought, which is prior to, and back of, all human intelligence, the motto to the chapter being, *Ἀρχὴ δὲ ἡ νόησις*.

But how is this intelligence possible for man? How can we know? This is the great fundamental problem of Philosophy, connected, as it is, inseparably and organically with the problem of *Being*. What is it for a man or for anything to *be*? What is being? In reality the object of knowledge? It is naught unless we can know, unless we can experience its reality. Knowing is thus the

key to *being*. But how is knowledge possible? How can we know? It seems a very simple question to ask, how do I *know*? What is knowledge, and how do I come by it? What is its relation to the subject and object of knowledge? What part of knowledge is supplied by external objects? What part does man supply? What is the relation between the two factors and the result called knowledge? Is it an unknown *tertium quid*, compounded of two other unknowns? We are familiar with the answer of English Empiricism, of which Hume's absolute skepticism as to any knowledge is the logical result. The current Agnosticism is but this skepticism apotheosised. The subject, and object, and their synthesis are inherently unknowable. Isolated as they are in time and space, in no living relation, as the theory holds, nothing can bring them together in other than a merely mechanical relation, and, therefore, no synthetic judgments, *a priori*, are possible or valid. We are familiar, too, in a popular way, with Kant's solution of the problem. That gives the reverse and isolated side of concrete experience, and thus, only reaching Agnosticism by a more intellectual route, mind and matter, God and nature, man, and all objects of possible knowledge, according to both the empirical and the transcendental solutions, are isolated, and can only be brought into a mechanical relation *à toute force*. They are inherently, or as to their natures, unrelated. They form a loose aggregate, not an organic whole. Theist, deist, and skeptic alike, on either of these solutions, can give no rational science of knowledge, and so can apprehend no reality, no real being.

But, in order to any knowing or known being, the subject and object must be in organic relation—must have something in common, and live together. Intelligence must be an energy in connection with energetic reality. The mind is not simply like a piece of blank paper upon which objects impress themselves, which is the favorite figure of sensationalists. The mind is active in receiving and unifying those impressions. Nor, on the other hand, are all objects of knowledge chaotic un-

intelligence, which the synthesising power of the mind forces into the strait-jacket of categories, to which these objects stand in an attitude of indifference or rebellion. The idealist's solution, too, fails. Appeal must be taken to experience, to the full content of consciousness. But this experience is other and greater than either sensationalist or idealist allows. Subject and object are both in consciousness in the act of knowing. They are not indifferent to each other. Their coming together is neither accidental nor arbitrary. The rather they are complementary and inseparable. Each implies, and is most intimately one with the other. The object becomes object only as it becomes part of the subject, for all experience is that of self-consciousness. Again, the subject becomes subject only as it merges itself in its object, for all consciousness is also objective consciousness. Thus the fundamental relation of subject and object in the process of knowing is one that can only be called *organic*, or the relation of particular to particular through the organic identification of both in the universal. It is a relation of life, of living subject and living object, in and through a Universal, which (as God) gives life and light to all reality. Neither are they mere space-occupying atoms, nor are they merely sensible entities or non-entities, mechanically separated from each other. They actively unite in one, and yet keep themselves differentiated from each other. Knowing is thus a unifying process. The subject, to use a sensible analogy for a spiritual process, passes over and loses itself in its object, and, finding its larger self in the object, it passes back to its subjective starting-point. Only in this way can the subject be aware of, or know its object, or itself as its own object. In losing its life in the object, the subject finds its own fuller life; wherever it goes it is still "at home." The more it goes out of itself, the fuller experience and wider wisdom it acquires. The undifferentiated subject would be a blank non-entity. Nothing intelligible is alien to the knowing subject. Its object, or its "other," is always larger than itself. In every act of conscious intelligence, self-consciousness

finds itself reflected, or rather realised. It is an inter-communion of mind with reason, spirit with spirit. The knowing agent thus finds himself set in the midst of an intelligible world of which he is a part. The forms of his intelligence are the forms of the world's existence. He is both the interpreter and the interpretation of nature. Hieroglyphics as strange as chaos have finally been deciphered, because they contained intelligence. Otherwise they would never have been more than the scratches of a lion upon the rocks. Man can only decipher a riddle that holds a meaning, contains thought. Intelligence subjective finds its larger self in intelligence objective, both being organically articulated as members of absolute intelligence. This last is not merely an inference from, but it is an implicit content of concrete experience. Reason, both subjective and objective, is personal. It is not only that of the individual man, but of man as a race. Nor is it only of sense-conditioned man. It exists independently of all knowing men. But, as it can exist only in self-conscious personality, it exists in Absolute Spirit. All concrete experience is the apprehension of objective consciousness by subjective consciousness. Both have their reality in organic synthesis. Thought within finds thought without. The microcosmic deity within finds its macrocosmic Deity without. Man geometrises and finds the diagrams writ large by another hand in nature. He finds God speaking to him, and God finds him intelligent to His intelligent self-revelations.

But man's intelligence is not creative but rather recreative; not an absolutely independent centre but the planet of a central Sun. Absolute Intelligence existed before he began to have self-conscious intelligence, in which alone can his own live, and move, and have its being.

The following is Dr. Morris' recapitulation of this lecture on knowing:

1. That knowledge is inexplicable on the sensational theory of subject and object, in knowledge, as only different, or only mechanically distinct from each other; knowledge is, therefore, not a purely mechanical, sensible, or physical process.

2. That subject and object in spite of their numerical difference, must be organically one, and that they are indeed thus one in a spiritual process of self-consciousness which conditions, rather than is conditioned by, time, and space, and their relations.

3. That finite self-consciousness involves and reveals its dependence on an absolute self-consciousness which, provisionally, we can only call, in agreement with philosophy and religion, the self-consciousness of an Absolute and Divine Spirit.

This passage from a knowing agent to intelligent Absolute Being is inevitable. Knowing implies real being. The self-conscious intelligence of man implies the absolute intelligence—God. Thus the problem of knowing lands us in, and is identical with the problem of being, and only ideally distinguishable from it. The spirituality of Absolute Being—which is the pre-supposition of Religion—is the attainment of Philosophy. Philosophy only comes to analyse, and redemonstrate, or point out this reality, livingly possessed by Religion. Such, too, is the ontology necessarily implied in physical science, though oftentimes repudiated by its votaries. In showing this the author, in a fine and convincing way, hurls back upon these empiricists the reproach of being *Abstract*. It is physical science as conceived by them, that is abstract, for it abstracts particular phenomena from the infinite and the absolute, by and in whose power and essence they have their being and their manifestation. They abstract the phenomenal activity of *being* from the Absolute essence and content of reality. He insists upon using both the words Science and Experience in the concrete sense of philosophical knowing. Each implies the infinite and absolute, of which concrete fulness they are shorn by empiricists. True knowledge is of the concrete universal. Empiricists separate, abstract the particular, which they deem the concrete, from its universal. As such, no particular is intelligible. “It is like the accidentally discovered member of an unknown organism, which cannot be truly known, until the idea of the whole organism is seen reflected in it, and is read in or from it.” And a sensible phenomenon is approximately *known* and comprehended, only when its larger self is discovered in some large scientific law.

The Science of knowledge, or philosophy, we have seen, gives us intelligence and *being* in organic unity—each inclusive of its diverse other.

Thus the *nature* of *being* is revealed in knowing; in one another's being mingled in the process of knowing; of no other than intelligent *being* can intelligence receive any revelation. The Science of knowledge negatives the possibility of any unintelligible, and, therefore, unintelligent, *being*. But all being or reality that intelligence cognises, enters into the form of self-knowledge or self-consciousness. But this, again, we have seen is a process, an energy in action. Hence, any mere dead brute matter is ruled out of possible existence. For the difference between the knowing subject and the known object is not absolute in kind. The relative difference is subsumed in the process of knowing, in which they become organically one, though not mechanically identical.

We can indicate the point of view of this interpretation of the universe no better than by saying that its keyword is *organic* unity, as opposed to merely *arbitrary* or *mechanical relations* of the great objects of knowledge—God, man, and the world, as set forth in empirical Philosophy, common logic, and Deistic theology. In place of the abstract principle of identity and contradiction, by means of which one—

“The parts in his hand he may hold and class,
But the spiritual link is lost, alas !”

there is given the principle of *organic unity*, which, without losing the identity of the objects, also preserves them from the annihilation that would otherwise be effected by their differences. A full explication of this significant term is easily accessible in Principal John Caird's *Philosophy of Religion*, and in Prof. Edward Caird's little volume on Hegel, as well as in Prof. Morris' volume on Kant. Shelley has delicately expressed the poetic side of this truth in his *Love's Philosophy*:

The fountains mingle with the river
And the rivers with the ocean,
The winds of heaven mix forever
With a sweet emotion;

Nothing in the world is single ;
 All things by a law Divine,
 In one another's being mingle,
 Why not I with thine ?
 See, the mountains kiss high heaven
 And the waves clasp one another ;
 No sister flower would be forgiven
 If it disdained its brother ;
 And the sunlight clasps the earth,
 And the moonbeams kiss the sea—
 What are all these kissings worth,
 If thou kiss not me ?

But the Science of knowing rules out the subjective idealism and pantheism of an absolute identity of all objects, as well as their empirical separation by absolute differences. For this Science requires that subject and object be distinct. The physical universe is not all in the eye of the beholder, but is a real object of intelligence. Man is not identical with nature, nor God with man. But the reality that each possesses is that, which in spite of differences and distinctions is of the same kith and kin in all. The resolute maintenance of this is a distinguishing mark of what we may term English Hegelians. The personality of God and man, and the objective reality of the world, are strenuously maintained by them all, as by Prof. Morris also.

The relations of these principles to Theism are obvious, and are well indicated by Dr. Morris. Thought is prior to being with us. Being is prior to thought in us. But, absolutely considered, there is unity of *thought* and *being*. But it is not our own individual thought and being that are absolute. But the absolute object of our intelligence, the unity of being which our every act of knowing implies, is that of Absolute Spirit. The real pre-supposition of all knowledge, is not my own consciousness of myself as an individual, but thought or self-consciousness which is beyond all individual selves, which is the unity of all thinkers and all objects of thought. That universal Self-consciousness, which the conscious life of all finite minds implies and on which it is based, is Absolute Spirit—God. We know only in part, but are known *in toto* by the absolute intelligence. What man

is by his self-conscious personality imperfectly, that God is infinitely, perfectly, independently. Man's intelligence can thus extend in ever-widening circles over the universe without ever missing its larger image. Wherever it goes it is still *At home*. With increasing intelligence, he loses his sense of isolation, and ceases to feel a stranger anywhere in the world. Nothing true is foreign to him, but all reality is, as it were, bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh. In all its discoveries, in Science, Art, and Religion, it discovers itself. So of all revelation—it is a revelation of intelligence to kindred intelligence for its enlargement. Thus too GOD, as Absolute Spirit, is everywhere *At home* in the Universe, and the Deistic conception, which has had so pernicious currency in Christian thought, is no longer tenable. Our FATHER in Heaven is also our FATHER on earth, His footstool. Within the inmost closet of our heart He is as much on His throne as on fiery Sinai.

Philosophy can indicate its claim to be concrete *experience*, taking true and complete and unprejudiced account of herself and her implications—a systematic analysis, or pointing out, of the real relations of self-consciousness.

Dr. Morris goes on in the larger part of his book, to show that “true religion necessarily finds her own lineaments prefigured, and the security of her own foundations demonstrated,” in true science. Again, “That such is the relation of Christianity to the demonstrable results of philosophic inquiry—this is the main thesis of the present course of Lectures.” “I desire to point out how Christianity, as the most spiritual of all religions, is also, and for that reason, the most philosophical, and to show in particular, that Christianity, in its Scriptures, either directly contains, or else immediately and obviously presupposes, a theory of knowledge and of objects of knowledge—of the Absolute (or God), of finite world and of man—which is not only confirmed by the results of philosophic inquiry, but also has positively contributed in the most marked way, to the enrichment of philosophic science itself.”

Revering Christianity as accordant with the highest

reason, he also maintains the progressive illumination, unfolding, and strengthening of reason through the energy of Christianity—JESUS CHRIST being the Incarnate LOGOS, or REASON of the Universe.

It is impossible to represent, without reproducing with expository enlargement, the whole content of the chapters in which he shows the consonance of the *Christian theory* of knowing, the three great objects of knowledge, and their mutual relations and kinship with the insight and demonstration of true philosophy. I can give but a few points in the exceedingly close and interesting treatment of this practical part of the work.

The Scriptures represent the Christian life as most intimately and indissolubly bound up with knowledge. To *know* GOD is eternal life. This is real spiritual knowledge and differs from the merely individual and relative. S. Paul's saying, "I know nothing by myself," and his declaration that "we are not sufficient of ourselves to think anything as of ourselves," are finely exegeted, to the discomfiture of both Christian Agnostics and anti-Christian Freethinkers. In Christianity, as in Philosophy, the Universal is the category of living reality. The individual subject must "lose his life" in that of the Universal, in order to "find it." Christian knowledge is realised only through a participation in GOD's truth through organic union with the LOGOS. It is to be begun, continued, and ended, not in mechanical or a pantheistic process of evolution, but in GOD. GOD is *the author* of all our true thinking, doing, being. It is only by His holy inspiration that we think those things that are good. Thus all true knowledge is of the nature of revelation. Thus, too, no revelation can be merely mechanical; the presentation of a foreign topic, previously undreamed of and unlonged for. For all revelation is in form and kind self-revelation—the revelation of intelligence to intelligence. In all true knowledge, either philosophic or religious, one knows only one's own larger self, and in all one's findings finds that same *larger self*. Only as we know GOD, and are partakers of the Divine intelligence, is this larger self graciously be-

stowed upon us as the precondition of true and eternal existence. The voice of God is the voice of man—that is of man according to his true nature and intent. The *perfect man* was the GOD-man, JESUS CHRIST. He is the perfect revelation of living truth. This revelation may not be completely apprehended by us, in all its details, but, in its substance, it must be intelligible to us. JESUS must be our elder brother, as well as our unquestioned master. Unrealised, the Eternal SON had yet even been “the light of the world.” Misunderstood, or even verbally denied, the CHRIST is yet to-day the light of all true knowledge. It is the revelation of intelligence to intelligence. “Intelligence must find its own larger lineaments prefigured in every dogma.” For true and proper man, no truth is or can be essentially mysterious, nor could any revelation of such be either made or received by *intelligence*. Dr. Morris gladly bears witness to the pregnant significance of Dr. Mulford’s view of Revelation in his *Republic of God*, commending them for a studious perusal, to all possessing a thoughtful interest in the subject. Just here let me say a few words as to the author’s rationalism. His theory of true knowing and real being should prevent any hasty conclusion from his words to a vulgar rationalism, which he opposes as strenuously as any of us could wish. His whole philosophy is a protest against the individualism of so-called *free thought*. It is only as our individuality increases and develops into personality, by entering into the larger life in religion, society, and art, only as we become organically one with these larger forms of intelligence, only as *Deus nos personat*, that we are able to think anything truly. But the same philosophy is no less a strenuous rebuttal of all sorts of Agnosticism, Scientific, Philosophical, and Religious. It is because our experience is a fragment of a living organic whole, that we may read in it the law and nature of the whole. Now, “I know,” though only in part. When my union with the Divine SPIRIT becomes perfect, “then shall I know, even also as I am known.” It is, however, in the last lecture that the author discusses most explicitly the

relations of reason and religion. From it we quote the following, *contra* the oft-asserted essential and absolute "impotence of human reason" [p. 263]:

It seems to me to presuppose, contrary to the words of Scripture itself, as also to the voice of Philosophy, a complete and essential mechanical separation between human and Divine intelligence. The *Bible* ascribes human understanding to the "SPIRIT of the LORD;" and "human reason" in the mouth of the worthiest and best accredited spokesman before the advent of CHRIST (Aristotle) ascribed its own origin and energy to GOD. Reason claims no power of her own out of organic dependence on the Absolute Spirit.

He distinguishes thus between the rationalism of *this* reason and that of the individual *understanding*:

Reason is the faculty of *insight*, i.e., of essential, thoroughly, and completed objective or *experimental intelligence*; understanding is the faculty, if I may so express myself, of *outsight*, or of superficial, *empirical*, contingent *information* respecting external particulars, viewed in abstraction and separation from their essential and vital ground. To men of the eighteenth century "reason" meant "understanding;" and the self-styled "Age of Reason" was, accordingly, not the age of true, concrete, *vital reason*, which, *in operation*, is simply equivalent to *experience*, taking true and complete and unprejudiced account of herself, but rather the age of "reasons," of *argument* or alleging of "reasons" *pro* and *con*, and of consequent "doubt" *respecting all* that can be made a subject of argument as everything can. Let us not then, confound the "reason" of Thomas Paine with the reason of Aristotle or of philosophy. And, finally, let us not forget that, while any true revelation may be expected to transcend and confound the "reasonings" of an unvitalised "understanding," the very condition of its reception is the existence of reason, as also the condition of its effectiveness is that by it reason finds itself truly illuminated. [p. 814.]

Connecting this quotation with its context already given, and with the following, we have a use of the reason maintained that commends itself as true and right. He maintains that it is only the Christian consciousness or the experience, that is the true experience of the "perfect man," "Christian knowledge is completed knowledge."

Philosophy [p. 266] is nothing independently of experience; it claims to do nothing but comprehend experience; and if in Christianity human experience is filled up and rounded out to a greater degree of

perfection and completeness than in any of its non-Christian forms, Philosophy is ready and quick to perceive and acknowledge this and gratefully to draw from it the fuller lesson that it teaches. Philosophy needed the new and added light which Christianity brought. But the assertion must be repelled, if the meaning of it is that Christianity involves, in any sense, the miraculous supersedure of reason or its disgrace.

Against such (Christian) reason, the epithets of rationalism and naturalism are only ignorantly and vainly hurled. Such views are as vitally supernatural and hyper-rational as any thoughtful Christian can maintain. They consist most kinly with a supernatural naturalism. The Divine element is asserted as the pre-supposition of all true experience. God is transcendent no less than immanent. The Deistic conception which has been so largely regnant in English apologetics set the natural and the supernatural over against each other as almost contradictory opposites. The canon of formal logic that "it is not non-A," being applied, there resulted either a low naturalism or a merely mechanical supernaturalism of sheer brute power to interfere and direct as from without and above. But true experience denies that man and the world are naturally isolated from God, strangers and foreigners to Him in their essential being and activity. Against such conceptions the author's most trenchant criticisms are directed.

We have called attention to his view of the relation of Reason to Christianity, preparatory to noting his discussion of the first phase of Biblical ontology, *i.e.*, the Absolute Being or the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

Absolute Being is everywhere present for philosophy. This, too, is the Christian conception of God. The absolute is Spirit, is intelligent energy. This, too, is the Christian view. Again, the finite, or the finite known in its implications, reveals the true Infinite. The absolute is the knowable, correlative of the conditioned. All limitation is affirmation, only transiently negative. Man in knowing and affirming himself truly as a spiritual personality, knows also and affirms his correlative, limiting

and yet fulfilling correlative GOD. There is a common ground of the λόγος and the ὄν in all being, both finite and infinite, material, human, and Divine. The Christian conception illuminates and fulfils this conception—the person and work of CHRIST being a concrete and special manifestation of it. In the personality of the Transcendent man we have the true revelation of the nature of GOD—the highest philosophical and religious ontology. In JESUS CHRIST all this is written in infinitely larger, more legible, and unmistakable characters. But this life and truth needed to be manifested in perfect man, in all its fulness, in order that it might be grasped by Philosophy in all its fulness and reality.

Again, Absolute Being is exhibited in the Bible under the attributes of light (intelligence), life, and love—names for three ideally distinguishable, but really inseparable aspects or functions of Spirit. These three are not merely accidental modes, but essential and constitutive attributes of the Divine nature or of Absolute Being. Their interpretation and exemplification are fully found in the personality of CHRIST, who declared, “I and my FATHER are one.” This brings us to the Church’s doctrine of the Holy Trinity.

His exposition does not differ from the construction of this doctrine given by some of our professors of divinity (*e.g.* the Rev. Dr. J. Steinfert Kedney of Seabury), a construction that makes the Trinity immanent and essential instead of “modal” or economic.” This doctrine, he maintains, cannot be essentially mysterious. To be received, it must be *of* and *for* intelligence—must come into some of the affirming limitations or categories of intelligible experience. It is an attribute of the *known* GOD—a fuller revelation of His being to man. It is essential to GOD that He be triune. At the same time it is the Christian Faith that He made man in His own image. We may therefore expect man, not to reproduce, but at least to *image* this Triuneness, to be “in the image of GOD,” but not to be GOD.

On the other hand, the knowledge of GOD’s Triuneness should help us to understand and explain the nature

of man thus made, though the image be broken. And Dr. Morris says :

The Church was, in my judgment—and I believe that I express the true historic verdict of philosophic science in this matter—guided by a true instinct or a true inspiration, in making the doctrine of the Trinity the corner-stone in the Confession of her Faith, and is right in praying that she and her children may evermore be kept steadfast in this Faith. It is, or involves, to my mind, the very key to all true illumination for the intellect, as well as to all solid and saving comfort for the soul. But certainly it is not this,—on the contrary it is purely and justly “a stone of stumbling, and a rock of offence,” when it is preached only as a sort of mystic or magic formula, which all the faithful are to repeat, but into the meaning of which they are warned, as they value the stability of their faith, not to inquire too closely. [pp. 140, 141.]

But Trinity does not mean threeness. It means three in one—a unity, the very condition of which is multiplicity. Again, it is a spiritual, not a sensible, category of being. Hence the attempt to find a purely sensible analagon for it fails and creates difficulties for the understanding whose province is that of sensible categories—*i.e.*, categories that obtain under conditions of time and space, which are only dependent functions of Absolute Spirit. Again, light, life, and love are each a triune process. While holding these as essential and constitutive attributes of God, the author does not set them forth as representing severally, the different persons in the Holy Trinity. Intelligence is a triune process. Its terms, as we have seen, are necessarily three—subject, object, and subject-object, or self-consciousness—but its nature is one. So as regards life and love. These are ideally distinguishable attributes of man's nature. These processes constitute his being and personality. But this trinity in man is obviously only an image and relative, because subject to the law of time and of temporal development. With God, however, these limitations do not exist, for time and space are not entities but only dependent functions of Absolute Being. Hence the Divine Trinity is an eternally perfect and immanent process of activity of the Divine Being. It is the everlasting act, the ever-complete and perfectly actualised spiritual

unity of consciousness of the ever-blessed Three-in-one. Three is the perfect number, the number that is essentially necessary for the concrete unity of self-conscious Personality. "In short, then, it would appear that the Absolute Personality of a God concretely—*i. e.*, really—one, must and can only be conceived as essential Tri-personality" [p. 163].

In his lecture on "The World" as another section of Biblical ontology, the author gives a "philosophy of nature," that excludes both the merely mechanical, material evolution that so many empirical scientists proclaim, and also the theory of an arbitrary, casual creation, which has been current in deistic theology. The *rationale* of creation is found in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, or the eternally active process of the Divine Personality, and is rightly connected especially with the doctrine respecting the nature of CHRIST. Thus creation, as a temporal process, is grounded in creation as an eternal act. The eternally-begotten SON is the Begetter of all temporal creation. "All things were made by Him." Nature is not a product of "world-dust," but is a living, purposeful process, the total significance of which is summed up in the phrase, "realisation or fulfilment of the Divine Word." And only by Him, in organic dependence on Him the potentialities of the groaning creation (*ἡ κτίσις*, Romans viii. 22), are *realised*, or, in Scriptural language, "redeemed" or "saved," as the end of the purposeful process. The whole view is admirably worked out to the strenuous and necessary exclusion of pantheism, which he styles "that peculiar and just horror of the religious mind."

In his lecture on "Man" he shows the consonance of Philosophy with the Christian conception. We have only space, however, to note his view of ethics, or the science which points out and defines the essential nature and character of man as man. Christian Ethics, too, is the science of the perfect (or Christian) man, and is thus only another name for the science of the perfect life of the perfect man. He insists upon using the two terms "Christian" and "perfect" as synonymous.

Christian ethics, therefore, rather confirms, completes, and is confirmed by, than opposed to the best of non-Christian conceptions of this science. Its object is not so much to dehumanise as to rehumanise or realise perfect or Christian manhood.

Then follows a trenchant criticism of the demand for the "secularisation of morals" by Mr. Herbert Spencer, whom a disciple applauds for having "humanised ethics." He asserts that

whatever may have been, or may still be the notion of Christian ethics conveyed by any class of professed Christian teachers, the conception of the nature of man and of the law of his perfect being, which is contained in the Christian Scriptures and is essential to the Christian Religion in its purity, is infinitely deeper, richer, and truer, and hence by so much more truly and genuinely "human" than any which has been reached by the so-called "modern method." And this I venture to say in the name and with the authority of Philosophy, whose "method" knows no distinction of "ancient" (or antiquated) and "modern," and whose ideal is simply that of the complete recognition and demonstration of the whole content of experience. In distinction from the ethics of Philosophy and Christianity, I venture to assert that the self-styled "scientific" ethics which thus laudably aims and claims to "humanise ethics" abstracts in tendency, and to the greatest extent in reality, from all that is most essential and substantial about man. [pp. 215-216.]

"Christian experience," in the genuine sense of this expression, is the experience of the perfect man. It is notable that Dr. Morris uses the term "human nature" in the sense that Bishop Butler contends for in his sermons on human nature.

Of the last lecture on "The Comparative Philosophic Content of Christianity," space will only permit me to say that it does not differ from the view I set forth in an article on "The Method of Comparative Religion," in the last number of the AMERICAN CHURCH REVIEW, previously to reading this volume. Religion is defined as organic unity with God. Christianity demanding and realising this perfectly is the absolute religion. All others have the comparative worth of partial, arrested attempts of man seeking to "come to himself," feeling after the LORD, Who ever seeks after men. I earnestly

trust that this very imperfect notice of this most noteworthy volume may lead earnest truth-seekers to study it for themselves. It will answer its purpose, if it serves as the sufficient "*verbum sapientibus.*"

J. MACBRIDE STERRETT.

SEABURY DIVINITY SCHOOL.

HUMAN IMMORTALITY NOT INNATE BUT CONDITIONAL.

THE subject of Human Immortality is one of the greatest importance. It concerns that which must either glorify man's whole being with the prospective splendor of an eternal day, or blacken it with the impending shadow of an endless night. If in that deathless state man is to be forever possessed of a perfect life as man, or of the still higher "life everlasting" of the glorified saint, then the very word *immortality* is a shout of triumph, not only over death and the grave—the natural man's fear, but also over all animal necessities and low desires—the earthliness which is the rational man's hatred. Or if, on the other hand, after all the hopes and opportunities of this preparatory state man is to fail of the immortal goal, or worse, if, as according to the favorite religious theory, he is to reach it only to the end of attaining a deathless capacity for endless dying under inflicted pains and ever-accumulating horrors, then the word itself is but another name for hell.

A subject of such infinite gravity needs to be approached with the utmost seriousness, and should be handled with judicial candor and the most painstaking care. Here is certainly no proper place for forced interpretation, hasty inferences, sentimental appeals, or passionate rejoinders of the thinker. The solemn importance of the subject forbids the mind to be either lifeless like the sea in a dead calm, or rudely disturbed and tumultuous like the ocean in a tempest. Deeply aroused it must be, but rather as the ocean under the pressure of a wind so powerful that it beats down the very billows, and only by flashing shreds of spoon-drift allows

it to give sign of its deep internal stir and excitement.

Discuss the subject, however, as reverently as one may, the effort is beset with difficulties and dangers. It is, at the outset, not easy to reach an assured landing-place of proof in behalf of any immortality. Nature, on the one hand, supplies us with certain pleasing analogies in which poetry finds a voice supposed to be prophetic. But, on the other, she arrays against these other considerations that were long ago felt by the deeper thinkers to hang over its prospect, chill and dark like the fore-flung shadows of death and the grave. In the apprehension of reason science affords a higher line of evidence which, for trained intellects, suffices for certainty. But to the great multitude who, through fear of death, are all their lifetime subject unto bondage, such proof, however strong, can bring no relief. Theological science, also, while striving to do more, is not less productive of embarrassment. It has complicated the subject of immortality with other and often extreme doctrines, making each sustain and intensify the other. The result is that the current Calvinistic doctrine of Eternal Punishment really dominates the whole line of argument. It determines the exposition of Scripture, controls the sense of English words, marks the conclusion to be reached, and so fixes the one position for the Orthodox. An independent examination of the nature and grounds of immortality is, then, attended both by the difficulty of satisfactorily disentangling the two doctrines, and the danger of compromising one's own standing as an Orthodox believer in Christianity. Still further, practical religion itself may be said to interpose a serious obstacle. From having been so interwoven with the current theology, the doctrine of man's inherent and indestructible immortality has come to be a necessary part of the faith of many earnest Christian people. Their religious character and life, in many respects most estimable, may be said to have been developed under the influence of that and other doctrines which have been, in their theological system, grouped about it. Now, even though

that system is defective, it is to be doubted whether an attempt should be made at its correction, where there is danger of weakening a sincere faith or disturbing any practical good work. Here, however, unless one is to follow the beaten track—in which case what need of any discussion?—there is imposed on him the necessity of proceeding with his inquiries in the most guarded and temperate manner, a thing neither easily nor too often done.

Keeping these cautionary facts in view, it is proposed here to inquire somewhat critically into the nature and grounds of human immortality. As is well known, two theories are before the Christian mind:

I. According to the first, immortality is the inalienable possession of every human being, is inherent in the very nature of man, and is grounded on the assumed indestructibility of spirit.

II. According to the second and antagonist theory, human immortality is a Divine gift, originally grounded on the creative will of God, conditioned by obedience to the law of righteousness, and forfeited in the Fall; but under the new Dispensation reoffered and reconferred as a free gift, on the sole ground of the grace of God in CHRIST, conditioned on faith in Him and obedience to His will, and to be obtained by those who “seek for glory and immortality” through Him.

It will at once be seen that the chief strain of the inquiry falls on the first theory, and that the crucial question is that of the inherence of immortality in man's nature. If it be proven that it cannot be innate, it must be conditional. The discussion may, then, be confined within those limits.

Accepting the question as thus stated, it appears that four classes of objections—logical, ethical, ontological, and Scriptural—may justly be urged against the theory of inherent or necessary immortality.

I. *Logical*.—(a.) It is the common and endlessly reiterated saying of the advocates of the theory that man is an immortal being. Yet, from time immemorial, the universal judgment of mankind has been that “Man is

mortal.' Taken in a plain straightforward way, both statements cannot be true. But if either is true on all grounds of sound reasoning, it must be the latter. The former is then illogical in that it is a contradiction.

i. Another form of the assertion common with that class of thinkers—that the "soul is immortal"—appears to evade the difficulty. In reality, it only involves the case in still greater inconsistency. For note the fact that there is here implied a change in the use of terms which violates the law of correlatives. To affirm that the soul is immortal in order to escape the force of the saying, "Man is mortal," is to say, that while man is mortal as to his body, he is immortal as to his soul. But as the word *immortal* is descriptive of the body as subject to death and of man as having such a body, the term *immortal* ought in all logical consistency, to be applied to the body and the bodily man as under the opposite condition. St. Paul so uses the terms in the passage "this mortal must put on immortality"—that is to say, that which is not immortal must put on immortality. In other words, whichever it be, whether the body as body or man as man, which is mortal, it is that which is to put on the immortality. As for the rest, it goes without saying that it is illogical to predicate immortality of that which has yet to put it on.

(c.) Still further, the doctrine of man's inherent immortality is generally argued on assumed Scriptural grounds. This would be eminently proper for the advocate of conditional or gracious immortality. But it is illogical and self-destructive for the other. If man is immortal by nature, then is his immortality, like his responsibility, a thing of *Psychology* rather than *Revelation*. The discrimination of its nature and grounds belongs to *rational science* and not to revealed religion. As the *use* and *blessedness* of immortality lie largely beyond the present state, and thus transcend the insight of reason, we may appeal to Revelation for *their* special unfolding. But not for proof of the immortality itself as inherent. That is to confess judgment against the inherency.

(d.) Once more. As has already been suggested, it is common for those who hold to inherent immortality to argue it from the demands of eternal punishment as assumed to be what is theologically termed "eternal death." The line of thought is much like this. Everlasting life is a life in man as body, soul, and spirit, which is eternally supreme over all conditions of deprivation, decay, and death. Eternal death, to be a proper retributive correlative of that, must be a similarly endless subjection of man as body, soul, and spirit to those conditions. But if the death be literal rather than constructive, this endless subjection to evils the opposite of the blessings of the everlasting life, becomes impossible. Eternal Death must, then, it is assumed, be a *constructive spiritual death* under the law of an *endless literal life*. Immortality in man must, then, be absolutely assured—that is, it must be inherent or essential. But to reason thus is grossly illogical. If immortality is inherent in man's nature it stands in his being, independent of the condition of final rewards and punishments. They owe their possibility to *it*. It can owe neither its existence nor inherency to *them*.

II. *Ethical*.—I pass now to the objections to innate immortality, which rest upon principles in morality. (a.) It is not consistent with Divine truth or virtue that God should discredit or violate His own necessary law of cause and effect. Everywhere He has made obedience to organic law conducive to organic health and life. Everywhere He has made disobedience to that law, not only injurious to health and life, but also capable of destroying both. By both His reiterated word in Holy Scripture and the thousandfold indications of nature has He striven to enforce this upon man as the law of sin and holiness. It is in the very nature of the latter as cause to produce indefinitely extended life, and of sin to produce its ultimate, if not its summary, extinction. Hence immortality is alien to sin, and germane to holiness. For God, then, to make life perpetual or endless in the perfected saint is not only in harmony with causal law, it is even its loftiest endorsement—its Divine consummation. But to

endow the utterly and incorrigibly disobedient with like indestructibility of being or life—that is, to make the reprobate sinner immortal, is to fly in the very face of this law ; is to override it by a provision not only arbitrary and a contradiction, but otherwise in conflict with perfect morality in the Divine Being. But no such objection holds good against a conditional immortality. It is simply Divine consistency with Divine law, for God to condition man's continuance in being according to the very causes, either righteous or sinful, conservative or ruinous, which bear upon it.

(*b.*) It is not inconsistent with pure morality that God, if He is to create at all, should, as the highest order, make beings in his own rational and moral image. Such beings must, of course, be possessed of free-will ; as finite, they must be fallible ; and as finite, fallible free agents they may mistake or mischoose their course, and may thus fall into sin. The highest created capacity must, outside of necessitated being, be subject to such a possibility. But if, notwithstanding this liability in man, God has furthermore endowed him with a *necessary* immortality—that is to say, with indestructible being, the case is not so clear. To create any such erring and possibly sinful being, one who may make himself a blot and a blasphemy in the moral system, in any such fashion that he cannot be *unmade*, does not appear to consist with either Divine wisdom or virtue. This is to suppose that God not only made man capable of sinning, but also practically rendered Himself unable ever to put a complete stop to his sinning. An unconditional immortality amounts to a conditioned Deity, and for God to condition Himself to the end of perpetuating sin cannot be ethically consistent.

(*c.*) It is true, the theory of a constructive eternal death, as a manifestation of God's hatred of sin, is by many supposed to be a sufficient corrective of the ethical impropriety just noticed. The pains of eternal damnation are looked upon as a perpetual protest on the part of God against sin as an evil in no part of His choosing, and as an utter and inexcusable blot, wrong, and outrage in

the Universe. But it may be questioned whether this theory does not, in the very secret of its securing such a punishment, represent God as marked by the unrighteousness of endowing man with an immortal or indestructible life, not only to perpetuate man's suffering under this species of punishment, but also to the practical end of eternising sin itself. Nor does it avail much to plead that the inherent immortality was given only that the good might be perpetuated in holiness and happiness. That could have been perfectly secured, and without necessitating the other, by conditioning immortality upon man's obedience to Divine law and continuance in holiness, or, in other words, upon his release from condemnation and restoration to holiness through CHRIST.

(*d.*) Again, if there was ever a time when there was no sin in the universe, then there has been a time when, as indeed our sacred records show, there was a Fall—a dread lapse of beings from their primal purity and perfection; a clouding of the creation glory of the Divine Handiwork; an ill-omened and shameful triumph of evil over good. Now, it would seem that under the government of such a Being as God, there should at some time come a pure, holy, and triumphant restoration of all things. God either has or has not power to bring back, to re-establish a reign of universal righteousness. If He has not, then we have only to reconstruct our whole idea of God. If He has, and yet practically puts that power out of His hands, then we have to reconstruct our ideas of ethical virtue in God. If, however, He has both the power and the liberty to do so, that restoration must come, and it must involve a return to a state in which there is absolutely no sin. The only alternative is to assume that the original state of things as *perfect* was the counterpart of the final state according to the current notions—that is, was a state in which sin existed, although under penal restraint. But this is not getting rid of sin. It is only reducing it again to penal subjection. It may cover it with eternal obloquy, but it is not overwhelming and destroying it. But how can a holy

GOD Who hates sin content Himself with less than the absolute destruction of sin and all things sinful?

III. *Metaphysical*.—To the doctrine of inherent immortality there are grave metaphysical or ontological objections—that is, objections founded on the nature of being.

(a.) In the first place, whatever has had a beginning, is not self-existent, and may, therefore, by the determination of the same will which gave it a beginning, have also an ending. But man has had a beginning; is therefore not self-existent; and, consequently, cannot have in his nature any necessary exemption from an ending. He is no more a being unending than unbeginning. In other words, he cannot be inherently immortal.

(b.) Again, whatever is finite must be dependent; for only the infinite can be unconditioned or absolute. But that which, as finite, is dependent for once, is dependent forever. If it was in the beginning dependent on something else for its being, it will always be dependent on it for the continuance of that being. Its existence, whether simply continued or actually perpetuated, is not, then, a thing of its own nature or inherent power, but ultimately and altogether the effect of some other being and potency. But man is confessedly thus finite and dependent. No second causes can obscure the fact that it is in GOD that he lives and moves and has his being. He cannot, then, be immortal by nature; but only by Divine favor and determination. That is, the same outgoing Divine will-force which creatively became his life and breath and being, must, in a perpetuated and most gracious ongoing, continue to bear up that being, or be its very ground and subsistence, in other words must forever *condition* it.

(c.) Finally, under this head, to be immortal by nature man must be by nature incorruptible or immutable. But no such immutability can be where there is not self-existence. But observation, science, and Scripture alike show that no such incorruptibility or immutability belongs to man. He himself acknowledges it. It is the confession of the ages. All history, all reflection, all poetry, all monumental art is full of it.

The substance of this argument is stated with conciseness and force in the following extract which came to my hands after this writing:

The word IMMORTALITY is a negative term, and means *no death*, and no possibility of death. INCORRUPTIBILITY means *no decay*, and no possibility of decay. IMMUTABILITY means *no change*, and no possibility of change.

But a *created* being is not immutable, therefore is not incorruptible, and consequently is not immortal. For immortality, being a negative quality, is based on incorruptibility; and incorruptibility, being a negative quality, is based on immutability; and immutability, being a negative quality, is based on *self-existence*.

Therefore, as immortality is based on incorruptibility, and incorruptibility on immutability, and immutability on independent and self-existent being, no *creature* is or can be in himself immortal. The only possibility of immortality to man is by and in the impartation to him of the communicable life of GOD in essential union of LIFE with the risen SON of GOD—even eternal, self-existent LIFE; immutable, incorruptible, immortal life.

But aside from this as the present fact, Philosophy cannot but hold, that, as on these grounds inherent immortality is demonstrably not an attribute of man's nature here; so also, for all of anything in his nature it cannot be such hereafter. *Ex nihilo nihil fit* is a sound dictum. But as it is not in the nature of nothing to evolve into something; of mutability to transform itself into the unchangeable; or of the wholly dependent to rise to the unconditioned in anything; so if man be not now immortal, he cannot become so, upon any natural or unconditional grounds, hereafter. If he ever possessed the quality, it was the original free gift of his Maker, and was conditioned, as in absolute morality it must have been, on his continued obedience to the law of righteousness. If he lost it and it is to be regained, in which case it cannot be inherent, it must be through the working of some *ab-extra* agency graciously restoring it on the old conditions, but under new and Divine provisions for their unfailing fulfilment.

IV. *Scriptural*.—But the advocates of inherent or essential immortality will take exception to any such appeal to Philosophy. They will insist on the Scripture

argument as alone competent and conclusive. What the Holy Scriptures really teach on this point is doubtless of the first importance and should be reverently entertained and most thoroughly weighed. It is, however, not to be disguised that two difficulties have here to be met. Protestantism has pressed the claim for Scripture infallibility so far that it has been practically made to apply to the exegesis of proof-texts. Hence, it is particularly the case, that in connection with any Scripture assumed to prove innate or essential immortality and eternal punishment, to depart from the popular exegesis is heterodoxy. On the other hand, the reaction against those extreme views touching the Bible as infallible, has been in some quarters so sweeping and violent that, unless the thinker proceeds with the utmost caution, he will at once be proscribed as a rationalist and infidel.

(*a.*) In proceeding it is to be noted that the resurrection of the body is a necessary link between the present mortal life and the future life eternal. To the common mind, that which under the law of the present life is mortal, must be brought back from death and corruption to organic life and consistence, in order that any immortality may be possible under the law of a future life. Hence, as addressed to the common mind, the Scripture view of a future and immortal life must be largely gathered from its teaching as to the resurrection. This is so especially true of the Old Testament Scriptures that the only proof-texts that can be assumed to bear on the subject of immortality refer directly to the resurrection alone.

(*b.*) It is also a significant fact that the resurrection proof-texts, commonly adduced from the Old Testament as in favor of essential or innate immortality, are few, vague, and generally subjects of much dispute. For example, Job xix. 25, on which large dependence has been placed, is, as it appears in our translation, opposed to the whole tenor of the book, and in direct contradiction to other strongly emphasised statements of the patriarch himself. [See iii. 11-16; vii. 9, 10; x. 18-22; xiv. 7-14.] It has always been the puzzle of translators;

is, by exegetes of unquestioned learning, regarded as susceptible of a much more probable meaning quite different in character, and was never appealed to by the later Jews, by CHRIST, or the Holy Apostles.

As for the Psalms xlix. 20, and civ. 30, they have no necessary or natural reference to a resurrection. Their use in that connection is suggestive of a grievous unsoundness in the proof-text system. Isaiah xxvi. 19 is wholly typical and refers only to the restoration of Israel then captive in Babylon. Besides, if it had any bearing on the resurrection, verse fourteenth would show that it contemplated only a resurrection of the righteous ; or, as we might say, a resurrection under conditional immortality. The vision of the valley of dry bones (Ezekiel xxxvii.) has a like reference to a similar, if not the same, national restoration. And so far from this use of resurrection imagery proving, as some assume, that the doctrine was generally understood and accepted, it argues the very opposite. The figure indicated not so much the *fact* of the supposed restoration, as its seeming hopelessness, and its dependence for realisation on Almighty power. The force of the figure depended on the *incredibility* of the figurative fact. Of all these passages it must be said that it passes belief that a doctrine so vital, far-reaching, and stupendous in its character, involving—as under the popular theory it does—the doctrine of eternal punishment, should be set forth by any inspired writer in texts so scanty and so vague. To plead that this was because the doctrine was so generally accepted, is to beg the question. No other so important doctrine, however fully received, as, for example, that of the sovereignty of JEHOVAH, was thus treated. Moreover, as affording a tremendous sanction to the law of obedience so constantly set forth, the doctrine of innate immortality would, if so generally known, have been as constantly appealed to, as affording a powerful incentive to righteousness. But this was not the fact, and the reason is plain.

(c.) We come now to Daniel xii. 2, until which nothing clear and unequivocal on the subject is found in

the Old Testament. Granting, now, that it does give clear indications of a resurrection and an endless future life, it must be borne in mind that the text is the utterance of the Angel, and part of his revelation to Daniel, and that its like is in no respect to be found in the antecedent Scriptures. This proves that the doctrine was not commonly known and accepted at the time. What need of an angelic revelation of the commonly known and believed? As a part also of the latest Messianic prophecy, it indicates the doctrine as belonging to the coming Christian revelation of the system of grace. It is an anticipation of the words of the Messiah Himself, "I am the resurrection and the life;" in which, to the fact indicated by the angel, there is now added a revelation of the agent by whom it is to be brought to pass. From this it is plain why the doctrine of the resurrection and an immortal life hold no strong place in the Old Testament Scriptures; and why, where they do appear, it is only as a late development, for which the Jewish mind was not prepared until it had been purified by the discipline of the Captivity.

Now, it is impossible to avoid seeing that these facts touching the Old Testament treatment of the doctrine of the resurrection and a future life, do not accord with the notion of man's inherent or essential immortality. So important an attribute, if thus innate, could not fail of a spontaneous recognition in the common consciousness of man from the beginning, and could by no possibility need to be revealed by either an angel Gabriel or a Divine CHRIST, no more, one might say, than the fact of man's rationality would need it. But they do agree perfectly with the idea of immortality as a special Divine gift, conditioned on obedience to the law of righteousness, a gift lost through sin in the Fall, and only to be regained through CHRIST, on the new and more gracious condition of a righteousness restored through faith in Him.

V. In passing to the New Testament argument it may be remarked, that there are two classes of proof-texts—those of a direct and positive character, and those

which have only an inferential bearing on the subject. The former will be noticed in detail. Of the latter class, it is simply remarked here that they are always adduced in behalf of the theory of essential or inherent immortality; and that their supposed force is due to a special theological interpretation given to certain words. Different as the meanings thus attached to them are from the natural Hebrew use, and from the necessary understanding of the candid common reader of Holy Scripture, one may be pardoned for not yielding an implicit assent to the conclusions drawn from the texts as thus interpreted. Theological thinking, according to the pre-determining lines of human systems of doctrine, has become so predominant, that whole classes of words have altogether lost their normal and natural meaning, and have taken on themselves a sense wholly artificial and technical.* It is simply amazing how Protestant thinkers, who lay so much stress on "the simplicity of the Gospel," overload it with theological subtleties.

Keeping in mind, now, the facts, that in the time of CHRIST the doctrine of the resurrection and a future life under a general and undefined form had come to be commonly accepted by the Jews (the sect of the Sadducees being an exception), and that the doctrine of immortality is made in the New Testament to stand out more by itself, we proceed to the examination of its proof-texts.

(a.) The New Testament expressly sets forth *immortality* as a Divine attribute. "Now unto the King eternal, *immortal*, invisible, the only wise GOD" [1 Tim. i. 17].

(b.) It expressly restricts it to the Divine Being. The King of kings and Lord of lords, who only hath *immortality*" [1 Tim. vi. 16].

If anything is made plain and indisputable by both

* The exclusive use of a purely theological lexicon in exegesis is not conducive to the best thinking or the soundest exegesis. One of the most acute and striking expositions I ever heard was given by a self-taught student of the Greek Testament, who declined the use of Robinson's Greek Lexicon, urging that as the Holy Apostles used the Greek of their times in writing to Greek-speaking Christians, the meaning of their language ought to be best gained from the classic lexicon.

these passages and their context, it is that immortality, or deathless existence, is an inherent or essential attribute of GOD alone.

(c.) It ascribes man's very knowledge of immortality, or possible approach to it, as wholly due to CHRIST as the SAVIOUR. "Our SAVIOUR, JESUS CHRIST, who hath abolished death, and hath brought life and immortality to light in the Gospel" [2 Tim. i. 10]. This is sustained by our LORD's own words, "I am the Resurrection and the life" (S. John xi. 25).

(d.) It expressly sets forth immortality as an integral part of eternal life, as being an express Divine gift bestowed upon man through CHRIST in the Gospel. "The gift of GOD is eternal life, through JESUS CHRIST our LORD" [Rom. vi. 23.] Proof-texts of this kind are too numerous to permit full citation.

(e.) The New Testament represents immortality as a thing to be sought and acquired under condition of righteous obedience. "To them who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory, and honor, and *immortality*, eternal life" [Rom. ii. 7]. This passage clearly shows what was assumed under the previous head, that immortality, like glory and honor (and peace, verse 10th), is an integral part of eternal life, and is given as that is given. Here, again, the proof-texts indicative of this conditioning of immortality, under the head of eternal or everlasting life are too numerous to be cited.

(f.) The Holy Scriptures generally make everything necessary to man's welfare conditional. Under the Old Covenant all Divine favor, prosperity, blessing, and perpetuated continuance in the same, was conditioned on obedience. Under the New Covenant, notwithstanding it is a Covenant of Grace, the law is unchanged, though the conditions are different. The latter may be more favorable, and Divine Power may be graciously combined with the human effort to secure their fulfilment, but everything is, nevertheless, conditional. The sinner's favorable reception is conditioned on his coming to CHRIST; forgiveness depends on true repentance;

incorporation in the Church as the Body of CHRIST is conditioned on Baptism; preservation from temptation is secured only through watchfulness and prayer; sanctification is conditioned on faithful co-operation with the HOLY SPIRIT; to share with certainty in the "first resurrection" requires the believer to have received the Body and Blood of CHRIST in the Holy Eucharist [S. John vi. 54], and the crown of life itself is promised only on condition of fidelity even unto death [Rev. ii. 10]. Nothing which pertains to everlasting life fails of being conditioned either in its bestowment, its continuance, or its real efficiency. There is not a loop-hole of escape from the principle. There can be none. To be conditioned is the law of the creature. How, then, can his immortality be unconditioned?

It does not appear necessary to pursue the argument from Holy Scripture further. The positive character of the passages cited as against inherent immortality, and the perfect agreement between their conclusions and the philosophical argument previously developed, are certainly sufficient to give the higher probability of truth to the contrary doctrine. No ground is taken here that the doctrine of conditional immortality should be held or advanced as *de fido*. Still, in view of the strength of the argument in its favor, it would appear that no sincere and sober-minded Christian should be considered heterodox for believing it. Certainly he should not be subjected to isolation or proscription, unless he be exceedingly indiscreet or sweeping in his public use of it.

Nor is the fact overlooked here that questions adverse to conditional immortality may honestly be raised, which are not always easily to be solved. Still it may be answered in a general way, that, as human immortality involves mysteries of the Divine system, it is not possible that it should not be attended with some difficulties. And this in part because they are not revealed in their details, and because otherwise they cannot be comprehended by man. The theory of innate immortality itself is not without its perplexing feature. These are even more inscrutable than those which mark the antagonist

doctrine. Innate immortality only deepens and darkens the mystery of human destiny. The horizon of man's future, which before lay dim and undefined, is by it girt—

“With ragged ruins of thunder brooding low.”

What is worse, beyond these awful signs of tempest it gives no tokens of coming clear and peaceful skies ; but only when once it shall have burst upon the doomed race an endless and unmitigated fiery storm.

OBJECTIONS.—But for all the inutility of dwelling on objections, there are minds for whom, like Banquo's ghost, they will not down. For their sake questions of doubt must sometimes be answered, even though it be impossible to lay the ghost of doubt himself.

First, then, it is objected, that the doctrine of conditional immortality involves the overthrow of the notion of a constructive eternal death, and thus removes from the sinner's mind, the deterrent influence of its terrors. “What,” says the objector, “will the drunkard, the voluptuary, and the whoremonger care for simple destruction as the final doom of the sinner?”

In reply, we say, to what extent do they now care for what is called eternal death? How often does the fear of it deter them from sin and lead them to holiness? To what, so far as true virtue is concerned, will such a change of conduct amount, produced as it is by the simple fear of the threatened punishment? How long do such offenders retain feeling enough to be affected by the fear of the punishment? [Eph. iv. 19.] Besides all this, if this fear of eternal death is necessary to deter men from sin, why is the knowledge of the popular doctrine of innate immortality and everlasting punishment bestowed only on a fraction of the race? Are milder restraints sufficient for heathen transgressors, or does GOD care less for either their sins or their salvation? The fact is, the objections to the objection itself are numerous and insuperable. It is not only practically untenable, it is also logically fallacious ; it assumes

a result, and then argues from it in behalf of the desired cause.

Secondly. It is objected that the doctrine of conditional immortality precludes a resurrection of the wicked, and thus conflicts with the doctrine of a general judgment. In other words, if immortality is conditioned on obedience to the law of CHRIST, then there is no resurrection of the disobedient; and if no resurrection, then no appearance at the general judgment, to be judged according to the deeds done in the body.

It may be urged in reply (*a*) that while a resurrection necessarily accompanies immortality in man, it does not necessitate immortality. Hence the want of that immortality by no means precludes a resurrection *per se*. It only compels it, if it be, to be merely a "resurrection of condemnation" [S. John v. 29]. As distinguished from the "resurrection of life," which attends conditional immortality, this other resurrection, elsewhere treated as a second resurrection (Rev. xx. 5 and 6), is simply a judicial expedient; a resurrection for the purposes of evidencing Divine justice through a general judgment. That such a resurrection is at least possible, no one should deny who believes in the first Resurrection. The power which produces the greater is all sufficient for the production of the less. Nor is such a resurrection unreasonable. No wrong is done to the guilty person by bringing him temporarily out of his dungeon for the purposes of open trial and just judgment, even though he be speedily remanded to it, only to pass thence to the scaffold. So the sinner can have no just ground of complaint if he be, by such a resurrection, temporarily, for the purpose of the Grand Assize of the Universe, released from the power of death and the grave; even though, under the sentence of law, he shall be thence remanded to absolute destruction. Dark as would be such a doom, it bears no comparison with the other, the equally enforced resurrection of one necessarily immortal, to the endless terrors and torments of "eternal death." Still further (*b*) such a resurrection is not so improbable. The Holy Scriptures

do not only indicate two resurrections, but insist upon a marked difference between the two (Rev. xx. 6). This necessary difference is most naturally provided for by the terms or accidents of conditional immortality. To assume that it is due to a speculative differentiation of a resurrection of "everlasting life," from a resurrection to "eternal death" under the conditions of an innate immortality, is simply to beg the question. But this is only to be taken as an answer to the objection, not at all as settling a point to be accepted as *de fide*.

Thirdly. The objection, however, which is more commonly and urgently pressed, is, that a conditional immortality necessitates a change in the nature and the measure of the sinner's punishment. In other words, it is objected that by giving ground for a literal destruction of the wicked, it makes a just, adequate, and effective punishment of sin hereafter, impossible.

(a.) To this, first, it has to be replied in a general way, that, as has already been suggested, this is simply the common error of making the common theory of "Eternal Death" determine the nature of immortality. But it does not appear that this is the proper order for determining either. It reverses the logical relations of the antecedent and subsequent. It makes the sinner's endowment as to being depend on its capacitating him to endure a certain extreme form of eternal punishment. To say nothing of the doubtful morality of such an exercise of creative power, this does not approve itself to the reflecting mind as being a Divinely consistent order of things in the penal system of the universe.

(b.) More particularly, however, it may be urged, that the objection is open to counter-objections more weighty than itself. It involves, and in fact rests wholly upon, mere assumptions. It assumes, for example, that conditional immortality involves an instantaneous and indiscriminate destruction of the wicked, and thus precludes the possibility of just gradations in their punishment. And yet there is nothing in the righteous conditioning of immortality which necessitates any restriction of the General Judgment in time to the brief period assumed

in the popular notion. The Judgment Day in Holy Scripture is no more defined as to time than a day in the creation or in prophecy. GOD has no more occasion for haste at the end than at the beginning. What to man seems the slow and the gradual, has always been His method. Hence it is to be doubted whether the General Judgment is any such summary and expeditious general gaol delivery as many fancy. There is nothing to show that it may not be deliberately extended over such reaches of time as will afford opportunity enough for large differences in the suffering experienced by the lost, differences and degrees large enough to satisfy the severest theological craving for pain and penalty. As, moreover, a court endowed with plenary power may fix its own time for the infliction of the penalty, as well as determine somewhat of its measure, there appears no reason why the Infinite Judge may not in the case of the more flagitious offenders—the filthy, the false, the cruel, the profane, and the apostate—ordain such delay in the execution of the final sentence, with such intermediate discipline, as will amply discriminate between those worthy of many and of few stripes [S. Luke xii. 47, 48.] This is not to argue that such will be the Divine method; but it is to affirm that, so long as there is nothing to show to the contrary, the assumption of the objector is not only unwarranted, but also involves a human limitation of the Divine prerogative.

(c.) Still further, the objection involves the assumption that under the law of a conditional immortality such will be the changed character of the final punishment of the lost, that its moral effect on them and on the universe will be destroyed; that it will be regarded by the former as a relief rather than a punishment; and that it will cease to act on the latter as an eternal warning and preservative against sin. This objection is in good part answered under the preceding head. In addition, however, it may be urged, that it is a pure assumption that to the finally condemned the appalling difference between the righteous and the wicked will not be perfectly apparent; that the solemnity of the

judgment and the hopeless irreversibility of its dread decree will not be fully realised; and that, even aside from the possibly intervening pains of special discipline, taken in full view of the lost glory and blessedness of Heaven, the utter destruction of the wicked, in any form, will not be agonisingly felt by them to be a punishment most condign and overwhelming. It ought not to be forgotten by the objector that man's present stupidity and blindness with regard to eternal things are not presumably to continue beyond the grave. As for the assumed necessity to the preservation of holiness in heaven, of an endless and inconceivably awful exhibition of the penal consequences of sin, under the form of what is called eternal death, it belies and blackens the intelligence, the loyalty, and the holiness of the glorified saint. It assumes that the painful lessons of the earthly life will be childishly forgotten; that the archives of Heaven and the instructions of angels will give us new insight into the evil nature and the awful work of sin; that heavenly loyalty can be preserved by Divine grace, only as supplemented by endless fear; and that the holiness of the redeemed is only to be perfected and secured forever by the vivid and appalling sight of the unending sin and misery of the lost. Thus do human schemes of theology try our faith more than do the mysteries of God in Holy Scripture. But the objection defeats itself by its own assumptions, in this last instance, so utterly wide of the mark. The grace which saved from sin is the power which forever keeps from sin. The golden bond of perpetuated peace and harmony in Heaven is love. The inspiration and life of the perennial holiness of Heaven is the contemplation of the Holy One. Not hell, but *Heaven*, is the preservative of holiness in Heaven.

But it is unnecessary, if indeed it be not wholly idle, to dwell further on objections. Though they prove little by themselves, there is nothing beyond the reach of their presumption. The profoundest truths are often the worst beset by them. Any question touching, as does the present one, the unsounded depths of the Great

Hereafter, could not be expected to escape their attacks. But it would seem hardly consistent for man, who at the last, has amid the shadows of death, to descend into those awful depths, to press such objections into the support of a doctrine which only adds to the perplexities which surround human immortality and to the terrors which are assumed to follow it. Why not rather be content with the method of the Gospel? To the Gospel immortality has its value, not because of its supposed necessity to vindictive justice, but because of its heavenly association with redeeming grace. Its favorite themes are salvation from sin, the triumphs of the redeemed over death and the grave, and the glory and blessedness of the immortal or endless life. Why not stop with the Creed at its exultant profession of a faith in the "Life Everlasting," and instead of searching for fathomless abysses of endless night and storm and wrath and ghostly wreck, content ourselves with looking away with eager longing and awaiting hope to those

"Mountains where immortal morn prevails"—

mountains whose vast uplift is but the strength of the Almighty, and whose brightness is but the rosy flush of man's recreated and eternal youth, the gift of GOD, through JESUS CHRIST our LORD?

FREDERICK S. JEWELL.

THE REFORMATION, MONASTICISM, AND VOWS.

THE State has felt the necessity of protecting the accused against the tyranny of prejudice by granting in certain cases in her courts a change of *venue*.

When the presumption of guilt is very strong, and the passions of the people are intensely excited, it is scarcely to be expected that an impartial judgment can be reached. Wisely therefore, and justly, under such circumstances, provision is made for removing the trial from the heated locality to another, where men can calmly weigh the evidence and without fear or favor render a fair decision.

Unhappily this is not the case, nor in the nature of things can be in crises of national and ecclesiastical history.

The trial as regards the original actors must take place on the spot, and without delay, and the judgment is pronounced at once. An appeal, it is true, goes to posterity, but it cannot save the victims of the hour. Their principles and motives and honor may be vindicated in time to come, but the reversal of judgment cannot redress their wrongs. They perish under the cruel hand of the tyrant, or by the madness of the people. If ever there was such a condition of things in human affairs, when passion prevailed over reason, and truth and falsehood were confused, and good and bad men were in popular estimation exchanged, the one for the other, it was in the sixteenth century, when Western Europe broke away from the restraints which had held the nations bound in mind and conscience for centuries. The rebound which took place was not the joyous and innocent exhibition of freedom, which the animal presents,

when released from the stall and the stable, but the reckless license which the oppressed captives show, when they rise in their might and overpower their keepers, and burst open their prison doors. Two sets of forces were in operation gradually preparing for this outbreak, unless relief were afforded. There were forces from within the body politic, which were growing in strength, and which were making themselves seen and felt as they seethed and hissed, seeking vent; there were forces from without, which combined to keep up the repression, if not with increased pressure, since that were scarcely possible, still with all their might. At length the crisis came, when the internal fires burst through the ribs of the mountain which held them in, and all was wild confusion. Protest after protest had fallen unheeded on the ears of the Papacy; instead of the correction and amendment which were demanded there came increased corruption and worse scandals. When the skies were from time to time bright with promise that reform was at hand, the clouds quickly gathered again and the gloom became deeper than it was before. At length patience was exhausted, and, when the occasion was given, the pent-up passions of the nations burst forth with irrepressible violence. These considerations account for much which took place in the sixteenth century, and has since taken place, and still exists as an influence in giving direction to popular opinion, and shaping the judgment of those from whom we would expect better things than bigotry and prejudice and narrowness. Still we must bear with this and be patient. Truth is mighty and will ultimately prevail. The history of the Reformation Period is yet to be written. What is now called history is largely fiction; the standard authorities, it is not too much to say, have been imposed upon, or deceived themselves, and have given us often fancies for facts, and have made persons and events appear as they would have them, not as they really were. The misrepresentations, not, of course, always intentional, of these standard writers have been distilled into the pages of inferior authors and school-books and popular literature, until

the minds of the people have become saturated with error and misconception and prejudice in regard to the Middle Ages and the events of the sixteenth century.

A similar condition of things followed our American Revolution. In the earlier decades of our national history it was next to impossible to obtain an impartial record of those times. The cry, "This is a great and glorious country, and we are a great people," prevailed over every other voice, and mutual panegyric and admiration alone were read in our newspapers and popular histories, and were heard from our platforms and lecture halls. We may be exceptional in our experience, but we do not think that we are, when we recall such recollections of our youth as these. We were taught—that is in the books we learned at school and read at home—the conversation to which we habitually listened, the influences which fell upon us from the society in which we lived and moved, these taught us that in the struggle for independence with the mother country in 1776, our country was *altogether right*, and England was *altogether wrong*; that nothing could with justice be said for the King, and nothing against the colonies. Moreover, our feeling was, when a boy, that our ancestors in that happy generation were all models of virtue and excellence, with one sad and conspicuous exception in the person of Benedict Arnold; while on the other hand the Britons, and worse than they, the Tories, were tyrants and abettors of tyranny and outrage and cruelty. Our education—not designedly, of course, it was the natural outcome of our political and social history—was one-sided in this respect. The same line of remark will apply to the subject under discussion, the religious revolution of the sixteenth century, and, had we been questioned when at college touching that period, we would, taking our impressions from our school-books, and later on from Mosheim and D'Aubigné and Hume, have represented the Western Patriarchate as totally corrupt, the Middle Ages as absolutely dark, and the reformers as uniformly pure, good men, and their cause without limitation the cause of righteousness and truth. In earlier days than

these we are speaking of we well remember the dread which we secretly felt but did not confess, when we were taken by the hand into a Romish church, on some grand occasion, lest we should be seized and shut up in a dungeon, or condemned to the tortures of the Inquisition. We mention these facts in our own experience, because we are persuaded that they echo the recollections of many, and because they help to explain the condition of the popular mind in regard to the religious movement of the sixteenth century. The people are not to blame for this misconception and prejudice. They cannot, if they would, have access to correct and authentic information touching these times. Scarcely more than twenty years have elapsed since an approach to a fair treatment of the Reformation in England has been made by writers who have had access to the public archives and publications of private societies. Fox's *Book of Martyrs*, Hume, Fuller, Soames, and kindred writers and their statements, dribbling down into our school histories, have formed the opinions of thousands from childhood; and these opinions, thus early gained, have grown and strengthened with advancing years until they have become the passionate convictions of their manhood, and they are, all unconscious to themselves that it is so, fierce partisans, full of misconception and prejudice, and deaf to the voice of reason and the appeal for justice. The time will come, it is not yet, and may not be for many a long day, when this tyranny of ignorance and prejudice will pass away, and then our posterity will read with wonder the records of a period about which we refused or were reluctant to be correctly informed. The publications of the Camden Society and of the State Paper and Record Offices, the preparation of such works as Hook's *Archbishops of Canterbury*, Stubbs' edition of *Mosheim*, Maitland's *Dark Ages and Reformation*, Blunt's *Reformation*, and Dixon's *Ecclesiastical History of England* give promise of better things in store for us in the future. As we write, we can imagine the surprise, perhaps the indignation, of some who will read these remarks and blame us for even suggesting that any re-

view is necessary as regards the judgment which has already been pronounced upon the acts of persons of the sixteenth century. Well, all we can say in reply is, that we are content to abide our time, and meanwhile be patient under the severe criticism which is heaped upon us, praying God to bless those that curse, and open their eyes to see the truth.

One of the disastrous effects of the violence which accompanied the Reformation, and, be it observed, this violence was the direct result of the long-continued usurpations and tyranny of the Papacy, was to wish to sweep all that was old away and substitute something entirely new in its place. Whatever existed was Popish, and must be abolished. Men did not stop long to inquire whether an institution, a dogma, an opinion, a practice was good and right, it was enough to know that it belonged to the old *régime*, and the cry was, "Down with it," and "Away with it;" destruction, revolution were wholesale. Some limitation was put upon this tendency in England by its insular position, and extreme removal from Italy, as the *Ultima Thule* then in the West of the Patriarchate of Rome. Her heavy hand had been burdensome, but it had not been so cruelly felt by the English as on the Continent, and consequently the reaction was not so severe and sweeping in its effects. By the mercy of God the spinal cord of the Body of CHRIST was not severed in England. The sacred ministry in its organic relation to the DIVINE HEAD was not cut asunder, and the vital functions of the Church were not essentially disturbed. While this was the case as regards fundamental principles, the shock of the great upheaval was felt throughout the kingdom, and the destructive, iconoclastic spirit, which was in the air, infected her people and led to the rejection and loss of much, which all sober-minded persons have since deplored. We may esteem it our great misfortune that during the critical period of the Reformation the throne of England was occupied by a capricious, tyrannical sensualist, whose natural abilities were such as to render his unprincipled vicious character more potent for evil. His will was

law, and his pleasure the rule of action for those about him. None but sycophants and unprincipled men could long maintain themselves in his favor. He was surrounded largely by such persons during his later years, and these are the years during which the Reformation passed through its earlier stages in England. It is very difficult to conceive a more hideous and repulsive character than that of Henry VIII. The worst Roman emperors were *heathens*; they are black figures on a dark ground. Henry VIII. is a black figure on a comparatively light ground. He was born in a Christian land, and reared and educated amid religious influences, nay more, as originally the *second son*, he was designed for the Priesthood, and hence his training until his brother's death was theological, and this original purpose influenced him, while a boy and youth, to continue the study of the Fathers and Schoolmen long after the occasion for such pursuits had passed away. Indeed, down to his latest years and death we find him addicted to religious disputation. This was the man and such were his surroundings at the time England broke away from the thralldom of Rome. If ever there was a case, when the wrath of man was made to praise God, it was, when the vices and self-will of Henry VIII. were overruled to sever the ecclesiastical connection of the National Church of England with the Patriarchate of Rome. His vices were the occasion, his self-will the instrument by which the release was accomplished. The most unworthy agents are often employed in the course of Divine Providence to effect the most beneficent results. Bent upon carrying out their own selfish ends, they are, all unconscious to themselves, in the drift of a mightier current, and are the while promoting objects they little dream of, and, indeed, were they aware of the effect of what they are doing, would often oppose with all their might. In this sense Henry VIII. is associated with the Reformation in England, and hence it may be seen how absurd is the charge that the English Church had its origin from Henry VIII. The English is an Apostolic or sub-Apostolic Church; it was brought with the rest of the

West into ecclesiastical connection with the Patriarch of Rome, and submitted in part, never unreservedly, to his domination. In the sixteenth century, aided by the imperious self-will of her sovereign, which would brook no contradiction, when his bad passions were aroused, she withdrew from canonical and legal association with Rome (the connection was never *organic*), on the principle, distinctly and emphatically affirmed by both her convocations, "that the Bishop of Rome hath *not by Divine right* any more jurisdiction within the Realm of England than any other foreign Bishop," and she proceeded in succession in her lawful assemblies of Church and State to repeal the statutes, ecclesiastical and civil, which had placed her by voluntary enactment under the control of Rome. Then she was, in so far as her status in the Catholic Body was concerned, where she was in the first ages of Christianity, a National Church furnished with all the Divine gifts in ministry and Sacraments necessary for her perpetuity. Henry VIII. was the instrument permitted by ALMIGHTY GOD to effect this blessed result, and probably to hasten its accomplishment, for doubtless, had it not been for the occasion out of which Henry's revolt arose, the freedom of the English Church would have been postponed to a later date. Let us clearly and firmly grasp the relation which Henry VIII. sustains to the Reformation of the English Church; it is simply incidental, his vile passions, and selfishness, and unbending will were made use of by a higher power to bring about changes for the better. His co-operation was that of a thoroughly bad man lending himself for base purposes to do what proved to be a good work. The English Reformation passed through its first stage during the reign of Henry VIII. It witnessed the cutting the cords, which in canons and statutes bound England to Rome, and the earliest tentative efforts to correct errors in doctrine and practice in the ecclesiastical system. But there was one great change effected in the sweeping away an institution, not necessary to the Church, but which she had accepted, and nourished, and encouraged as an instrument for the accomplish-

ment of widespread good, which naught else, so far as we can see, could have effected. In 1509, when Henry VIII. became King, England was dotted all over with splendid establishments, richly endowed with lands and money, and united by many ties with the domestic, social, and religious life of the people. These were the monasteries and nunneries. In 1547, when Henry VIII. died amid awful tokens of the Divine wrath, these were all gone, their grand buildings were roofless and in ruins, their princely revenues were in the royal coffers or the pockets of vile favorites, their lands were attached to the Crown or distributed among greedy parasites; only a small fraction of all this wealth was appropriated to its legitimate owner and custodian, the Church, in the formation and endowment of new sees. The Monastic system was the inheritance and growth of past ages. It came into active usefulness coincident with the downfall of the Roman Empire, and the chaotic condition of Western Europe, when inundated with the successive waves of the Goths and Vandals and Huns. The condition of affairs was simply frightful. The ordinary restraints which hold men in check were no more. Every one did what seemed right in his own eyes; might made right. Creatures in human shape, worse than wild beasts, were in the high places of the earth. Civil rule, social order, the useful labors of the field and the shop had ceased to exist. Everywhere were wild confusion, war, havoc, rapine, outrage, murder. It seemed as though all that was good, and pure, and useful must die out and be forever forgotten; then, at this juncture, the Church made use of men and women banded under rule and obedient to vows to deal with the gigantic evils which were threatening the extermination of the human race. It is not our purpose to sketch the history of monastic institutions, we merely wish to affirm that history shows that among the instrumentalities employed by Divine permission, and, we believe, by Divine sanction, to cure the evil of those dreadful times, naught proved more effective than the monks and nuns. In their associated life they were enabled to hold their own in the midst of

ignorance and vice, and often active hostility. Thus planted in the dark places of the earth with the blessed Gospel in their hands, and inspiring reverence by their lives and works, they were the pioneers of civilisation; they taught the rude barbarians around them the useful arts in field, and shop, and home; they tamed them with holy lessons from GOD'S Word, and baptised them and built them up, as far as their coarse natures would permit, in the spiritual life. They gave them often the first ideas of law and order. In a word, they were their benefactors in every sense, and the while they were sheltering the scanty remains, which survived the disorder which had prevailed for centuries, of ancient literature and art, and became the generous donors to whom we are largely indebted for the primary elements in our modern civilisation. At the opening of the sixteenth century the monks and nuns in England were very numerous. Their wealth, relatively speaking, was enormous; their influence was very great in Church and State; their representatives in the House of Lords exceeded in number the archbishops and bishops; their establishments vied in splendor with those of the grandest nobles; their conventual churches equalled in many cases, if they did not excel the cathedrals; their hospitality was liberal, and extended to the entertainment of the serf and the beggar as well as the gentry. Their ministries reached all classes, and through their landed estates, their schools, their libraries, their hospitals, they were brought into contact almost daily with the great mass of the people, especially the young and the poor. How far in their condition at this time they had outgrown their usefulness is a question for the philosophical historian to discuss. That they had become utterly useless and bad is an extreme view, as untenable as it would be to affirm that they were without blemish and indispensable to the good of society. In the later centuries there had been *two* causes which had operated with fatal effect to deprave the monastic system and lower the tone and character of the conventual life. These were, *first*, the feudal system, which placed large

classes of the community under the irresponsible control of their superiors; and, *secondly*, the exemption of Monasteries from episcopal control and placing them under the immediate jurisdiction of the Pope. The *first cause* led to the introduction into the monastic Orders of both sexes of large numbers of persons who were entirely unfitted for the life. Unprincipled sovereigns and nobles and guardians of every social degree compelled their wards to become monks and nuns, that they might enjoy their honors or property, and thus these unhappy beings were consigned to a servitude worse than death, and in which it would be difficult for them to live without falling into habitual and deadly sin. The *second cause* was productive of evils even more disastrous than the former to the fair fame of the institution. It was the policy of the Popes to have, as far as they could create it, a constituency in every country immediately dependent upon themselves. This object they secured by the system of exemptions.

The Bishop of Rome, as Universal Pontiff, at his pleasure released individuals and communities from the control of their local superiors, and brought them under his own special jurisdiction, so that they were responsible alone to him. The effect of this freedom from the immediate supervision of those, who were over them in the LORD, was to engender carelessness of living and frequently frightful abuses and gross scandals. The power that could restrain was too far removed to be feared, and if it were invoked, the process of correction was too slow and uncertain to cure the evils. These causes, which had been at work for centuries at the time of which we are speaking, had been deteriorating monasticism in England, but they were not inherent in the system, they were influences exerted upon it by other systems extraneous to it and independent of it. There was another reason for the decline of the monastic Orders in the later days of their existence, and this became the immediate occasion of their fall.

This was their great wealth. How hardly shall the rich man enter into the Kingdom of Heaven? The dif-

ficulty here suggested by our LORD besets the monk and nun, as well as the ordinary man and woman. Wealth begets luxury, and luxury weans away from GOD and lowers, often kills, the spiritual life. The monasteries had been growing richer and not better as the centuries advanced, and in 1534, when Henry VIII. had broken with the Pope and proclaimed himself the Supreme Head of the Church, they presented a splendid prey to invite the hand of the spoiler. Henry wanted money, and money was within reach. All he had to do was to dissolve and rob the monasteries; their sole protector, the Pope, was driven from the realm; they who would have been in the normal condition of affairs their defenders, under the pernicious system of Rome had been superseded in that relation, and now the monks were absolutely defenceless against the rapacity and greed of their unscrupulous master the King. Through his viceroy, Thomas Cromwell, he let loose upon them a pack of wolves, whose only object was to get all that they could. These unprincipled men were capable of any baseness. They deliberately invented lies against their victims, and thus persecuted and ruined them on account of these very lies. When all these resources failed them, they were sure to catch their prey in the toils of constructive treason, manufactured out of oaths touching the King's Supremacy and marriages. There was no help. Wherever and whenever these miscreants willed to destroy a monastery and rifle its treasury, its doom was sealed. Happy was the abbot, if he was not hanged, drawn, and quartered; happy were the monks, if they were allowed to depart penniless into a world with which they were totally unacquainted. It must be remembered that the verdict rendered against these monasteries and their occupants was, and is based upon an undefended case, and that the evidence adduced, was often obtained under the stress of torture, and in every instance is furnished by their enemies. *The Suppression of the Monasteries*, a volume published by the Camden Society, is a work containing the letters and reports of the agents of Cromwell, and no better defence

of the poor maligned persecuted monks and nuns is needed than this exposure of the vicegerent of the Supreme Head and his emissaries by their own hands. It is to be borne in mind that the monasteries which were reported to be untainted with vice in 1535, were charged with being full of iniquity within two years from that date, and that, too, when they had been threatened, and were on their guard, and in a sense open to the public eye. The process of accusation went on, until there was not a single religious house that was not indicted, convicted, and destroyed. The condemnation is too universal. It condemns itself. We are not contending that there were no bad monks or wanton nuns, or monasteries of ill repute condemned, and justly, for their misdoings, but we are maintaining that the popular opinion about the vice of the monasteries at the time of the Reformation is monstrously exaggerated, and, moreover, that it is not greater than can be brought home to any equally large class of the community. We are maintaining, and we do maintain, that monastic promises, when guarded, as they ought always to be, by such provisions as we find in our Prayer Book protecting the Marriage Vows—are not to be taken unadvisedly or lightly, but reverently, discreetly, advisedly, soberly, and in the fear of God—promote a life that is as near to the example and precepts of our Blessed LORD as it is possible for human infirmity to reach in this our present estate of temptation and sin. We would suggest that, if the same course was to be adopted in the treatment of the ministry of any religious body, as has been for the last three hundred years pursued by Protestant writers toward the medieval monks and nuns, their case would not be much better than that of the Monastic Orders. Suppose we were to gather together all the instances of unworthy preachers in any denomination of Christians, and spread their alleged crimes before the public; suppose we were studiously to suppress all their virtuous deeds, and, whenever we had occasion to mention them, to call them vile names and heap upon them all manner of abuse, perhaps the poor unhappy monks and nuns of

the sixteenth century would not, considering their relative numbers and the circumstances under which many of them became members of their orders, suffer in the comparison. Be this as it may, we need not excite ourselves by panic fears until we tremble in our shoes, lest monasticism should return upon us, as it was of yore, and absorb our sons and daughters and desolate our homes, and leave but scanty material for the office of Holy Matrimony and the joys of wedded life.

We ought not thus to alarm ourselves, and then in our consternation abandon all sense of candor, fairness, and justice, and heap abuse indiscriminately upon a large class of Christian men and women without respect of persons, simply because they belonged to the class which we condemn. Henry VIII. and his minions had the excuse for their slanders and lies that they wished to make the monks and nuns odious in popular estimation, in order that they might more safely rob them. The present age has no such plea, and the suggestion that it is prudent to keep up the prejudice in order to protect ourselves against the revival of the system is as wicked as it is silly.

It is wicked, because it is doing evil that good may come, repeating and perpetuating a lie in order to promote what is supposed to be the cause of righteousness and truth; it is silly, because the conventual life of the Early and Middle Ages can no more be reproduced in this nineteenth century, among ourselves, than we can bring back the castle with its moat and drawbridge, the knight with his pages and armor, and the state of society and condition of affairs which then existed and answered as cause to effect in producing the monastic system. All has passed away never to return, and we may therefore safely do justice to the medieval monk and nun. It is time that we began at least to divest ourselves of rancor and ill-temper when we approach the subject. We may, and we probably ought, to ask the question, Is the principle of monasticism the absolute and life-long surrender of one's self to God in vows of poverty, celibacy, and obedience, wrong? Is it forbidden by Holy Script-

ure, and is it injurious either to the parties themselves or society at large? The answer to this question, if in the affirmative in either of its branches, settles the case. What is wrong in itself or pernicious in its effects must not be allowed. But if the answer is in the negative, then the whole subject is open to us, and we are free to discuss the expediency of suggesting and encouraging the creation of such orders of men and women, adapted to our times and circumstances, and qualified, as none others can be, to do work for God, which ought to be, and must be done. We simply propose to answer very briefly the inquiry, Are the vows of poverty, celibacy, and obedience forbidden by Holy Scripture, or are they of themselves injurious to the parties who take them, or do they of necessity exert a bad influence upon the community at large? Scripture certainly does not prohibit the taking vows. It recognises them, both in the Old Testament and the New. It warns against rash, hasty, and improper vows. The Church, which rests upon Scripture as her charter, brings her children into her bosom with vows, summons them to her again in later years, and solemnly calls upon them to renew these vows. She provides for their union in holy wedlock with life-long vows, she ordains her clergy as Deacons, Priests, and Bishops with vows. Her system is a system of perpetual vows, and surely we need not press the question any further, Are vows forbidden in Holy Scripture? But, it will be said, the vows of Baptism, Confirmation, Matrimony, and Orders are right and proper vows. This, of course, is true, and the inquiry, therefore, advances a step, and the question now is, are not the vows of poverty and celibacy and obedience right and proper vows? In themselves as describing states of life they must be, because they are recommended by Our LORD by example and by precept. We say in themselves, abstractly considered, for, be it observed, these views are not, like the Baptismal vows, of universal obligation, which all without exception ought to take. They are to be guarded with extreme caution, with even greater securities against mistakes than those with which the Church surrounds

the Marriage vows. About this there can be no dispute, the utmost care should be taken; but, when all has been done, which in the nature of things can be done, is it lawful and right in the sight of God for men and women to take vows of perpetual obligation binding themselves to God in lives of poverty, celibacy, and obedience? We affirm fearlessly that it is, not as the decision of our own poor, weak, miserable judgment, but, as we believe, as the counsel of our Blessed Lord, the teaching of the Apostles, and the practice of the Undivided Church of God. It may be said that Holy Scripture does not in so many words prescribe these vows, neither does it the vows of Baptism, Matrimony, or Holy Orders. The essence is in Scripture, the form is of ecclesiastical origin. Precisely the same is true of monastic vows; the counsels, to such as are able to receive them, are in the Gospels, their embodiment in promises to follow them while life lasts are framed and proposed by the Church. We are not urging that monasticism should be revived, we are merely pleading that, when women and men feel themselves called by the voice of God to surrender themselves unreservedly to Him, to do Him service, and when this call, heard and obeyed through influences operating upon the mind and conscience penetrates their being and makes them feel and know by experience that it is God's will with them that they should be His in a special sense to do His work, then, we say, that the Church ought to receive them and encourage them and bless them with her benediction; then we urge that the Bishops, as the leaders in God's Host, ought to be the first to welcome them, not as it were by stealth, as though they were ashamed of what they are doing, but openly in the light of day, as a glorious tribute to the power of CHRIST in drawing human hearts with passionate devotion to follow in His footsteps.

Is it so that the Church has room for all kinds and sorts of societies, and guilds, and clubs, and lines of labor, save one, and that one the embodiment of Our Dear LORD's Counsels to the few who in any age and generation are able to rise up and leave the world and follow

Him? We cannot believe it. Ah! but it is asked why cannot these eccentric people be content, as many are, to forego these vows and associations, and live by themselves and follow their bent on their own individual lines? The answer is, because they find help in these vows and associations, and, if they are not inherently wrong, why may they not place themselves under solemn pledges of self-consecration and live in community without hindrance or reproach, as well as their brethren, who, in the exercise of the same personal freedom, prefer the independence of their own homes and their own wills.

There is no question as to the excellence of these admirable souls, nor of the usefulness of their lives and the value of their works. Why should there be any comparison between them, and perhaps their less favored brethren and sisters, who live in community and under vows? It is not well for man or woman to be alone. The application of this principle includes more than the married, it is satisfied when a common life is created, and they who share in it are members of a spiritual family. It has been suggested that in the case of those in Holy Orders who take these vows, that they contravene their obligations already assumed. This, however, is an entire mistake. These vows of poverty, celibacy, and obedience are not in conflict with the Ordinal, they simply carry the devotee further on in the same lines of self-consecration. It would be much more to the purpose to allege that, when a Bishop, Priest, or Deacon marries, he contravenes his Ordination vows, since the promises there made are not on the lines of the Ordinal, and yet we would contend most earnestly for the liberty of the Clergy in this respect. As regards the vow of obedience, the only possible conflict that could arise between a man's duty as a member of an order, subject to a head, and a Priest owing submission to a Bishop, would be avoided, were the authorities of the Church in a friendly spirit to take the brotherhoods and sisterhoods under their protection and legislate with loving wisdom for their welfare and protection.

It is to be greatly regretted that the married have

seemed to speak and write, as though these vows reflected upon their high, holy, and happy estate. This idea has been suggested, perhaps, and fostered by the title under which one of the vows has usually been named, chastity. This word, however, was not originally employed in a relative sense as implying that others were unchaste. It was used absolutely, committing simply those who took it to a pure life in thought, word, and deed.

It would be better, however, since misapprehension is likely to occur as regards this term, to substitute a perfectly innocent word in its place and call the vow that of Celibacy. There ought to be no antagonism between "the married in the LORD." If either provokes the other to jealousy, it is without excuse, since our Blessed LORD recognises both estates as excellent in themselves, and identifies Himself with both. Under the shelter of Holy Matrimony He became Incarnate and was born of the Blessed Virgin Mary. As a member of the Holy Family He passed His youth and early manhood working at His reputed father's trade. At a marriage He entered upon His ministry and wrought His first miracle.

The Blessed SPIRIT speaking by the Apostle employs the Marriage relation to set forth the deepest mystery of the kingdom of CHRIST, His union as the Bridegroom with the Church as His Bride. And at last in heaven the symbolism of Marriage is stamped with the seal of eternity, as forming an important element of the beatific vision in the relation which the Redeemed will forever sustain to their LORD. Surely the married can ask for no more. Their estate is blessed, thrice blessed in the birth, ministry, and everlasting love of their Divine Master. Why should they begrudge their brethren and sisters their fair share of nearness to their LORD in life and estate? It will not do for the one to say hard things of the other. The sins of both are only too manifest. No vows will keep the heart and life pure; the scandals of monastic life are only equalled by the horrid disclosures of the divorce courts. We are to guard the two estates with all the care we can, and, realising that both have their high and holy mission to fulfil, pray GOD to bless them both and keep them pure and undefiled.

GEORGE F. SEYMOUR.

THE INSPIRATION OF THE BIBLE.

ARTICLE I.

THE first step to be taken in approaching the subject of Inspiration coincides with the first step in the investigation of every fact or truth. One must determine his fundamental concept, educe his primary idea, and formulate his axiom. These three, though relatively distinct, are actually inseparable. They are the trinity of every first principle. A first principle cannot be susceptible of proof, because it precedes all investigation as to fact, and constitutes the very basis of reasoning. Evidently in a given case only one such concept, idea, and axiom can be true, because there can be only one universal first principle. The harmony of the universe, the consistency of all being, the whole relation of cause and effect depend upon the unity of truth. Moral obligation and religious faith are only possible when truth is one.

Two axioms—not quite accurately so called—have from the first historic ages of human thought been asserted and set over against each other. They have been in conflict always, of course ; because both cannot be real, one or the other must be false.

One is the germ of all scepticism. The other is the foundation of all religion. If the first is real, then doubt pervades all thought, all action, all life, and the “assurance of hope” dies. If the second is real, then religion rests upon an immovable basis, and Christianity maintains not merely its supremacy, but its exclusiveness as the one religion that is catholic.

Every Christian ought to give, and every one who is

bent upon honest thinking must give careful attention to this beginning. Which is real, the germ of scepticism or the foundation of religion?

The germ of skepticism is abstract; the foundation of religion is concrete. The germ of skepticism is a seed that grew upon no tree, an ovum that had no matrix, a primordial cell that is self-existent and self-evolute. Nay, farther back yet goes this axiom of skepticism. Even a germ is too concrete for its basis. The axiom of skepticism is, that an undiscoverable, primordial, and ever-prevalent energy exists, in which the universe of reality and idea dwelt potentially, and from which being, in all forms and relations, has proceeded, is proceeding, and will forever proceed by self-evolute power merely.

Every form, system, or variety of sceptical philosophy, modern, medieval, or ancient, rests upon this fundamental concept. Every form of heresy or false religion is more or less associated with it, either in origin or progress.

Hence the conflict between Christianity and all its avowed opponents and traitorous allies is narrowed to a single issue. The fundamental concept of Christianity is Personal Being. Standing on this foundation it faces human philosophy on its own level. Indeed it claims to be standing here on the very ground of philosophy itself. It recognises the fact that philosophy precedes religion. It presents its own philosophy, before beginning to teach, to claim authority, or to demand allegiance.

Over against each other, therefore, stand these two postulates: *Self-evolute Potentiality* and I AM.

Without going into the conflict between these two principles, without showing how the first plunges man and the universe into an infinite void of darkness and cold, while the other conserves his own unit personality of spirit and soul and body, filling his heart and satisfying his mind; it is enough for our present purpose to start with I AM. That is all, and that is enough. "He Who is," "He Who will be," the Creator, the Preserver

is self-evident. Man, conscious of his own personality, starts with the primary axiom, idea, and fundamental concept of the personal being of GOD. All searching for knowledge of the Divine, which starts with the axiom, GOD, is "profitable for doctrine, for reproof, and for instruction in righteousness." Any other starting-point leads only, through many devious ways, to the "foolishness of wisdom."

A correlative of GOD, as the beginning of every coherent system of ontology, is the concept, idea, and axiom of human personality as the beginning of all true knowledge of man. Christianity starts with these postulates, and makes no argument until they are accepted. The Personal-being GOD, and the person man are its axioms.

Obviously the first step next taken in this philosophy is to the probability that the Divine Person has communicated with the human person. At this point "the evidences" begin. It becomes then questions of fact whether GOD has communicated with man, when He has so communicated, and what means of communication has He chosen!

Revelation is the term that describes GOD's word to man. Many ways of revealing Himself may be conceived. He might, for example, have simply dictated to accredited authors, and they might have written from His voice; or He might have put into them the knowledge of His will, and compelled them to utter it in His own chosen way. In this case the Bible would be the single foundation of true religion. Like foundations support false religions. They rest upon them. The Veda, the Zendavesta, the Koran, the Book of Mormon, are the bases of their respective religious systems. If Christianity stood only upon the Bible, then its conflicts with other forms of religion would be narrowed to a comparison of books. Its works of instruction, exhortation, and warning to its own disciples and to all hearers would, in that case, consist merely in interpretation and emphasising the words of the Book.

Many advocates of Christianity take this position,

while its opponents, especially its modern opponents, direct their attacks against the Bible. Many honest and earnest Christian souls are very much disturbed by the assaults made against the Bible, because they have been taught to regard it as the foundation on which Christianity itself rests.

In point of fact, however, Christianity is a visible organisation. It began with Abraham, developed through Moses, and became complete in CHRIST. Along its way of historic progress and development revelations from God are scattered. These are contained in the Bible. The true religion came to man through a course of Divinely ordered and directed development, and its points are recorded in The Book. The Bible, therefore, grew through the Church. The Church is not itself founded upon the writing of the Divine Revelation.

They who perceive and accept this historic fact rest secure, however the Bible may be subjected to destructive criticism. It is not necessary for them to defend the book, as all must who believe it is the foundation of Christianity. They esteem it as one of the stones in the walls of the fair building. They follow the course of all criticism without any sinking of heart, much less any trembling for the Faith. Their foundation is personal. Accredited persons laid it, stone by stone and course by course, until it was completed. It became, in its completeness, "the household of God; . . . built upon the foundation of the Apostles and Prophets, JESUS CHRIST Himself being the chief corner-stone" [Eph. xi. 19, 20].

This organisation, Household, Kingdom, Body, Church, has its human members. Christians are such by virtue of their membership in CHRIST through His Body.

Now we are in position to look at Inspiration as it is related to the evidences of Christianity. Not only may Christians take the vantage ground of their membership in CHRIST through His Church, from whence to view and treat of the Bible, but every person who questions them in respect to their faith must, in all fairness and justice, go through all previous evidence until this Christian position is reached, before any criticism of the Bible

can begin. The point is, that Christianity is an established historical fact, as well as a present organic institution. What it is at present it has been essentially in all its past. It has grown. Its beginning was not as its ending. It is not now in formal condition or aspect what it was in even the near past, much less in the remote past. It has, however, been essentially one thing from the beginning, one organism indeed. Its developments have been always in the line of its type. However the forces of its development may have been manifested, whether they seemed to spring from within, or to enter from environment, or to be sent down from above, they have always been in consonance with its essence, and in harmony with its principles; so that, from first to last, Christianity has been one evolving organism, of which the faithful have been members.

The Bible has grown *pari passu* with the Christian organism or Church. The very same LORD, Who is the Head of the Church, is also the giver of the words of The Book. The Bible has been duly authenticated by the living organism. The two have grown up together. They have stood always in the unchanged relation of proximate cause and effect. Within the Church came forth, as occasion called, the formal causes in the persons of prophets and apostles; while behind all, or rather above, beneath, and around all, ever continued the determinate cause—the LORD—who is Head of the Church and Author and Finisher of the Faith.

The Bible is thus seen to be the Word of God. Not only does it contain God's word, as nature contains it, and as works of human genius and worth contain it, *i.e.*, partially, and in partnership with other good books; but it is the whole of the Divine Revelation, upon the subject of which it treats, "so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man that it should be believed as an article of the Faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation" [Art. VI.].

This position needs to be carefully considered, distinctly understood, and clearly taken. One sees in it

the important distinction between the ground that "The Bible *contains* the Word of God," and the ground that "The Bible *is* the Word of God."

The first ground is narrow and dangerous; especially dangerous in the age wherein the intellect is abnormally developed, while the idea is prevalent that the Bible is the historic source whence Christianity sprang, and that it constitutes the energy, or is the efficient cause, of Christianity's present life and operation. In this view the Bible is regarded as one among many good books. It is placed on the common book level. It is criticised as if it stood alone. It is compared with other books, even with other utterances, indeed, with private opinions, imaginations, and emotions; and neither authority nor prestige is granted to it.

The second ground, that the Bible is the word of God, does not carry the meaning, that everything within the covers of the book was revealed from God, or was breathed into the writers by the SPIRIT of God. The meaning rather is, that the whole revelation of the Faith is contained in the Bible. No point of faith can be made outside the Bible. Every doctrine of salvation, every needful reproof, every essential form of instruction in righteousness is in the Bible.

It will be recollected that the promise of the Divine presence and guardianship was never given to the Bible as a book. It was given in form to the Church, and in declaration to the Truth. The book was left to its fortunes, under the care of the Church. Providence has not preserved it miraculously; and yet considering the dangers it has undergone, it has been wonderfully preserved, doubtless by Providence.

As a book the Bible contains every form of literature. Its revelations are things made known from God. Its histories, its moral precepts, and its poetic pictures, are not necessarily immediate revelations from God. The universal law—that everything be done by the least requisite force—is apparent as the constructive energy of the Bible. What the human writer could set forth, by his own knowledge, judgment, or wisdom, he was left

to so set forth. Inspiration, however, is apparent even in this lowest form of writing in the Holy Scriptures. Where aught of this class touched, directly or indirectly, the Faith, there the inspiring Spirit guarded the writer from error: otherwise the Bible would not be the Word of God. Hence every theory of Inspiration covers the accuracy and consistency of the Bible. Every fact that touches the Faith is as sure as the very revelations themselves which are directly Divine utterances. Every fact that does not touch the Faith, stands upon the ordinary ground of credibility. Every opinion that is not of the Faith, carries only the weight of him who expresses it. Many such facts are related, and many such opinions are recorded in the Bible. Hence, in its study, there is opportunity and need for the ordinary learning and judgment which are applicable to common documents. In this respect the rules of fair criticism only may be insisted upon.

Thus it appears that much of the Bible is of human origin, and can claim no more authority or prestige than the authors respectively are entitled to. Indeed the authors are themselves subjects of criticism, and their works must stand or fall, in whole or in part, accordingly as they pass the tests of fair criticism.

The Bible also contains purely Divine revelations. Words directly spoken by God are contained in it. They have been recorded under inspiration of the Spirit, so we know them as His words. It also contains revelations, uttered by persons who "spake as they were moved by the HOLY GHOST." Thus two elements of authority exist in the Bible, sometimes apart and sometimes commingled. It has grown up, therefore, now by ordinary human means, now by Divine operation, and now by human and Divine co-operation.

Inspiration, generally considered, is a corollary under the axioms of Divine and human personality. As from these axioms we deduce the primary probability of revelation, it follows that the channels of that revelation are inspired. Inspiration and revelation are distinct from each other, but they are inseparable. They both

stand together and are to be duly regarded in every case of Biblical criticism. If a given passage is human only, it is subject only to the canons of human criticism. If it is purely Divine, it carries all the weight of God's consistency and authority. The sources of its utterance, with its authenticity and transmission, are all subject to just criticism. In a mixed revelation criticism inquires how much is human and how much Divine; and further, how inspiration has affected the human element, ratifying its memory, swaying its reason, and guiding its action or utterance.

The scope of criticism is thus seen to embrace the whole Bible. Its details are innumerable. Inspiration follows everywhere. Not a point of criticism can be made without considering if, or how far, or by what means Inspiration has operated.

The great mass of Christian people have neither inclination, ability, nor opportunity for Biblical criticism; and yet every one has an interest in its results. The critical details of Inspiration are beyond their reach; and yet the worth and value of Inspiration are inestimable to every one. If it were the duty of every Christian person to understand all the bearings and applications of Inspiration, not one—humble or learned—could be a Christian. The scope of the matter is too vast for any one mind to grasp it, while its details are too numerous to be encompassed in a lifetime. If "the Bible and the Bible only were our religion," this impossibility would be a duty. Every Christian ought to know it all, and everything about every part. Otherwise he might leave something essential to salvation out of his account.

The real Christian position, however, as has been shown, is quite different. He stands in his lot in the Family, Kingdom, and Church of CHRIST and reads the Bible with serenity and assurance. Inspiration is a general conception. He believes and knows that the HOLY GHOST inspires him, breathes into him comfort and light. He is assured that this same SPIRIT has inspired, does inspire, and will continue to inspire the Church of CHRIST. He has no doubt that the Bible is God's word, and

that it is inspired by the same Spirit. He is aware that endless questions may be put, touching these three classes of inspirations. His assurance of Faith and comfort of hope, however, remain firmly fixed. He may know more or less about inspiration; but no questions concerning it can assail the defences that surround him. He, in person, has entered into personal communion with "CHRIST, Who is head over all things to the Church, which is His Body." Being a member of that Body, the Christian knows that support from the hand of GOD is assured to him, and that his personal trust in CHRIST will keep him, so long as he continues faithful, in the Way, holding the Truth, and sustained by the Life.

A definite theory of inspiration, however desirable in other respects, is evidently not needful for the devout and peaceful following of the Christian vocation. The whole subject of inspiration may be left open, and opinions may in fact oscillate, from the extreme of plenary verbal inspiration almost to its opposite, without touching the foundation of The Faith, or shaking the firm stand of the Christian's assurance of hope.

The belief in inspiration, as a general fact, follows from the primary probability that GOD has revealed Himself to mankind; while it is confirmed by the evidences that He has given His Word, and caused it to be written. Part of this belief is personal. It consists of assurance of the fact, and experience of the reality "that the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal" [1 Cor. xii. 7]. This personal inspiration illumines, but does not necessarily and irresistibly purify the character. The co-operation of the human person himself is needful to attain the "profit." This relates to the individual, and has various bearings upon his mortal life and immortal destiny.

Another department of inspiration—not another kind, "for all these worketh that one and the self-same SPIRIT, dividing to every man severally as He will" [*Ib.*, 11]—is that which governs the direct revelations from GOD as well also as the administration of "The Body." In this latter department various theories have prevailed from

time to time, while controversies have sometimes raged. If the "severely Protestant" opinion be held, that the Bible is the foundation not merely of the explicit faith, but of the whole Christian system, including the historic origin and continuity of the Church, with her ministry, Faith, and Sacraments, then it would be necessary to have and hold a definite theory of inspiration: indeed, in that case, it would be hardly possible to stop short of the theory of plenary inspiration, so that any doubts thrown upon any part of the Bible, any question raised as to the authenticity or genuineness of any text, would imperil the stability of Christianity, and disturb the "assurance of hope."

The Christianity of the Catholic Faith, however—resting as it does upon the historic Church, confirmed by the primitive Creed, and witnessed by the Ministry and Sacraments, still continuing essentially as they were at the beginning, and have been ever since—remains undisturbed amid the discussions in respect to Inspiration. The SPIRIT is the life-giver, the illuminator, not the creator. As He breathed into the fully formed Adam, and "man became a living soul," so Christianity was fully formed, the Church was thoroughly organised, when He descended upon it, as at Pentecost, and poured in His inspirations.

Thus inspiration is seen to be a fact, but its position is not at the base of the Christian Faith. Hence this paper has been directed singly toward the point of the evidential importance of Inspiration. If that has been made clear, it will follow that criticism of the Bible may flow where and how it will, may touch authorship of the books or parts of books, may handle gently or roughly the authenticity or genuineness of particular passages or texts, and still Christianity will remain unmoved and immovable, founded upon "The Rock."

B. FRANKLIN.

THE INSPIRATION OF THE BIBLE.

ARTICLE II.

EVERY Clergyman of our Church, before his ordination, has signed a declaration that he believes "the Holy Scriptures . . . to be the Word of God." They are not "like other books." They "came not in the old time by the will of man, but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the HOLY GHOST." They are holy, not only with an external consecration, but with an inherent and essential sanctity. The Prayer Book is sacred from its object and use, but a large part of the Prayer Book is of human origin only. The Scriptures, though of human authorship, are of Divine Inspiration.

Said a table neighbor to me, "I call every man inspired who speaks the truth." "What! If a man tells you the time of day correctly, do you call him inspired?" "Oh, I mean important truth." He believed the so-called inspiration of Plato and Shakespeare to be of the same kind as the inspiration of Moses and Isaiah. He belonged to a school which is a denier throughout of the supernatural. To it all things, all persons, all places, all times, are alike sacred or alike profane, all on one level of natural uniformity. But the Christian recognises a whole supernatural system, of which the Scriptures form a part; a series of supernatural revelations, of which the Scriptures preserve the Record; supernatural, Divine interpositions, culminating in the Incarnation; a supernatural Kingdom of God, having the Scriptures for its Sacred Books.

The defence of the Scriptures is rendered less easy to those who ignore the Catholic Kingdom, of which they

are at once the Constitution and the Book of Origins. When the revised New Testament was published, many good Christians were much worried because the Doxology of the LORD's Prayer was declared to be un-Biblical. To the Churchman it matters little whether it is Biblical or only Liturgical. We have a right to use it in either case. Questions of the Canonicity of particular Books are settled for us when we hear the voice about them of the contemporary Church. We take the Hebrew Canon at the hands of the Hebrew Church. Ezra's contemporaries knew well enough whether Ezra or Moses wrote the Pentateuch. There was no time in Hebrew History when a brand-new book could be foisted on the nation as part of their Primeval law, or when any radical changes or enlargements of the immemorial Text could be attributed to the Original law-giver and Author. The Hebrew Church authenticates the Hebrew, the Christian Church the Christian Canon. And he who has reached the really Catholic voice of the Church need trouble himself very little about the thick-spawned theories concerning the Books, by which German Professors seek notoriety, and which English-speaking Rationalists borrow for the same or more mischievous purposes.

The Church is very general in her statements concerning Inspiration, and allows much latitude of thought and expression on the subject. Is Inspiration verbal? Does it extend to the exact words of the Scriptures, or is Inspiration general, extending merely to the sense? It does not depend upon Dialect. An accurate translation is inspired in the same sense and to about the same extent as the original. The writers of the New Testament quote the Old largely from the Greek Translation, and often quite loosely, as if from memory, not stopping to refer to the Text; sometimes with delicate adaptation or improvement of word or thought, as if the HOLY GHOST were remodelling His own expressions for the new generation of their readers. As committed to the hands of man, the text of the Scriptures has not been supernaturally preserved from slight mistakes in

transcription which exercise the critical skill of its modern editors. And slight discrepancies as to details, where the same events are told by two or more narrators, testify to the independence of the witnesses, and give occasion for careful and thoughtful study of the records.

On the other hand, the exact wording of Scripture is often important. In the higher merely human literature, oftentimes the change of any single word would do injury to the perfection of the verse or sentence, and this must be an even more marked characteristic of inspired Scripture. The New Testament writers or speakers sometimes base an argument on a single word of the Old Testament; the magistrates being called "gods," or the promise being to Abraham and his "seed." The best preachers, like Bishop Andrewes, and the best commentators, like Rudolph Stier, are those who enter most deeply into the fine and delicate shades of meaning expressed by the discriminating selection of words in Greek or Hebrew. Other things being equal, those who study the words most carefully learn most of "the mind of the SPIRIT."

The sacred books of no other religion have the extent and variety, in time, literary form, and authorship, that mark the Christian Scriptures. The Koran is the work of a single mind. The Zendavesta is mainly liturgical. The Vedas consist largely of prayers and hymns. The Chinese Sacred Books are Treatises of ethics and etiquette. Many open "the Sacred Books of the East," now largely translated and made accessible. Few get very far in their perusal. They are monotonous and uninteresting. But children become absorbed in the stories of the Christian Bible, and, of their own accord, devour large portions of its contents. It begins with the Creation of the Universe, and it ends with prophetic descriptions of the eternal world to come. And of the Life of Man between the two eternities, there is no part that is not illuminated, explained, or aided by its light. In its many forms of History, Biography, Statute, Precept, Prophecy, Vision, Psalm, Lyric, Drama,

Idyll, treating of Nature, God, of human Life and the human Soul ; speaking to the individual, the family, the Nation, and the Church, it is the poor man's Library, the child's Educator, the thinker's Guide, the statesman's Manual, the theologian's Text-book, the humble Christian's Chart and Compass and provision for the voyage to Heaven, his super-substantial Bread.

The very variety of Scripture raises a question concerning the nature and extent of its Inspiration. Is any inspiration needed to relate contemporary History? How can as much be needed for that as for predicting the future, or telling the story of Creation, or disclosing the nature or the will of the Almighty? Here comes in the distinction between Revelation and Inspiration. The Books of Scripture differ greatly in the amount of Revelation they convey, not so greatly in the nature of the impulse, the moving by the HOLY GHOST that led their human authors to compose them. Many took in hand to set forth the Life of the Redeemer, but only four of those many Biographies were the work of inspired men, and so recognised and accepted by the Church.

It may happen that the narrative of a Scripture Chronicler may not seem as rich and as lofty as Plato's Philosophy or Shakespeare's Poetry, and yet it may have been the HOLY GHOST that moved that Chronicler to record the part Divinely assigned to him, and in the same sense possible to no other, of the History of the people and Church of God. There are other purposes to be served besides presenting grand thoughts and magnificent images to men, and we may accept the Church's Testimony that, until the giving of the final Revelation, the Church's whole history was recorded by Inspiration of God. The bran is as really the work of God as the fine flour ; and we are told that the ground-up wheat is more wholesome with the bran left in, as God gave it, than when men throw away the bran and gorge themselves with fine white flour.

It is testimony on which, for the most part, we receive the several Books of Scripture as inspired. A man's

contemporaries knew if in speech he gave them authenticated messages from JEHOVAH, if he belonged to the line of supernaturally gifted men. If he had proved himself a prophet in speech, his inspired writings would be received into the Canon of Holy Scripture, the Library of the HOLY GHOST. The cessation of supernatural inspiration after the Apostolic Era is as marked a fact as its appearance at intervals through the ages from Moses to S. John. Even Rome has never dared to add to the Canon any book written since the last Apostle died.

A great deal of Scripture testifies to its own supernaturalness, by transcending in truth and power the ordinary writings of men. No other literature contains so many *semina rerum* words that expand into volumes, sentences out of which systems grow. Its *obiter dicta*, apparently chance expressions, turn out to be laden with meaning. See what CHRIST makes of the phrase, "The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob," and S. Paul (and the whole Church since) of the "obscure expression" of Habakkuk, "the just shall live by Faith." Even infidels admit that to be inspired which "inspires" them. Those who refuse to say that the Bible *is* the word of God admit that it *contains* GOD's word. And this subjective evidence, strong even to an outsider, is stronger still to one who, being a sincere member of the Kingdom, is in genuine sympathy with its prophets and its evangelists. Such an one can appreciate the wonderful agreement in all essential doctrine of men so different in time, in place, in antecedents and circumstances; the systematic and superhuman progress and development of Revelation; its noble manifestation of the Divine Glory; its perfect adaptation to human needs. Such an one will accept the twofold meaning of "Word of God," and believe that the eternal Wisdom and LOGOS who became incarnate "for our salvation," has manifested Himself and His Father through the Scriptures inspired of the HOLY GHOST. The Scriptures are the Daily Food of souls. There is Divine Life and Power in them. But rightly to hold the whole doctrine of Inspiration, we

need to combine this subjective and individual sense of the Divinity of Holy Scripture with the objective testimony of God's Church in every age that, in these Books, in all these Books, and in no others (in the same sense or to the same degree), "holy men of God spake as they were moved by the HOLY GHOST."

JOSEPH M. CLARKE.

THE INSPIRATION OF THE BIBLE.

ARTICLE III.

A VERY able lecture was published some two or three years since, entitled *Certainties in Religion*, by the Rev. Joseph Cook, the famous Boston lecturer. In a similar line of thought we may contend that there are certainties as to the truth of the Old Testament Scriptures, and in these days when these Scriptures are discarded by many professing and calling themselves Christians, as having any Divine original, and when some who minister at the Altars of the Church relegate a portion of them to the realm of myth and fable, it is a matter of vital importance to consider whether there are any "certainties" in regard to the truth and inspiration of these writings which have been held so many ages in the Church to be not only true but inspired. There is a book well known in the Church, written by the Rev. Charles Leslie, entitled *A Short and Easy Method with a Deist*, which presents an argument for the truth of the Christian Religion with unanswerable force and logic, and at the same time in so simple and direct a manner that the plainest mind can appreciate it. I desire in this article to make the argument for the Old Testament likewise convincing to the most ordinary mind. I do not propose to enter into any elaborate discussion as to the authenticity of the various books, or as to the time of their writing or compilation, or to touch the various theories of inspiration and the distinction between it and revelation—all these involve an amount of research and study entirely beyond the ordinary reader. I desire rather to call the attention to

the testimony of two witnesses, whose testimony is easily understood and makes those things certain in which we have been instructed and which we have believed from the beginning, viz., that the Scriptures are the Word of God, the Old Testament as well as the New. What, then, is certain as to these Scriptures, especially the Old Testament, for this is now on trial.

I. It is certain that when our Blessed LORD was on the earth, these Scriptures, both in the Hebrew and the Greek, were essentially the same as they are now.

II. It is certain that He was familiar with them, that He knew the books that composed them, and the evidence upon which their authenticity and genuineness was based.

III. It is certain that these sacred writings were held in the highest esteem by the Jewish Church—regarded with almost superstitious veneration—that the alteration of a word, nay, even of a letter, would have been considered profanation; yet CHRIST never hinted or suggested that they were mistaken or in error as to these writings. While He condemned them for making void the Law by their traditions, and rebuked the Pharisees for “teaching for doctrines the commandments of men,” He never sought to lessen in the slightest degree their veneration for the Scriptures themselves.

IV. It is certain that JESUS constantly appealed to the Scriptures to substantiate His claims to be the Messiah. “Search the Scriptures,” said He on one occasion, “for in them ye think ye have eternal life, and they testify of me.” The Scriptures, therefore, were the authoritative standard; they settled the question of His Messiahship. Again and again He appealed to them and challenged His critics and enemies to examine and see if in every particular He did not fulfil them, as they prophesied of the coming character and work of the Messiah. But not only in this *general* way did JESUS appeal to the Scriptures, but He referred to particular books and passages. In His memorable interview with the disciples going to Emmaus after His resurrection, He quoted the Scriptures to them and said: “O fools, and slow of heart to

believe all that the Prophets have spoken! Ought not CHRIST to have suffered these things, and enter into His glory? And beginning at Moses and all the prophets, He expounded unto them the things concerning Himself." So again in this same 24th chapter of S. Luke, at the 44th verse, He said: "These are the words which I spake unto you, while I was yet with you, that all things might be fulfilled which were written in the law of Moses, and in the Psalms, concerning me. Then opened He their understanding, that they might understand the Scriptures." Again we find Him referring to certain historical facts and events contained in the Scriptures. These are especially noteworthy because our German and American critics speak of them as wholly unworthy of credit, if indeed they do not ridicule the supposition of their truth. For example, JESUS warns his disciples by referring to Lot's wife, and to the punishment of Jonah for disobedience, making his continuance in the whale's belly a type of His burial and resurrection. These are His words: "For as Jonas was three days and three nights in the whale's belly, so shall the Son of Man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth."

It is well here to observe that according to Jewish computation of time it is perfectly correct to speak of an event which ended on the third day from its inception as continuing three days. It is also important to note that the Greek word *κητος*, which in our authorised version is translated "whale," means a great fish. The new version renders it "sea-monster." This should be observed, because the objection is sometimes made to the whole account on the ground that, in view of the construction of the whale's throat, it would have been impossible for a man to enter alive into his belly. The objection is a good illustration of many other objections to the Bible which are found to be baseless when thoroughly examined. Not a few of the so-called discrepancies and contradictions of Old-Testament history have entirely disappeared by a thorough examination, and in the light of modern research. Such men as Stephens,

Layard, Porter, and Rawlinson have poured a flood of light upon this history, and confounded the sceptic and infidel by their confirmations of the truth of the Scriptures.

It might indeed be said that inasmuch as the preservation of Jonah in the belly of the fish was miraculous, it is hardly worth while to refer to any other incident of the narrative to which rationalists and infidels object. But it seems to me where an objection rests upon a wrong translation it is well to remove it, on this ground if no other, that it is unwise to multiply obstacles in the way of any facts in Scripture history, or to suppose miracles where they are not necessary, especially as it seems to be a law of the Divine economy not to work miracles when natural means or instruments will answer the purpose.

But let us now consider more particularly the significance of the witness of JESUS. If we looked upon Him simply as a man, His witness would be exceedingly mighty. Men like John Stuart Mill, Thomas Carlyle, Theodore Parker, Doctor Channing, and Ernest Rénan, and even Strauss, all disbelievers in His Divinity, and some of them atheists, yet profess the most profound respect for His character and wisdom, eulogising Him as the best and wisest of the sons of men. Even then, from the humanitarian stand-point, we should be very slow to say that He was mistaken in a matter so vital as the truth of the Jewish Scriptures. But suppose we go a step further and look upon Him as an inspired prophet, as one sent directly from GOD, to warn and instruct His people; what then? Could there be any doubt about His testimony? But we go further than this, we say He was Deity Incarnate, "GOD manifest in the flesh," and hence His witness is infallible, it cannot be gainsaid or resisted, certainly not by any true Christian. Have the critics who reject a part or the whole of the Old Testament, as an inspired work, sufficiently considered this, that the rejection of this book is virtually the rejection of JESUS of Nazareth, if not as a prophet, certainly as GOD? JESUS might have been wise and

good as a man, and yet have been mistaken; but certainly not as Divine, as Deity His witness is infallible. Now we might rest the case here, for this is all-sufficient for the confirmation of our faith. But it is interesting to note how entirely the great Apostle of the Gentiles, S. Paul, re-echoes the words of CHRIST in this particular. I suppose that even these hypocritics will not question the great ability and superior learning of this Apostle. He was not only thoroughly instructed in the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures, but was familiar with the literature and philosophy of the Gentile world—in other words, he was a scholar, and certainly in this respect he had not his peer in the college of the Apostles. How, then, in the presence of such a man, should our modern critics hide their “diminished heads;” they are, in fact, completely dwarfed by his overshadowing greatness. But how significant, first of all, to observe that this great Apostle bows in the presence of JESUS of Nazareth as the LORD of all; that he points to Him as the Infallible Teacher, the Divine Saviour, and counts all his learning, all his gifts, all his righteousness as dross, that he may be found in Him and saved by Him. But observe again how he establishes and fortifies his faith in JESUS by a constant appeal to the Scriptures, bearing the most unmistakable witness to their truth and inspiration. In the book of the Acts we read [xvii. 2]: “And Paul, as his manner was, went in unto them, and three Sabbath days reasoned with them out of the *Scriptures*, opening and alleging that CHRIST must have suffered, and risen again from the dead, and that this Jesus whom I preach unto you is the CHRIST.” Again he says [Rom. xv. 4]: “For whatsoever things were written aforetime were written for our learning, that we through patience and comfort of the *Scriptures* might have hope.” Again [1 Cor. xv. 3, 4]: “For I declared unto you first of all, that which I also received, how that CHRIST died for our sins according to the *Scriptures*; and that he was buried, and that he rose again the third day, according to the *Scriptures*.” Again [2 Tim. iii. 15, 16]: “And that from a child thou hast known the *Holy Scriptures*, which are able to make thee

wise unto salvation, through faith which is in CHRIST JESUS. All *Scripture* is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness." In view of such passages as these, there certainly can be no doubt of S. Paul's witness, not only to the truth, but the inspiration of the Old Testament. He certainly knew what Scriptures were regarded sacred and inspired by the Jews, he knew what Scriptures Timothy had read, and how he would understand him, and hence the rendering of the New Version of *πᾶσα γραφή*, "every *Scripture*," does not lessen the force of the passage. Timothy would certainly understand S. Paul to mean that this phrase was equivalent to the *τὰ ἱερα γράμματα*, in the fifteenth verse. Admitting therefore that the new translation is more literal than the authorised version, yet the meaning of S. Paul is the same. No one claims that he declares all writings to be inspired. This would of course be absurd; but those writings of which he was speaking, the Old Testament Scriptures. It is well to note, however, that high authority affirms the old translation the best. Olshausen, a critical scholar, equal perhaps to any on the commission of the New Version, says *πᾶσα γραφή* should be translated "all Scripture," because "it means Scripture in all its parts." But whichever way it is rendered it is perfectly plain that S. Paul meant Timothy to understand that the "Scriptures" in the fifteenth verse were the "Scriptures" referred to in the sixteenth. The testimony of Christ to the truth of the Old Testament Scriptures is, of course, sufficient to establish their truth and inspiration; at the same time, however, it is a great satisfaction to note how entirely this great Apostle follows in the path of the Master, for his witness makes it certain that we have in nowise misunderstood that of CHRIST.

In view of the whole question I think, in conclusion, we may safely draw these several conclusions :

1. It is certain that the men who cast discredit upon the Old Testament, who relegate a portion of it to the realm of myth and fable, reject the witness of CHRIST and His chief Apostle.

2. It is certain that if JESUS was mistaken in so vital a matter as the truth or falsity of the Jewish Scriptures, upon which He rested His claims to be the Messiah, He was not only not Divine, not Deity incarnate, but not even an inspired Prophet.

3. It is certain, if the witness of S. Paul cannot be received in regard to these Scriptures, neither can it be in regard to the resurrection of JESUS, nor any other vital doctrine of the Gospel—the Old and New Testament therefore stand or fall together. But these wiseacres of the day, these Daniels who have come to judgment, these men who prate so much of modern thought and criticism, cannot surely afford to put aside S. Paul, this great theologian, this master-mind of the Christian Church, this heroic champion of the Gospel, and most illustrious witness of the truth. They are wise no doubt, they are learned no doubt, they know some things which S. Paul did not; yet with all due deference to their learning, their scholarship, and their research, we still prefer to take our stand with S. Paul. But

4. It is certain if these two Testaments fall, then there is no consistent halting-place this side of practical atheism. This is a strong assertion I am fully aware, but is there any other book extant, besides the Bible, which can lay any reasonable claim to inspiration or a Divine original? Surely no intelligent person in Christendom will for a moment contend that the Vedas of the Hindoo, or the Zend-avesta of the Persians, or the Koran of the Mohammedans, can lay any such claim—books full of incongruities and absurdities, books no more to be compared with the sacred Scriptures than a torchlight to the blazing sun. If the Bible, therefore, is not the revelation of Almighty GOD, then we have no written revelation of His being, character, or rule; then He has left the world to itself; then we are at once plunged into the gloom of Paganism, left to grope our way amid its vagaries and superstitions, its idolatries and abominations, without hope and without GOD, for the words of the Apostle are as true now as when first spoken, “The world by wisdom knew not GOD.”

This rejection, then, of the Scriptures is, I repeat, practical atheism, for in rejecting these we reject the God revealed in them, and are then left to the worship of the gods of the heathen, which, as it is written, "are no gods," or to the "Unknowable" of Spencer, or the "Great Universe" of Strauss, or "Nature," as suggested by Seeley, and there is little to choose between these various substitutes of the one living and true God. S. Paul says, "Some have not the knowledge of God: I speak this to your shame." This is a rebuke to the Agnostics. Then of the heathen world it is written, "Who are without hope and without God." The teaching is plainly this, that men without the knowledge of the true God are without any God, and hence practically atheists; for the belief either in an unknown power or false deity is not only vain so far as truth and salvation are concerned, but may tend to the deepest degradation and ruin. If, then, we should set aside all positive and dogmatic teaching in regard to the truth and Inspiration of the Bible are concerned, and say this is all we have, there is no book which can be substituted for this, what folly! what madness! for men to raise their hands against it, to obscure in the slightest degree its light, to lead the people for a moment to slight or undervalue its teaching. The sun itself has spots on it, nevertheless it is the only source of physical life to this system. Without its light and heat we would perish, and the man who would reject or disparage the light and heat because of the spots would be regarded as a fool or lunatic. But how much greater the folly and madness of men who, because they think there are defects in the Bible, would destroy it, or weaken its force over the minds and hearts of men, for here man's spiritual and eternal life is involved. This book settles the question whether he shall live forever or perish like the brute. But this is precisely what such men as the Rev. Heber Newton are doing. By their rash words and reckless criticisms they are undermining the Faith of the people in the sacred Scriptures, and lessening their power over their hearts and lives. Surely no words of condemnation

can be too strong for men who, ministering at the Altars of the Church, betray the cause of the Church and of CHRIST, and play into the hands of the "free-thinkers," the Ingersolls, the infidels throughout the land. But we have no fear for the final result. "God's word standeth sure," the witnesses cannot be impeached; the truth and inspiration of the Scriptures are demonstrated by "infallible proofs," and long after these men have gone to their account, aye, until time be no more, and faith is swallowed up in knowledge, their light shall shine and multitudes shall see it and acknowledge its power to enlighten, sanctify, and save the soul through the influence of that Divine Spirit, under whose guidance, superintendence, and inspiration, they were written.

GEO. H. McKNIGHT.

STORMONTH'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY.

A Dictionary of The English Language, Pronouncing, Etymological, and Explanatory, Embracing Scientific and other Terms, Numerous Familiar Terms, and a Copious Selection of Old English Words.
By the REV. JAMES STORMONTH. The Pronunciation carefully revised by the REV. P. H. PHELP, M.A. Cantab. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1885.

WHEN a book has achieved great success the critics are not slow to recognise their duty to examine it and to point out its merits and defects. All mankind are interested in such examinations of literature, in which the author addresses himself to the imagination and feelings, and to the sense of beauty or humor. But a dictionary is another matter. That is associated in the minds of many only with drudgery. The school boys think that age, ache, penury, or imprisonment can lay on nature no more weary life than a life of work on a dictionary. Not so scholars. Words are on one side thoughts. The history of a word is the development of a thought. The modern dictionaries are the storehouses of the thought of the race. Tracing thoughts by their stamps in words, preparing dictionaries, has been the delight, not only of the men of genius for linguistic research like Grimm and Horne Tooke, but of Milton and Jean Paul.

The modern dictionary is also worthy of admiration, as machinery for giving easy access to all knowledge. It is an arsenal for the weapons of future conquests, as well as for trophies. There are a million, perhaps, of

thoughts ready for reference. By what contrivance can they be made easily accessible, any one of them, to any person? The philosopher's *encyclopédie* is naturally systematic, arranged in some scientific order of thought. Nobody can find anything particular in such a work without mastering the system. Vocabularies used to be arranged according to the thoughts. That of Ælfric, a tenth century Anglo-Saxon work, begins with farmers' tools all in a heap, then come ecclesiastical matters, then political, then diseases, wild beasts, insects, vessels, a chamber and its contents, and so on. Nothing could be done with the material of Webster on any such plan. Dictionaries are sometimes arranged according to some philological system. Etymüller's Anglo-Saxon Dictionary has the words classified under their roots, and the roots and words arranged according to the scientific order of the sounds. The beginner has to master this order of sounds, and then to guess under what root his word belongs,—or rather under what root Etymüller thinks it belongs. He has, in fact, to learn the language to its depths, before he can use the dictionary. The machinery of a serviceable dictionary is found in the alphabet. The invention of alphabetic writing has been often pronounced the most important invention ever made. It is not the least of its benefits to mankind that it affords the means of making knowledge accessible. Every one knows the letters of the alphabet. If all thoughts are arranged under their words, and the words arranged in alphabetical order, any one can find off hand any of the million facts and thoughts which are stored in the dictionary. The arrangement of a dictionary in simple alphabetic order is almost as important an invention as the representation of words by single signs of their elementary sounds. When we consider what triumphs of invention, what accumulations of knowledge, what generations of toil are implied in a modern dictionary, we may well look with respect on that of Webster, or the Philological Society, or the Imperial, or Stormonth. The new dictionary of Stormonth is the work of his lifetime. It was published in 1871 as an Etymolog-

ical and Pronouncing Dictionary of the English Language for use in schools and colleges. It was itself an enlargement of a two-shilling school book which was thought to combine the advantages of an ordinary pronouncing school dictionary and an etymological spelling-book. The dictionary of 1871 has passed through seven large editions in England, which have kept the author constantly employed in revisions; and finally it appears again, greatly augmented, in a handsome large type library edition, which Harper & Brothers have reprinted from duplicate plates for the American public.

With all its enlargements it is still a small work in comparison with the Historical Dictionary of the Philological Society, with the Imperial, or even with Webster or Worcester. The first ten pages run to the word *acquire*; it takes eighty-five of the great three-columned fine print quarto pages of the Historical to reach the same word.

If we examine to see what has been omitted, we find in the first place that there are nothing like as many words. There are about 1,750 in the Philological dictionary, and about 550 in Stormonth. The Philological gives all the words which have ever been printed in an English book. Stormonth gives only those of present use, either in speech or in reading common classic authors, Milton, the Bible, Shakespeare, Spenser, and Chaucer. Stormonth gives only serviceable meanings within the same range, but the Philological begins with the first appearance of the word in an English book, and gives all the meanings from that time to the present in due order of development. Then a great part of the Philological Dictionary is occupied with quotations in which all the meanings are exemplified, each quotation having an exact reference to its source, and its date, and being printed *verbatim et literatim*, so that a scientific history of the word, or at least an accurate biography, is presented. Stormonth has no quotations.

Then the definitions are compressed to the last word. The London *Times* calls Stormonth encyclopædic, but that would be apt to mislead Americans. We ex

pect in our encyclopædic dictionaries expository articles of sufficient length to give some scientific apprehension of the objects which the words stand for, with pictorial illustrations, if necessary. Under *Darwinism*, for example, we should expect to find a statement of the principles of the Darwinian hypothesis. Under the name of a mineral or animal we expect at least scientific identification, and a picture perhaps. Stormonth has no pictures; what he says is almost always good, but it falls far short of being encyclopædic, in this sense, in comparison with the Imperial or Webster.

The etymology, as it was originally cast, is of the curtest. For pronunciation and orthography a single form is given, without citation of authorities, with only rarely a variant.

But a principle of economy is to be found in the printing. Clusters of words connected in etymology are printed in solid paragraphs, and the definitions of all are made to use that of the leading word, so that a dozen words may be dispatched perhaps in a dozen lines, which in Webster would have taken fifty. Not a streak of fat was left for the printers, or a type set for garnish in the whole book.

In the earlier editions fine type was used and the general make-up of a school manual, or a *vade mecum*. It was one of the most compact of books, and yet by the skilful use of various kinds of type and other devices of the printer's art, it was easy of reference.

The large type edition, which the Harpers give us, does not rely so much on its having reached the lowest ultimate of incompressibility. It is a fair volume every way, and Mr. Stormonth has allowed himself a more liberal use of types than in the early editions, especially in his additions to the etymology.

The merits of the book are, however, those of a popular handbook. They are very much the same, in many respects, as those of Worcester's dictionaries, which have been such favorites with those of our literary men who are not special students of language. They turn to the dictionary oftenest to see how a word is pro-

nounced or spelt, or what the current meaning is of some ambiguous word or phrase, or of some scientific novelty. In Worcester they could learn how Mr. Everett pronounced, and Professor Channing spelt, and the use of words current at Harvard and the parts adjacent; if they wanted to know the derivation of a word there was always something safe, according to the knowledge of the time, in the way of proximate etymology.

So Stormonth is the latest authority for the pronunciation of the University of Cambridge in England. The pronunciation has, in fact, been prepared by the Rev. P. H. Phelp, M.A., Cantab., and the book has been used in America heretofore mainly for its pronunciation. Aid has been given in the definitions by distinguished scientific scholars of Cambridge and Edinburgh, and by learned and eminent professors and dignitaries of the Church. The fulness and accuracy of the archæological and ecclesiastical terms are worthy of special mention.

Stormonth himself is not a specialist in any department, least of all in the science of language, so that there is no danger of his riding any specialistic hobbies.

The absence of a large number of words has been mentioned, but the absent words are mostly entirely obsolete and rare, or slight variations of words which are found in their proper places. *Darwinism* is not found, but *Darwinian theory* is; *abbud* is not found, but *abbot*; *abbrevy* not, but *abbreviate*; *abda* and *abada*, a rhinoceros, are clean gone; and so on. It is really very full in those words likely to be looked for, those heard in conversation or lectures, or found in current books, slang words even, and phrases.

Since it has been in my hands for examination, the following occasions have occurred for special practical use of it: First, an inquiry from a college professor whether *boniface* is not in use in the sense of *inn-keeper*. It is a familiar word to me, and I was surprised to find that it is not in Worcester or Webster, either among the common words or in the vocabulary of noted names of fiction. It is in its place in Stormonth.

A teacher of geometry wanted to know which propo-

sition is called the *pons asinorum*. Webster does not specify, but Stormonth does. In looking for *pons*, I noticed that *pony* in Stormonth does not have the slang meaning so familiar to college men, or any of the secondary meanings in Webster. An inquiry for *pièce de résistance* was answered from Stormonth. It is not in either Worcester or Webster.

One of our newspapers announced on March 20th that the next day would be the first of spring. Looking to see how far the astronomical divisions of the year are recognised as the seasons of common speech, one will find that Stormonth does not tell the beginning or end of Spring; Webster gives the three months' period, March, April, and May.

A reader of Ælfric's Anglo-Saxon Colloquy, wanting to know about *Canonical hours*, found that Webster only gives the use of the expression in the English Church, 8–12 M., during which alone marriage can be solemnised, but Stormonth gives also the Roman Catholic use, specifying the sacred seven by name and time of beginning, *matins*, *prime*, *tierce*, and so on. "Boss" is here, but not *dude* or *mugwump*.

On the whole it answers very well. It is convenient also to have the latest news about the pronunciation in England, to know that they say, for example, *dādo*, *dec'-o-ra-tiv*, *khēd-ēv'* (khedive).

It is by no means certain, however, that a pronunciation is not good English because it is not in Stormonth. He seldom gives a variant, but there are many in England. The Philological Society's dictionary approves pronunciations not mentioned in Stormonth; after *answer*, for example, and the like.

The spelling is also pure English, with no hint of American or other variants. This must exclude it from use in our schools and as a popular authority. We may like to know the peculiar forms of English spelling and pronunciation, but they are often entirely obsolete in America. It will be welcome to our libraries and to the shelves of literary workers.

The weak side of the book is the etymology. Stor-

month seems to have undertaken that himself, and he is not only no specialist in the science of language, but apparently ignorant that there is any such science. He knows that there are, or are said to be laws according to which the changes from Latin to French occur, but if he knows the laws, he has no skill in applying them. He gives *pledge* from the Latin *pignus*, and *play* from *placitum*. He seems to know nothing whatever of the Anglo-Saxon side of the language. He announces, in fact, in his preface, that "there can be but little of that direct etymology in English which the French presents to us in the great mass of its vocables." Laws of change cannot be traced in English words, he says, or only to a very limited extent. He knows nothing of the work of tracing out such laws which has been done by Sweet, Nichol, Murray, Ellis, and their like, much less that of Germans and Americans. He mentions Professor Skeat, to be sure, as an authority, but it is evident that he does not know that his eminence consists in having made better study than others of the laws of the language. He puts him on a par with Wedgwood, Dr. Farrar, and Dr. Mackay.

In the small editions, where nothing was given by way of etymology, as a rule, but three or four of the best-looking foreign words found so given in the larger dictionaries, this defect was not so obtrusive, but in the new edition there is a special expansion of etymological notes. These are usually appended to the former article, and very little coherent with it. Many of them are from Prof. Skeat, and valuable corrections; but Dr. C. Mackay and his Celtic etymologies seem to have given Mr. Stormonth a bad attack of Celtomania. *Church*, for example, is said to be derived from "Greek *κυριαχόν* the LORD's house, from *κύριος*, the LORD; *οἶκος*, a house: A. S. *cyrice*." That is bad enough, surely. The last syllables of *κυριαχόν* have nothing to do with *οἶκος*, but are an adjective ending. The word means simply "belonging to the LORD," and is never used for *church* in the New Testament. It appears in that sense first in the third century, Origen, vii. 132, and becomes common in the

fourth in Greek. But it was never taken up by the Roman Church or the Latin writers. They use *ecclesia*. Here was excellent occasion for a note historical to explain how the word came to the Anglo-Saxons, who were converted by missionaries of the Latin Church; also for a note philological, to give the laws of change by which *church* comes from *cyrice*, and the feminine *cyrice* from the neuter *κυριαχόν*; and to explain why it should not be taken from Greek *κυριαχή*, which corresponds to it exactly in form, and might mean it just as well as *κυριαχόν*. Only, as a matter of fact, it has not been found to occur with that meaning till the eleventh century. In the earlier Christian Greek it means the *Lord's Day*, *κυριαχή ἡμέρα*.

But instead of matters like these, Stormonth presents us with a note, in which he discourses on the Christian churches having been erected on the sites of the old heathen worship, and concludes thus:

“The more recent spellings, as well as the modern spelling, arose from the system of accommodation and corruption which prevailed before our language was fixed. In Scotch, *clachan* means ‘a village in which there is a church or place of worship,’ from Gaelic *clachan*, a circle of stones. Under the influence of the Greek, together with priestly instruction, it was easy for such a word to assume the northern forms, Dan. *kirke*, Sw. *kirka*, Icel. *kirkja*, Scot. *kirk*, and the softer A. S. form *cyrice*.”

This is a deliberate closing of the eyes to linguistic laws, and plunging into chaos. One does not like to set bounds to the power of priestly instruction, but what is meant by calling *cyrice* a softer form than *kirke*? One cannot but suspect that Stormonth did not know that *c* in Anglo-Saxon sounds like *k*, and that he pronounced *cyrice* with a Circean softness.

A note on *jealous*, Latin *zelosus*, informs us that “*jealous* may be connected with Gaelic *dileas*, loyal, faithful—for the *jealous* one is supposed to be loyal and faithful, on the supposition that ‘there is no love without *jealousy*.’” Even in the most familiar words there

are the most impossible guesses ; *clear* is referred to a Gaelic word for part of its meanings. *Dollar*, German *thaler*, is put with German *zahlen*, to pay, and compared with Gaelic *dail*, to deliver, and Welch *talú*. Under *devil*, Greek *διάβολος*, we are told to compare Gaelic *diabuaile*, the god who strikes.

Stormonth's want of scientific knowledge and temper leaves him an easy prey to the onomatopoetic fancies of Wedgwood ; *plunge*, he thought, represents "the sound of a thick heavy body falling into the water ;" the real meaning and origin, "to fall like lead—from *plumbum*, lead," are appended from Brachet.

The appearance of such an undigested mass as this for the etymology of an English dictionary in many respects so admirable and so successful, is a striking proof of the deplorable neglect of the study of English in Great Britain, especially the historical and scientific study of it. The labors of the band of scholars who are devoting themselves to it, and who have won fame in other countries, do not seem to have reached the great body of English men of letters, still less the publishers. One cannot imagine such etymology, to be as this, prepared under the auspices of professors about a German university, or our American Cambridge, or other the like American seat of learning.

FRANCIS A. MARCH.

BAPTISM FOR THE DEAD—AN EXEGESIS.

THE following letter is too valuable a contribution to our exegetical literature to be permitted to remain in the file of ordinary letters. It is from the pen of the learned and venerable Dr. Smith, ex-President of our State University, who is recognised by scholars as a Greek scholar of unusual acumen. I have his consent to forward it to you for the forthcoming number of the REVIEW. It will speak for itself. G. M. E.

LIVINGSTON, ALA., March 1, 1885.

REV. GEO. M. EVERHART, D.D., *Montgomery, Ala.*:

REVEREND AND DEAR SIR: When you were here you kindly lent me the October Number of the CHURCH REVIEW, containing an article on *Baptism for the Dead*, to which you called my attention. I told you I was not satisfied with it, and at your request promised to give you what seems to me the probable meaning of 1 Cor. xv. 29. I now try to make good my promise.

It is plain that this verse is logically connected with vv. 12-19 (inclusive), and that the passage next foregoing [vv. 20-28] is a digression from the strict line of thought, and must be regarded as parenthetical. Parentheses, often long and much involved, are characteristic of S. Paul's style.

To bring out clearly my own notion of the meaning of v. 29, I give, first, a sort of free paraphrase of it and of a part of its context, which I take to be in logical connection with it. I begin with v. 16:

For if the dead are not raised, not even has CHRIST been raised: and if CHRIST has not been raised, your faith is groundless; ye are yet in your sins. Then they also, who are fallen asleep in the faith of the

resurrection of CHRIST, have perished utterly. If, in this life, we have hoped *in CHRIST only*, we are of all men most pitiable . . . vv. 29–32. Since then the dead perish utterly, how shall they fare who are baptised for the dead? If, in a word, *the dead are not raised*, what is the significance of baptism for them? And why do we imperil our *all* of life every hour? I incur daily the risk of death by violence, because of my glorying in the hope of eternal life—and this I protest by the glorying which I have in CHRIST JESUS our LORD, and which is also yours. If, with all the might of my manhood,* I had fierce and bloody encounters in Ephesus, what the advantage to me? If the dead are not raised, let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die and perish utterly and forever.

Such seems to me the drift of v. 29 and its context. S. Paul is here combating the fatal error of “some” of the Church at Corinth who denied “the resurrection of the dead” [v. 12]. In v. 29 he adverts finally to *baptism*, which, on the hypothesis of no resurrection of the dead, he virtually affirms to be not merely nugatory, but even utterly absurd, and “how shall they fare who are baptised for the dead?” Baptism for the dead is nothing—even worse than nothing, for they who are baptised for the dead compromit their enjoyment of life by exposing themselves to the contempt of the world, to persecution, and even to martyrdom, without a ray of hope, of life, and happiness after death. “Why then are they baptised for them?” If Christian baptism is baptism for the dead, then, indeed, is Christianity itself foolishness.

Knowing little or nothing of the opinions of theologians in regard to the meaning of this passage, I have tried to get at it by pondering S. Paul’s own words, as they stand in the Greek of v. 29 and its context. The steps by which I have reached my own notion of its meaning will be seen more clearly in the following brief notices of certain words and constructions. I copy the Greek text of v. 29 from Hahn’s edit. of Tittman. The interpunction is that adopted by the authors of the late Revised Version of the New Testament:

Ἐπεὶ τί ποιήσουσιν οἱ βαπτιζόμενοι ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν;
εἰ ὅλως νεκροὶ οὐκ ἐγείρονται, τί βαπτίζονται ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν;

* Κατ’ ἄνθρωπον—lit., “According to the measure of a man” (Harrison, Gr. Prep.).

I. *Ἐπεὶ*. With this word S. Paul takes up his line of thought where he dropped it at the end of v. 18, and goes on with it, just as if he had not dropped it all. I believe he here uses *ἐπεὶ* in its primary* causal sense, and says virtually this: "Since then the dead perish utterly, how shall they fare," etc. The word "else" ("*alioqui*" in the Latin versions of this passage), *never*, as I think, represents *any* strictly proper sense of *ἐπεὶ*. It seems, however, to be the best word for this place. It serves as a sort of smooth pivot—so to speak—upon which the reader turns easily from the end of a long digression to the hypothesis of no resurrection in vv. 12–19. In other words, its use here seems to be a clever device of translators for *suggesting* the causal sense of *ἐπεὶ*, and for carrying this sense *back* to the point where *ἐπεὶ* logically belongs. In similar cases, and especially in elliptic expressions, this word is therefore fairly rendered by the English "else."

II. *Τὶ ποιήσουσιν*. . . . Whether *ποιεῖν* is used here in the sense of "gain," or (as seems more probable), in the sense of *πράσσειν* intransitive, so that *τὶ ποιήσουσιν* is equivalent to *τὶ πράξουσιν*,† "how shall they fare?" matters little, as in either case the question is about the same. I think the answer may be gathered from the next two verses: Perils every hour, risks of death by violence every day, fierce and bloody encounters—all these fall to the lot of them that are baptised for the dead. And what the advantage of all these to them, if CHRIST be not risen from the dead, and life in this world be their *all* of life? Surely they "of all men are most pitiable."

III. *ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν*—"for the dead" (*i.e.*), "in ref-

* I do not think that *ἐπεὶ* is the mere outgrowth of the prep. *ἐπὶ*. It seems to be composed of two elements, *ἐπὶ* and *εἰ*. If, as Bopp argues (*Comp. Gram.*, p. 556), the base of the Greek relative pronoun is *εἰ*, it would seem probable that *ἐπεὶ* is an old, much mutilated form of the construction of *ἐπὶ* with the dative of the relative *ἐφ' ᾧ* in the common language. If this be so, the radical or primary sense of *ἐπεὶ* would be "upon which," or (to bring out better the proper conjunctive force of the relative element), "and upon this," "since then," "since." From this primary causal sense come naturally the secondary temporal meanings "when," "after"; just as from the local meaning "where" of the Latin *ubi* (dative locative of "qui") comes the temporal sense "when."

† Eph. vi. 21., *τί πρᾶσσω*, "how I fare."

erence to," or "because of the dead." This is one of the regular senses of ὑπέρ with the genitive. The use of the generic article here is noticeable, showing that νεκρῶν is to be understood as including *all* the dead, even CHRIST *himself*. Elsewhere in v. 29 and in its context the plural forms of νεκρὸς are all without the article, and mark the idea of individuals of that class, not the strongly emphatic notion of the class in its whole comprehension. If the precise meaning of the phrase, οἱ βαπτίζόμενοι ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν, be not already pointed at plainly enough in the context foregoing [vv. 12–19] it would seem to be settled definitely by what comes next: "If (ὅλως), to sum up the whole matter, the dead are not raised, why then are they baptised for them?" What is the significance of the baptism of such as "say there is no resurrection of the dead." Why then are they baptised at all?

IV. Εἰ ὅλως νεκροὶ οὐκ ἐγείρονται. I do not believe that S. Paul says here: "If the dead rise *not at all*," or, as the New Version has it, "If the dead are not raised *at all*." I think the adverb ὅλως belongs just where he put it; and I believe he meant it to be the attributive of the *whole* hypothetic clause in which it stands. The English of the clause seems to me to be about this: "If, *to sum up the whole matter*," or, "If, *in a word*, the dead are not raised," etc. In S. Jerome's Vulgate [A.D. 384] we have "Si *omnino* mortui non resurgunt." This is a rigidly correct rendering of S. Paul's Greek. Beza's translation [A.D. 1556], "Si *omnino* mortui non suscitantur," is about the same. In neither of these translations is there any leaning toward the construction, ὅλως οὐ, "omnino non," "not at all." In both, the proper force of ὅλως and its right construction in this passage are clearly exhibited. In v. 19 of the context foregoing occurs in our English versions a similar error, growing out of the wrong construction of the adverb μόνον. Here S. Paul is made to say, "If in this life only, we have hope in Christ." Evidently he says no such thing. It is seen at a glance that μόνον belongs where he put it. He

says plainly what he means to say: "If, in this life, we have hoped (ἐν Χριστῷ μόνον) *in CHRIST only*" (i.e., only in a Christ not risen from the dead), "we are of all men most miserable." To make S. Paul speak of hope in CHRIST *in this life only* is to make him talk sheer nonsense. He is made to give out the notion that there is to be hope in CHRIST in the next life also. This is absurd, for the simple reason that, in the next life, there is to be—not hope—but fruition of what the Christian in this life hopes for in the next. The Vulgate version of this passage: *Si in hac vitâ, tantum in Christo sperantes sumus*, etc., if rightly punctuated, gives the right sense. Beza is wrong-headed here. His attempt to translate the passage is a failure. The sense of his *Si in hac solum vitâ speramus*, etc., is so like that of our English versions, that these might be imagined to have been made from Beza's poor Latin instead of S. Paul's Greek.*

But to return to the baptism for the dead. In vv. 12–19 the drift of S. Paul's argument on the hypothesis of no resurrection of the dead is manifestly toward the *reductio ad absurdum*. In v. 29 the argument reaches that point. The absurdity of the hypothesis appears in the absurdity of baptism on that hypothesis.

"I am the Resurrection and the Life: He that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live." In these words of Divine Majesty—the grandest ever spoken on earth, and fraught with infinite interest to man, the SON of GOD proclaimed to the world the grand central fact of the Gospel—"death abolished"—"Life and Immortality brought to light." Baptism, the initial rite of Christianity, is grounded on faith in this central fact. Even the primitive Apostolic mode of baptism by

* It is singular that these venerable blunders in the English translation of 1611 should have been overlooked by the authors of the late Revised Version. The English version of the Vulgate [Douay Bible] has the same errors. It seems to me that S. Paul's meaning in these two places lies on the surface of his language and ought to be understood at a glance. In the late Revised Edition of the New Testament, the marginal reading of v. 19, "If we have *only hoped* in Christ in this life," is about as bad as it can be. Why it should have been put on exhibition is hard to imagine.

immersion * plainly symbolises the burial and resurrection of CHRIST. In the Catholic Church this Holy Sacrament is duly administered only upon profession of belief in "all the Articles of the Christian Faith as contained in the Apostles' Creed." The culmination of this Creed is the solemn declaration of belief in "The Resurrection of the body, and Life everlasting." Baptism, then, is *for the living*, and in no sense whatever *for the dead*. In v. 29 S. Paul, as I understand him, so far from affirming the reality of baptism for the dead, very ingeniously brings in a mere *conception* of it as the point of his *reductio ad absurdum*. Elsewhere,† his plainly stated doctrine is, "One LORD, one Faith, *one* Baptism." This is the *one* Apostolic Baptism, ordained by CHRIST Himself, and administered only upon profession of faith in Him, the Resurrection and the Life. It is the *sacramentum* of the Christian soldier, when he enlists in the army of the Faithful. It is the *only one* baptism that ever was, or ever can be in the Church militant. In a word, it is *the one baptism for the living*, which utterly excludes the idea of another baptism for the dead. The latter I believe to be nothing more nor less than a mere figment of the old ecclesiastics, which grew naturally out of their misconception of the *reason* of S. Paul's allusion to a baptism for the dead. Had they clearly perceived *that*, of course, they would at once have understood him to allude to an unreality—even a gross absurdity—in order to give point and power to the conclusion of his argument.

Such is my own notion of S. Paul's meaning in 1 Cor. xv. 29. For aught that I know, the same view may have been taken by others. This would seem to be not improbable, for the reason that the sense of the passage, as I understand it, lies—where it ought to lie—on the surface of S. Paul's Greek.

* If this is not indicated clearly enough in sundry other places in the New Testament, it would seem to be marked out quite plainly in Rom. vi. 3, 4, and in Col. ii. 12. The figures in these two passages can be fairly accounted for, as I believe, in no other way, than upon the hypothesis of this mode of baptism.

† Eph. iv. 5.

The view defended in an article in the October Number of the CHURCH REVIEW is thus stated :

As the term "resurrection of the dead" means only resurrection, so the phrase, "baptism for the dead," is a full, orthodox, and, in this connection, peculiarly apt and forcible designation of the ordinary sacrament of Regeneration.

As the author of this article seems to be quite clever at showing up the fallacy of arguments by reducing them to the syllogistic form, I could wish he had put this statement also into that shape. Had he done this, possibly he might have helped his readers to a clearer understanding of the logical sequence of conclusion from premises. In trying to do this for myself, I seem to be trying to catch sight of the invisible. Stripped of verbiage, his statement of his view is this : Baptism for the dead is Christian baptism. His reasons for it—much like Gratiano's—would seem to be "as two grains of wheat hid in two bushels of chaff; you shall seek all day ere you find them; and when you have them, they are not worth the search." This view of baptism for the dead may be, as he says, "substantially patristic," but it is certainly none the more trustworthy on this account, if it be not really Pauline.

I have now given you, my dear Sir, my own notion of the meaning of this vexed passage. Without suitable books of reference, and in the midst of the toils and worries of my manner of life, I have snatched a few hours for the fulfilment of my promise. If it gives you pleasure to read what I have written, I shall be well rewarded for the writing.

Very truly your friend,

CARLOS G. SMITH.

THE SPIRITS IN PRISON.

Defense of the Version of King James I. "The Spirits in Prison," 1 Peter iii. 18-20, against the Westminster Revision. By Rev. SAMUEL FULLER, D.D., Professor of the Literature and Interpretation of the Scriptures in the Berkely Divinity School. T. Whittaker, New York, 1885.

THIS Lecture (for so it is called in the Preface) was "read," as we are informed in a footnote, "by the request of the Dean," "to the Professors and students of the Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge, Massachusetts." Coming to us thus auspicated it has special claim to our careful consideration.

S. Augustine, replying [*Epistle* 164 al. 99] to an inquiry of Enodius about the "spirits in prison," and the "preaching" to them, writes: "The question you have proposed to me out of the Epistle of the Apostle Peter is wont, as I think does not escape you, most vehemently to move us"—*solet nos, ut te latere non arbitror, vehementissime commovere*. That it has most vehemently moved the Lecturer is shown in his cavalier treatment of famous men of old, whose mother-tongue was Greek, and who give *some* indications of having known how to use it, and how to interpret it as used by others; and of men of a later day, his peers, to say the least, as theologians and exegetes. Here is a specimen; and I think the reader, when he has got through it, will agree with me that I but do my duty, if, in commenting on such language, I "use great plainness of speech:"

A great and imperishable fact (all *facts* are imperishable) is the result of this meaning (which) S. Peter, himself, imposes (the im-

position isn't S. Peter's; it is the Lecturer's) upon the verb "preach," in 1 Pet. iii. 19. This is the loud fact (I have heard of dressing loud, and the slang is very expressive; but a "loud fact"—well, I suppose it is *meant* to be a "stunner"): Because the Spirit of CHRIST preached *repentance* to the antediluvians, the verb to preach [1 Pet. iii. 19] cannot possibly there mean to preach *the Gospel*. The strong assertions of the Christian Fathers, Irenæus, Clement, and Cyril of Alexandria, and of Bps. Horsley and Wordsworth, Dean Alford, and Canon Cook, to the contrary, cannot destroy S. Peter's own definition. With S. Peter, to preach is to preach *repentance*, and nothing else.

Still another fact equally loud (and equally stunning): S. Peter's verb to preach cannot mean to preach *the Gospel*. All that these Fathers and Divines say about the human Spirit of CHRIST preaching the Gospel to disembodied souls is *unmixed invention and unwarranted dogmatism* (italics his), not having even a shadow of authority from the real language of this Apostle [p. 13].*

Here is another specimen :

To the neglect of this just and reasonable law of exegesis—that every writer is his own best interpreter—must be attributed a pernicious host of mistakes and errors, which, in the progress of the Christian era, have invaded, and still dominate, the field of interpretation. Unjust and tyrannical are mild terms to characterise the actions of the lawless invader. He silences the voice of the actual writer. He compels his muzzled slave to express ideas utterly foreign to his own mind and purpose. He deprives the world of the light and knowledge it would receive were the real author allowed to speak for himself [p. 7].

So, then, Irenæus, and Clement, and Cyril of Alexandria, and Bishops Horsley and Wordsworth, and Dean Alford, and Canon Cook have not only made a slave of S. Peter, but have actually muzzled the Apostle, and it has been reserved to the Lecturer to unmuzzle him. Had he been content to stop here, we might have favorably allowed this charitable work of his. But this would seem to have been the last thing he had in mind. The trouble with him was not that S. Peter was muzzled, but that he had the wrong muzzle on; so what does he do but take that off and put on another, of his own making, that is to the old one, as we shall see before we get through, as a man's loins to his little finger.

* The numbers from 1 to 25 refer to the pages of the Lecture; those from 145 to 165, to the pages of an article in this REVIEW for July, 1882, of which the Lecture is, in part, a rehash.

But let us look at the passage itself and see who is the muzzler. In the original it runs thus :

Χριστὸς ἅπαξ περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν ἔπαθε, . . . θανατωθεὶς μὲν σαρκὶ ζωοποιηθεὶς δὲ πνεύματι, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασι πορευθεὶς ἐκήρυξεν, ἀπειθήσασί ποτε, ὅτε ἅπαξ ἐδέχετο ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ μακροθυμία ἐν ἡμέραις Νῶε.

Passing over what precedes, as not here in controversy, I begin with the antithetic clause. What is the antithesis of "put to death?" "Made alive," says the Lecturer: "The full and exact contrast of 'put to death' is nothing less than *made alive*" [p. 8]. And on page 3: "The Greek verb, here translated by the Vulgate *vivificatus*, 'quickened,' made alive, has this sense *in every place in the New Testament*" [John v. 21, vi. 63; Rom. iv. 17, viii. 11; 1 Cor. xv. 22, 36, 45; 2 Cor. iii. 6; Gal. iii. 21; 1 Tim. vi. 13; 1 Pet. iii. 18].

It will be observed that this remark (which, by the way, coolly begs the question in the last of these references) is confined, in terms, to the New Testament, the Lecturer being doubtless aware that it at least does not hold good of the Septuagint Version of the Old Testament, from which there are in this very Epistle no less than ten distinct quotations, besides constantly recurring turns of expression that show that the mind of the Apostle was *saturated* with it. In this Version there are six passages in which the *piel*, or *hiphil*, of *hhayah* is translated by ζωοποιῶ. Let us examine them in their order.

In Judges xxi. 14 we read: "And Benjamin came again at that time; and they gave them wives which they had *saved alive* of the women of Jabesh-Gilead." I am inclined to think that those "four hundred young virgins," when they saw all the men and all the other women and the children of Jabesh-Gilead put to the sword, and themselves alone spared, would have been utterly unable to conceive of any more "full and exact contrast [p. 8] of 'put to death'" than "saved alive."

In 2 Kings v. 7 we read: "Am I God, to kill and to *make alive*, that this man doth send unto me to recover a man of his leprosy?" Here, *make alive*, in the mouth

of the king of Israel, means *preserved alive*, for that was what was asked of him by the king of Syria.

In Nehemiah ix. 6, we have the opening words of the Blessing (extending through the entire chapter) where-with the Levites “stood up and blessed the LORD their God:” “Thou, even thou, art LORD alone; thou hast made heaven, the heaven of heavens, with all their host, the earth, and all things that are therein, the seas, and all that is therein, and thou *preservest* them all; and the host of heaven worshippeth thee.” Here the sudden change, in the Hebrew, from the perfect (aorist) tense of the verb *’asitha* (Sept., ἐποίησας; Vulg., *fecisti*) to the (*piel*) participle *m’hhayeh* (Sept., ζωοποιεῖς; Vulg., *vivificas*), and the (*hithpael*) participle *mishtakh’wim* (Sept., προσκυνοῦσιν; Vulg., *adorat*) necessarily, according to the laws of the Hebrew, expresses the present, as contrasted with the aorist past: *madest, preservest, worshippeth*; if the latter of these last two is continuous, so is the former. Here, then, is another passage (that in Judges being one) in which ζωοποιῶ cannot possibly mean *make alive* in the sense of *creation*, or of “*restoration from death to life*.”

The next passage is Job xxxvi. 6: “He *preserveth* not the life of the wicked: but giveth right to the poor.” Here οὐ μὴ ζωοποιήσῃ cannot mean “raiseth not the wicked to life,” for that would contradict the declaration of S. Paul concerning a resurrection “both of the just and of the unjust.”

The next passage is Psalm lxx. (lxxi.) 20, which in the Prayer Book Version reads: “O what great troubles and adversities hast thou showed me! and yet didst thou turn and *refresh* me; yea and broughtest me from the deep of the earth again.” The King James Version is more idiomatic, and in place of *refresh* has *quicken*; but the two have the same meaning, to wit, restoration, not from death, but from “great and sore troubles.”

The last of the six passages is Ecclesiastes vii. 12 (13): “Wisdom *giveth life* to them that have it;” where, obviously, as in the passage from the Psalms, the expression is figurative. In the other four passages

the word is used in its literal sense. In the first of these passages the word means *save alive*, and cannot possibly mean anything else; in the second, that meaning is called for by the context; in the third, the very tense of the verb *determines* it to sustentation, as contrasted with the creative *act* of the preceding clause; in the fourth, the analogy of the Faith decides between two otherwise equally admissible interpretations. What more natural, then, than that S. Peter, familiar with this use of the word in the Old Testament Scriptures, should so employ it here?

“But,” says the Lecturer, “CHRIST’s human soul . . . could not be made alive, for it was already alive” [p. 2].

True; but it could be *preserved* alive. But this preservation, according to the Lecturer, is just what it did not need. “The human soul of CHRIST,” he says, “like every human soul, cannot, even for an instant, lose its immortality.” What, then, are we to understand by that of S. Paul to Timothy [vi. 16]: “Who only hath immortality?” Is the Lecturer yet to learn that no man hath *absolute* immortality? That only as we are preserved in being by Him, “who holdeth our soul in life,” are we saved from lapsing into non-existence? I had thought this one of the commonplaces of all theology. “In Him we live, and move, and have our being.”

To pass from the participles to the nouns. As both are in the dative and without a preposition, the admitted antithesis would seem to require that if the one is to be translated “in the flesh,” as all acknowledge, the other should be translated “in the spirit.” Not so, argues the Lecturer: “Unquestionable instances are there in the New Testament Greek where, in antithetic clauses, nouns have *different* attributes: Ἐν πνεύματι, πνεύματι καὶ στοιχῶμεν—If we live *by* the Spirit, *according* to the Spirit let us walk [Gal. v. 25]” [pp. 157, 158].

To this it is obvious to reply, first, that the clauses are *not* antithetic, and the citation, therefore, is not in point; and, secondly, that στοιχέω does *not* necessitate translating the dative by “according to.” In none of

the four instances—there are but four—in which it occurs with the dative (and in every one of them without a preposition) is “according to,” employed either by the King James or by the Westminster Revision; in every instance they employ either “in,” or “by.” In one of the passages [Rom. iv. 12], “walk *in* the steps,” the Lecturer himself would hardly employ “according to.” A translation should always preserve “the very body” of the original, “his form and pressure,” as well as the soul, when the idiom of the language will allow of it, as it will here. If, with the King James Revision, we translate, “live *in* the Spirit,” with it we should also translate, “walk *in* the Spirit;” if, with the Westminster, on the other hand, we translate, “live *by* the Spirit,” with it we should also translate, “walk *by* the Spirit,” which gives the same meaning as the Lecturer’s “walk *according to* the Spirit,” while it preserves—which his does not—the *form* of the original.

To come back to the passage of S. Peter. The *grammatical construction* of *σαρκὶ* with *θανατωθεὶς* and that of *πνεύματι* with *ζωοποιηθεὶς* are identical, just as in 1 Cor. vii. 34, “holy both in body and in spirit,” *ἁγία καὶ σώματι καὶ πνεύματι*, the grammatical construction of *σώματι* and that of *πνεύματι* with *ἁγία*, respectively, are identical; and this identity of construction, in the one passage as in the other, *necessitates* in English the same preposition in the latter clause as in the former. So obvious, indeed, is this that, as Bishop Browne [*On the Articles*, Am. ed., pp. 100, 101] well remarks, “It is scarcely possible, upon any correct principles of interpretation, to give any other translation to the words. . . . This is the natural interpretation of the passage; and if it ended here, it would contain no difficulty, and its sense would never have been doubted.” The “difficulty,” as we shall see further on, is theological, not exegetical.

Put to death in the flesh, but held alive in the spirit. His human soul survived His body, only as it was held in life by Him “Who holdeth our soul in life;” “Who only hath immortality.”

Held alive in the spirit; in which (sc. spirit) *even to the in-prison spirits going he preached.* *In* which, not *by* which. Can the Lecturer, or anybody else, suggest any conceivable link between CHRIST's having preached by His Divine Spirit to the antediluvians in the days of Noah, and His having been Himself raised from the dead by that Divine Spirit two thousand years afterward? But, with the other interpretation, the connecting link between the two statements of the Apostle is obvious: having mentioned the separation of the spirit from the flesh in death, he naturally goes on to tell us where the spirit was during the three days of that separation, and what it was doing, to wit, preaching to the spirits in prison, the mention of whose disobedience and its consequences naturally draws after it all that follows, to the end of the chapter.

In which EVEN *to the in-prison spirits going he preached*—καὶ τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασι. Καὶ *intensive* is repeatedly employed in the New Testament, as well as in classic Greek, for emphatically distinguishing a single word or clause, which notion we express sometimes by *also*, sometimes by *even*, sometimes by the pronoun *self* [*Liddell & Scott*]. It is thus employed when something unlooked for is to follow, something that one would not expect beforehand, something exciting surprise: EVEN *the hairs of your head are all numbered*—καὶ αἱ τρίχες [S. Matt. x. 30]; EVEN *that which he hath shall be taken from him*—καὶ ὃ ἔχει [S. Mark iv. 25]; would EVEN *dare to die*—καὶ τολμᾷ [Rom. v. 7]; lest haply ye be found EVEN *to fight against God*—καὶ θεομάχοι [Acts v. 39]; EVEN *the winds and the sea obey him*—καὶ οἱ ἄνεμοι [S. Matt. viii. 27]; *with authority commandeth he* EVEN *the unclean spirits, and they do obey him*—καὶ τοῖς πνεύμασι τοῖς ἀκαθάρτοις [S. Mark i. 27]. So in numerous other passages. So in the passage we are considering. He preached even to the spirits in prison who had been disobedient under peculiarly aggravating circumstances, and who might therefore be supposed to be past preaching to. He preached *even* to them.

Even to the IN-PRISON spirits. The prepositional phrase—"clause," the Lecturer [p. 145] incorrectly calls it—he undertakes to throw light on by quotations from standard authorities, as follows :

Whatever words stand between the article and its substantive are *attributives*.—Donaldson, Gr. Gram., p. 360.

A preposition with its case is connected *attributively* with a substantive by means of *an article*, in the same way as an adjective standing between the article and its substantive.—Madvig, Gr. Syntax, p. 10.

The attributive adjective *expresses some quality* residing in the subject.—Jelf, Gr. Gram., § 425.

The attributive adjective is purely *adnominal*, *belonging exclusively to its substantive*.

The attributive stands *in the closest relation to its subject*, forming with it *one complex idea*, like the parts of *a compound word*.—Hadley, Gr. Gram., §§ 488, 489.

All gospel truth. Now let us see what consequences he fathers upon them :

1. The phrase is an *attributive*.—Donaldson.
2. This attributive is an *adjective*.—Madvig.

Not so. Madvig does not say that it *is* an adjective, but that it is *connected with* a substantive "in the same way as an adjective"—which is quite a different thing.

3. Ἐν φυλακῇ, in prison, expresses some *quality* of τοῖς πνεύμασι, the spirits.—Jelf.

Jelf expressly confines his remark to "the attributive *adjective*;" the Lecturer extends it, without compunction, to the prepositional phrase, and to every instance of it, else his allegation is not *ad rem*. Dr. Jelf knew Greek too well to do that. How a New Testament exegete, with Col. i. 2, τοῖς ἐν Κολοσσοῖς ἁγίοις—the *in-Colosse saints*, and iv. 15, τοὺς ἐν Λαοδικείᾳ ἀδελφούς—the *in-Laodicea brethren*, staring him in the face, could take the responsibility of such a *dictum*, is passing strange. Obviously, the prepositional phrase in each of these passages designates *locality*. Suppose we try on the *dictum* in the last of these two passages and see how it will fit. The *dictum*, remember, is that *in-prison* expresses some *quality* of *the spirits*, because it is a prepositional phrase; *in-Laodicea* must therefore express

some *quality* of the brethren. The only *quality* for which they were *distinguished*, so far as we are informed in the New Testament, was *lukewarmness*. So, by help of the before mentioned "unmovably established" grammatical principles, we arrive, by short and easy stages, at the following translation: *Salute the lukewarm brethren!* Will the Lecturer adopt this translation? or will he give up his *dictum*? One or the other he *must* do.

But we are letting S. Paul interpret S. Peter, whereas S. Peter "is his own best interpreter." Very well! Call S. Peter into court, then; but first take off his muzzle—the muzzle that the Lecturer has put on him—that he may speak for himself:

Ἀσπάζεται ὑμᾶς ἡ ἐν Βαβυλῶνι συνεκλεκτή, καὶ Μάρκος ὁ υἱός μου—There saluteth you the in-Babylon co-elect, and Marcus my son [1 Ep. v. 13]. Babylon, as we all know, means *confusion*, the name having been suggested by the *confounding* of the language of the Babel-builders; if we were to apply the *dictum*, the Lecturer, I trow, would be confounded, as well as the co-elect.

On this foundation of sand the Lecturer builds a figurative prison for the spirits, as contra-distinguished from a literal one: "These facts," he says [p. 146], referring to the grammatical extracts above given, "justify the position we take with regard to the imprisonment of the spirits mentioned by S. Peter. Their imprisonment was not objective; was not external; was not imposed by others. On the contrary, their imprisonment was *in themselves*; was *self-imposed*; was *personal*; was spiritual." And [p. 19], "The 'prison' is *within* 'the spirits,' a *state and habit* of soul created by the spirits *themselves*, and not by others." Not only is the prison figurative *here*, it is figurative everywhere: "The *non-literal* sense of *in carcere*, 1 Peter iii. 19, is established," he says [p. 147], "by the meaning the Vulgate elsewhere assigns this expression. Absolutely *everywhere* (italics his) in the Vulgate is '*in carcere*' a *figurative and spiritual imprisonment*."

To which simply *astounding* assertion I reply: Ab-

solutely *nowhere* in the four places (beside that in S. Peter) in which it occurs as the translation of ἐν φυλακῇ, and the five places in which it occurs as the translation of ἐν τῇ φυλακῇ, in the Vulgate, is "*in carcere*" a figurative and spiritual imprisonment; always and everywhere in these passages is it a literal one. Four out of the five passages refer to John the Baptist, and I take it his imprisonment was a literal one; the fifth refers to S. Peter. The *other* four instances occur in S. Matt. xxv. 35-44, where our LORD represents Himself as an hungered, in the person of His Members, thirsty, a stranger, naked, sick, and *in prison*. Now some may think that He has here "in a figure transferred to Himself," μετεσχημάτισε [1 Cor. iv. 6], these experiences of His Members, but that the experiences themselves are literal, no one can deny. When the Head in the person of His Members, Peter and John [Acts v. 18-22], and afterward in that of Peter alone [Acts xii. 5], was "*in carcere*"—a *carcer* that had doors that could be opened and shut, and keepers standing before the doors, it would have required more, I trow, than the eloquence of the Lecturer to persuade the Apostle that he wasn't in a literal prison at all; that it was the prison of his sins that he was shut up in!

Having turned the prison outside in, he proceeds to turn the prisoners inside out. They are not spirits at all. They are [p. 152] "'flesh and bones' [Luke xxiv. 39]: Men, Men alive, Men passing their lives on this material earth." To meet the anticipated objection that *spirits* is a singular term to designate men-in-the-flesh by, he cites S. John, 1 Ep. iv. 1, "Try the spirits, because many false prophets are gone out into the world." "With S. John," he says, "in this passage, 'spirits' and 'false prophets' are identical."

Not so. Prophets, like other men, *have* spirits; and these spirits are *in* them. "For who among men knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of the man, which is in him?" [1 Cor. ii. 11, *Westminster Revision*.] And who among prophets knoweth the things of a prophet, save the spirit of the prophet, which is in him? More-

over, "the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets" [1 Cor. xiv. 32]. How, then, can they be identical? What the Apostle evidently means is, Believe not every spirit of a prophet, but try the spirits, whether they are of God: because many false prophets are gone out into the world; and the spirits of these prophets are lying spirits, that confess not that JESUS CHRIST is come in the flesh. The idea of making S. John, in these passages, stand sponsor for the Lecturer's metamorphosis of S. Peter's "spirits" into "flesh and bones" [p. 152] is, to say the least, an *original* one, and we may safely say that no one will be found to dispute the title to it, whatever he may think of its value. With *that* even the Lecturer doesn't seem to be satisfied; so he attempts to press the Vulgate and the Syriac into the service. With what success, we shall see further on.

In which even to the in-prison spirits going he preached; πορευθεῖς ἐκήρυξεν. Here the participle would seem to designate actual locomotion,* especially as it occurs again only three verses further on, and is there admitted to designate it: "who is gone into heaven"—πορευθεῖς εἰς οὐρανόν. But no, says the Lecturer. "In its *literal* sense the word 'went' cannot be applied to CHRIST'S *Divine* Spirit. The word 'went' must, therefore, be here used for the adverb, *continually*. This meaning has, through [what the Lecturer unwarrantedly maintains to be] S. Peter's definitions of Spirit, become a constructive and resistless necessity.

"The Old Testament writers often use the words 'go and went' in this sense of *continuance*. I here give you an example:

" 'The noise in the host of the Philistines *went on* and increased' [1 Sam. xiv. 19]. That is, the noise of the Philistine host *continually* increased.

"S. Peter himself uses a Hebrew idiom which ex-

* Of course, after the manner of a spirit. What that is, whether spirits can pass from one point to another without passing through the intermediate points, I remit to the Schoolmen.

presses *continuance*. In scoffing scoffers, 2 Pet. iii. 3, that is, *continual* scoffers."

"Scoffers in scoffing" no more means "*continual* scoffers," than "let us threaten them with a threat" [Acts iv. 17] means "let us threaten them continually." In both instances (as well as in several others, *e.g.*, S. John iii. 29; Acts v. 28, xxiii. 14) the idiom expresses not *continuance*, but *intensity*; *fierce* scoffers; threaten *straitly*. S. Peter was, no doubt, familiar with the Hebrew idiom expressing continuance, but he nowhere, outside of the passage in controversy, makes use of it. Does he here? Let us see.

Among the uses of the Hebrew *halak*, to go, Fuerst gives this: "2. A kind of auxiliary verb, expressing the continuance, self-increasing state of the action involved in the verb following, in such a manner as this:" He then cites the Hebrew of the following passages, which I give, first, in the King James Version, then *literally*, and then in the Septuagint and in the Vulgate as follows:

"And the man waxed great, and *went forward and grew*."—Gen. xxvi. 13.

Lit., *went going and increasing*.

Sept., *προβαίνων, μείζων ἐγένετο*.

Vulg., *ibat proficiens atque succrescens*.

The kine "went along the highway, *lowing as they went*."—1 Sam. vi. 12.

Lit., *went going and lowing*.

Sept., *ἐπορεύοντο καὶ ἐχοπίων*, *went and were weary* (apparently mistaking the Hebrew verb for one closely resembling it).

Vulg., *gradiebantur pergentes et mugientes*.

"And it came to pass, as they still *went on and talked*."—2 Kings ii. 11.

Lit., *went going and talking*.

Sept., *ἐπορεύοντο καὶ ἐλάλουν*.

Vulg., *cumque pergerent, et incedentes sermocinantur*.

"And the waters returned from off the earth *continually*."—Gen. viii. 3.

Lit., *going and returning*.

Sept., ἐνεδίδου τὸ ὕδωρ πορευόμενον ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς.

Vulg., reversæque sunt aquæ de terra, *euntes et redeuntes*.

“And the waters *decreased continually*.”—Gen. viii. 5.

Lit., *were going and decreasing*.

Sept., τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ἡλαττονοῦτο.

Vulg., ibant et decrescebant.

“And the Philistine *came on and drew near*.”—I Sam. xvii. 41.

Lit., *went going and drawing near*.

Sept. (This verse is not in the Septuagint.)

Vulg., ibat . . . incedens et appropinquans.

“The noise that was in the host of the Philistines *went on and increased*.”—I Sam. xiv. 19.

Lit., *went going and increasing*.

Sept., ἐπορεύετο πορευόμενος καὶ ἐπλήθυνε.

Vulg., Crescebatque paulatim, et clarius resonabat.

This last passage is the one cited by the Lecturer. The other six are all that are given by Fuerst. Gesenius [Gram., § 131, 3, Rem. 3] and Deutsch [Gram., § 105, 7] cite I Sam. ii. 26, “And the child Samuel grew on, and was in favor.”

Lit., *going* (the participle for the finite verb, *ut sæpissime*)—*was going—went and was great, and was good*.

Sept., ἐπορεύετο, καὶ ἦν ἀγαθόν.

Vulg., proficiebat, atque crescebat, et placebat.

Now it is obvious, on the slightest inspection of the foregoing, that not one of them justifies the Lecturer's rendering of πορευθεὶς ἐκήρυξεν by “he preached *continually*.” To make the Apostle's language parallel to that of the foregoing passages, the participle would have to be changed into a verb, and the verb into a participle, so as to read, not, *going he preached*, but, ἐπορεύετο κηρύσσων, *he went preaching*, or (following the passage cited by the Lecturer), *he went going* (ἐπορεύετο πορευόμενος) *and preaching*. Moreover, and this consideration, of itself, is *fatal* to the Lecturer's theory, in every one of the foregoing passages, whether in Hebrew, or in Greek, or in Latin, *continuance* is, and, by the law

of the language, has to be, expressed in the *unfinished* tense, present or imperfect; whereas S. Peter employs the aorist in his narration, a tense that can by no possibility express "continuance." Here is what one of the Lecturer's authorities, Hadley, says of it, and if the statement had been drawn up for the express purpose of negating the extraordinary interpretation, it could not have been more pat:

705. The aorist is used in narrating past actions, when thought of merely as *events* or *single facts*, without reference to the time they occupied, or to other actions going on at the same time.

And here, equally pat, is what he says of the imperfect tense:

701. The imperfect is used, especially where different past actions are conceived as going on at the *same* time. It is used also in reference to past actions frequently *repeated*, and in reference to past *states* or *conditions*.

So says Hadley, and so they all say.

If S. Peter had only used the imperfect! But he didn't. He knew what he wanted to say; he knew how to say it; and, as there was no one to "muzzle" him (for "Thomas Matthews," to say nothing of his "captions,"* was not yet born), he said it.

In which even to the in-prison spirits going he PREACHED. What did he preach to them? Something that you would not expect. Something that S. Peter thought might *startle* his readers, and against which startling, therefore, he seeks to put them on their guard by interposing a *καί*. And what could that something be but the *Gospel*, the very suggestion of the preaching of which to the disembodied spirits of the antediluvians by the disembodied (human) spirit of our LORD so startles the slaves of the popular theology of the day, and among them the Lecturer? Why, says he [p. 18], they

* *Webster, Unabridged*, after giving the two *legitimate* meanings of *caption*, gives the *bastard* one, "3. The heading of a chapter, section, or page," and adds: "In this sense the word is an Americanism, but is not used by our best writers."

are "the world of the ungodly" [2 Pet. ii. 5], upon whom God "brought in the flood" in the days of Noah; of whom our LORD Himself says, "they were eating and drinking, marrying and giving in marriage, until the day that Noah entered into the ark, and they knew not until the flood came and took them all away;" adding, for our admonition, "so also shall the coming of the SON of man be."

Certainly S. Peter was aware of all this, for he expressly mentions the fact of their disobedience, and yet he says CHRIST preached καὶ τοῖς, κ. τ. λ., *even* to them; or, if you prefer the *inclusive* to the *intensive*—it *must* be one or the other, for "καὶ always belongs to what follows," vid. *Liddell & Scott*, Art. καὶ, sub fin.—*also* to them. Their disobedience in the days of their flesh, and His preaching the gospel to them in their prison two thousand years afterward, are the final cause of the καὶ; had He preached *retribution*, there would have been no occasion for the conjunction—no room for it.

And here let me ask the Lecturer, and those who agree with him, where, on their theory, *is* the room for it? The Divine Spirit of CHRIST, we are told, preached, by the mouth of the patriarch, to the antediluvians then living in the flesh. Certainly. But if that is the preaching meant by S. Peter, why the καὶ? He preached *even* to them. Whom else *should* he preach to, however disobedient, during the one hundred and twenty years of their probation? Whom else *could* he preach to, unless it were to his wife, and his three sons, and their wives? An interpretation that thus evacuates the Apostle's καὶ of all significance writes its own epitaph.

Even to the in-prison spirits going he preached, ἀπειθήσασί ποτε, ὅτε, κ. τ. λ., who disobeyed (or, disbelieved) aforetime, when the long-suffering of God waited in the days of Noah. The Rhemish Version reads, "which had been incredulous sometime;" whereat the Lecturer [p. 17] charges "the makers" of it with "inventing out of nothing the pluperfect." They did nothing of the kind; they simply translated it from the Vulgate, which, in every copy of the passage at hand as I

write, has *fuerant*. Bagster's Octaglot (Anglican) Prayer Book, in which the Epistles and Gospels in the Latin are declared, in the *Ordo Prælegendi Psalterii*, to be taken from the Vulgate, has, in the Epistle for Easter Even, *fuerant*. Du Hamel's "Biblia Sacra Vulgatæ Editionis, Sixti V. et Clementis VIII. Pontif. Max. auctoritate recognita, Venetiis, MDCCXLI. Superiorum Permissu ac Privilegiis," has *fuerant*. S. Jerome himself, the "maker" of the *Vulgate*, as distinguished from the *Itala* [*Opera*, tom. x. col. 838, Ed. Migne], has *fuerant*. Did *he* make it out of nothing, or was the *Itala* the culprit? If the latter, then where *did* the Lecturer get his *fuerunt*? S. Jerome knew *some* Latin and *some* Greek. He had found out (what the Lecturer seems not to be aware of, though it is one of the commonplaces of Greek Syntax, as one of his own authorities, *Hadley* [706 and 717], can inform him, that "the aorist indicative is often used in Greek where the perfect or pluperfect might be used with more exactness;" and that "the aorist participle represents the action as *prior* (italics *Hadley's*) to that of the principal verb in the same sentence." As an instance of the first of these commonplaces, *Hadley* cites the statement that confronts the tiro as he crosses the threshold of that elementary text-book of classic Greek, the *Anabasis* of Xenophon, that "Darius sends for Cyrus from the province of which he had made him (ἐποίησε) Satrap."

Winer [Gram., 7th Ed., Andover, 1869, p. 275] refers to seventeen instances of this use of the aorist where the pluperfect would be more exact, one of these being S. John xiii. 12.

So when he had washed (ὅτε οὖν ἔνιψε) their feet, and taken (ἔλαβε) his garments, and sat down again (ἀνέπεσε πάλιν), he said unto them, Know ye what I have done to you?

Have we here, in the Lecturer's opinion, "a pluperfect tense made out of nothing?" Does he really think that to strike out "had," and change taken to "took," would be an improvement on the passage as idiomatic English?

But whatever he may think of the *possibility* of employing the simple past instead of the pluperfect in translating the above passages into English, howbeit unidiomatic, here is one from Xenophon [*Anab.*, ii. 1, 4] which, by help of the pluperfect, is readily and accurately translated into English, but which, on the Lecturer's principles of interpretation, cannot be translated into it at all:—*εἰ μὴ ὑμεῖς ἦλθετε, ἐπορευόμεθα ἄν ἐπὶ βασιλέα*—“if you had not come, we should (now) be marching against the king.”

So much for the Lecturer's “pluperfect tense made out of nothing” by those naughty “makers of the Rheims Version;” it is equalled only by a counter-exploit of the Lecturer's own; to wit, an aorist made *into* nothing, as thus: “S. Peter's actual language is merely ‘spirits disobedient,’ not, as in our Bible, ‘spirits *which were* disobedient.’ . . . In the expression, ‘spirits disobedient,’ ‘disobedient’ is simply an adjective of *quality*, without either action or time, save ‘the days of Noah’” [p. 16].

Why save them? Does he not know that “an adjective of *quality*,” “simply” such, has in it no expression of time? Had S. Peter meant what the Lecturer *says* he meant, he would have used the *adjective* ἀπειθέσι; but he uses the aorist participle, because *time* is of the *essence* of the participle as differentiated from the adjective (since *all* participles have tense), and time was of the essence of what he wanted to say; to wit, that the disobedience *preceded* the preaching. But the Lecturer, perceiving that this would be fatal to his theory, to wit, that the preaching here spoken of was by the mouth of Noah, and that therefore the disobedience *followed* the preaching, coolly makes the aorist *into* nothing, in other words, *annihilates* it; and with it the relative clause—*qui fuerant* (or *fuerunt*)—*which had been* (or *were*)—by which alone it could be translated into Latin, or into English: “In the original Greek of the passage,” he says—and he says it in five different shapes in as many lines, as if iteration and reiteration could turn his *ipse dixit* into *proof*—“this relative sen-

tence *does not exist*. It is wholly the unlawful creation of the Vulgate. In the English Version, 'which were' is an unauthorised intruder. The relative sentence, 'which were,' is a human (why not diabolical?) invention and interpolation. S. Peter never spoke or wrote the sentence." [p. 16.]

This reminds me of the comment of a Western theological Professor (one whose praise is in the General Convention, and in all the Churches) on a student's translation of *μὴ γένοιτο* by *God forbid*: "There are only two objections to that translation. One is that there is no word meaning *God* in the sentence; the other is that there is no word in it meaning *forbid*." It was a bit of humor on the part of the Professor; but the Lecturer's comment is evidently *bonâ fide* and *con amore*. He cannot abide the relative clause; or rather, he "cannot away with it." "It is iniquity." Goodwin, to be sure, justifies it, in saying [*Greek Moods and Tenses*, § 108], "The Participle, like any other adjective, may qualify a noun. In such expressions it must often be translated by a finite verb and a relative;" but it is an "interpolation," nevertheless. Yes, just as *women* is an interpolation in S. Luke, xvii. 35—*ἔσονται δύο ἀλήθουσαι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό*—There shall be two *women* grinding together. "In the original Greek of the passage" the noun "*does not exist*. It is wholly the unlawful creation of the" Rheims Version. "In the English Version" *women* "is an unauthorised intruder." The noun *women* "is a human invention and interpolation. S. Peter never either spoke or wrote" the word. I am merely applying the lecturer's characterisation of the one passage, *mutatis mutandis*, to the other, the two being, as respects "interpolation," exact parallels, the "interpolation," *so-called*, of the noun in the one, of the relative and the verb in the other, being indispensable to the adequate representation of the original. In truth, there is no *interpolation* in either, the noun being *involved* in the feminine participle in the one, the relative and verb in the aorist active participle in the other; and accordingly, while the King James Version, from over-

scrupulosity, gives the noun (though not the relative clause) in *italics*, the Westminster Revision gives both in Roman ; an indication (shall we say ?) of the Romanising instincts of that naughty revision.

So much for "interpolation." Now for a specimen of argumentation. I take it from page 147 ; and the better to enable the reader to appreciate its force, I give alongside of it, in the right-hand column, an application of it to a part of the very next verse of S. Peter :

The Latin Vulgate, the creation of the second century of the Christian era, translates ἐν φυλακῇ, 1 Peter iii. 19, by *in carcere*.

In the Old Testament, *Sheol*, the Hebrew word for "The place of departed spirits," occurs *thirty-one* times. *Not in a single instance* does the Vulgate translate *Sheol* by *carcer*, but by either *inferum*, *infernium*, or *mors*.

In the New Testament, *Hades*, the Greek word for "The place of departed spirits," is found *eleven* times. In no instance does the Vulgate translate ᾗδης by *carcer*, but by either *inferum*, *infernium*, or *mors*.

Thus *forty-two* opportunities had the Vulgate for translating "The place of departed spirits" by *carcer*. Yet the Vulgate neglects *every opportunity* !

How can we explain this repeated and uniform neglect ?

There is but one possible explanation. In the judgment of the Vulgate, *carcer*, in 1 Peter iii. 19, does not mean "The place of

The Latin Vulgate, as revised by S. Jerome in the fourth century, translates κιβωτὸς, 1 Peter iii. 20, by *arca* (ark).

(I omit the passages in the Old Testament as I find enough, and more than enough, in the New.)

In the New Testament, πλοῖον, the Greek word for "*floating vessel*,"* is found *sixty-five*† times. In no instance does the Vulgate translate πλοῖον by *arca*, but by either *navis*, *navicula*, or *navigium*.

Thus *sixty-five* opportunities had the Vulgate for translating "*floating vessel*" by *arca*. Yet the Vulgate neglects *every opportunity* !

How can we explain this repeated and uniform neglect ?

There is but one possible explanation. In the judgment of the Vulgate, *arca*, in 1 Peter iii. 20, does not mean "*a floating*

* Strictly *a floating vessel*, hence *a ship* or *vessel* in the most general sense . . . ναῦς being a ship of war.—*Liddell & Scott*.

† I omit Rev. xviii. 17, where the true reading is πλέων, and S. Matt. iv. 22, where the Vulgate seems to have read δίκτυα, for it gives *retibus* as the translation.

departed spirits" ; does not mean the invisible world ; does not mean the unseen region, where disembodied souls are reserved unto the Final Judgment.

vessel" ; does not mean a carrying ship ; does not mean a water-craft wherein souls not yet disembodied were saved-through (δυσώθησαν) for Final Vindication.

In Geometry, *reductio ad absurdum* has given place, to a great extent, to more direct methods ; but in "the field of interpretation" it is not yet obsolete.

From the Vulgate the Lecturer passes to "the Syriac Version of the passage," which, as he rightly says, "is in its character a *paraphrase*, and, as such, is rather an explanation than a literal transcript of the Greek text," meaning, I suppose, a literal *rendering*, for a *literal* transcript of *Greek* could hardly be *Syriac*. Accuracy of language is important in an exegete.

One would think it would require no little courage in the Lecturer to undertake to press the Syriac into his service, but he is equal to it. Here is what the Syriac, speaking through the Lecturer's "muzzle," says [*Lect.* p. vi.], and alongside of it, in the right-hand column, what it says unmuzzled.

The Messiah died in body, and yet He lived by the Spirit : and He preached to souls which were being held by Sheol (by moral death), those that aforetime were not obedient in the days of Noah.

He was dead in body, but alive in spirit : and he preached to those souls which were kept in Hades. [Browne : On the Articles, Amer. Ed., p. 101, note.]

Commenting on his "transcript," the Lecturer says [p. 149] :

First of all, the authors of the Syriac Version of 1 Peter, iii. 19 change the term "spirits" into the term "souls." The Syriac translators had a potent reason for this change.

What, in the estimation of the Lecturer, that reason was, I am almost afraid to state in my own words, lest the reader should think I was drawing on his credulity. But as the alternative is to transcribe bodily a whole page [p. 150] of verbiage—"words, words, words," with a vengeance—I must run the risk.

Why, then, according to the Lecturer, did the Syriac change "spirits" into "souls?" Because "souls," as contradistinguished from "*the* souls" (*italics* his), is "invariably" employed (as in 1 Peter iii. 20, "eight souls," Acts vii. 14, "threescore and fifteen souls," etc. etc.) to designate "*persons, even persons alive in this world,*" and it wanted so to designate the "spirits in prison!" *Credat Berkeleianus, non Syrus.*

The reader will have observed that while Browne, in his translation of the passage, gives "*those* souls," the Lecturer, in his, gives simply "souls." It would seem from the foregoing that he had "a potent reason" for it.

In his translation of the Syriac, the Lecturer interpolates, in brackets, the words, "by moral death," as his explanation of "by *Sheol*." And on page 152 he says: "Even *Sheol*, although usually designating 'the place of departed spirits,' can have no such designation (he *means*, 'cannot designate it;') it is another instance of his loose use of language) in the Syriac of 1 Peter iii. 19." Why can it not? Because his theory will not let it. In other words, he begs the question; as he does, also, in rendering the last clause of verse 18th, "by the Spirit," and then adducing it as proof that, in the view of the Syriac, the Greek should be so rendered. There is precisely the same room for differing about the meaning of this part of the Syriac as there is for differing about the meaning of the corresponding part of the Greek; and, therefore, on this point the former can throw no light upon the latter.

Equally unfortunate is the Lecturer in his argument [pp. 154, 155] from the Syriac of Acts ii. 24, that *Sheol*, as there used, signifies "Death *physical*;" for the Syriac read not *θανάτου*, but *ᾗδου*, as did also the Vulgate, the Coptic, the Arabic, Polycarp, and Irenæus; and that is the reading of Codex D. Of course, *Beth* is *instrumental*; for it is the translation of *ἐν*. Equally, of course, *Beth* in the Syriac of 1 Peter iii. 19, is *not* instrumental; for it is the translation of *ἐν*, which, in the phrase *ἐν φυλακῇ*, can no more be instrumental than *in* can in the phrase *in carcere*. The Hebrew *bishol* (*beth*

and *sheol*) occurs three times in the Old Testament: Job xiv. 13—O that thou wouldest hide me in *Sheol*; Psalms vi. 5—In death there is no remembrance of thee: in *Sheol*, who shall give thee thanks? Ecclesiastes ix. 10—There is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in *Sheol*, whither thou goest.

On the second of these passages [Psalms vi. 5] De Burgh, as quoted by Fausset* in his *Critical, Experimental, and Practical Commentary* [Philadelphia: Lippincott], thus comments:

Here and elsewhere [Psalms xxx. 9; cxv. 17, 18; lxxxviii. 10; Is. xxxviii. 18] *death* and the separate state are contemplated in the aspect which they bear to the unpardoned sinner, apart from the influence of redemption: *Death*, with its sting, and *Hades*, viewed as the dark prison-house of spirits reserved unto the judgment, another consequence of sin. But the aspect of both is changed by the fact that CHRIST has encountered death and descended into Hades, by which both are in His power, and are no longer objects of terror [Rev. i. 18]. While, even as regards the redeemed, it is still *the living* who pre-eminently *praise God* [Is. xxxviii. 19], as well those who now live, as those who shall hereafter live again out of death by resurrection. The glory of GOD, in service and testimony, which is the end of man's being, cannot be answered among men in death as in life; and the intermediate state of separation from the body, though blessed, is imperfect, and is one of *rest* rather than of active service; where there is *remembrance* of GOD, but no memorial to His praise. (Fausset adds :) David does not deny consciousness of GOD in *the intermediate state*, but implies that the state of disembodied spirits is one in which the praises which are so grateful to GOD [Psalms l. 23; cf. Heb. xiii. 15], and which are the main end of life, can no longer be rendered by *man in his integrity, body, soul, and spirit, and before his fellow men*.

This will serve as an answer to the allegation [p. 155] that *Sheol*, in Prov. xxiii. 13, 14 (Thou shalt beat him with the rod, and shalt deliver (save) his soul from *Sheol*), means *moral death*, and therefore *may* mean it in the Syriac of 1 Peter iii. 19. There is no warrant for ascribing that meaning to it in either passage. It has the same meaning in Proverbs xxiii. 14 as in Psalms ix. 17—The wicked shall be turned into *Sheol*, and all the nations that forget GOD. If the Lecturer were to meet, in some new Book of Proverbs, this utterance:

* Rector of S. Cuthbert's, York, Eng.

Thou shalt beat him with the rod, and save his manhood from Bridewell, would he say Bridewell is lawlessness? I trow not. Bridewell is the *consequence* of lawlessness. In like manner *Sheol*, in the specific sense, as in Ps. ix. 17 and Prov. xxiii. 14, is the *consequence* of moral death.

The passage in Job [xiv. 13], as it stands in the Septuagint, throws light on the φυλακῇ of S. Peter: εἰ γὰρ ὄφελον ἐν ᾧδῃ με ἐφύλαξας, ἔκρυψας δέ με ἕως ἄν παύσηται σου ἡ ὀργή, καὶ τάξῃ μοι χρόνον ἐν ᾧ μνείαν μου ποιήσῃ—O that thou wouldest hide me in *Sheol* (*Hades*), that thou wouldest keep me secret, until thy wrath be past, that thou wouldest appoint me a set time, and remember me!

The Hebrew word here rendered by ἐφύλαξας—the verb corresponding to the noun φυλακῇ—is *tsaphan*, to *cover about closely*, to *enclose*, to *conceal*, to *protect* [Ps. xxvii. 5];—with *beth* of the *place where* [Psalms xxxi. 21]; *thy hidden ones* [Ps. lxxxiii. 3].—*Fuerst*. Job wishes that GOD would *hide* him, would *cover* him, *protect* him, *shield* him, *keep* him; and the Septuagint expresses this hiding, covering, protecting, shielding, keeping, by ἐφύλαξας, and the *place* of it by *Hades* (*Sheol*). What more natural, then, than that S. Peter should designate this place of *protection* by the noun φυλακῇ, corresponding to the verb ἐφύλαξας?

Having thus compelled the Vulgate and the Syriac to speak “half in the speech of Ashdod” (for he admits that in the other half they are responsible for the naughty “relative sentence”), the Lecturer proceeds to “confirm” these half-utterances of his “muzzled slaves” by “the early Fathers of the Christian Church;” not, indeed, the earliest, for he is aware of certain “strong assertions” [p. 13] of Irenæus, Clement, and Cyril of Alexandria—he might have added, Hermas [*Simil.* iii. 9] and Origen [*Homil.* 35 in *Matt.*], and he is *not* aware of any counter utterance by any Ante-Nicene Father. But he finds, or thinks he finds, two Fathers of the fourth century on his side, one Latin, Hilary of Poitiers, and one Greek, Epiphanius of Salamis.

Here is what Hilary says ; he is commenting on the last verse of the 141st [our 142d] Psalm, Bring my soul out of prison, that I may give thanks unto thy name : Deinde rogat, ut anima sua educatur e carcere. *Si in carcere positus, etiam ante Noe tempora resurrectionem secundum Beatum Petrum Dominus prædicavit* [1 Pet. iii. 19] ; carcer est inferi, a quo se educi rogat. [Migne, *Patr.*]

The part I have given in *italics* is what the Lecturer cites [p. 156], with the reading *exhortationem* in place of *resurrectionem* ; and he translates it, “ Since, according to Blessed Peter, our LORD also before the times of Noah, preached his exhortation to them placed in prison.”

Now, in the first place, *Si* does not mean *Since* ; it means *If*. In the second place, *etiam* does not belong to Dominus ; it belongs to *ante Noe tempora*. In the third place, *exhortationem* (if that is the true reading, which *Migne* maintains it is not) does not here mean *exhortation* ; it means, as we shall presently see, *encouragement, comfort, consolation*. Correctly translated, it runs thus : “ If to imprisoned ones, even before the times of Noah, the LORD, according to S. Peter, preached resurrection.” It will be seen that the sentence is an unfinished one, a protasis without an apodosis. Evidently something is wrong ; for what is here put hypothetically is not, as Hilary (as we shall presently see) was well aware, in fact true. “ Blessed Peter ” does *not* represent our LORD as preaching *before* the times of Noah. One thing, however, Hilary does say categorically, without any “ if ” or but : *carcer est inferi*—“ the prison is hell.” But right there the Lecturer stops short in his quotation, for to have given those three words to his hearers would have spoiled at least a part of the “ instruction,” of which, he tells us, “ Hilary’s words are full ; ” “ for,” says he, “ they affirm :

“ 1. CHRIST’S preaching occurred ‘ *ante Noe tempora*,’ *before* Noah’s times.”

They do not affirm that ; what they affirm is *that* S. Peter SAYS *that*, which the Lecturer knows he doesn’t ; and they affirm *that* only hypothetically.

“ 2. The preaching of CHRIST was addressed to the antediluvians.”

There is the same discrepancy here between the allegation and the fact as in the preceeding.

“ 3. Their prison, since it could not be *material*, is *spiritual*.”

Hilary says, “ The prison is hell ”—*carcer est inferi*. I leave the Lecturer to settle it with Hilary, and to explain to him, for I am sure Hilary will think it *needs* explaining, how he came to stop short at these three words following next upon the words he quoted.

I have said that Hilary is aware that S. Peter, in the passage under consideration, does not represent CHRIST as preaching *before* the days of Noah, or even *in* the days of Noah. Here is his comment on a part of another Psalm, the 82d verse of Psalm 118th (our 119th), “ Mine eyes fail for thy word,” or, as the Prayer Book Version, less literally, but more idiomatically, has it, “ long sore for thy word ; saying, O when wilt thou comfort me ” :

Scit exhortationem hanc sanctos quiescentes in inferno desiderare. Scit, testante Apostolo Petro, descendente in inferna Domino, etiam his qui in carcere erant, et increduli quondam fuerunt in diebus Noe, exhortationem prædicatam fuisse [1 P. iii. 19 et 20.]—[Migne, Patr. ix., Hilar. tom. prior, col. 372, 373.]

“ (The soul) knows that the saints resting in Hades long for this comfort.* It knows, on the witness of the Apostle Peter, that on the descent of the LORD into hell comfort was preached even to those who were (at that time) in prison, and who had aforetime, in the days of Noah, been† unbelieving.”

So much for the “ expositions ” of Hilary. I think I may safely bid the Lecturer welcome to all the consolation he can get out of them.

We now come to Epiphanius, from whom the Lecturer [p. 158] quotes the following :

Μυστήριον ὁ ἀπαθὴς λόγος, παθὼν ἐν σαρκὶ δι’ ἡμᾶς,

* Consolation, encouragement ; a common meaning of *exhortatio*. See the Lexicons.

† It is simply impossible to translate *fuerunt* into English in this passage so as to preserve the distinction between it and *erant*, by any other tense than the pluperfect ; the *finished* tense cannot be contemporary with the unfinished.

μένει δὲ ἐν ἀπαθείᾳ, ὡς λέγει Πέτρος, θανατωθεὶς μὲν σαρκί,
ζωοποιηθεὶς δὲ πνεύματι.
and he thus translates:

Mystery :—The impassible Logos, while suffering in the flesh, yet remains in impassivity : as saith Peter, Put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit. [Lib. i. 25, p. 448.]

I have given an exact transcript of the original and the translation, with the punctuation, or want of punctuation, as it stands on his page. His translation is incorrect, in that he makes the aorist participle παθὼν synchronise with the present indicative μένει, and he again begs the question in making πνεύματι the dative of *instrument*.

Wishing to see the passage in its context, and there being no copy of Epiphanius in the library here, I wrote to a clergyman in Baltimore, a scholar and a theologian,—one of the three Examining Chaplains lately appointed by Bishop Paret, and whose contribution to the January number of this REVIEW speaks for itself—requesting him to look up the passage for me in the Whittingham or the Peabody library. He accordingly made search in the *Cologne* edition with Notes by Dionysius Petavius Aurelianensis, in the Whittingham library, and in that of Migne [Patrol. t. 41–43] in the Peabody; but without success. “I have searched,” he writes, “pretty carefully the three tomes, and cannot verify his (the Lecturer’s) reference.” *How* “carefully,” may be judged from the fact that he has found, in one or the other of the two editions, no fewer than six passages citing and expounding the declaration of S. Peter. I here translate them into English, appending the Greek where it bears directly on the points at issue.

For the great Coryphæus of the Apostles, Peter, interprets for you the question (ὑπόθεσις) of his death, saying, θανατωθεὶς . . . πνεύματι; for his Godhead having taken upon itself to suffer in the flesh, impassive is, and impassive was, and impassive remains, the impassivity unchanged, the eternity not trenched upon. [*Ed. Colon.* vol. ii. p. 40.]

And again : θανατ. . . πνεύματι, καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς. He is crucified, buried, goes down into the underworld (εἰς τὰ καταχθόνια), in Godhead and in soul (ἐν θεότητι καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ), leads captivity captive, and rises again the third day with (σὺν) the holy Spirit (a mistake for *body*; see

next paragraph) itself, uniting the body to the Godhead, nevermore to be sundered, nevermore to suffer, nevermore to be dominated by death, as saith the Apostle [Rom. vi. 9], Death hath no more dominion over him. [Migne, t. 42, col. 849, 851.]

"There is a similar passage," writes the clergyman above mentioned, "*word for word* (*italics* his), in t. 41, col. 276, except that ζωογονηθεὶς is given in place of ζωοποιηθεὶς, and τριήμερος is rendered τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ, and τῷ ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι is given τῷ ἁγίῳ σώματι. The Latin translation in both cases is *cum sanctissimo suo CORPORE*." Evidently the true reading is, ἀνίσταται τριήμερος σὺν αὐτῷ τῷ ἁγίῳ σώματι, συνενώσας τὸ σῶμα τῇ θεότητι—he rises again the third day *together with* his body; not *together with the* Holy Spirit Himself; with his body *itself*, his *very* body, uniting this body with the Godhead. The substitution of ζωογονηθεὶς, in this last-mentioned passage, shows how Epiphanius understood ζωοποιηθεὶς; for ζωογονηθεὶς, in the only passages in which it occurs in the New Testament, clearly means *save alive*, as in S. Luke xvii. 33, Whosoever shall lose his life, shall preserve it, *lit.* (see Margin of Westminster Revision), *save it alive*; Acts vii. 19, to the end they might not live, *lit.* be *saved alive*; and 1 Tim. vi. 13 (whichever is the true reading), who *preserveth all things alive*; so the Westminster Margin and Robinson's Lexicon. There is an evident allusion in it to the passage already quoted by me from Nehemiah ix. 6. After quoting 1 Peter iii, 18, and other texts, writes my authority, this follows:

Not Simon the Cyrenian is our life, but He who suffered for us, that He might loose our sufferings, and, dying in the flesh, might become the death of death, that He might crush the sting of death, going down into the underworld (τὰ καταχθόνια) that He might break in sunder the adamantine bolts. Which having done, He brought again the captivity of souls, and emptied hell, ἀνήγαγε τῶν ψυχῶν τὴν αἰχμαλωσίαν, ἐκένωσε τε τὸν ᾗδην. [Migne, t. 41, col. 320.]

For a suffering CHRIST is preached to us and believed on by us, not as having suffered in Himself (οὐ καθ' ἑαυτὸν παθὼν), nor that He who suffered is one, and the LORD another, nor yet that the Godhead suffered; but our LORD JESUS CHRIST suffered, the Godhead remaining unchanged and impassive, suffering nevertheless, and yet remaining impassive. For, if CHRIST died for us, and really died, not the Godhead died, but He died in the flesh, according to that which is said, θανατωθεὶς . . . δὲ τῷ πνεύματι; and again [1 Pet. iv. 1], CHRIST having suffered in the flesh for us. [Migne, t. 42, col. 688, 689.]

But though Paul writes, JESUS CHRIST the same yesterday, to-day, and forever, yet the impassive, incorporeal LOGOS of GOD was in a circumcised body, a body handled, taking food, tiring, nailed to the tree, suffering. And this body was lying in the sepulchre, when Himself went to preach even to the in-prison spirits (τοῦτο ἦν ἐν τῷ μνημείῳ τεθεῖν ὅτε αὐτὸς ἐπόρευθη κηρύξαι καὶ τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασιν), as saith Peter. Which especially shows the folly of those who say that the Logos was changed to bones and flesh; for, if it had been, there would have been no need of a sepulchre; for the body itself would have gone by itself to preach to the in-*Hades* spirits—αὐτὸ γὰρ ἂν ἐπορεύθη δι' ἑαυτοῦ τὸ σῶμα κηρύξαι τοῖς ἐν τῷ ᾗδῃ πνεύμασι; but now Himself went to preach, and

the body Joseph, having wrapped in linen, laid away in the Golgotha ; and it was shown to all that the body was not the LOGOS, but was of the LOGOS. [*Haeres.* lxxvii. 7, *Ed. Colon.* vol. i. p. 1002].

So, then, the Lecturer's second and only remaining fourth century witness turns against him, affirming that the prison is *Hades*, and that the preaching was by the Godhead and the human soul, while the body lay in the grave.

His next witness is S. Augustine, in the fifth century, whom he represents as a brother dogmatiser, which he is very far from being, as witness the following from his Epistle to Enodius, already cited :

Considera tamen ne *forte* totum illud quod de conclusis in carcere spiritibus, qui in diebus Noe non crederant (mark the pluperfect), Petrus Apostolus dicit omnino ad Inferos non pertineat, sed ad illa potius tempora, quorum formam ad hæc tempora transtulit. "Consider, however, whether *perhaps* all that which the Apostle Peter says about the shut-up-in-prison spirits, who in the days of Noah *had* not believed, may not pertain at all to the disembodied spirits, but rather to those times whose mould (form, pressure) he has transferred to these times."

And in the second sentence of this same letter, immediately following the one quoted (in part) by me at the opening of this article, he says : Replico ergo tibi eandem quæstionem, ut, sive ipse potueris, sive aliquem qui possit inveneris, auferas de illa atque finias *dubitationem meam*. "I throw back, then, on you the same question, that, if you can yourself, or can find anybody else that can, you may remove and put an end to *my* *doubt* about it."

That will do, I think, for S. Augustine.

These hesitating, halting utterances of three of the Fathers of "the early Church," offset, as they are, by counter utterances of their contemporaries, Athanasius, Ambrose, Jerome, Cyril of Alexandria,* and by counter

* See the extracts from these authorities in *Browne*. The simple fact that the Fathers were wont to appeal to this passage of S. Peter in refutation of the Apollinarian heresy, which denied that our LORD had a human soul, shows how they understood it.

utterances of their own, cannot countervail the unhesitating, unhalting utterances of the Fathers of the earlier Church, the Church of the first three centuries, Hermas, Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Origen; especially as there are absolutely no counter utterances extant of theirs, or of any of their contemporaries.

Next we have [p. 157] the *names* of five "medieval writers:" "Bede, the Venerable, eighth century; Rabanus Maurus and Walafrid Strabo, ninth century; Anselm, eleventh century; Nicholas of Lyra, fourteenth century;" to which he adds [p. 159], "Œcumenius, tenth century," and [p. 160] "Theophylact, twelfth century." From each of these last two the Lecturer gives an extract, and these extracts are undoubtedly on his side, without any *if* or *but*. Unfortunately, however, so far as their *testimony* is concerned, they come a thousand years too late.

"We now enter," says the Lecturer [p. 160], "the happy period in which, by God's great mercy, the Church of England *acquires* mind, voice, literature, faith, worship, life (? ζωοποιηθεῖς), testimony, of her own." Alas for the poor Church of England, that, according to the Lecturer, was, before this "happy period," without even a "mind" of her own! And this is the way he defends his Mother! *Non defensoribus istis*.

"The English reformers," he goes on, "most firmly retain and authoritatively perpetuate the explanation of 1 Peter iii. 18, 19 they inherited from the Vulgate, the Syriac, the early Fathers, and the mediæval writers," every one of whom, except the last mentioned, are, as we have seen, dead against him.

The first he brings forward of these inheritors is John Wiclif.

Now I am aware that Wiclif was the Morning Star of the English Reformation, but I do not exactly see how he comes in the Reformation period, while "Nicolas of Lyra," who as clearly heralded the continental,*

* Si Lyra non lyrasset,
Lutherus non saltasset.

and who lived a century later, comes in the medieval. But here is his translation :

Made dede in fleisch, but made quyk in spirit : for which thing he cam in spirit, and also to hem that werun closid togidre in prisoun prechid, whiche werun sumtyme unbileeful whanne thei abideden the paciens of god in the dayes of noye, whan the schip was made.

This translation of Wiclif's (except in "made quyk," which is equally patient of either rendering) is in the teeth of the Lecturer's. Wiclif has, in both instances, *in spirit*, not *by the Spirit*. The *werun* SUMTYME (the exact equivalent of our *aforetime*), like the *πότε* of the original, is *appended*, to show who they were that were "prechid" to, and what they were in prison for, and, therefore, necessarily precedes (chronologically) the preaching. On the title-page of Liddell and Scott's Greek Lexicon we read : "Robert Scott, M.A., Prebendary of Exeter, *Sometime* Student of Christ Church, and *Late* Fellow of Balliol College." This is cited in *Webster* as authority for the definition, "At a past time indefinitely referred to ; once ; formerly." The two *werun*'s, so far as themselves are concerned, might be contemporary, but the *sumtyme* appended to the latter *compels* its chronological precedence of the former.

Next we come [p. 161] to *three* Bibles which, says the Lecturer, "we desire to place in high prominence—the Bible of Thomas Matthews, A.D. 1537, the Bishops' Bible, A.D. 1568, and the Bible of King James I., A.D. 1611.

"The Bible of Thomas Matthews has *captions* (he means *headings* ; this for your information, reader, whose mother-tongue is English) *to the chapters*, explaining (he means *declaring*) their contents. We can be familiar with these captions of Matthews, as they still appear in all the larger editions of our present English Bible. (How about the smaller editions of our present American Bible—the Bible of the poor ? Why are they deprived of the 'benefits' of these wonderful *captions*, that might help them to *seize* the meaning of what they read ?)

His caption of 1 Peter iii. 19 is a declaration most remarkable and most important. Many persons may read it with surprise that it has so long escaped their notice. We would write its words in letters of fire, that the truth the declaration holds forth may catch all eyes, enlighten all minds, and engrave itself on all hearts.

And what, in the name of all the captions, and captations, and captivations, is this wonderful declaration, that so thunders in the index? Really a very harmless one. "The ancient and ever-living caption is this: 'He (Peter) declareth the benefits of CHRIST to the old world,'" meaning thereby "nothing else than *the antediluvians*."

And is it *this* that "many persons may read with surprise that it has so long escaped their notice?" The "caption" may have escaped their notice, especially if it isn't in their Bible; but the thing "explained" in the "caption"—how could it escape their notice, when it lies on the very face of the narrative? Antediluvians? Of course, they were. Did they not live "in the days of Noah, while the ark was a preparing?" And was not that before the flood? And is not an antediluvian, according to Webster and all other lexicographers, "one that lived before the deluge, or flood?" And had they ceased, in S. Peter's day, to be antediluvians? And are they not *now* antediluvians? Are they not *now* men that lived before the flood? The question is not about the *fact* of CHRIST's benefits to the antediluvians; the question is, When and where those benefits were conferred; whether on earth, in the days of Noah, or in "the place of departed spirits, between the Crucifixion and the Resurrection;" and on that point Thomas Matthews is silent.

The Bishops' Bible is undoubtedly on the Lecturer's side, and that most emphatically: "*By the which: CHRIST being from the beginning head and governour of His Church, came in the daies of Noah, not in bodie, which then he had not, but in spirit, and preached by the mouth of Noe for the space of one hundred and twenty yeres to the disobedient, that would not repent*" [p. 162].

The Lecturer could not wish for more emphatic language. If it were only S. Peter's! *If*.

The principal versions in the languages of Southern Europe all unite with Augustine, with the mediæval writers, and with King James's Bible in pronouncing πνεύματι both instrumental and divine. *French* Bible, Paris, A.D. 1805: *Par* l'Esprit. *Spanish*, A.D. 1872: *Por* el Espíritu. *Spanish*—Baptist version, A.D. 1858: *Por* el Espíritu. *Portuguese*, A.D. 1871: *No* Espírito. *Italian*, A.D. 1871: *Per* lo Spirito [p. 160].

A most slovenly *array*! Who knows who was the translator in each case; whether some French, or Spanish, or Portuguese, or Italian? The Portuguese is evidently by a *Scholar*, who is too conscientious to let his theology "muzzle" his exegesis; for *No* (pron. *noo*) is simply the contracted combination of the preposition *in* with the article *o*, and means not *by* the, but *in* the; by no usage known to the Portuguese language can it express instrumentality.

We come last to the Epistle for Easter Even, containing this very passage of S. Peter. Why did the compilers of the First Prayer Book of King Edward assign this portion of Holy Scripture to Easter Even, when it was not so assigned in any other Christian Liturgy then extant? Because, says the Lecturer [p. 164], "Easter Even was the great season for administering Christian Baptism," and "in 1 Peter iii. 21 this Apostle magnifies the value of this Sacrament." He is sure it was *not* because it speaks of the preaching to the spirits in prison.

The compilers of the First Prayer Book of Edward VI. were the contemporaries and coadjutors of the translators of the Early English Bibles, and in several instances were *the same individuals*. The compilers of this Prayer Book did not adopt 1 Peter iii. 17–22 as the Epistle for Easter Even in order to teach the mission of the human spirit of CHRIST, between His death and resurrection, to disembodied souls. The compilers believed in no such mission.

The utter recklessness of this last assertion is paralleled only by that about the figurative meaning of *in carcere*. Did the Lecturer never read the Third of the original Forty-two Articles of 1552? If not, then, if he

will only turn to the second paragraph of Article V. of Pearson on the Creed, and the note appended thereto, he may read it both in Latin and in English :

Nam corpus usque ad resurrectionem in sepulchro jacuit, Spiritus ab illo emissus cum spiritibus qui in carcere sive in Inferno detinebantur fuit, illisque prædicavit, ut testatur Petri locus, etc.

The body of CHRIST lay in the grave until His resurrection : but His spirit, which He gave up, was with the spirits which were detained in prison, or in hell, and preached to them, as the place in S. Peter testifieth.

Pearson adds, in the note, " Which place (of S. Peter) was also made use of in the Exposition of the Creed contained in the Catechism set forth by the authority of King Edward, in the seventh year of his reign."

After this, can *anything* from the Lecturer in the way of point-blank denial of *fact* astonish us ?

But I have not yet quite done with the Lecturer's *exegesis* :

We are all familiar with 1 Peter iv. 6, as it stands in King James's Version : " The gospel was preached to them that are dead (Why does he leave out the *also*—Westminster Revision *even*—before 'to them'?) that they might be judged according to men in the flesh, but live according to God in the spirit.

The Greek of the passage requires and justifies (Why "and justifies?" If it requires, of course it justifies. Words, *words*) this new translation :

The gospel is preached to them that are dead in sin, that they may be condemned as individual men for their sinful flesh, but may live according to the will of GOD by His SPIRIT.

κατὰ ἀνθρώπων, man by man, *not* κατὰ ἄνθρωπον, according to man, is the opening key to this verse. [pp. 8, 9.]

"New translation" indeed, and with a vengeance! Was ever such translation heard of, or dreamed of, in Christendom before? Because κατὰ ἀνθρώπων means sometimes *man by man*, it must mean that here, where it is in antithesis to κατὰ θεόν!—and then that omission of the καὶ before νεκροῖς, and that interpolation of "in sin," making it read (with the καὶ restored), "The Gos-

pel is preached *even* (or *also*) to them that are dead in sin." Why, of course. To whom *should* the Gospel be preached, if not to those that are dead in sin? If that were the meaning of the Apostle, why the *καὶ, also, even*? The Lecturer felt the force of this consideration, and so he left out the *also*, not only in his "new translation," but in his transcript of the old one.

The word Peter in the Greek never means a "rock," but simply a precious stone, a small gem, called "a white stone," Rev. ii. 17, where its gift by CHRIST is a token of His love. . . . This is the full extent of the signification of each of these names (Cephas, Peter), Thou art precious to me, Thou art dear to me, Thou art greatly beloved by me. [p. 15.]

This is not only "the full extent," but a great deal more than the full extent. Πέτρος, either in New Testament or in Classic Greek, never means a precious stone. It means simply a common stone, such as you may pick up on the highway, or in the fields, as is indicated by its derivative τὸ πετρῶδες, the stony ground, and by our word *petrification*. There are in Greek several words, or phrases, for *precious stone*; as, λιθάριον, λιθεία, λίθος τίμιος, ψῆφος; but πέτρος is *not* one of them.

In the Latin language, the verb *est*, "is," Matt. xxvi. 26; hoc *est* corpus meum, does not, like the Greek verb ἔστι, "is," in the same passage, mean *represents*, symbolises, . . . , but *est* indicates identity. . . . Thus the Latin *est*, "is," Matt. xxvi. 26, introduces Transubstantiation; while the Greek ἔστι, "is," in the same place, rejects the dogma. [p. 15.]

So, then, when one of the interlocutors in Plautus [Stich. 5, 4, 49] says to another, *Ego tu sum, tu es ego: unanimes sumus*, he means, I am transubstantiated into you; you are transubstantiated into me: we are unanimous. And when Jerome says [Rev. i. 20], *Candelabra septem, septem Ecclesiæ sunt*, he either means, The seven candlesticks are transubstantiated into seven churches, or he does not know his mother-tongue, and the Lecturer came on the stage fifteen hundred years too late

to teach it to him ; else, the world might have been spared the dogma of Transubstantiation !

That will do, I think, for exegesis. A specimen or two of the Lecturer's *logic*, and I have done.

I have just repeated the remarkable declarations of Bishops Horsey and Wordsworth and Canon Cook [about 1 Peter iii. 18]. There is a *contrary judgment* in this very case, even the free and open profession of *these very men themselves*.

They are all dignitaries in the Church of England. (Mark the links in the argument, reader.) They promised to observe the Canons of their Church. These Canons, adopted A.D. 1603, appoint the *Bishops' Bible*, published A.D. 1563, to be read in *all churches throughout the kingdom*.

The *Bishops' Bible* in express words condemns the explanation of S. Peter by these very dignitaries. . . .

The Canons of the Church of England have never been repealed. [pp. 4, 5.]

Let us put this argument into syllogistic shape :

Major.—The Bishops' Bible puts a certain interpretation on a certain passage of S. Peter.

Minor.—The Bishops' Bible is appointed by Canon to be *read in church* by these dignitaries ; which, by the way, it isn't, as we shall presently see.

Conclusion.—These dignitaries, when they write commentaries, or preach sermons, are bound to interpret S. Peter as the Bishops' Bible interprets him.

I have said the Bishops' Bible is *not* appointed by the Canon to be read in the churches. Here is the Canon as given by the Lecturer himself [pp. 162, 168,] and his comment on it :

Canon 80 has this injunction : "If any parishes be yet unfurnished of the *Bible of the largest volume*, the Church Wardens shall provide the same at the charge of the parish."

The Canons of the Church of England became the law of that Church A.D. 1603. The Bible called King James's did not appear till A.D. 1611, *eight years after*. This difference of dates establishes this fact : "The Bible of the largest volume" . . . was the *Bishops' Bible*, folio . . . 1576.

So then, a Canon containing an "injunction" whose *sole* object was to secure the placing of a folio Bible in

those churches that were yet "unfurnished of" one, is made by the Lecturer to enact a certain interpretation of a certain passage of S. Peter, and to bind that interpretation on the conscience of every Bishop, canon, clergyman, and layman [p. 5], "throughout the British Empire."

Now mark the consequence of all this. Taking the Lecturer's interpretation of the Canon as the true one, it is the bounden duty of every Church Warden in the British Empire to oust the King James Bible from the parish church, and put the Bishops' Bible back into its place of honor. Again:

The Bible of King James I., A.D. 1611, contains the caption to 1 Peter iii. 18, 19, which first appeared in the Bible of Thomas Matthews, A.D. 1537. For nearly three centuries has King James's Bible itself, in its larger volumes, held this declaration before the world. Millions of copies of this Bible have been published in England and these United States by private individuals, by associated firms, by the British and Foreign Bible Society, and by the American Bible Society. All these copies innumerable have been continually repeating and displaying this caption: "The Apostle Peter declareth CHRIST's benefits toward the old world."

If the reader does not have a hearty laugh over this, it will be because he thinks it too melancholy to laugh over. It reminds us irresistibly of a certain occasion when, at the instigation of those "of like occupation," the multitude "with one voice about the space of two hours cried out, Great is Diana of the Ephesians." Of course, after this, Diana *was* great.

But let us avail ourselves of the opportunity offered us by the Lecturer to give a lesson in "*applied* logic."

In the King James Version of our LORD's denunciation of the scribes and Pharisees [Matt. xxiii.], we read [v. 24]: Ye blind guides, which strain at a gnat, and swallow a camel.

For nearly three centuries has the King James Bible . . . held this *denunciation* before the world. Millions of copies . . . have been published. . . . All these copies innumerable have been continually repeating and displaying "strain *at*." If the Greek says, "strain *out*," as every one who has read it knows it does, so much

the worse for the Greek. Greece is a little kingdom ; England is a big one.

“ Constituted as are the Government and Church of England,” says the Lecturer [pp. 164, 165] in continuation of his argument (and he says it in answer to the question, “ Have these incessantly reiterated proclamations of the Thomas Matthews Bible, and the Bishops’ Bible, and the King James Bible) uttered in our hearing, and these perpetually conspicuous records before our sight, now any authority ? ” “ Constituted as are the Government and Church of England, ecclesiastical enactments are expressions, records, publications, perpetuations of the national mind. While the nation remains unaltered, its mind remains.

In the social and Christian systems into which GOD at our birth brings us, our individual consent to these existing institutions is not essential to the creation in us of personal obligation and obedience. These are the productions of GOD Himself. Since, from Him, they impose upon us their own authority and create our duty.

Ergo—Every man, woman, and child, who has chanced to be born into “ the social and Christian systems ” of the British Empire, is bound in conscience to swallow the “ strain *at*,” though to one who knows the Greek, the swallowing of the camel would be a trifle in comparison.

Here is a *Sorites*, but whether Aristotelian or Goclenian, I think, would puzzle even the Archbishop of York to determine :

“ Great is thy *mercy toward* me, and thou hast delivered my soul from the lowest *Sheol*.

“ Mercy *toward* is forgiveness. Without *sin* forgiveness is impossible. *Sheol*, therefore, in this passage, is *a state of sin*.

“ But a state of sin is *a process* [‘ Add sin to sin ’—James v. 1]. A process of sin is a *habit of sin*. *Sheol* figurative is thus demonstrated to be *the habit of sin*.” [p. 155.]

Was ever cumulus on cumulus more felicitously piled up ?

It remains to give the Lecturer's new *Article*—Forty save one are not enough for him—*Articulus Bisextus*, his Second-Sixth Article “for the establishing of Consent touching true Religion.”

“The *opposite* of this assertion of our Sixth Article of religion, ‘Whatsoever is not read in Holy Scripture, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man that it should be believed as an article of the Faith,’ is *most true*; namely, Whatsoever is read in Holy Scripture, or may be proved by it, is *required of every man to be believed as an article of the Faith*.” (p. 165.)

A word, in conclusion, on the province of theology in exegesis. When the original Greek or Hebrew admits of two interpretations, the analogy of the Faith may legitimately determine between them; when it admits of but one, that one must be *adhered to*. In such case, it is the *theology* that wants revising, not the *interpretation*.

E. J. STEARNS.

ERRATA.

Page 126, line 9, for *agreed* read *agrees*.

- " 127, " 9, for *Michael* read *Michel*.
- " 137, " 4, for *bonds* read *bounds*.
- " 142, " 22, for *or* read *and*.
- " 148, " 15, for *repressing* read *expressing*.
- " 159, " 15, for *six* read *five*.
- " 159, " 25, delete *by even any definiteness of aim or policy*.
- " 159 (Note at foot), add, *In the case alluded to the strong words were supported by some action, but not by the "vigorous discipline" deemed by the writers to be worthy of the "Apostolic Church."*
- " 161, line 26 and line 30, for *toleration* read *tolerance*.
- " 163, " 36, insert comma after *excuse*.
- " 163, " 36, for *protest* read *protect*.
- " 170, " 8, for *thoughts* read *thought*.
- " 181, " 15, for *imperfect* read *important*.
- " 186, " 19, after *dissatisfied* insert *of*.
- " 187, " 8, after *and* insert *do*.
- " 190, " 28, for *there* read *then*.
- " 192, " 31, for *generally* read *severally*.
- " 193, " 11, after 1883 insert *formed*.
- " 194, " 1, for 1886 read 1884.
- " 194, " 21, for *baseless* read *careless*.
- " 195, " 20 and 34, for *Constitution* read *Construction*.
- " 200, " 24, for *party* read *hasty*.
- " 424, line 19, for *creations* read *creatures*.
- " 424, " 27, for *implicitly* read *impliedly*.
- " 424, " 34, delete *co-tempore*.
- " 426, " 21, insert quotation marks before "*prepared*."
- " 426, " 36, insert quotation marks after *daughter*."
- " 429, " 2, delete *co-tempore*.
- " 430, " 1, for *assured* read *assumed*.
- " 432, " 31, for *their* read *third*.
- " 433, " 9, for *Conventions* read *Convention*.
- " 433, " 38, for *foremost* read *most*.
- " 434, " 14, for *votes* read *vote*, and insert *entire* before the latter word.
- " 434, " 16, for *were* read *was*.
- " 435, " 38, delete *that is*.
- " 436, " 21, insert quotation marks before "*is* and after *free*."
- " 436, " 26, for *organised* read *constituted*, and delete *she was not an organised diocese*.
- " 438, " 12, for *penalties* read *penalty*.
- " 440, " 19, for *of* read *or*.
- " 440, " 38, for *creation* read *creature*.
- " 446, " 21, for *because* read *for*.
- " 450, " 38, for *is* read *are*.
- " 455, " 12, for *cestui* read *cestuis*.

INDEX TO VOL. XLV.

ABS

ABSOLUTE (The), Spencer on, 113-114
 Admonition, rule of, 152-153 ; need of, 170-172
 Ælfric's Vocabulary, 541
 African Church, 212-216
 Agnosticism the same as Atheism, 122-123 ; vindication of knowledge against, 456, 461
 Allies, Rev. T. W., on S. Cyprian, 215 ; the Pope's supremacy, 231-232 ; case of Apiarius, 249-250
 America, outlook for toleration in, 159-160
 American Book of Common Prayer, 1-60
 American Catholic Church, 8 ; *see also* Protestant Episcopal
 American Church law, relation of English to, 78-96
 American churches in Europe as examples of Christian unity, 379
American Literary Churchman, on the Greek schism and that of the English Church, 251-252
 American Roman Catholics, 262-263
 Anarchists in the Church, 163-164
 Andrea d'Altagene, Fra, sketch of his life, 98-99
 Andrews, Judge, power of the diocese, 434-435, 450
 Anglican Church, *see* English Church
 Annihilation, *see* Resurrection
 Another view of natural law in the spiritual world, 390-414
 Apiarius, case of, 248-249
 Apocrypha on the use of wine, 330-331
 Apostolic succession, 223-228, 309-310
 Apostolicity of the Roman Church, 271-274 ; of the English Church, 281-282

BUC

Articles of Religion, standard edition of, 12
 Atheism the same as Agnosticism, 122-123
 Augustine, S., his share in the conversion of England, 306 ; on "spirits in prison," 556
 Authority and conscience, 346-358
BAPTISED, Use of Burial Office for, 9-10
 Baptism for the dead, 549-555
 Basil the Great, on the Pope's supremacy, 234, 236
 Beach, Rev. Abram, organization of National Church, 429
 Bible, scope and limits of toleration in, 150-152 ; inspiration of, 515-539
 Bible wines, *see* Communion wine
 Bibliography of early editions of the American Prayer Book, 59
 Biology in the spiritual world, 392-414
 Birth, natural and spiritual, 403-409
 Bishops, consecration of, 223-228 ; jurisdiction of, 202-208, 211-212, 238-255, 307-309. *See also* Apostolic, Diocese, Episcopate
 Blakeslee, S. V., government and conscience, 147-148
 Bonn Conferences as examples of Christian unity, 380
 Book of Common Prayer, *see* Prayer Book
 Bossuet, on the Pope's supremacy, 231-232 ; royal power over Bishops, 257
 Bouix, D., on schism, 222
 Bradlaugh, on atheism, 122-123
 Bright, Dr., on the conversion of England, 306
 Browne, Harold, on toleration, 132-133
 Buckle, on toleration, 126, 134

BUR

- Burgh, de, on the future state, 577
 Burgwin, Hill, The National Church and the Diocese, 423-455
 Burial Office, its use for unbaptised, 9-10
 Burke, on the English Church, 201
- C**AIRD, Dr. John, on the organic development of Christianity, 75-76; on organic unity, 465
 Campbell, J. McLeod, on toleration, 175
 Campello, Rev. Count Enrico di, his request to be received into the Anglican Communion, 97-98
 Canon law, *see* Church law
 Capel (Monsignor) again; 202-260; Dr. John Fulton to, 261-316
 Carlyle, Thos., his protest against the theory of quackery in reference to paganism, 64; on toleration, 134
 Catholic Church, *see* English, Italian, National, Protestant Episcopal, Roman, Scottish
 Catholic unity, Restoration of, 372-389; *see also* Unity
 Celibacy, sacerdotal, 268-271
 Censure of the press, 148
 Chalcedon, decree of Council of, 275-276
 Christianity, Philosophy and, 456-476; *see also* Religion
 Chrysostom, S., the Pope's supremacy, 235
 Church law, Relation of English to American, 78-96
 Civil law, its analogy with Church law, 79-87
 Clarke, J. Freeman, his "Ten great religions," 73
 Clarke, Joseph M., Inspiration of the Bible, 525-530
 Clement, on heathen religions, 66-67
 Coleman, Leighton, Lives of Bishops Jolly and Gleig, 415-422
 Colenso, Dr., intolerance in case of, 158

EMO

- Columella, on wine of the ancients, 339-340
 Communion Table, North side changed to right side in Prayer Book of 1832, 37-44
 Communion wine, 317-345
 Comparative religion, Method of, 61-77
 Conscience, Government and, 144-150; Authority and, 346-358
 Consecration of a Church, Standard edition of form of, 12
 Convention, Prayer for, Standard edition of, 12
 Cooper, Thomas, on Atheism, 122
 Criminal law, its analogy with Church law, 85-88, 93
 Curci, Padre, separation between him and Monsignor Savarese, 100
 Cyprian, S., on jurisdiction and infallibility, 212-216; the Church founded upon the Episcopate, 228, 229; the Pope's supremacy, 291-293
 Cyril, S., the Pope's supremacy, 293-294
- D**EAD, Baptism for the, 549-555
 DeKoven, Dr., on toleration, 124-125
 Dictionary, Stormonth's English, 540-548
 Diocese, National Church and, 423-455
 Dix, Dr. Morgan, on toleration, 124
 Douglas, George William, Authority and conscience, 346-358
 Drummond, Professor Henry, his "Natural law in the spiritual world," 390-414
 Du Perron, Anguetil, opens to Europe Persian literature, 62
- E**CCLESIASTICAL law, *see* Church law
 Editions of the American Prayer Book, Standard, 11-58
 Emott, Hon. James, on modifications in the Prayer Book, 198-200; Memoir of, 359-371

EMP

Empiricism, 461, 464
 England, outlook for toleration in, 157-158
 English Church, Monsignor Capel on history of, 255-258; tests of Catholicity of, 278-283
 English Church law, its relation to American, 78-96
 English dictionary, Stormonth's, 540-548
 English Prayer Book the basis of the American one, 1, 2; peculiarities of early editions, 17-20
 Episcopate in the Roman Church, 272-273; *see also* Bishops
 Ethics, Christian, 474-475
 Ettmüller's Anglo-Saxon dictionary, 541
 Evans, Hugh Davy, authority of the diocese, 434
 Evolution of religion, Organic, 66-77
 Excommunication of the Greek and English Churches, 252-254

FAUSSET, on the future state, 577
 Ffoulkes, Rev. E. S., the Pope's supremacy, 232-233; on schisms, 252-253
 Firmilian, S., on jurisdiction and infallibility, 216-217
 Foley, Rev. George C., Herbert Spencer's plea for religion, 113-123
 Franklin, B., Inspiration of the Bible, 515-524
 Free-religionists, riot of, 166-167
 Free thought, 469
 Fuller, Rev. Samuel, his Defense of "The Spirits in Prison," 556-593
 Fulton (Dr. John) to Monsignor Capel, 261-316; on dioceses, 426
 Future punishment, 478
 Future state, 556-593, *see also* Immortality

GAVAZZI, Father, on fermented wine, 338

INS

Gibson, Rev. Frederick, American Book of Common Prayer, 1-60; on modifications in the Prayer Book, 200
 Gleig, Bishop George, Life of, 415-422
 Government and tolerance, 143-144; and conscience, 144-150
 Gregory the Great, S., the Pope's supremacy, 236
 Gregory Nazianzen, S., the Pope's supremacy, 234-235
 Guettée, Abbé, case of Meletius, 301

HALL, Dr., on modifications in the Prayer Book, 181, 185, 189
 Hallam, on toleration, 125-126
 Hamilton, on infinite space and time, 115
 Harris, Prof., on infinite space, 115
 Hefele, Bishop, ordination of Bishops, 241
 Hegelianism, 457-459
 Henry VIII. and the Church, 502-510
 Heredity, 412-413
 Hergenrother, Cardinal, doctrine of the one Episcopate, 230
 Hilary, on the future state, 579-580
 Hoffman, Judge, on Church law, 196-197, 432, 433
 Holyoake, Austin, on atheism, 122
 Homes, Rev. Henry, on unfermented wines, 343-344
 Hooker, on natural law in the spiritual world, 393
 Hopkins, Rev. John Henry, Monsignor Capel again, 202-260
 Hoseius, jurisdiction of Bishops, 247-248
 Human immortality not innate but conditional, 477-497

IMMORTALITY not innate but conditional, 477-497
 Infallibility, Papal, 209-211, 213-216
 Inspiration of the Bible, 515-539
 Institution, standard edition of office of, 12

INT

Intolerance, *see* Toleration

Italian Catholic Church, present position of, 97-112

JEVONS, W. Stanley, on the principles of science, 141
Jewell, Frederick S., Human immortality not innate but conditional, 477-497

Jewett, Edward H., Communion wine, 317-345

Johnson, Rev. John, Outlook of toleration, 124-175

Jolly, Bishop Alexander, Life of, 415-422

Jones, Sir William, opens to Europe the literatures of the East, 62

Josephus, on the use of wine, 336-337

Judaism, its connection with Christianity, 73-74

Judgment Day, 494-495

Julius, Pope, jurisdiction of Bishops, 247

KEDNEY, Dr. J. Steinfert, on the Trinity, 472

Knowledge defined, 461-465

Kyrie, its omission from the American Prayer Book, 8-11

LABARRE, Rev. B., jr., use of wine among the Nestorians, 328

Langdon, Wm. Chauncey, Restoration of Catholic unity, 372-389

Law, Wm., his letters to Bishop Hoadley on toleration, 130

Law, *see* Church, Civil, Criminal, Natural

Lay, Bishop, on the Maryland act of toleration, 129

Lecky, on toleration, 126, 134, 168; on Church infallibility 169

Lees, Dr. F. R., on Bible wines, 319-340

Leo, S., the Pope's supremacy, 237-238

Lewes, G. H., on Atheism, 122

Lieber, Dr., on the intolerance of fashion, 142 ;

NAS

Life, origin of, *see* Biology

Littlejohn, Bishop, on non-sectarian education, 387

Lord's Prayer, its omission after the Creed, 8-11

Luscombe's (Dr.) consecration, question of, 421

MACAULAY, Lord, on toleration, 126

McCrary, Edward, Another view of natural law in the spiritual world, 390-414

Mackintosh, Sir James, on the freedom of the press, 148; object of conformity to law, 162

McKnight, Geo. H., Inspiration of the Bible, 531-539

Mahommedanism, Carlyle on, 64-65

Manning, Abp., on private judgment, 165-166

Marca, Archbishop de, jurisdiction of Bishops, 246

March, Francis A., Stormonth's English dictionary, 540-548

Maryland, Act of toleration, 129

Medical intolerance, 168-169

Meletius, S., his controversy with the Pope, 219-220, 301

Method of comparative religion, 61-77

Mill, John Stuart, liberty the vital question of the future, 124; on toleration, 135; object of Church discipline, 162

Mission, use of the term, 202-206

Monasticism, 498-514

More, Sir Thomas, on toleration, 126-127; law-breakers, 164

Morris, Geo. S., his "Philosophy and Christianity," 456-476

Mulford's (Dr.) view of revelation, 469

Müller, Max, his "Sacred books of the East," 63; on tolerance, 136, 142

NASH, Stephen P., his argument on proposed modifications of the Prayer Book, 176-201

NAT

National Church and the diocese, 423-455

Natural law in the spiritual world, 390-414

Neale, Dr., on Bishop Gleig, 421-422

Nevin, Rev. Robert J., Present position of the Italian Catholic Church, 97-112

Newman, John Henry, on conscience, 357

ORDINATION Office, standard edition of, 12

Organic evolution of religion, 66-77

Outlook of toleration, 124-175

PACIAN, S., the Church founded on the Bishops, 229; the

Pope's supremacy, 294-296, 299

Palmer, William, on toleration, 132

Papal elections, simony in, 227-228; supremacy, 231-238, 291-305; *see also* Roman Catholic

Patterson, Christopher Stuart, Prayer Book in the Convention of 1886, 176-178

Persian literature opened to Europe by Du Perron, 62, 63

Philo, on the use of wine, 334-336

Philological Society, Dictionary of, 541-542

Philosophy of religion, 67; and Christianity, 454-476

Plea for religion, Herbert Spencer's, 113-123

Pliny, on the use of wine, 331, 338-339

Prayer Book, American, 1-60; on Church law, 80-81; in the Convention of 1886, 176-201

Presbyterian Church, restoration of unity in, 376

Present position of the Italian Catholic Church, 97-112

Proper Lessons, Second, 10-11

Proposed Book of Common Prayer, 3-5, 58

Protestant Episcopal Church, adoption of title, 3-8; sketch of, 310-311; proposed change in name,

SEC

313-316; *see also* National, Scottish

Protoplasm, *see* Biology

REASON, *see* Philosophy

Reconciliation of the Churches, 283-289

Reformation the cause of modern progress, 62; Monasticism and vows, 498-514

Relation of English to American Church law, 78-96

Religion, Method of comparative, 61-77; Spencer's plea for, 113-123; authority in, 346-358; *see also* Christianity

Renaissance, its effect upon religion, 62

Restoration of Catholic unity, 372-389

Resurrection, doctrine of, 486-489, 493-494, 550-555

Roman Catholic Church, its attack upon the Italian Catholic Church, 101-112; opposed to Catholic unity, 380-381, *see also* Capel, Papal

Rosetta stone, discovery of, 63

SAINTS' DAYS, their omission from the American Prayer Book, 9

Sanctity in the Roman Church, 268-271; in the English Church, 280-281

Sanderson, Bishop, on conscience, 146, 147

Samson, Dr. G. W., Bible wines, 319-344

Satterlee, Henry Y., James Emott: a memoir, 359-371

Savarese, Monsignore Giambattista, his reception into the American Church at Rome, 99-101

Science, tolerance repudiated by, 140-141

Scottish Episcopal Church, 415-422

Second Proper Lessons, 10-11

SEY

Seymour, Bishop George F., The Reformation, Monasticism, and Vows, 498-514

Sheffey, Hon. Hugh W., Prayer Book in the Convention of 1886, 179-201; independence of the diocese, 435, 437

Shelley, P. B., "Love's Philosophy," 465-466

Simony in Papal elections, 227-228

Smith, Carlos G., Baptism for the dead, 548-555

Smith, Dr. Eli, on Syrian wine, 340-342

Smith, Robertson, intolerance of, 167

South, Dr., government and conscience, 145

Spencer, Herbert, his article on "Religion: a Retrospect and Prospect," 65; his plea for religion, 113-123

Spirits in prison, 556-593

Spiritual life and natural law, 390-414

Standard editions of the American Prayer Book, 11-58

Stearns, E. J., The spirits in prison, 556-593

Stephen, Sir J. Fitzjames, on toleration, 135, 136, 157

Stephen, Leslie, on toleration in England, 158

Sterrett, Rev. J. Macbride, Method of comparative religion, 61-77; Philosophy and Christianity, 456-476

Stier's comment on "offending the little ones," 154

Stormonth's English dictionary, 540-548

TARGUMS, on the use of wine, 331-334

Taylor, Jeremy, on toleration, 127-128; on government and tolerance, 144; government and conscience, 144, 145, 146; object of Church discipline, 163

Thayer, Rev. W. M., Bible wines, 324-340

YOU

Theophilus, S., his excommunication, 220

Tillemont, the Pope's supremacy, 235

Title-page of Prayer Book, correct printing of, 53-54

Toleration, Outlook of, 124-175

Tractarian movement and James Emott, 363

Trinity, doctrine of, 471-474

UNITED States, *see* Protestant Episcopal

Unity in the Roman Church, 266-268; in the English Church, 278-280; *see also* Catholic

Universe, Spencer's hypotheses as to origin of, 114

VAN DYKE, Dr. C. V. A., on Syrian wine, 342

Vincent of Lerins, S., on Church error, 107

Virchow, Prof., science and tolerance, 140-141

Voltaire, attributes inferiority of Chinese to ignorance of Christianity, 62

Vows, 497-514

WALKER'S Lives of Bishops Jolly and Gleig, 415-422

Washburn, Dr., and James Emott, 367-368

Waterland, Dr., on toleration, 130-131; on fundamentals, 172-173

Webster's Dictionary, 541-545

Whately, Archbishop, on toleration, 131; on conscience, 145

Williams, Roger, on toleration, 128-129

Wilson, Rev. W. D., relation of English to American Church law, 78-96


Wine, Communion, 317-345

Wright, Rev. W., on Bible wines, 344-345

YOUNG Men's Christian Associations, Christian unity of, 373, 379, 380

REMINGTON

Standard Type-Writer.



Probably no other invention of modern times has done so much to **relieve overworked professional and literary men** from nervous strain, and **facilitate their work**, as the **Remington Type-Writer**. The drudgery of pen-writing is avoided, and writing is done at **three times pen speed**.

Latest improvements still further enhance the value of this **incomparable machine**.

Send for illustrated pamphlet.

WYCKOFF, SEAMANS & BENEDICT,

339 Broadway, New York.

The Great Family Magazine

THE PASTOR, THE TEACHER, THE PARENT.

PURE, WHOLESOME and ENTERTAINING.

EDITED BY T. DE WITT TALMAGE, D.D.



FRANK LESLIE'S SUNDAY MAGAZINE is the only publication of its kind in the country. Its position is both strong and unique. It offers to every member of every family a large variety of pure, wholesome and elevating reading, and free from any sectarian and proselytizing tendencies. Stories, Sketches, Poems, by the best writers, and Sermons and Lectures by its distinguished and eloquent Editor, make up in each issue a table of contents of unsurpassed richness and variety.

For the ensuing year the attractions of the SUNDAY MAGAZINE will be greater than ever. A highly interesting series of articles on the Leading Religious

Journals and Journalists of America will begin in the January issue, and will be continued regularly during the year. Among the publications and editors which will be depicted by pen, pencil, and photograph are: THE NEW YORK OBSERVER, Dr. Prime, editor; THE NEW YORK EVANGELIST, Rev. Dr. Field, editor; THE INTERIOR, Chicago, Dr. W. C. Gray, editor; THE CHRISTIAN STANDARD, Cincinnati, Rev. Dr. Errett, editor; THE LUTHERAN OBSERVER, Philadelphia, Rev. Dr. Conrad, editor; THE PILOT, Boston; and others, covering fully the important denominations of the country.

Other new and valuable features will be added, and nothing omitted necessary to keep the Magazine up to its previous high standard of merit and popularity.

NOW IS THE TIME TO SUBSCRIBE.

Price, post-paid, \$2.50 a Year. Specimen Copies 10 cents each.

Specimen copies of all the Frank Leslie Publications, post-paid
—three weeklies and four monthlies—30 cents. Address,

MRS. FRANK LESLIE, Publisher, 53-55-57 Park Place, N. Y.

**A
\$25
Lantern
FOR \$12.**

THE WORLD ELECTRO RADIANT MAGIC LANTERN.

The body of the Electro Radiant is a conical reflector which gathers each divergent ray of light and concentrates them all on the main reflector whence the whole mass of brilliant light is projected. The body of the Electro Radiant is a conical reflector which gathers each divergent ray of light and concentrates them all on the main reflector whence the whole mass of brilliant light is projected. The body of the Electro Radiant is a conical reflector which gathers each divergent ray of light and concentrates them all on the main reflector whence the whole mass of brilliant light is projected.

\$25 TO \$100 PER NIGHT MAY BE EARNED
by giving Parlor, Sunday School, Academy or Public Entertainments. For Public Entertainments the possessor of an Electro Radiant has something that will draw with the combined power of the Theatre, the Circus, the Grand Hotel, the Country Fair, the Temperance Crusade, and the Camp Meeting. A room that will hold 100 persons may be filled brightly and a good profit be cleared. You have only to tack the sheet to the wall, darken the room, place the Electro Radiant on stand, light lamp, and you are ready to begin the exhibition. The Electro Radiant projects on the screen a PICTURE 8 Feet in Diameter.

**PATENTED
Perfection
at the
LOWEST
PRICE**

**A rare chance to engage
in a profitable business.**

The Electro Radiant No. 2 is packed in neat box may be easily carried in the hand. — (shown in cut with 14 slides and strings complete, will be sent by express on receipt of \$12.00 or C.O.D. If \$3.00 is sent with order, purchaser paying the balance \$9.00 at express office. Full instructions and list of other views sent with each Lantern. Send money Order or Registered Letter. Send all orders to **World M'f'g Co. 122 Nassau Street, New York.**

This Lantern can be made very profitable at Church Fairs and Sunday School Entertainments, and a large amount of cash realized at a very small outlay. As an educator the ELECTRO RADIANT surpasses almost every other apparatus used in a school. The attention of the scholar is concentrated on just the ONE illustration before him, and the mind of the student is forcibly impressed. There is a fascination about illustrations by means of the Lantern which dispels any lack of interest in the subject in hand, which it might otherwise be dry and hard to attract the student's attention toward. The value of the Magic Lantern for educational purposes is acknowledged by many teachers who have tried it, and no Colleges, Lecture Room, or School should be without one.

As a means of impressing the minds of the young, it stands unexcelled. We particularly recommend this Lantern to all societies who have occasion to raise money for Charitable and other purposes.

Completion of the Revised Bible.

Will be published May 21st the **HOLY BIBLE**, as Revised by the Committee of American and English Divines.

THE FOLLOWING ARE THE SIZES AND STYLES OF BINDING:

PEARL, 16mo.

Nos. 40.	Cloth, boards, red edges, postage 7c. additional.....	\$15 00
45.	French Morocco, limp, gilt edges.....	1 50
46.	Venetian Morocco, limp, gilt edges, 6 maps.....	1 75
47.	Persian Morocco, limp, red under gold edges, 6 maps.....	2 25
50.	Turkey Morocco, limp, gilt edges, 12 maps.....	3 00
51.	Turkey Morocco, circuit, gilt edges, 12 maps.....	4 00

MINION, DEMY 8vo.

60.	Cloth, boards, red edges, postage 16c. additional.....	\$2 00
66.	Venetian Morocco, limp, gilt edges, 6 maps.....	2 50
67.	Persian Morocco, limp, red under gold edges, 6 maps.....	4 50
70.	Turkey Morocco, limp, gilt edges, 12 maps.....	6 50
71.	Turkey Morocco, circuit, gilt edges, 12 maps.....	8 00

SMALL PICA, IMPERIAL 8vo.

80.	Cloth, beveled boards, red edges, postage 46c. additional.....	\$6 50
87.	Persian Morocco, beveled, red under gold edges.....	11 00
90.	Turkey Morocco, boards, gilt edges.....	14 00

PICA, DEMY 8vo, in 5 Volumes.

260.	Cloth, beveled boards, red edges, postage 92c. additional.....	\$11 50
267.	Persian Morocco, beveled, red under gold edges.....	25 00
270.	Turkey Morocco, boards, gilt edges.....	35 00

PICA, ROYAL 8vo (Wide Margin), in 5 Volumes.

280.	Cloth, beveled boards, red edges, postage \$1.84 additional.....	\$20 00
287.	Persian Morocco, beveled, red under gold edges.....	37 50
290.	Turkey Morocco, boards, gilt edges.....	52 50

THE REVISED OLD TESTAMENT ONLY, IN 4 VOLS.

PICA, DEMY 8vo.

Nos. 160.	Cloth, beveled boards, red edges, postage 73c. additional.....	\$10 00
167.	Persian Morocco, beveled, red under gold edges.....	20 00
170.	Turkey Morocco, boards, gilt edges.....	25 00

PICA, ROYAL 8vo (Wide Margin).

180.	Cloth, beveled boards, red edges, postage \$1.05 additional.....	\$16 00
187.	Persian Morocco, beveled, red under gold edges.....	30 00
190.	Turkey Morocco, boards, gilt edges.....	42 00

THE PARALLEL BIBLE, *being the Authorized Version arranged in Parallel Columns with the Revised Version, in One Volume.*

MINION, CROWN 4to.

Nos. 140.	Cloth, beveled boards, red edges, postage 47c. additional.....	\$8 00
147.	Persian Morocco, beveled, red under gold edges.....	14 00
150.	Turkey Morocco, boards, gilt edges.....	16 00

It is recommended that intending purchasers should order of their bookseller, or the publishers, at the earliest possible date, so that a prompt delivery may be guaranteed. All orders booked as received and will be filled in rotation. Specimen pages furnished on application.

No extra charge for postage on Morocco binding.

“ OXFORD ” BIBLE WAREHOUSE,
THOS. NELSON & SONS, 42 Bleeker St., New York.

FASHIONABLE WRITING PAPERS.



WHITE CREAM AZURE, ALBURN SAUTERNE AND
HYSON wove, highly finished

LINEN, ANTIQUE cream laid, in two thicknesses, mill
finish.

The highly finished papers are all thick, and comprise
some new and delicate tints.

The linen has the appearance of the ancient hand-made
paper, set up with Hays' new format to suit the fashion-
able shapes with steel plate labels, one quire at 50 cents,
2 quires \$1, four quires, \$1 50. Samples by mail.

"NONOTUCK" PERFORATED SERMON PAPERS

SET UP IN LEAD TYPE WITH 20 MANILLA COVERS.

PER QUARE				PER REAM			
Sermon Note, Size, 5 1/2 x 10			\$1 50	Sermon Letter, Size, 8 x 10			\$2 50
Half, " 7 x 9 1/2			2 00	Octavo " 6 x 9 1/2			1 00

SAMPLES SENT BY MAIL.

FOR SALE BY ALL DEALERS IN FINE STATIONERY.

Manufactured by Morgan Envelope Co., Springfield, Mass.

Incorporated 1870

Capital \$1,000,000

INSURANCE CO. OF NORTH AMERICA,

Company's Building, 232 Walnut St., Philadelphia.

One Hundred and Eighty-second Semi-Annual Statement of the
Assets of the Company.

January 1, 1895

Real Estate in City of Philadelphia	\$1,725,720 67
Real Estate in Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New York City	312,800 33
United States Loans and Bonds of the Government of Pennsylvania and New Jersey	664,200 00
Bonds of the City of Philadelphia and City Loans	524,200 00
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Delaware, Delaware Valley, and other Companies, Bonds and Stocks	3,000,000 00
Cash on Bank and by Cash and Cash	600,400 61
Loans with Accruals	302,400 00
Notes Payable to Insured and Marine Premiums	313,000 00
Net Cash from Premiums and other Income	244,300 00
Accrued Interest on all other Property	112,700 00
Total Assets	\$9,087,215 40

LIABILITIES

Capital Stock	\$1,000,000 00
Reserve for Re-insurance	2,510,000 00
Reserve for Unadjusted Losses and other Liabilities	112,700 00
Surplus over all Liabilities	1,125,000 00
	\$9,087,215 40

CHAS. PLATT, JR., T. CHARLTON HENRY, JR., WILLIAM PLATT, JR., JR., JR.,
GREENVILLE & FRYER, JR., FURNISH & ELIOTSON, JR., JR.

[illegible]

THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS IN

THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20250

READY AND DESIROUS, OR, THE RIGHT

PARALOG OF THOSE TO BE CLIMBED BY 644, 1 CA
116 7 0 50

REASSURING HINTS. By Dr. HENRY FORD.

[illegible]

OLD TESTAMENT CHARACTERS. BY CUN

NAME: _____

PLAIN FOOTPRINTS, OR DIVERS ORDERS.

U.S. AIR FORCE - 1950 - HEMAD - T. BLUM - 1950 - 1950

NOTES, ECCLESIOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL

IN THE HOLY OFFICE OF THE CHURCH. Now and Forever. Amen.

PRIMITIVE CONSECRATION OF THE E

FILE A CHEATERS WITH AN EXAMPLE1 APPEAL FOR ITS
FOR THE LAMBERTS, PLEASE DO NOT WRITE ME





1

2

